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ABSTRACT 
This research challenges the hypothesis that Biko was anti-liberal and anti-white. Biko's clearly 
defined condemnation of traditional South African white liberals such as Alan Paton is 
hypothesised as a strategic move in the liberation struggle designed to neutralise the "gradualism" 
of traditional white liberalism which believe that racism could be ultimately superseded by 
continually improving education for blacks. Biko neutralised apartheid racism and traditional 
white liberalism by affirming all aspects of blackness as positive values in themselves, and by 
locating racism as a white construct with deep roots in European colonialism and pseudo-
Darwinian beliefs in white superiority. The research shows that Biko was neither anti-liberal nor 
anti-white. His own attitudes to the universal rights, dignity, freedom and self-determination of all 
human beings situate him continuously with all major human rights theorists and activists since the 
Enlightenment. His unique Africanist contribution was to define racist oppression in South Africa 
as a product of the historical conditioning of blacks to accept their own alleged inferiority. Biko's 
genius resided in his ability to synthesize his reading of Marxist, Africanist, European and African 
American into a truly original charter for racial emancipation. 
Biko' s methodology encouraged blacks to reclaim their rights and pride as a prelude to total 
emancipation. The following transactions are described in detail: Biko's role in the founding of 
SASO and Black Consciousness; the paradoxical relations between white liberal theologians, 
Black Consciousness and Black Theology; the influence on BC of USA Black Power and Black 
Theology; the role of Black Theologians in South African churches, SACC and WCC; synergic 
complexities ofNUSAS-SASO relations; relations between BC, ANC and PAC; the early 
involvement of women in BCM; feminist issues in the liberation struggle; Biko's death in 
detention; world-wide and South African liberal involvement in the inquest and anti-apartheid 
organisations. 
Keywords: Biko, Paton, Mandela, ANC, PAC, National Party, communism, liberalism, Marxism, 
Black Consciousness, South Africa, racism, colonialism, apartheid, negritude, Africanism, Black 
Power, NUSAS, SASO, Black Theology, SACC, WCC, women, liberation theology, feminism, 
feminist history, liberation struggle, oppression, psychological liberation 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the contribution made by white liberal institutions and 
particular individuals in liberal circles to the formation and maintenance of the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM)1, which was established in the late 1960s. Such an analysis may 
shed a new light on the real nature of the transactions between BC and white liberals at the time 
and may provide grounds for a more nuanced understanding of why it was that BC (with some 
notable exceptions) was apparently so hostile at the time of its inception and its greatest influence 
(i.e. in the late sixties and the early seventies) towards traditional white liberals and liberal 
institutions. It is worth noting at the outset that previous researchers, whether sympathizers or 
opponents ofBC, invariably draw attention to this phenomenon more than to any other aspect of 
their research. Mokgethi Motlhabi and Thomas Ranuga represent those who were supportive of 
BC. 2 Gail Gerhart also focuses on BC's hostile policy towards white liberals. 3 Among the 
opponents of BC have been white liberals such as Alan Paton, who was, as is well known, 
astonished by the ingratitude shown to him and the hostile criticism heaped upon him by the very 
1 Hereinafter in the text, the Black Consciousness Movement will be referred to as "The 
Black Consciousness Movement" or "Black Consciousness" or "the BCM" or "BCM" (i.e. 
without the definite article) or "BC". This reflects all the various ways in which it is referred to 
in the literature and various sources. 
2 Mokgethi Motlhabi, Black Resistance to Apartheid: A Social-Ethical Analysis (Skotaville, 
Johannesburg, 1984), pp.21-30 and 106-139; Thomas Kono Ranuga, "Marxism and Black 
Nationalism in South Africa (Azania): A Comparative and Critical Analysis ofthe Ideological 
Conflict and Consensus Between Marxism and Nationalism in the ANC, the PAC and the 
BCM, 1920-1980", Ph.D. thesis, 1982, Brandeis University, pp.221-294. 
3 Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1978), pp.221-265. 
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same black people whom he had hoped to help and benefit. 4 
Hostility to white liberalism (whether direct or implicit) was an integral part ofBC policy right 
from it~ inception. 5 The message which BC sent to white liberals was that Africans were ready 
to take complete control of those political activities which affected their lot and their future. 6 One 
of the leading personalities in BC and a founding member of the movement, Drake Koka, became 
an embodiment of this new attitude. His criticism of white liberalism was all the more potent and 
startling to the old guard of the white liberal establishment since he himself had been a member 
of the multiracial Liberal Party, which was founded in 1953 and disbanded in 1968 by the common 
consent of its members. Koka accused the Liberal Party ofhaving failed their black supporters in 
the party since they had been unable to elect a single black person to parliament. 7 Koka based his 
criticism on the fact that there were more black members than white members in the Liberal 
Party8 
It is this kind ofblack criticism of white liberals and liberal institutions which is often adduced as 
evidence of a basic hostility and variance of purpose between BC and white liberals. By collating 
such statements and isolating them from their context and the matrix of events and constraints out 
4 Alan Paton Centre, University ofNatal, Pietermaritzburg. Paton to Neville Curtis, 18 
January 1971, pc 1/9-23. 
5 Unisa Archive, Centre for African Studies, "Composite Report of the Interim-Executive to 
the General Students Council, St. Peter' Conference Centre, Hammanskraal, 14-22 July 1973", 
pp.27-40. 
6 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Johannesburg. Dr. A.M. Ramphele, "The History of the 
Black Man's Struggle for Liberation in South Africa and the Role of Black Consciousness", 
pp.1-13. 
7 Randolph Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid: A History ofthe Liberal Party of South 
Africa, 1953-68 (London, Macmillan, 1997), p.209. 
8 Joshua N. Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid (UWC, 
Bellville, Mayibuye Books, 1994), p.60. 
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of which they arose, it may seem possible to "prove" that BC and white liberals were implacably 
opposed to each other in strategy, vision and action. Although previous researchers (whose 
contributions will be noted later) have generated a certain amount of evidence for just such a 
thesis, this research will propose a more complex thesis, the main contention of which will be that, 
in many ways, white liberals and their institutions became indispensable to the welfare and 
maintenance ofBC, especially during the difficult years when the key figures in the organisation 
began to feel the full brunt of the apartheid state's well-organised apparatus of control and 
repression. 
It must also be stated at the outset that, although my thesis postulates the existence of a positive 
symbiotic relationship of mutual benefit and dependency between white liberals and liberal 
institutions and the BC, such a relationship was never obvious, overt, public, conspicuous or 
explicit. In fact it often seemed to be the case (and indeed often was the case) that there existed 
some degree ofhostility and antagonism between white liberals and the BC. But just as there were 
many different personalities among the proponents ofBC, so there were many different kinds of 
white liberal and (predominantly) white liberal institutions, all with different agendas, purposes 
and personal histories. The only common factor on both sides (apart from their shared opposition 
to the 1 acist and white supremacist policies of the apartheid state), was the strained and abnormal 
circumstances under which everybody lived and worked in the period under consideration. The 
world of resistance politics was not a place in which scholarly discourse flourished or in which 
fine distinctions or clarifications could be postulated and examined at leisure. In the abnormal 
world where surveillance, deportation, banishment, detention, torture and death were ever -present 
realities, a certain lack of fine gradations of meaning and expression often prevailed in political 
discourse. It is my contention that many such statements (but by no means all) veiled an often 
4 
complex symbiotic reality which was frequently concealed from public view under many rhetorical 
flourishes of the time. 
To put it bluntly, BC was frequently dependent on material support from white liberals for the 
survival of the organisation while the same liberals in turn benefited from associating with a body 
which had gained the confidence of the black community and which was directly challenging the 
authority of the apartheid government. The liberals who supported the cause ofBC gained a great 
deal of transferred prestige and credibility from supporting BC. As for the anti-white-liberal 
rhetoric of BC, it was without doubt absolutely necessary at that stage of the organisation's 
existence for BC firmly and unambiguously to divorce itself from the somewhat leisurely, 
European-orientated and often condescending old-style liberalism represented by figures such as 
Alan Paton. But even as one makes such a statement, it is necessary to qualify it by drawing 
attention to the fact that there were a number ofheroic white liberals (such as Trevor Huddleston 
and Helen Joseph)9 who never, in any way, represented this style of white liberalism. It is worth 
noting that white liberalism in South Africa (and the whole colonialised world) had for centuries 
been tainted with a kind of unself-conscious condescension towards the indigenous races that 
usually dulled the edge of any radical critique of colonial oppression and institutionalised racial 
supremacy. 
Paradoxically, it is not one's enemies who can do one the greatest harm. The experience ofblack 
people in Africa has for centuries been that it is not the brutal racists who can do the greatest 
9 Robin Denniston, Trevor Huddleston: A Life (London, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1 0-16; Helen 
Joseph, Side by Side: The Autobiography ofHelen Joseph (Johannesburg, Ad. Donker. 1993), 
pp. 1-20, 59-103, 122-130. 
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harm, for they are the obvious enemy. More undermining and disempowering can be the well-
meaning, essentially kindly but often confused and fumbling condescension of those who really 
care (perhaps even passionately) about one's welfare. Anyone who doubts the damage that such 
well-disposed individuals can do, and have done, to the self-respect and self-esteem of the 
colonialised person, should examine, say, the diaries and letters of some of the missionaries who 
worked at the Lovedale Institution (Alice) towards the end of the last century. Such people were 
good people, people of the noblest character and moral fibre, by any standards at any time or 
place, but they were also so inextricably mired in the unquestioned assumptions oftheir own racial 
and imperialist experience that they simply could not see that their condescension and their 
unspoken (perhaps unspeakable) assumptions about the inferiority of indigenous people were 
fundamentally destructive of African culture, welfare and sanity, and, in addition, deeply and 
inexpressibly hurtful and repellent to the Africans for whom they had sacrificed their whole lives. 
The history of the colonial exploitation of Africa is so complex and so qualified by layer upon 
layer of paradoxical moral and semantic distortion, that stating an obvious truth can often be 
deeply hurtful and disturbing to those who believe that their intentions are good. Although white 
liberal (and Christian) intentions in Africa have often been demonstrably good, Blake's 
observation about the road to hell has also never been more relevant. 
The BC found itself in the awkward situation of simply not having the time to wait for white 
liberals (of a certain kind) to become sufficiently conscientised to be of any direct use to the 
struggle for black liberation. As the tides of history swept up and over the continent of Africa, 
especially after the Second World War, it was necessary for certain white liberals to become 
marginalised and peripheralised in the liberation struggle. As the founders ofBC realised, it was 
6 
necessary for blacks to free themselves- without waiting for their allies (the white liberals) to take 
the lead. 
"Taking the lead" was precisely what white liberals (if one may speak so broadly of such a varied 
class of people) had been doing for centuries. And, in many ways, they had been effective (such 
as in the abolition of slavery). But such enterprises were always essentially white and always, to 
some extent, part of the agenda of imperial expansion and colonialism. The white experience of 
how indigenous people felt and thought and lived and dreamed was always (and could never be 
other than) second-hand, and at many removes from subjective African experience. However 
kindly and well disposed to indigenous people a white person may have been (and most were not), 
the African experience was always mediated to white consciousness through the filters of 
centuries of deeply embedded assumptions about the patent superiority ofW estern, white religion 
and civilisation and the obvious inferiority of all things pertaining to the "barbaric native" cultures 
of the colonial empire, so recently (in the nineteenth century) the supposed beneficiaries of 
European colonisation. 
What may ha.ve distorted (from an African point ofview) the perceptions of some "old school" 
liberals may have been the last lingering vestiges of the belief that blacks needed white liberals to 
take the lead, to exercise control, to define the agenda, and to dictate the pace of change. Again, 
such generalisations would never have been so blatantly articulated, and, where they were 
applicable, they were applicable only in degrees and in widely differing circumstances. This 
research will show that BC's "anti-white" campaign was (partly) a necessary didactic device 
designed rapidly to conscientise the great inarticulate masses of South Africa to their true 
condition, and that it was also part of a deliberate strategy to prevent white liberals from meddling 
7 
too closely in BC affairs during a crucial stage in the organisation's history. The BC protagonists 
of anti-white rhetoric consciously kept their liberal allies at arm's length so that they could design 
their own programme of action without liberal intervention. 10 
Like all fictions, however, the invention often concealed a greater or lesser degree offact, and the 
research which follows is designed to show just how exceedingly complex and fluctuating was the 
symbiosis between ostensible enemies and actual allies. Obviously, it was through trial and error 
that BC realised the shortcomings and limitations of their policy of racial exclusiveness. While, 
by clever use of theory and rhetoric, the proponents of BC might succeed in attracting and 
convincing large numbers of black followers and supporters, the ultimate success of the whole 
enterprise depended on scarce resources of all kinds which (at the time) only well-disposed white 
liberals could supply. I therefore contend that, although it was never official BC policy, the 
leaders of the alliance consciously sought and cultivated active cooperation with progressive 
liberal institutions. In the last analysis, BC needed liberal institutions and individual liberal 
expertise to achieve it aims. The University Christian Movement (UCM), the South African 
Institute ofRace Relations (SAIRR), the National Union ofSouth African Students (NUSAS) and 
the Black Sash are examples of liberal institutions on which BC had to rely in times of need. In 
addition, various liberal publications carried articles and analyses which sympathised with or 
publicised BC aims and policies at a time when there were no black-controlled publications in 
South Africa. 
BC "rhetoric" also served to alert susceptible white liberals to the fact that there was a new kind 
10 Barney Pityana, "Priorities in Community Development - An Appeal to the Blackman's 
Compassion", in SASO Newsletter, September 1971, p.l3. 
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of black activism abroad in the land. Part of my thesis seeks to demonstrate that BC's criticism 
of liberals and their institutions was deliberately designed to educate whites to change their old-
fashioned (colonial) approach to black political issues. As the material in chapter three will show, 
this policy worked. Because BC was unambiguous in its repudiation of the old-style colonialist 
and patriarchal liberalism, a whole new younger generation within NUSAS became amenable to 
radical conscientisation and a fundamental change in their outlook. 11 
Although UCM was another liberal organisation which supported BC, it was different from 
NUSAS in that it was only established in the late sixties, at almost the same time that BC was 
founded. Both organisations were therefore direct responses to the radical political currents and 
revolutionary perceptions of the sixties, at a time when the atmosphere of state repression in 
South Africa was becoming ever more intensified by apartheid laws and practice. Because UCM 
was a radical political (and Christian) organisation from the very beginning, the relationship 
between BC and UCM was both friendly and cooperative. One may attribute UCM's political 
status to the influence of two of its white liberal Christian leaders, Basil Moore and Colin Collins, 
about whom more information will be given later in this text. In any event, UCM embodied a 
political edge which attracted a large number of African followers, who found in UCM a clear and 
rational voice which echoed their deepest aspirations. 12 
This thesis will attempt to show that both NUSAS and UCM played a substantial role in 
supporting and cooperating with BC. While NUSAS was opposed at the beginning to the 
11 Oppenheimer Centre for African Studies, Cape Town University. President ofNUSAS 
Charles Nupen's letter to Black Campus, 17th June 1974, pp.1-2. 
12 George M. Fredrickson, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in 
the United States and South Africa (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995), p.303. 
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formation of a new, exclusively black organisation (BC), this opposition eventually gave way to 
understanding and approval. 13 A similar change of attitude never developed within UCM. This 
may be attributable to the fact that some executive members ofUCM, Chris Mokoditoa, Justice 
Moloto and Sabelo Ntwasa, for example, were also in close contact with the BC leadership.14 
In general, the term liberal might refer to a person or a group of people who are disposed 
towards democratic and human rights changes of a progressive political nature as opposed to 
those (conservatives) who are unwilling to make progressive political changes and who are in 
general dedicated to preserving and maintaining the (usually reactionary) status quo. Because of 
the racially polarised nature of South African society, however, these two interpretations might 
take on a slightly different coloration. Randolph Vigne suggests that liberals are those who "plead 
for fuller knowledge, or more humane consideration, of non-European needs and interests" _IS 
The black point of view, however, particularly the BC point of view, is effectively rather different. 
For the BC adherent, liberal referred to any white person in South Africa who was seen to be 
opposing the apartheid system of government, whether or not such a person was radical, 
moderate or even conservative. 16 By this definition, even supporters of the old United Party were 
de facto liberal. Although the United Party was not very different from the Nationalist Party in 
their attitude to race relations in the country, and although their opposition to the government was 
essentially spineless (their long-time leader, Sir de Villiers-Graaf), the mere fact of their 
13 Fatima Meer, "NUSAS in the seventies", in South African Outlook, September 1970, 
p.135. 
14 Ellen Kuzwayo, Call Me Woman (Johannesburg, Ravan Writers Series, 1996), pp.185-
186. 
15 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, p.ix. 
16 
"Introduction to Formation School", in SASO Newsletter, April1970, pp.l-4. 
10 
opposition to total black disenfranchisement allowed the BC to classify them (for the purposes 
of practical politics) as "liberal". While both the UP and the NP supported apartheid policies and 
denounced the international community for criticising the racist apartheid regime, the UP 
supported the franchise for other (than white) South African population groups in terms of a 
property qualification. In the event, such good political intentions were never tested in practice, 17 
and both the UP and Sir de Villiers-Graaff eventually disappeared into the oblivion they deserved. 
The other "liberal" political party, as indicated early in the chapter, was the Liberal Party itself, 
which was prima facie more genuinely liberal than the UP. The Liberal Party recruited a fair 
number of black members, many of whom were actively involved in promoting the liberal cause. 
What bothered many blacks, however, was, as mentioned earlier, the Liberal Party's failure to get 
a single black person into parliament since its foundation in 1953. Many black people began to 
suspect that blacks were being included in the party as tokens rather than equal participants, and 
the suspicion only became greater as time went on. It was partly this kind of frustration at the 
failure of white Liberal Party members to implement their policies on a national level that caused 
many former black members of the party to abandon the Liberal Party and play a leading role in 
the establishment of the Black Consciousness Movement. There is also little doubt that an intimate 
experience of the high-minded ineptitude of white members of the party made them permanently 
aware that blacks would have to sponsor their own revolution. 
In the early days of the South African Student Organisation (SASO), black political veterans such 
as William Nkomo, although reluctant to support SASO because of its racial exclusivity, attended 
17 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1993), pp.40-41. 
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the organisation's meetings. 18 Koka and Manasseh Moerane featured prominently in the formation 
of the Black People's Convention, 19 and Koka was a member of the ad hoc committee. Moerane 
eventually lost interest in the activities ofBPC after the general opinion of the founders was that 
it should be a political party instead of a civic organisation. Although the Progressive Federal 
Party (PFP) strenuously denounced the apartheid regime inside parliament for its racist policies, 
it was perceived by many blacks (especially those in BC) as condoning and perpetuating the 
apartheid system of government on the grounds that, by accepting the role of being an official 
opposition party in a parliament that had been elected only by white people, it was encouraging 
a perception overseas that South Africa was to some extent a democracy. Many blacks felt that 
the PFP was implicitly excluding blacks from the parliamentary process since, by law, no black 
South African was allowed to be a member of parliament. 
The term liberal was extended in BC thinking to include liberal extra-parliamentary organisations, 
which happened also to attract mainly liberal English-speaking South Africans. Although these 
organisations were defined as playing an interim caretaker role until black majority rule could be 
achieved, they were criticised for taking upon themselves the role ofbeing spokespersons for the 
18 Mabel Maimela, Interview with Radwezi H. Nengwekhulu, University of Pretoria, 26 May 
1996. 
19 The Black Peoples' Convention was established in 1972 to accommodate adults who 
wished to become political activists, but who were not able to join SASO because it was a 
student organisation. Recruits for the BPC were drawn from members of the Liberal Party, the 
banned ANC and PC, non-political associations such as the International African Ministers' 
Association for the Education and Advancement of African People (Idamasa), the Association 
for the Educational and Cultural Advancement of African People (Asseca), of which Manasseh 
Moerane was the chair, the African Independent Churches Association (AICA), the Young 
Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and St Peter's Old Boys' Association. The latter 
association consisted of politically radical Catholic priests who received their theological 
training at St Peter's Seminary in Hammanskraal near Pretoria. (Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. 
Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South 
Africa, 1882-1996 (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 1997), vol 5, p.l31.) 
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black majority instead of preparing the oppressed to speak for themselves against the apartheid 
system. There were also notably a few heroic white Afrikaans South Africans who had early on 
decided that the whole apartheid system was a crime against humanity and God and who were 
prepared to pay the price for taking a principled stand against apartheid and expressing their 
opposition in public. One such Afrikaner was Beyers Naude, who became head of the Christian 
Institute in 1963. In the BC' s interpretation, such Afrikaans-speaking South Africans were also 
classified as liberals. 
Although it is also true that there were black liberals (in the strictly technical sense) before BC, 
who operated in the period under consideration in this research (in the sense they were either bona 
fide members of the Liberal Party or else had strong connections with the Liberal Party), the 
scope of this research is limited only to the role played by white liberals in general. The scope of 
this research also excludes members of other radical white groups which were silenced during the 
late sixties and early seventies since most of them were members of the banned Communist Party 
of South Africa (CPSA) or the African National Congress (ANC). These limitations imply no 
value judgement. 
The term liberal in this thesis will therefore be defined and used in the sense that it was defined 
and interpreted by BC because this research revolves around the role of BC and the symbiotic 
relationship between members ofBC and white liberals in the period under consideration. The 
term liberal therefore will by necessity include a select number of all the above-mentioned groups 
or individuals who, at one stage or another, opposed the supremacist racial policies of the 
apartheid state - because that is how BC used the term. 
13 
BC also from the beginning used the term black to designate all members of South African 
society, namely the blacks, Coloureds and Indians, who, according to the South African legislation 
of the time, were labelled "non-white" and hence acutely discriminated against in terms of all 
human rights and all the normal privileges of citizenship. Because this is how BC defined black, 
the term black in this thesis will always be used inclusively, i.e. in the sense that it refers to 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians. The trend since the eighties has been to replace the word black 
with African. For this thesis, however, the term black will be used in the inclusive sense indicated 
above (although it is occasionally also used in the latter sense to denote African.). It should also .· 
be mentioned that the term "African" is used fairly extensively in later chapters, and that this usage 
indicates the shift towards a more defined use of the term "African" which is current in Africanist 
historiography. 20 
The terms Black Consciousness and Black Consciousness Movement (as indicated in footnote 1 
of this chapter) will be used as synonyms. It should be noted however that the former was used 
mainly in the early seventies during the period of the establishment of the organisation while the 
latter term was used in the late seventies and eighties- especially with reference to the movement 
in exile. Within South Africa itself, BC was organisationally replaced by the Azanian People's 
Organisation (AZAPO), which was formed after the banning of all BC-related organisations in 
1978. It should of course be emphasised that BC transcended all political parties because it was 
primarily an ideology that fertilised and nourished the thought and actions of the ANC, the PAC, 
AZAPO, and even Inkatha. 
20 Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South 
African Communist Party in Exile (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992); Francis 
Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1998). 
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Reasons for the researcher's interest in the subject 
My interest in this field of study in South African History was influenced by my relationships with 
members of the Black Consciousness Movement who, in one way or another, were active in 
promoting the interests ofBC. Informal discussions with these people motivated me to look more 
closely into the role played by those white liberals who were the subject of such acute criticism 
by BC analysts. Among those who stimulated my interest in this subject were Simon Maimela, 
then a student at the Harvard Divinity School; Mokgethi Motlhabi ofBoston University; Thomas 
Ranuga ofBrandeis University; Aggrey Mbere of the Harvard School ofEducation; Bongajalo 
Goba of the Chicago Theological Seminary, and Father Buti Tlhagale, who, at the time, was 
studying at the Gregorian University in Rome. This group was joined in the eighties by Takatso 
Mofokeng, a senior lecturer in the Department ofTheology at the University of South Africa, and 
David Mosoma, who also worked at the same university and department. In addition, Itumeleng 
Mosala, a senior lecturer in the Department ofReligious Studies at the University of Cape Town, 
played a substantial role in helping the researcher to look critically at the field. 
My first intention, as I approached the research, was to expose what I understood to be the 
hypocrisy and self-interestedness of white liberals and the part they played in attempting to 
ameliorate the plight of blacks under the apartheid government. The received wisdom in radical 
black circles at this time was that white liberals tended to retard the liberation process because, 
although they expended a great deal of effort in challenging and criticising apartheid policy, it was 
always without (so it seemed) in any way compromising their own safety, comfort and security. 
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This was the thesis that I intended to verify in my research. 
However, after I had exposed myself to the variety of reading material that my supervisor required 
me to read - material that I had not hitherto encountered - I began to realise that the realities of 
opposition politics as they developed at the time under consideration were far more complex than 
(until then) I had reason to believe, and that I needed to reconsider and rework my theoretical 
assumptions (which by then I realised could not account for the historical developments- except 
in a simplistic and essentially artificial manner). Although I cannot obviously disclaim personal 
bias in my point of view, I was led to reconsider the issues in a way that has resulted in what I 
now believe is a much more balanced and nuanced analysis of the relations between white liberals 
and the blacks who were supporters of BC. By the end of the research, my position is that, 
although the BC analysis was certainly valid in many ways and although it is even now undeniable 
that liberals (whether inadvertently or not) retarded the pace ofblack liberation, white liberals and 
their institutions also paradoxically contributed a great deal in terms of expertise and human and 
material resources and that this contribution kept the movement alive under the most difficult 
circumstances imaginable. 
The worst disability which had to be endured by blacks under apartheid was, in the opinion ofBC 
members, that they had to rely on other racial groups to act and speak on their behalf One may 
also apply this disability to the South Afiican literature on Black Consciousness. A fair number 
of articles, dissertations, theses and books about Black Consciousness were written either by 
white liberals or by Afiican Americans, the only exception being those contributions by Allan 
Boesak, Thomas Ranuga and Mokgethi Motlhabi- black South Afiicans who had studied abroad. 
In fact, the whole topic of Black Consciousness and Black Power was so hedged about with 
16 
taboos under the apartheid system that the subject was all but inaccessible to serious researchers. 
Until very recently in South Africa it was difficult (and often impossible) for researchers to gain 
access to archival information. It was often easier for foreigners to be granted access to records, 
and this may explain the paucity of indigenous research in South Africa. (Gail Gerhart, in 1978, 
was, for example, among the first researchers on the subject. )21 This research in fact represents 
only the second major attempt by a black South African at a South African university to trace in 
some detail the history of the vicissitudes of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa. 
What made this kind of research possible was the unbanning after February 1990 of Black 
Consciousness and other liberation movements by the then president of South Africa, F.W. de 
Klerk. The first thesis to appear was that ofEmest Messina from the University ofWestern Cape 
in November 1995. Messina analysed the impact of BC among the Coloureds in the Western 
Cape.22 
Another important contribution made by this research is an analysis of the role played by women 
in a male-dominated organisation such as BC. I will argue that women played such a crucial role 
in the organisation that BC could never have exerted the crucial influence that it did on the history 
of South Africa if the contribution had been absent. This influence, which will be explored in some 
detail in a later chapter, was vital to the successful dissemination ofBC ideology into all areas of 
the South African political scene. To give but one example at this point: Anne Hope, a 
distinguished Catholic layperson who was one of the founders of the Grail movement in the 
Catholic Church, met Steve Biko when they were both members ofSPROCAS (the Study Project 
21 Gail Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa, pp.257-311. 
22 Ernest Messina, "Swartbewustheid in die Wes-Kaap 1970-1984", Ph.D. thesis, University 
of the Western Cape, December 1995; Mabel Maimela, Interview with Messina at the 
University ofthe Western Cape, 13 Aprill991. 
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for Christianity in an Apartheid Society). Hope writes: 
In 1972 Steve Biko and Bokwe Mafi.ma approached me and asked me to teach 
a group of members of the South African Student's Organisation (SASO) to 
use the Freire method. In the last half of 1972, I worked with them in 
workshops to introduce them to the Freirean method and help them to adapt 
it to their local conditions. I loved working with SASO, as they were one of the 
most committed and deep-thinking groups I have ever worked with. It was also 
a tremendous conscientisation for me to work with them. They believed that 
the churches had betrayed black people, but that there was much truth in what 
Jesus had taught. In the mean time the South African government was very 
frightened of the discussion and implementation ofFreire's method.23 
Main sources for the research 
A number of sources helped me to formulate the terms of my thesis. My main concern at the time 
was to concentrate on the subject in such a way that I would be able to keep both the liberal and 
the Black Consciousness points of view in focus at all times- so as ultimately to be able to prove 
that a complex relationship had indeed existed between the two traditions. Gail M. Gerhart, in her 
book, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, deals fairly comprehensively 
23 Anne Hope's story is narrated by Annalet van Schalkwyk in "Sister, We Bleed and We 
Sing: Women's Stories, Christian Mission and Shalom in South Africa", D.Th. thesis, Unisa, 
1999, p.13. 
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with both points of view. She analyses the role of the liberals and their institutions as they tried 
to assist the blacks towards gaining political rights in a racist South Africa. Gerhart contends that 
although liberals tended to be accepted by many concerned parties as trustees of the black cause 
before World War II, this position changed dramatically towards the end of the forties. 24 Even 
with the establishment of the ANC Youth League, which promoted the radical programme and 
with the introduction of the ANC Programme of Action of 1949, there was a reluctance on the 
part of many liberals to relinquish the role of trustees of the Africans. 
Gerhart details the increasing distrust of liberals felt by Africans. She also describes the concrete 
support which various liberal institutions such as the Congress ofDemocrats, as part of the body 
involved in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and the Freedom Charter of 26 June 1955, gave to 
the cause of black liberation. She describes the role of the National Union of South African 
Students (NUSAS), especially in the 1960s, and on the formation in 1960 of the African 
Resistance Movement by white radicals whose purpose was directly to sabotage the apartheid 
state. 25 
Motlhabi's book, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid, was another book 
which covered more or less the same ground as did Gerhart, but from a different point of view. 
While Gerhart maintains a sympathetic attitude towards the liberals, it is obvious from Molthabi's 
comments on the material which he examines that he was one of those who was sceptical about 
the efficacy of the role ofliberals as agents ofliberation. With hindsight one can justify Motlhabi' s 
scepticism. He was an early BCM activist who played a crucial role in the struggle as the editor 
24 Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, pp.7-12. 
25 Ibid, pp.51-72. 
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of the very first book26 about Black Theology in South Africa - after its first editor, Sabelo 
Ntwasa, had been banned by the South African government. In Motlhabi's investigation and 
analysis of the three main black resistance movements in South Africa, namely the ANC, the Pan-
African Congress and the BCM, represented by SASO and BPC, liberals are more often than not 
portrayed as individuals who adopted a double standard while acting as agents of change in the 
political activities in South Africa. 27 
While organisations such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the UCM and the 
Christian Institute, as well as liberal denominations such as the Anglican, Methodist and Roman 
Catholic Churches in Southern Africa, were acknowledged and singled out by Motlhabi for the 
part th0y played in exposing the evils of apartheid in South African society as a whole, NUSAS 
received no such acknowledgment. 28 As a student organisation always in the forefront ofthe 
conflicts from the 1960s onwards, its shortcomings, rather than its contributions, were more easily 
identifiable than those of other liberal organisations. It is also highly probable that the 
unavailability of sources on NUSAS in Boston where he studied could be another reason for 
Motlhabi being as critical as he was ofNUSAS. It is likely that his theological background caused 
Motlhabi to be more sympathetic and kinder to these religious opponents of apartheid that they 
deserved. 
Another valuable source for my research was the collection entitled, Bounds ofPossibility: The 
Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness, which, as its title indicates, centred mostly 
26 Mokgethi Motlhabi (ed.), Essays ofBlack Theology in South Africa (Johannesburg, 
University Christian Movement, 1972). 
27 Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice ofBlack Resistance to Apartheid, pp. xviii-21. 
28 Ibid, pp.22-30, 72, 90, 138-139. 
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around Biko's contribution to the Black Consciousness Movement. A number of the contributors 
played active roles in the political activities of the 1970s and were hence Biko's contemporaries. 
While the first part deals with the role played by Biko, the second part analyses the legacy of 
BCM as a movement of political awakening which embraced the cause of the empowerment of 
women and Black Theology_29 One of the most important essays for the purposes of this research 
is that contributed by Geoff Budlender. Budlender was a member of NUSAS who had been 
actively involved in the organisation's politics and he elucidates what he perceived to be the role 
ofNUSAS and his personal misgivings about the organisation at the time.30 This book was the 
most valuable source for this research because it was written by former activists in BCM and in 
NUS AS. As such the contributors were able to provide their own versions of what had taken 
place during the period under discussion. 
Other recent sources, which were given careful consideration and which are important since they 
balance what might be the subjective bias of the South African contributors, were found in the 
writings of George M. Fredrickson, Thomas G. Karis, Gail M. Gerhart and Toussaint (whose first 
name is not recorded in any records). All these sources address the question of the connection that 
existed between BCM and white liberal organisations in the black liberation movement. 
Fredrickson's book, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United 
States and South Africa, traces the origins ofBCM in terms of what inspired the movement. The 
independence of a large number of former African colonies and the impact which the civil rights 
29 N. Barney Pityana et al, Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black 
Consciousness (Cape Town, David Philip, 1991 ), pp.1 00-153, 
30 Ibid, pp.228-237. 
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movement made in the United States, encouraged black South Africans to engage in political 
activity with a view to obtaining their own political rights and freedom. 31 His most important 
contribution was to explain in some detail why the BCM tended to be opposed to liberals. He 
asserts that liberals planned to eliminate racial discrimination and transform South Africa into a 
kind of Western democracy rather than into a socialist society of either a Marxist or an Africanist 
kind_ He argues in addition that an alliance with liberals and radicals disadvantaged Africans 
because whites in general tended to assume authority and behave paternalistically - thereby 
preventing blacks from rising above their conditioned feelings of inferiority. 32 
Fredrickson observed the extent to which religious beliefs and associations shaped BCM's 
ideology and its mode of operation. BCM embraced religious organisations by allowing the 
leaders from mainstream ecclesiastical organisations to play a leading role in the organisation. He 
documents the participation of individual white and black clerics such as Basil Moore, Beyers 
Naude, Aelred Stubbs, and Smangaliso Mkhatshwa Most of the black clergy thus involved 
became prominent advocates ofBCM and were widely represented in the leadership of the "adult" 
wing of the movement 33 
Karis and Gerhart's book, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics 
in South Africa. 1882-1990 (Volume Five), is a recently published work which, to some extent, 
supports Fredrickson's view of the role of liberals in the political development of South Africa. 
In this volume the authors make two main original assertions_ The first is that BCM was formed 
31 Fredrickson, pp.298-302. 
32 Ibid, pp.298-302_ 
33 Ibid, pp.302-303_ 
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by students who were far more radical than their older counterparts in the ANC and the PAC. 
Their first contact with white radicals was with those liberal students who were members of 
NUSAS. When the majority of these students reneged on their radicalism, black students lost 
interest in NUSAS and the revolutionary potential of white liberalism.34 This (they aver) is the 
reason why BCM went on to become so bitterly critical of liberals and liberal institutions. 
Their second assertion is that BCM was ideologically inclusive in that they defined the word 
"black" to include all the population groups (Coloureds, Indians and Africans) which were 
discriminated against by the South African government. BCM's critique of liberalism was, as 
C.R.D. Halisi has pointed out, merely a prelude to their central concern: to consolidate black 
solidarity among the oppressed in order to expose and neutralise the kind of ethnic-based 
resistance which the government was trying by all means to encourage. 35 This inclusivist use of 
the word "black" originated in the University of Natal's Non-European Section, in which the 
above-mentioned "black" groups (blacks, Coloureds and Indians) were all accommodated by the 
university in one residence- Taylor residence. Using the word "black" in this widely inclusivist 
way was conceived at Wentworth where group identification was less important. 36 In the early 
stages ofBCM, some Africans were reluctant to recognise Coloureds and Indians as "black11 , but 
this opposition soon subsided - mainly because the first leaders of BCM (such as Biko and 
Aubrey Mokwape) were part of the Wentworth group.37 
34 Karis and Gerhart, pp. 91-92. 
35 C.R.D. Halisi, "Racial protelarianisation and some contemporary dimensions ofBlack 
Consciousness thought" in R. Hunt Davis Jr (ed.), Apartheid Unravels (Gainesville, University 
of Florida Press, 1991 ), p, 79. 
36 Ibid, p. 98. 
37 Karis and Gerhart Collection (Johannesburg). Gail Gerhart, Interview with Steve Biko, 
Durban, 24 October 1972, pp. 14-16. 
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Toussaint's contribution to the debate lies in his analysis of the involvement of the liberals in the 
struggle for black liberation. His point of view supports Fredrickson's observation that liberals 
were concerned about eliminating racial discrimination and transforming South Africa into a 
Western-style democracy. In addition, Toussaint suggested that BCM opposed liberals because 
their point of view was selective. Liberals believed that educational reform was the first step in 
the elimination of racial discrimination. In practice this would have meant that educated Africans 
would be accommodated in a Western-style democracy while the uneducated would continue to 
experience discrimination. 38 
Two other sources which dealt with contemporary attitudes of whites in general and which were 
useful for this research were Joshua Lazerson's book, Against the Tide. and Randolph Vigne's 
Liberals against Apartheid. The former traces the involvement of mostly liberal institutions after 
World War II until the eve of the April 1994 democratic elections in South Africa, as well as the 
oppositional role played by the Springbok Legion, the Torch Commando, the Defiance Campaign, 
the Congress of Democrats and other institutions such as NUSAS and various mass media.39 
Vigne's book deals with the activities ofthe Liberal Party, the most genuinely liberal party which 
had ever existed until that point in the history of South African politics. The reasons why the 
Liberal Party did not support the Congress of the People (which eventually facilitated the 
agreement and signing of the Freedom Charter) are explained by Vigne. He also details the 
contributions of individual members and their interactions with black members in the party. His 
38 Toussaint, "Fallen among Liberals: An Ideology of Black Consciousness Examined", in 
African Communist. no 78, 1979, p.23. 
39 Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid, pp.53-80, 115-134, '1 
161-220, 246-253. 
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explanation of the role played by individual members in the activities of various African 
organisations such as the ANC and PAC is extremely valuable. 40 
It was these sources which helped me to conceptualise my central thesis, namely that liberals and 
their organisations played a crucial part in the development of political consciousness among 
Africans and that a complex and paradoxical interaction between liberals and Black Consciousness 
existed, especially during the late sixties and early seventies. My contention is that while most 
Africans who became outspoken against the apartheid system were the products of liberal 
institutions and their association with liberals, a need for the establishment of a radical black 
organisation such as the BCM became an absolute necessity in the 1970s so that blacks could 
articulate their political aspirations and also conscientise white liberals in general. 
While some researchers prefer to locate the founding paradigms of Black Consciousness in 
Europe and the United States, the founders ofBlack Consciousness deliberately focused on Africa 
rather than on European or American sources. Like the PAC, BC, for a number of varied reasons, 
looked more to the African continent than anywhere else for political inspiration. Firstly, a number 
of African countries which had been colonised by European countries had become independent. 
These countries became a source of encouragement for black South Africans who were still under 
the yoke of the racist apartheid government. Even more encouraging, some of the leaders of these 
countries had pledged their unconditional support for the liberation movements of Southern Africa 
as a whole. 41 
40 Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, pp.33-84,90-99, 138-151. 
41 See David Howarth, "Complexities of identity/difference: Black Consciousness ideology in 
South Africa", Journal ofPolitical Ideologies, vol2, no 1, 1997, pp.58-72. 
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Secondly, a number of African leaders were enthusiastic about the concept ofPan-Africanism (the 
idea that African states should amalgamate to form a strong confederation so as to prevent foreign 
control). The leading exponents of this idea included the president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, 
Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and Kenneth Kaunda, the president of Zambia. (Nyerere formulated 
his own African brand of socialism and became one of the major critics of apartheid. It was 
because of his outspokenness that he was so highly respected among BCM supporters. 42} BC 
theorists were understandably obsessed by the writings of these former leaders of the various 
liberation movements who had become leaders of independent African states. Another great 
theorist was the French physician, Frantz Fanon, who lived in a former French colony and who 
advocated socialism as the form of government capable of solving the economic problems facing 
Africa as a whole. 43 F anon was highly regarded by BCM members and indeed was a kind of cult 
figure among anti-establishment figures in the sixties and seventies (his works were all banned in 
South Africa). 44 It was logical that African literature was the first and primary focus ofBCM since 
it located the significance of African identity in Africa itself 45 
Thirdly, BCM activists were inspired by speeches from shortwave radio broadcasts from 
independent African states. These speeches helped BC members to realise that many Africans all 
over Africa were by then already in control of their own countries. Biko tells how he used to 
listen attentively to the revolutionary speeches broadcast from Africa, especially those ofHastings 
42 Gerhart. Interview with Biko, p.l3. 
43 See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Mask (New York, Grove Press, 1967) and The 
Wretched of the Earth (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1967). 
44 Ibid, pp.S-24. 
45 Godwin Mohlomi, "Black Search for Identity and Dignity", in The World 15 July 1976, 
p.2. 
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Kamuzu Banda, then head of state. (These points will be discussed more fully in chapter four.) 
This research will also examine the vital role played by black women in BCM (and the special 
relations of support and inspiration which existed between white and black American women 
during that time). There are important similarities between the roles played by American black 
women role in the civil rights movement in the United States of America and those played by 
black South African women in the struggle against apartheid. While both groups fought alongside 
their male counterparts against racism, neither women in Africa nor women in America were 
afforded the opportunity by their men to compete on an equal basis. This raises the vital question 
as to whether women, by working alongside their male counterparts, actually compromised their 
own gender liberation movement. 46 Kogila Moodley has observed that few women were on the 
BC executive in the early days ofthe movement. They had their own organisation (the Black 
Women's Federation), which they used to make a decisive contribution the the struggle.47 These 
issues will be explored in some detail in chapter five. 
In the United States a small number of black women actually joined the white-led feminist 
movement (in spite of opposition from their men) because they perceived it as being a part of the 
wider liberation movement which they were seeking. 48 In contrast to this, the majority ofblack 
women activists in South Africa conceded to their men's requests not to join any multi-racial 
46 Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott and Barbara Smith (eds), All the Women are White. All 
the Blacks are Men. but Some ofus are Brave: Black Women's Studies (New York, Feminist 
Press, 1982), pp.?-9. 
47 Kogila Moodley, "The Continued Impact of Black Consciousness in South Africa", The 
Journal ofModern Studies, vol29, no 2, 1991, p.244. 
48 Gerda Lerner (ed.), Black Women in White America (New York, Vintage Books, 1973), 
p.585. 
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feminist movements - so as to avoid any sign of division in the black population. Black American 
women did not in fact join white American feminist organisations: they formed their own 
organisations because they perceived their problems and aspirations as being different from those 
white women. 49 Thus the working environment of black and white women differed radically: 
blacks were usually engaged in the lowest-paid employment while white women were often well 
paid and comfortably offby comparison. White women were also legally protected against sexual 
abuse while blacks were not. These are but two examples to illustrate how different were the 
needs of the two groups. This difference has been examined by Angela Davis who has observed 
that more black women have always worked outside their homes than have their white sisters. 50 
Davis's main point is that white women more frequently have been able to choose comfortable 
jobs while black women, more often than not, have been forced to take any available job, merely 
in order to survive. 
Because of the many similarities which have existed between the two groups, it is instructive to 
compare black women in the United States and in South Africa- specifically to determine 
whether, by actively and obediently participating in political activism during the 1970s on male 
terms, black South African women compromised the possibility of an earlier gender liberation. I 
shall examine this problem in more detail in chapter five. What is known without any doubt is that 
there was an important relationship between South African and American women. This was 
demonstrated (for example) by the fact that the president of the National Council of Negro 
Women, Dorothy Height, was invited to the annual Conference of the Federal Women 
49 Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider (New York, The Crossing Press, 1984), p.60. 
50 Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class (New York, Vintage Books, 1973 ), p. 5. 
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Organisation (a predominantly black organisation) as the main guest speaker. 51 Details ofhervisit 
and speech are reviewed in chapter five. 
The format of the research 
In each of the following five chapters, various aspects of the contribution made by both groups 
are stated and analysed. Chapter two traces the role played by some leading clerics, especially 
those white liberals from the Anglican Church in the 1950s, as they tried to expose the evil of 
apartheid in a country which prided itself on being 80 per cent "Christian". 52 Because of this 
legacy, most ofthe black priests who eventually became warriors against apartheid were members 
of the Anglican Church. 53 Prominent among these were Leo Rakale, Simeon Nkoane and 
Desmond Tutu. 54 Chapter two will also analyse the extra-parliamentary ecclesiastical body, the 
South African Council of Churches, and how the racist policies of the SACC were effectively 
challenged and ultimately altered by those Africans within the organisation who had been 
influenced by BC thinking and by the adoption ofBlack Theology, a theology which originated 
among black people in the United States of America. 
This chapter also shows how the formation of radical organisations by white liberals such as those 
of the Christian Institute and the UCM, and the radical changes effected in the SACC, made it 
51 Women's Supplement to The World. 15 September 1977, p.l. 
52 Mokgethi Motlhabi, "The Historical Origins ofBlack Theology", in Itumeleng Mosala and 
Buti Tlhagale (eds), The Unquestionable Right to be Free (New York, Orbis Books, 1986), 
pp.29-33. 
53 Joseph, Side by Side, pp.229, 233. 
54 
"Anglican clerics honoured", Sowetan, 24 Aprill998, p.6. 
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possible for the African point of view to be heard. I will also analyse the pressure exerted by the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) on the SACC, to which it was affiliated, and how this helped 
to strengthened the position of anti-apartheid protesters in South Africa. 
Chapter three deals with the part which was played by the white liberal student organisation, the 
National Union of the South African Students (NUSAS), in black politics prior to the formation 
of the exclusively black students organisation, the South African Student Organisation (SASO), 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With the emergence ofSASO in student politics, NUSAS found 
itself challenged by a truly radical organisation. Although NUSAS at first could not adapt to 
SASO's criticism, it later accepted the validity of such criticism and began to work cooperatively 
with SASO wherever possible. This cooperation was most evident during the leadership of Steve 
Biko and Barney Pityana from SASO and Paul Pretorius and Neville Curtis from NUSAS. 55 It has 
often been said that friction between the two bodies was quite common, but, where this happened, 
it was more a function of dissonances between the personalities of whatever leaders were in office 
at the time. The converse is also obviously true. This point is clarified in the chapter. 
My most important contention in chapter three is that SASO influenced NUSAS to change its 
policy towards race-related student political issues. The changes implemented included the 
introduction of three departments in the organisation. The Annual NUS AS Convention of July 
1970 established Aquarius, Nuswel and Nused. It was no coincidence that one of these projects 
was under the directorship of a black student, Ernest Ralekgetho, a seminary student from St 
55 Karis and Gerhart Collection. Correspondence between Curtis and Biko, 2-4-1970, 
Pretorius and Pityana, 15-7-1970, 7-9-1970. 
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Peter's Seminary at Hammanskraal near Pretoria. 56 
Chapter four emphasises the role of the forerunners of BCM in shaping the movement, their 
critique of white liberals, the inclusion of the outlawed liberation movements and the apartheid 
government's reaction. It focuses on interpreting the liberal role prior to, during and after the 
banning of BCM. It also demonstrates how the forerunners of BCM attempted to incorporate 
some principles of the ANC, PAC and NEUM as a way of trying to elicit support from supporters 
of these liberation movements. The effects, both positive and negative, of acknowledging and 
giving credence to these movements by including their principles, are also examined. 
Because the dominant nature of South African society is patriarchal and because this has 
undermined and marginalised women's activities, it is the purpose of chapter five to examine the 
role played by women in the Black Consciousness Movement. Two particular points will be made 
in this regard. There were those women who saw and accepted the necessity of joining the 
organisation after they had been politically influenced by men. These joined the organisation of 
their own free will. Some, however, were involuntarily drawn into politics because of the activities 
of their next of kin. The political activities of either children or spouses forced many women to 
offer their practical support to the liberation struggle and to defy the apartheid government. 
Although BC was a short-lived movement, it had an enormous impact that changed the political 
outlook of the country and shook the strength of the South African apartheid system to its very 
foundations. Biko' s death and the subsequent Inquest into his death not only exposed the most 
56 
"NUSAS in Action 1970: the Generation ofWar", in Phenomenon, vol 1, no 1, June 1970, 
p.S. 
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violently racist and inhumane aspects of the system but it also intensified internal and external 
pressure on the government to such an extent that the government was forced to adopt certain 
changes. 
Chapter six attempts to analyse the role played by liberals and liberal organisations after the death 
of Steve Biko in detention on 12 September 1977. It also examines the response of the 
government and how the inquest into Biko's death was organised. Looking at these events is 
necessary because Biko's death, more than any other incident, exposed the cruelty of the apartheid 
system. 57 Biko's death exposed apartheid's supporters both nationally and internationally to the 
extent that they could no longer comfortably pretend that there was nothing really wrong. More 
than anything else, Biko's death drew specific attention to the operation ofthe South African 
security laws. 58 Chapter six will show how the liberal press and the' opposition party in parliament 
were the only ones effectively to criticise the government during the period under discussion 
(most of the government's critics had been banned on 29 October 1977). The BC and its affiliates, 
the The World and The Weekend World, the two major newspapers reporting African views, 
were banned at this time. Because of this, the voices ofblacks on relevant issue were hardly ever 
heard. At the same time, white organisations such as the Christian Institute were banned, along 
with al! the other liberation movements mentioned above. After these bannings, liberal institutions 
remained the sole critics of the circumstances surrounding Biko's death. 
I was particularly interested to establish whether, because ofthe influence ofBC, liberals might 
have changed their approach to various issues (whether they might, for example, support universal 
57 
"Biko was a 'messiah'- US ambassador," Sowetan, 1 June 1998, p.9. 
58 
"Heavy toll of the 1973 crackdown", Daily Dispatch, 14 March 1978, p.IO. 
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franchise). I also argue that Biko's death and the subsequent commission of enquiry came at an 
opportune time for the opposition party. The tragic way in which Biko died, and the insensitive 
manner in which the case was handled by the government, caused a groundswell of support for 
the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), which then fulfilled the role of arch-critic of the National 
Party government. For the first time in its existence, the PFP had the (relatively large) number of 
seventeen members in parliament when parliament reopened in January 1978. 
Analysing Biko's death and the inquest involves examining local conditions in the Eastern Cape 
Province. IfBiko had been better known on a national level among liberals and blacks, it would 
have been inconceivable for the security police to have treated him in the way in which they did. 
The tragedy of his death (I contend) could only have taken place in the Eastern Cape and in Port 
Elizabeth in particular. This region was known for being ultra-conservative. Port Elizabeth's 
Walmer Police Station, the place where Biko was detained, was notorious for the brutal treatment 
of political detainees. At the same time, the area had a long history of black resistance to racist 
pressure. During the ANC Defiance Campaign, it was established that the largest number to heed 
the campaign came from Port Elizabeth (more than 10 000 participants). 59 Biko therefore became 
a symbol of the threat to white supremacy in the whole ofthe Eastern Cape. 
Although the security police probably did not plan to kill him, it is highly likely that the police 
brutalised him as severely as they did in order to make an "example" of him in the eyes of his 
followers and so frighten them and deter them from involvement in political activism. Police 
brutality in the region might also have been motivated by the fact that it was a region which was 
59 Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid, p.60. 
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far more highly politicised than other regions of the country. It is likely that the politically 
reactionary security police were enraged by opposition from Africans who they believed to be 
participating in acts intended to overthrow democratic government in anticipation of communist 
rule. 
The various international groups which had supported the liberation movements added their 
pressure to that of their respective governments in order to effect measures against the apartheid 
government. As a result of their efforts, the South African government was subjected to 
continuous pressure. Most of these anti-apartheid organisations were based in Europe and in the 
United States of America. 60 This point will be discussed in chapter seven. 
The final chapter assesses the entire work and proposes reasons why black opinion in general was 
suspicious of the role played by liberals in black activism. Concrete examples are adduced ofhow 
white liberals and the proponents ofBlack Consciousness compensated for each other on issues 
of common interest. 
Method of research 
60 R.M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa. 1975-
1990 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991 ); R.E. Edgar ( ed. ), Sanctioning Apartheid 
(Trenton NJ, Africa World Press, 1990). 
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I accessed most of the primary sources through interviews which I conducted with other 
researchers on the same subject, This provided me with tapes or written transcripts. I also 
conducted a few interviews with people who were activists during the period under discussion 
were conducted. Other sources which I consulted were various newspapers from around the 
country; private letters and other documents donated to the Archives at the University of South 
. 
Africa (U nisa) and to the University of the Witwatersrand; documents from the Alan Paton Centre 
at the University ofNatal (Pietermaritzburg), the Centre of African Studies at the University of 
Cape Town (UCT), and the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape (UWC). In 
addition to these interviews, newspapers and documents from the above-mentioned archives, I 
consulted a number of works of research in the form of dissertations and theses on the same 
subject. The availability of such in-depth research made it possible for me either to support or 
modify my contentions. A hindrance to this research was the unavailability of sources, such as 
documents which were restricted because they had not yet been classified (as in the case of the 
Mayibuye Centre). Another hindrance was that other major libraries such as the State Library had 
little to offer on the subject of black politics. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS, BLACK THEOLOGY OF LffiERA TION AND THE 
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 
In this chapter I shall describe, firstly, the role which was played by a small group of white 
liberals, in their capacities as leaders of various religious denominations, in the fight against 
apartheid at a time when it had become impossible for blacks inside South Africa to speak for 
themselves. Secondly, I shall also describe how these same white liberals played a role in 
facilitating the introduction of a Black Theology of liberation into South Africa. Finally, I shall 
outline relations between Black Theology and Black Consciousness between 1968 and 1977. 
I shall also touch on certain problems with regard to the origins of Black Theology in South 
Africa. Although Black Theology was profoundly influenced by events and currents of thought 
outside South Mrica, it was also shaped by the harsh realities of what was happening inside the 
country during the apartheid years. It is necessary, in pursuit of an answer to this problem, to 
examine research conducted by certain seminary students, ministers and theologians so as to 
expose the double standards of the so-called multi-racial churches that practised a subtle kind of 
apartheid in their denominations during the apartheid years. This research provides evidence of 
the ambivalent and equivocal relationships which often existed between white liberals and Black 
Consciousness. 
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It has been well documented from contemporary sources1 that the three major African liberation 
movements, the African National Congress (ANC.), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the 
Black Consciousness Movement (BC), but particularly the latter two, objected to the 
participation of white liberals in the black liberation struggle. Both the constitutions ofP AC and 
BC made this point quite clear. In spite of this, exceptions were made in practice to white liberal 
participation. Thus, for example, white liberal organisations such as the University Christian 
Movement (UCM) and the Christian Institute (CI), played a vital role to play in assisting the BC 
materially. 2 
The role which these two white liberal organizations played in providing material assistance 
demonstrates that, while BC certainly wished to carry on its own struggle without any assistance 
whatsoever from white liberal organisations or individuals, it was reduced in practice to accepting 
a certain amount of assistance. This underscores the paradoxical discrepancy between the rhetoric 
and the practice ofBC, which is one of central themes of this research. Although white liberals 
have often been severely criticized for interference in African affairs and attempts to "manage" 
the black struggle (whatever the truth value of such claims may be), it is nevertheless fair to say 
that a select group of white liberals and white liberal organisations did help to further the aims 
and the ambitions ofBC at a crucial time during the struggle. 
I hope in this chapter also to elucidate another point which certain BC protagonists have failed 
1 Sipho Buthelezi, "Emergence ofBlack Consciousness", in Barney Pityana, Mamphela 
Ramphele, Malusi Mpumlwana & Lindy Wilson ( eds ), Bounds of Possibility: the Legacy of 
Steve Biko and Black Consciousness (Cape Town, David Philip, 1992), pp.ll2-114. 
2 William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, University 
Christian Movement (UCM) Papers, Biko's correspondence with Colin Collins, December 
1969. 
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to appreciate in their analysis of race relations in South Africa, and that is that progressive white 
non-South African citizens were often much more vociferous in their support of the oppressed 
majorit~ than were white liberal South Africans such as Alan Paton, who was internationally 
known and respected for his opposition to apartheid and a key member of the South African 
Liberal Party (which prided itself on its multi-racial membership). Paton was not only less than 
vigorous in opposing the evils of apartheid: he issued no clear call for universal suffrage within 
South Africa. 4 
Early African protest against white domination 
The Black Theology of liberation first manifested itself in South Africa in the UCM project in 
March 1970.5 Its protagonists were not the first African ecumenical group to challenge both 
church and government for its segregationist policies. The first group of Africans to break away 
from mainline churches, were a group of black Methodists in 1880. These Africans were 
disillusioned, according to Sundkler, by the way in which white mission churches (or the mission 
arms of white churches) ignored certain important aspects of African religion6 while, at the same 
time, imposing an undilutedly Europeanized form of Chri'stianity on their African adherents. 7 
3 Michael E. Worsnip, Between the Two Fires: The Anglican Church and Apartheid 1948-
1957 (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1991 ), pp. 73-153. 
4 Archive, Paton Centre, University ofNatal, Pietermaritzburg, (Paton Papers), Pcl/5/1/8, 
Alan Paton's correspondence with Edgar Brookes, 8 September 1977, pp.1-2. 
5 Ngindi Mushete, "The History of Theology in Africa: From Polemics to Critical Irenics", in 
Kofi Appiah and Sergio Torres (eds), African Theology en Route,(New York, Orbis Books, 
1979), p.31. 
6 B.G.M.Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London, Oxford University Press, 
1961), p.15. 
7 Ogbu U. Kalu, "Church Presence in Africa: A Historical Analysis of the Evangelization 
Process", in Kubi and Torres (eds), African Theology en Route, pp.l3-21. 
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Christianized Africans were in fact often criticized by European missionaries for maintaining their 
ties with "the heathen" and for continuing to practise African customs which were unacceptable 
to missionary ideals of exactly how they thought that black Christians should worship and behave. 8 
When the arrogance of the Western colonial missionary point of view finally became too much 
to bear, Africans such as Nehemia Tile, an ordained Wesleyan minister, and Kgatlamping, the 
chief of the Taung, took the initiative and formed their own independent churches. 9 The essential 
aim of these new churches was to create space and opportunity for the observance of the 
uniqueness of an African Christianity. By the time these new churches were founded, it had long 
since become impossible for blacks in the white-ruled colonial churches to practise their 
traditionally African religious and social customs (such as traditional African healing, to mention 
but one). 10 
If one looks at the history of white missionary activity in Africa, no matter how progressive and 
"liberal" one might consider such missionaries to have been, white-dominated Christianity has, for 
Africans, been one long nightmare of cultural, political, psychological and social humiliation and 
self-abnegation. For centuries, African self-identity and self-respect have been severely damaged 
by the explicit and implicit racialism and assumptions of superiority which have been the stock in 
trade of European Christianity. 
8 Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, p.15. 
9 Victor Wan-Tatah, Emancipation in African Theology (New York, Peter Lang, 1988), 
pp.35-74. 
10 Sabelo Ntwasa, "The Concept of the Church in Black Theology", in Basil Moore ( ed. ), 
The Challenge ofBlack Theology (Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1974), pp.102-110. 
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It was this appreciation of the damage that had been done to African culture and self-esteem that 
drove Motlhabi Mokgethi to articulate his urgent affirmation of the necessity for a Black 
Theology ofliberation in South Africa which would liberate Africans from the kind of repressive 
theology which has always (implicitly and explicitly) been the subtext of the racist fantasies and 
apparatus of oppression sponsored by the apartheid regime. 11 The proponents ofBlack Theology 
differentiate it from the kind of African Theology which arose in most countries in the African 
continent after they had attained independence. Gabriel Setiloane was one of the few South 
Africans to remain an exponent of this (African) kind of theology, which focuses mainly on 
African culture. 12 The difference between the two types of theologies, according to Setiloane, is 
that African Theology addresses itself to the restoration and the africanisation of Christianity -
while Black Theology ofliberation deals in the main with the means by which blacks may liberate 
themselves (politically but also in all spheres of life) from the inauthenticity and domination of 
most white political, religious, cultural and religious culture. 13 Simon Gqubule also maintains that 
African Theology is primarily concerned with the africanisation of the Christian religion. 14 
There are also slight differences between the concerns and strategies of the African Independent 
Churches (AICs) and Black Theology. According to Sabelo Ntwasa, a student activist in Black 
Theology, the independent churches cut themselves off from their dependency on white-controlled 
11 Motlhabi Mokgethi, "The Historical Origins ofBlack Theology", in Itumeleng Mosala and 
Buti Tlhagale (eds), The Unquestionable Right to be Free (New York, Maryknoll, Orbis 
Books 1986), pp.29-33. 
12 Gabriel Setiloane, The African Theology (Johannesburg, Skotaville Publishers, 1986), 
pp.29-33. 
13 Ibid, pp.34-36. 
14 Bonganjalo Goba, "The Black Consciousness Movement: Its Impact on Black Theology," 
in Mosala and Tlhagale (eds), The Unquestionable Right to be Free, pp.l09-113. 
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churches. 15 Motlhabi on the other hand avers that it was the enormity of black suffering under 
European and colonial rule (and, worst of all, the cruelty of the colonial church in tacitly giving 
consent to racist attitudes and structures) that forced Africans to look for alternatives to 
remairing in white churches. 16 The only significant difference between the two kinds of African 
churches was that the AICs, as Simon Maimela has observed, opted to break away from the 
"mainline" white churches in order to enjoy the kind of religious freedom which was not available 
to them as perpetual wards of a vitiating white imperial culture. The protagonists of Black 
Theology, however, remained in the existing colonial churches with the aim of politicising 
Africans by addressing the political, social and economic imbalances and injustices which were 
maintained by church and state. 17 
White liberal priests and apartheid 
Prior to the advent of the Black Theology of liberation, a small number of liberally inclined 
clergymen who were not South African citizens, began to voice their abhorrence of racial 
discrimination in the country. Among these were Michael Scott, Trevor Huddleston and Ambrose 
Reeves, each of whom was to play a vital role in challenging the evils of the apartheid system. 
Because Scott's protests against racial injustice and domination took place in the early 1940s, his 
period of activity does not fall within the ambit of this research. His contribution, although 
distinguished and noteworthy, will not be examined. It therefore remains to consider the works 
of both Huddleston and Reeves, whose contributions are more germane to this research. 
15 Ntwasa, "The Concept of the Church in Black Theology," pp.111-118. 
16 Mokgethi Motlhabi, "The Historical Origins ofBlack Theology," p.52. 
17 Simon Maimela, "Faith That Does Justice", in The Journal ofBlack Theology in South 
Africa, vol3, no 1, May 1989, p.2. 
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Trevor Huddleston 
The Church ofEngland sent Father Trevor Huddleston from England to South Africa in 1943 to 
work as a missiont1ry among Africans. Huddleston, who came from a distinguished British family, 
was both an ordained priest and a monk who had taken his final monastic vows. He was stationed 
by his order in Sophiatown, Johannesburg, and it was here that he witnessed at first hand the 
harshness and cruelty of the life to which Africans were subjected. It was the introduction of the 
Group Areas Act, and the effects of the forced removal of Africans from their homes and 
businesses in the 1950s18 that appalled Huddleston and confirmed what he already knew. 
In the great "forced removal" from Sophiatown (it was to be perhaps one of the most notorious 
of numerous subsequent forced removals all over South Africa), Africans were forcibly ejected 
by police and municipal authorities from their homes so that the whole area could be demolished 
prior to the building of the exclusively white suburb of Triomf where Sophiatown had once 
stood. 19 Huddleston used every means in his power to protest against and challenge the system. 
He was viewed as one of the most ardent campaigners against the removals and an outspoken 
critic of the apartheid system.20 He also became one of the first white liberal clerics to call for an 
international sports boycott against South Africa in the hope that its imposition "would rudely 
18 Abdul Samad Minty, "The Anti-Apartheid Struggle", in Deborah Duncan Honore (ed.), 
Trevor Huddleston: Essays on his Life and Work (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), 
p.191. See also, Robert Denniston, Trevor Huddleston: A Life (London, Macmillan, 1999), 
pp. 45-66. 
19 Frank Chikane, "Church and State in Apartheid South Africa", in Sechaba, vol22, no 6. 
June 1988, p.3. 
2
° F. Deon Patrick Van Tonder, "Sophiatown: Removals and Protest, 1940-1955", M.A. 
dissertation, Unisa, 1990, p. 154. 
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waken the average non-political white voter from the sleep of complacent tacit racism". 21 
According to Nadine Gordimer, Huddleston is known to have conscientised his black congregants 
not to rely on anybody but take it upon themselves to resist forced removals. 22 This idea of(black) 
self-reliance became the cornerstone of BC ideology, and was expressed in the words of the 
slogan, "Black man: you are on your own".23 Huddleston's encouragement ofblacks to be agents 
of change (and not to rely on white help or sympathy) shows how exactly his analysis of the 
situation at the time coincided with that made by black exponents ofBC philosophy. It is for this 
reason that Shirley du Boulay praises Huddleston as one of the earliest white liberals to have 
contributed towards the raising of a self-reliant consciousness among A:fricans24 at a time when 
it was still acceptable for white liberals to act as "trustees" for A:fricans.25 
In his widely published speech recorded in the Observer and entitled "The Church sleeps on", 
Huddleston attempted to galvanise support among the international ecumenical community to 
pressurize their governments (those which still retained diplomatic relations with South Africa) 
to persuade Pretoria to stop its policies of forced removals. 26 Because he was becoming an 
embarrassment to both the Church of England and the South African government in his criticism 
ofthe apartheid system, Huddleston was recalled to England in 1956. This, however, did not 
deter Huddleston from continuing his struggle against the evils of apartheid. Upon his arrival in 
21 Nadimer Gordimer, "Huddleston: A Sign", in Honore (ed.), Trevor Huddleston, p.8. 
22 Ibid, p 8. 
23 Mosibudi Mangena, On Your Own (Johannesburg, Skotaville Publishers, 1990), pp.S-12. 
24 Shirley du Boulay, Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), 
p.22. 
25 Minty, "The Anti-Apartheid Struggle," p.l91. 
26 Ibid, p.l92. 
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Britain in 1956, his first book, Naught For Your Comfort, which detailed the evils of apartheid, 
was published. This book subsequently became something of a bestseller and served to make the 
general public of the United Kingdom more aware of the institutionalised cruelties ofapartheid.27 
Huddleston was also instrumental in getting some British Anglican congregations to invite young 
African Anglican priests to their country. Two of the Africans who were invited were Leo Rakale 
and Simeon Nkoane (the former visited the United Kingdom between 1959 and 1963)?8 Nkoane 
was to follow five years after Rakale. 29 These two middle-aged African priests became pioneers 
in boldly and publicly challenging apartheid policy. 30 Living in a British environment must have 
opened Nkoane and Rakale's eyes because they both became emboldened to be among the first 
clerics to criticise the apartheid government for restricting members of the community from 
associating with the banned individuals. 31 They were among the few clerics who were respected 
by the black community at large for the role they played by intervening in volatile situations 
between the agents of the apartheid system, such as the police, and the youth. One such occasion 
when they acted was during the funeral of Robert Sobukwe, the president of the PAC, on 11 
March 1978. An angry mob ofyoung people attempted to attack the chief minister ofZululand, 
Gatsha Buthelezi. 32 These young people did not approve ofButhelezi's presence because he was 
27 Francois Piachaud, "Reflection from a London Parish", in Honore, (ed.), Trevor 
Huddleston, p. 81. 
28 Alan Wilkinson, The Community of the Resurrection: A Centenary History (London, 
SCM Press, 1992), p. 296. 
29 Crispin Harison, "Trevor Huddleston was a Mentor of Simeon", in Seek, October 1989, 
p.11. 
30 Mamphela Ramphele, A Life (Cape Town, David Philip, 1995), p.127. 
31 Du Boulay, Tutu: Voice ofVoiceless, p.55; The Star, 27/2/1978, p.1; Natal Witness, 
28/3/1978, p.3; Daily Dispatch, 3/3/1978, p.8. 
32 Daily Dispatch, 14/3/1978, p.l1; Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to 
Challenge (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 1997), vol 5, p. 773. 
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a homeland leader and was hence considered to be a "sellout" -like other homeland leaders.33 It 
was only the two clerics who were able to convince the crowd not to harm Buthelezi. 
Rakale and Nkoane also had opportunities to visit Mirfield (the mother house of Huddleston's 
order, the Community of the Resurrection, in Yorkshire) while they were working in Britain. Alan 
Wilkinson has pointed out that the theology taught at Mirfield encouraged members of the 
Community of the Resurrection to think along lines that empowered them to condemn as 
unChristian the ideologies of the apartheid government. 34 (Both Scott and Reeves were also 
monks from the Community of the Resurrection.) 
Huddleston was instrumental in organising the first conference on apartheid in Britain, a 
conference that took place on 26 June 1959, the fourth year after the signing ofthe Freedom 
Charter in 1955 . The main speaker was the then-president of the ANC, Albert Luthuli. He 
appealed to the international community to boycott sporting activities with the South African 
racist regime.35 He had been actively involved in the formation of the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
in Britain in 1958, and participated in supporting the International Defence and Aid Fund, a body 
which financially and in other ways assisted the victims of apartheid. 36 
The results ofHuddleston's efforts were two-fold. On the one hand, he was greatly respected and 
revered by the black community, whom he encouraged in forms of non-violent protest. 
33 Diana E.H. Russell, Living of Courage: Women for a New South Africa (London, Vrrago 
Press Limited, 1990), p.l34. 
34 Wilkinson, The Community ofResurrection, pp.296-304. 
35 Minty, "The Anti-Apartheid Struggle", p.l92. 
36 Shriday R. Ramphal, "Man of Our One World", in Honore (ed.), Trevor Huddleston, 
p.l29. 
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Distinguished African Anglican priests, such as Desmond Tutu and Nkoane, who were both 
champions of non-violent forms of protest, are known to have been profoundly influenced by 
Huddleston. They had participated in non-violent forms of protest during the height of Black 
Theology ofliberation in the 1970s when other protagonists were no longer convinced that non-
violent protest was still a viable proposition. 37 On the other hand, however, Huddleston's 
continuing involvement in the struggle for the total liberation of Africans bothered some white 
liberal individuals who believed that he had overextended himself in his dedication to the struggle 
for justice in Africa. Paton felt that Huddleston had done more than enough when he expressed 
his dismay by saying, "I think myself that it is something near tragedy that Trevor, in his declining 
years, should be devoting himself so largely to protest"38 - suggesting thereby that Huddleston 
should have been active in affairs other than politics. 39 
Ambrose Reeves (1949-1960) 
Ambrose Reeves, the Bishop of Johannesburg, had been involved in the struggle against social 
injustice long before he accepted a bishopric in South Africa. 40 He had served as a secretary for 
the Student Christian Movement and the World Student Christian Federation during his student 
37 Mutlanyane Stanley Mogoba, "From Munsieville to Oslo", in Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng 
Mosala (eds), Hammering Swords into Ploughshares (Grand Rapids, Michigan, William B. 
Eerdmans, 1987), pp.23-30; Naomi Tutu (ed.), The Words ofDesmond Tutu, (New York, 
New Market Press, 1989), pp.15-16. 
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years.41 As a parish leader in Liverpool he had been involved with community developments and 
had played a crucial role in the Liverpool Docker's strike of 1945.42 Worsnip suggests that it was 
because of the experience he had acquired in his own country (the United Kingdom) that he was 
careful first to assess the situation before becoming politically involved. 43 After two years in the 
country in 1951, he started to challenge the apartheid system, especially after the introduction of 
the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act No. 50 of 1951. 44 
His close working relations with the Africans impelled him to work and strategise in co-operation 
with them. He openly associated with black politicians, Marxist lawyers and progressive 
businessmen. 45 It was because ofhis every day contacts with Africans that he began to understand 
their problems better than people like the Archbishop of Cape Town, Geoffrey Clayton, who 
worked mainly with the white community and who had endless dispute with Reeves. 46 Reeves 
protested vigorously against the introduction ofthe Bantu Education Act, which was implemented 
in 1955.47 
He served as the chairperson of a consultative committee which had been set up by fourteen 
organizations opposed to the apartheid policy. 48 While this committee consisted of representatives 
who were opposed in every way to the apartheid form of government, it is puzzling that Reeves 
41 Worsnip, Between the Two Fires, p.ll8. 
42 Ibid, p.118. 
43 Ibid, p.119. 
44 Ibid, p.120. 
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46 Chikane, "Church and State", p.3. 
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was not keen to invite the newly formed PAC in 1959 to be a part of it. His reason for not 
considering the PAC was that it was a racist group.49 His refusal to include the PAC confirmed 
the accusation made by the Black Consciousness movement at a later stage, namely that liberal 
institutions tended to undermine Africans potential in their dealings with issues that affected them 
directly. Had the PAC been included in the committee its input might have made all the difference. 
In any case, together with Huddleston and a few concerned whites, Reeves negotiated with the 
authorities at the request of the Africans, during the Alexandra Bus boycott. The government-
sponsofed bus authorities had raised bus fares at a time when commuters' wages were below the 
poverty datum line. 50 
Reeves also played a prominent role after the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960 when 69 
African protestors were shot by police as they were running for cover. The bullet wounds in the 
victims' backs was evidence enough that they had been running away. Immediately after the 
incident Reeves tried unsuccessfully to contact a local minister, Z.M. Voyi (the telephone lines 
in the area had been cut). 51 By using the Treason Trial Defence Fund, Reeves retained the services 
of two lawyers to investigate the case by interviewing and compiling the statements from the 
victims before any government attempts to disseminate disinformation. 52 The two lawyers whom 
Reeves retained for the Sharpeville tragedy were John Lang and Ernest Wentzel. 53 Wentzel had 
actively been involved in extra-parliamentary protest as a member ofthe National Union ofthe 
49 Randolph Vigne, Liberals against Apartheid: A History of the Liberal Party of South 
Africa 1953-1968 (London, Macmillan, 1997), p.79. 
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48 
South African Students (NUSAS), and had been the NUSAS national president in 1957.54 
Wentzel also later defended the accused in political cases at the time when BC involvement in 
national politics was at its height. 55 (The detailed documentation of such political cases appears 
in chapter three.) 
In his book, South Africa: Yesterday and Tomorrow, Reeves reveals how his role in exposing the 
police and government cover-up of the Sharpeville massacre caused him to be harassed by the 
agencies of the state such as the South African Special Branch of the police (the so-called security 
police) who followed his movements and watched him day and night. 56 He left South Africa 
through Swaziland on 2 April 1960 after receiving confidential information that his arrest was 
imminent. 57 His departure from South Africa was interpreted as a sign of contradiction. A large 
number of the white community who were opposed to Reeves's anti-Apartheid campaign, such 
as Archbishop Joost de Blank, Philip Russel and Tom Bishop, criticized Reeves for having 
abandoned his flock. 58 They felt that Reeves should have stayed in the country in order to face the 
consequences. But those who were intimate with the bishop, men such as Reverend A.G. 
Sidebotham, Archdeacon E. Walls (who drove him to Swaziland), Dean P. Barron, Paton (who 
paid him a visit while he was in Swaziland), and Oliver Tambo, did not agree with this opinion. 59 
Unfortunately, only the views of one African priest, Jacob Namo, who had worked with Reeves, 
were recorded. 60 It would have helped to have known the opinions of a number of the Africans 
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who had worked with Reeves, in order to ascertain what really happened. John Peart-Binns's 
opinion, namely that the black community felt betrayed by Reeves when he left South Africa, 
cannot be based in fact. 61 
Reeves simply continued to campaign against apartheid policies by furnishing details about the 
Sharpeville Massacre to all interested parties while he was in Britain, and this must have agitated 
the South African government deeply. He returned from a five months' leave of absence from his 
diocese on 10 September 1960 -only to be deported back to the United Kingdom after two days 
on 12 September on the authority of a deportation order delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel AT. 
Spengler. 62 He was refused permission to consult his attorney. 63 The reason for his deportation, 
accordi.ng to the South African government, was that he had accused the police of having used 
dum-dum bullets during the Sharpeville shootings. According to Phillips, this fact had never been 
raised by Reeves- but by one of the attorneys, Lang, who represented the victims.64 Reeves had 
been a thorn in the side of the apartheid government and he earned the respect of Africans for his 
contribution. Chikane praised Reeves as a being "part of a long tradition of church struggle 
against the evil of apartheid" .65 
In summarising this subsection, one might say the most important contribution made by 
Huddleston and Reeves was that their approach was different from that of other white liberals 
who (as the Black Consciousness interpretation emphasises) assumed positions ofleadership in 
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the struggle for black liberation- and so opened themselves to accusations of condescension and 
patronisation. 66 By living and working close to Africans, these two men learnt to know them and 
to understand what their political goals were and how they might be achieved. 67 This also helps 
to explain what Wilkinson says about Reeves, namely that he associated with anyone who was 
against racial segregation- irrespective of the ideology they held. 68 Their association with secular 
African organizations made it easy for these clerics to identify the real needs ofblacks and to find 
realistic solutions in consultation with genuine African political leaders like Tambo, a member of 
the Anglican church, as stated earlier in the chapter, who is reported to have encouraged Reeves 
to leave for hiding in Swaziland during the state of emergency in 1960.69 
It is also worth mentioning that many of the clergymen who supported the cause of Black 
Theology belonged to the Anglican Church, and that both Huddleston and Reeves were pioneers 
in this regard. In the end, their passionate commitment to the cause of African liberation became 
an embarrassment to some of their ecclesiastical superiors such as Clayton who, according to 
Paton, Wilkinson and Worsnip, was a "gradualist" in ideology70 - and hence was unlikely to 
sympathise with the radical approaches advocated by both Huddleston and Reeves. In spite of 
opposition within the Anglican church to involvement in radical politics, many black priests who 
were involved in BC and active participants in Black Theology, were members of the Anglican 
Church (the CPSA). This is a link which can be traced back to the period under review (the 
1950s). 
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The criticisms levelled against the liberal priests 
Because Huddleston and Reeves and the other more activist liberal priests in the Anglican Church 
in South Africa (the CPSA) were in the minority, they failed to obtain the support of clergy and 
congregations to enforce multi-racial services in a denomination which was (theoretically) 
multiracial. This was convenient for most Anglicans who, although opposed to the government, 
were (in practice) unlikely to be amenable to enforced integration in churches - even as a gesture 
of defiance against the government.71 Anglican churches therefore remained racially segregated 
and integration was not considered to be an important issue. When Black theology was 
introduced into South Africa in the 1970s, its proponents accused missionaries of supporting 
church segregation. It was therefore logical that most of the literature on early Black Theology 
in South Africa (between 1968 and 1977), underscored how the role played by the churches 
supported the government's perpetuation of racial segregation. 72 
The main criticism of missionaries and white liberal theologians in general was that they 
conveniently ignored incorporating African traditions and culture into their Westernised version 
of the Christian religion. Takatso Mofokeng argues that this emphasis caused converted Africans 
to lose a sense of their own identity and the self-respect on which it was based. 73 Such Africans 
were much more likely to become manipulated by their churches and by the government. Manas 
Buthelezi, Charles Nyembezi and Gedeon Mkhabela, the earliest proponents ofBlack Theology, 
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furthermore suggest that the missionaries divided Africans according to the denominational 
groupings by separating converted Africans from their traditional communities as a way of 
perpetuating the old European system of divide-and-rule. 74 The theologians who were most 
critical of their own denominations, such as (chiefly) Buthelezi, but also Lebamang Sebidi, Ernest 
Baartman, Allan Boesak and Sol Selepe, questioned the credibility of th~ so-called multi-racial 
churches which paid lip-service to the equal treatment of its members while in practice often 
discriminating against blacks. 75 
The role played by the Black Theology of liberation imported from the United States 
Black Power and Black Theology originated in the United States between 1966 and 1969. It was 
imported into South Africa in March 1970 when the concept ofBlack Theology was first used 
in the country by members of the University Christian Movement (UCM), and in particular by 
Basil Moore. 76 It is interesting to note that Black Theology in South Africa was introduced by a 
white liberal at a time when the BC was at the height of its influence and when its proponents 
were sceptical about the roles played by white liberals in the black political struggle. Moore was 
acceptable to Black Theologians because he devoted a lot of energy and effort to encouraging 
blacks to radicalise themselves on their own terms. In doing this he was far removed indeed from 
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"traditional" paternalistic liberals such as Alan Paton. The fact that Moore was the first white 
theologian to write about Black Theology, and that his article was published in Pro Veritate, gives 
some indication ofhis standing among Black Theologians. 
Steve Biko, Barney Pityana and Ntwa~a, who were acquaintances ofMoore and who trusted his 
political instincts, immediately saw that Black Theology would be crucial to the whole liberation 
struggle and they embraced it without any hesitation. 77 This philosophy found greater support 
among blacks in South Africa than in any other part of Africa because they found in the 
exploitation of the African Americans by whites in the United States an instructive parallel to the 
South African situation. Blacks in South Africa found themselves in the same position as African 
Americans. They found in it a valid critique of"an imperial western and colonial white theology"78 
while other countries on the African continent were mainly concerned with the reconstruction of 
their countries after they had attained independence (to the latter African Theology was preferable 
to Black Theology). Buthelezi and Kenneth Hughes maintain that Black Power and Black 
Theology in the United States became a model which South African Black Theology could 
emulate. 79 
The Black Power movement in the United Stated took root in 1966 as a way for radical blacks 
to counteract the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. According to Dwight 
Hopkins, the civil rights movement received both financial and moral support from American 
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white liberals. 80 Traditional liberals supported it mainly because it advocated a policy of non-
violence - which traditional liberals preferred to radical views which seemed to countenance 
violence. Another reason why passive non-violence had succeeded for almost eleven years- until 
challenged in 1966 - was because of the character and charisma of its leaders. Since the 1950s, 
the civil rights movement had been under the control and the influence of moderate African-
Americans who usually went out of their way to avoid creating any kind of conflict which might 
have compromised the financial assistance given by their white liberal backers. 81 
When the younger members of the civil rights movement, especially the members of Student Non-
violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), succeeded in radicalising the movement and steering 
it away from its past policy of non-violent confrontation towards an acceptance of Black Power, 
this was interpreted as political extremism which changed the entire complexion of the 
movement. 82 When this happened, moderate African Americans began to have reservations about 
their further involvement, and white American businesspeople and liberals withdrew their financial 
support after they realised that they stood to gain nothing from supporting a radical Black Power 
Movement. 83 
Historically speaking, there have been two principal traditions of black resistance in the United 
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States: integration or assimilation. These divergent approaches are the product of the African 
American experience of slavery. W.E.B. DuBois summed up the African American dilemma 
(exacerbated by the irreconcilable demands of slavery both before and after the American Civil 
War and the necessity to live in some degree of cooperation and integration with American 
whites) in the sentence "What, after all, am I? Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be 
both?". 84 
James Cone has suggested 85 that these two traditions crystallised around the figures ofMartin 
Luther King and Malcolm X since they respectively represented the polarities on the continuum 
on which each African American was required to situate his or her attitude to the relationships 
of race and power that governed all discourse and interaction between white and black 
Americans. Stokely Carmichael was perhaps even more influential in articulating an African 
American alternative to the integrationism ofMartin Luther King (especially for South African 
blacks) because his message concentrated more on the psychological and spiritual harm that had 
been inflicted on blacks by whites. 
The two most influential personalities to shape the Black Power ideology which discredited the 
civil rights movement and its leader Martin Luther King Jr, were Malcolm X and Stokely 
Carmichael. Malcolm X emerged as one of the most revolutionary black nationalists between 
1961 and 1965. He combined a form of Islamic religion, of which he was a minister from 1953 
onwards, with a form ofblack nationalism which had been influenced by Marcus Garvey's return-
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to-Africa ideology. 86 Malcolm X believed that the enemy of the poor blacks were both racist white 
Americans and the "black bourgeoisie", especially members of the old established National 
Association for the Advancement of the Colored People (NAACP), who, he claimed, tried to 
behave like whites. 87 He was against any form of integration between blacks and whites, for, in 
his opinion, only a few blacks would ever qualify for integration into white society - while the 
majority would simply be reft out. 88 
Malcolm X was popular mainly with young activist students who were supporters of the civil 
rights movement. His main antagonist was Martin Luther King Jr. who represented the "black 
middle-class" that, according to Malcolm X, expected to have a place alongside whites89 while 
the poor, the majority of whom were black, would have no place in any such set-up.90 For him, 
the "dream slogan" used by Martin Luther King Jr was in fact a "nightmare".91 It was because of 
his radical criticism of racism and his active campaign for black empowerment that Malcolm X 
was considered to be one of the pioneers ofBlack Power philosophy.92 
Stokely Carmichael, according to Brisbane, became involved in political activity during his student 
years at Howard University, at the height of the Civil Rights movement. 93 As a member ofSNCC, 
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he embarked, together with other student members on a voter education programme between 
1961 and 1964, which was aimed at educating Southern African Americans, particularly those in 
Greenwood and Jackson in Mississippi, about the importance of procedures which had to be 
followed when voting. 94 These were the years during which Carmichael received his greatest 
recognition from the black community. He participated in what were called the" Freedom Rides", 
carefully planned marches that involved intermittent camping along the road. 
It was during the second of the Freedom Rides that Carmichael and some of the young members 
of the SNCC questioned the wisdom and validity of a non-violent march after they had suffered 
beatings and assaults at Birmingham and Montgomery and had been locked in police cells in 
Jackson.95 Like Malcolm X, Carmichael was opposed to integration because, when two such 
groups are integrated, he argued, it is inevitable that the white group assumes that they are 
superior in status, and that the black group is therefore be, by definition, inferior.% 
Integration, in Carmichael's opinion, would divide the black community because only the "black 
middle class" would ever benefit from it.97 Black students at the time were in general no longer 
loyal to King's philosophy especially because they alleged that King personally "had avoided any 
physical participation in these Freedom Rides". 98 At this time therefore the influence ofBC and 
Black Power had, for many blacks, superseded the ideals of integration and the influence of white 
liberals. 99 This new groundswell of support caused Carmichael to replace John Lewis as 
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chairman100 of the SNCC during an election in May 1966. Carmichael's election was an indicator 
that the student movement at least would follow a different direction- one that espoused Black 
Consciousness and the new Black Nationalism. 
Among such people, Martin Luther King Jr's non-violent movement became an outdated principle 
and the new philosophy of Black Power continued to attract more and more support, mostly 
among younger and more radical grassroots activists in the black community. 101 The old 
established black middle-class, together with many white Americans, criticised the new 
movement, whose chances of survival they thought to be minimal. 102 This attitude was not unique 
to the American white liberal community: the same kind of criticism was directed against the 
ideology and approach of Black Consciousness and Black Theology by many white liberals in 
South Africa. 
James Cone, a leading Black Theologian in the United States, maintains that Black Theology 
originated in the desire to provide a theological justification for Black Consciousness, thus 
ensuring its survival. 103 Many of Cone's books such as Black Theology and Black Power (1969), 
The Spirituals and the Blue: An Interpretation ( 1972), God of the Oppressed (1975) and A Black 
Theology of Liberation (1970), which were written at a time when Black Power was gathering 
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momentum in the United States, constituted an attempt to clarify the reasons why Black 
Consciousness had emerged out of the historical struggle against white oppression and racism. 104 
Cone's literature on Black Theology played an influential role in South Africa during the 
establishment of Black Theology of liberation. It was always extremely difficult (and usually 
impossible) to obtain access to his books in South Africa, especially those which were critical of 
the government's racist policy of apartheid, because of the draconian censorship practised by the 
apartheid regime. 105 Various means were utilised by scholars and activists to obtain Cone's books 
and tapes without the Nationalist government's knowledge. According to Goba, Cone's second 
recorded audio taped message entitled "Black Theology and Black Liberation" facilitated most 
of the discussions and proceedings of the first conference pn Black Theology, which was hosted 
by the University Christian Movement at Wilgespruit Centre near Roodepoort in March 1970.106 
Cone's first recorded message, which had been sent earlier to the UCM offices at the request of 
its leadership for use at the conference, had been confiscated by the South African Security 
Police107 who charged that Cone's books were "undesirable" for the South Africans. The second 
tape was sent by express post. 108 This method of smuggling in literature which was considered 
undesirable by the apartheid regime, was used by BC more and more frequently. While they often 
succeeded in securing such literature on more than one occasion, they were not always so 
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lucky.to9 
Cone's books were used in the resistance underground by black seminary students at various 
institutions in South Africa. One such student who was attracted by Cone's ideas, was Ntwasa, 
a theology student at the Federal Seminary at Alice in the Eastern Cape. He was later to become 
head of the Black Theology project under the UCM. no Cone's valuable contribution to South 
African Black Theology forged a strong bond between South African Black Theologians, notably 
Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak, and exponents and institutions ofBlack Theology in the United 
States.u 1 
Because of the deep regard in which Cone was held by South African. students, he was twice 
invited to address the General Annual Conference of the South African Students Organisation 
(SASO) in July 1975, and also the seminar for black clergy scheduled for 9 to 13 July 1976 by 
the congress of the South African Council of Churches. m The government denied Cone a visa 
to enter South Africa in 1975. In 1976 the visa which he was eventually granted was revoked 
while he was already travelling to South Africa from Geneva where he had been visiting the 
World Council of Churches (WCC ). 113 
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Black Theology in South Africa had a reputation for being anti-liberal. This point of view was 
maintained in liberal circles which criticised the nature of a theology that disassociated itself from 
the liberal Christian Institute. It had somehow been expected that Black Theology would embrace 
and work more closely with liberal institutions. 
When, however, the Black Theology leadership elected to associate itself with the UCM, it was 
no accident although, by this association, the proponents of Black Theology seemed to be 
deviating from their principle of being anti-liberal. As I pointed out earlier in the chapter, the 
founders ofUCM were not considered to be "dangerous liberals"- mainly because of their long 
history of working with Africans in a way that allowed them to take control of their own destinies. 
(This attitude, as we have seen, was embodied in figures like Huddleston, Reeves and Helen 
Joseph, and was very different from the kind of gradualist liberalism of Alan Paton and the Liberal 
Party.) One of the co-founders ofUCM, John Davies, was, for example, Anglican chaplain to 
both the University ofthe Witwatersrand and the Anglican Student Federation (ASF) when UCM 
was founded. 114 His close association with blacks dated back to his student years when he had 
been the secretary of the ASF, a multi-racial organisation catering mainly for university 
students. 115 Colin Collins was chaplain to the National Catholic Federation of Students (NCFS) 
and secretary of the Catholic Education Department for the ten years between 1959 and 1970.116 
Because of Collins's long association with the black community, his political ideology was 
regarded as radical in the South African context because he called for revolutionary changes in 
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the South African political arena. 117 Their acceptance by radical blacks was total. As in the case 
of Huddleston, their early and close contact with blacks facilitated their understanding of the 
plight of Africans under apartheid- and blacks in tum trusted them. 
Basil Moore, an ordained minister of the Methodist church, was considered to be a Marxist by 
conservative white South Afiicans. 118 While he had no historical associations with Africans, his 
first encounter with them in 1966 demonstrated that his intentions and those of the other members 
of the UCM were to work with blacks on a footing of equality and partnership. He stated this 
eloquently in an article in the UCM journal, One for the Road. 119 
One of the first U CM Newsletters 120 spelt out the organisation's dedication to the struggle for the 
black cause and proved to go beyond the commitment that black students expected from white 
liberals at the time. 121 They worked together with black students on every possible occasion. 
When Moore and Collins attended the American UCM Conference held at the Sheraton Hotel in 
Cleveland, Ohio, in 1967, a South African, Bobo Kgware, who was later to become the director 
of the UCM for the Transvaal region, accompanied them. 122 This choice of Kgware as a 
representative was not purely "window-dressing" because Kgware had a reputation for being one 
117 William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, UCM Minutes, 
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of the most politically outspoken young men of his generation. 123 This demonstrates that, from 
its inception, the UCM was prepared to invite black participation on an equal footing. 
An additional factor which created a good working relationship between the white founders of 
UCM and Africans was that, unlike traditional white liberals who were accustomed to dictating 
the agenda to Africans, the UCM executive (according to Moore) defined their role in the Black 
Theology of liberation as only that of facilitators, and they encouraged the building up of self-
confidence among blacks so that they might express themselves more effectively. 124 Moore also 
pointed out that it was in the interest of the oppressed- and not only of the oppressors- to wage 
a successful struggle for a true liberation. 125 
The black members were given leadership positions as an expression ofthe UCM principle of 
black empowerment. Justice Moloto, one of the first members ofUCM, an associate ofBlack 
Consciousness founders like Biko and Pityana, and also a member the Black Consciousness 
Movement, 126 was twice UCM president (in 1970 and 1971 respectively). He was also elected 
UCM general secretary in 1972, but because of a banning order he could not perform his duties 
in this regard. 127 Chris Mokoditoa, also a member ofBlack Consciousness, became the UCM 
general secretary in 1972 after the banning ofMoloto. Ntwasa, a student at the Federal Seminary, 
also a member ofBlack Consciousness, was assigned to the directorship of the Black Theology 
123 Ibid, p.3. 
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project within the UCM. 128 Manana Kgware, a former member of the Student Christian 
Movement at the University of the North, served on the UCM executive, where he represented 
the Lesotho/Orange Free State region. 129 The effect of including Africans in leadership positions 
gave the UCM a unique credibility among liberal organisations. 
Under the directorship of Moore, in its early stages, UCM introduced the Formation School 
programme. This programme organised workshops and seminars in the seven regions of South 
Africa. 130 The rationale behind this programme was to introduce Black Theology even to the 
remotest rural areas of South Africa, where the means of communications are often very poor.131 
The first Formation School was held in March 1970 at Thaba-Nchu. The venue was chosen 
specifically to be accessible to delegations from Lesotho, the Orange Free State and the Western 
Transvaal. 132 It was at this school that the term "Black Theology" was for the first time introduced 
to a public audience in South Africa. 133 
Kritzinger suggests that the reaction of the participants to the new terminology was positive 
because the majority of them supported Black Consciousness. 134 This policy of electing black 
leaders in UCM, and the accommodating spirit shown by the founders ofUCM, attracted pioneers 
of the Black Consciousness movement, particularly members ofSASO such as Pityana and Biko, 
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who at the time were the first non-theologians to join UCM and support its activities. The effect 
of this was to facilitate continued contact between the offices of both organizations.135 
The involvement ofboth Biko and Pityana in UCM allowed the organisation to play a significant 
role in the incubation of Black Conscious ideology. The strong bond between UCM and Black 
Consciousness in general caused the first South African book on Black Theology, Essays on 
Black Theology in South Africl!, edited by Mokgethi Motlhabi, to appear. The three non-
theological articles in the book were written by Pityana, 136 Biko, 137 and Adam Small. 138 
After it was banned in South Africa in 1972, it re-surfaced under the different title, The Challenge 
of Black Theology in South Africa, and was edited by Basil Moore while he was in exile in 
Australia. It was in this publication that two of Ntwasa.'s articles appeared. In South Africa, 
Ntwasa could not be quoted because he had been banned. 139 Because both books were banned 
in South Africa and so could not be reviewed, David Bosch was only able to review (but not 
quote from) the volume in Pro Veritate. 140 Bosch sympathetically reviewed the ideals ofBlack 
Theology by making two observations. His first was that radical black South African literature 
was more inclined to be influenced by African American ideas than by those emanating from the 
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northern part of the African continent. He also pointed out that the so-called Coloureds, especially 
intellectuals, identified themselves more and more with Black Consciousness. This, he argued, 
would nullify the historical identification between the Coloureds and Afrikaans-speaking white 
South Africans because politically conscientised Coloureds would identify themselves as "black" 
(in accordance with Black Consciousness ideology) and repudiate their links with white people. 
Bosch believed that this revelation would cause shock waves among Afrikaners and in the 
Nationalist Party, but, in the event, it was received with complacency. 141 
The strong convictions of Moore and Collins that the churches should play a constructive role in 
assisting the oppressed to fight apartheid practices, necessitated the establishment of Black 
Theology in South Africa at the time when it was risky for any organisation to champion black 
upliftment. Ackerman142 pointed out that this was as true of extra-parliamentary liberal 
organizations such as the Black Sash as it was of the National Union of the South African 
Students (NUSAS), 143 whose members were constantly intimidated and harassed by having their 
passports withdrawn and by being served with deportation orders for daring to criticise the 
government. 
Because of the repressive action being taken by the government against these liberal 
organizations, it was impossible for them officially to incorporate Black Consciousness or Black 
Theology into their programmes. It was the openly stated policy ofBC, enunciated by Biko, to 
141 Ibid, p.6. 
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place no trust in white liberals and their institutions. 144 At the same time, however, BC was 
viewed with abhorrence in white circles- especially among older -style liberals. Gradualist liberals 
of the old school, such as Leo Marquard145 and Alan Paton, were relentlessly criticised by Biko 
for harming rather than helping the cause of black liberation. Part ofBiko' s critique of gradualist 
liberalism was that it predicated the racial problems of South Africa on the condition of blacks. 
In this view, racism would gradually disappear as black people became more civilised (i.e. 
Westernised) through (gradual) education, modernisation and urbanisation. Because Biko saw 
with great clarity exactly how convenient and self-serving this analysis was for whites, he firmly 
placed the blame for racism in the laps of the white people. "There is nothing the matter with 
blacks. The problem is WIDTE RACISM and it rests squarely on the laps of the white society. 
The sooner the liberals realise this, the better for us blacks."146 The subtleties ofBiko's critique 
were opaque to most South African whites at the time, and his pronouncements caused a great 
deal of hostility towards Black Consciousness among traditionalliberals. 147 
Another alternative progressive organisation which might have accommodated Black Theology 
in South Africa was the Christian Institute, founded in 1963. Its leadership, however, was not 
ready to accept the Black Consciousness philosophy espoused by the South African Students 
Organisation (SASO). This was demonstrated by the editor ofPro Veritate, Brucker de Villiers, 
who protested against BC ideology at the conference of the World Alliance of the Reformed 
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Churches. 148 At this conference, held in Nairobi, the black delegates from South Africa, together 
with those already in exile, criticized the South African Dutch Reformed Church's policy of racial 
segregation149 and supported a motion for the expulsion of the South African Dutch Reformed 
Church from this world body. 150 This attitude, however, changed two years after the white 
founders had opened their doors to full black participation by giving material support to the Black 
Community Programme under the directorship of Ben Khoapa. 151 Manas Buthelezi, whose 
contribution to Black Theology will be discussed below, was employed by the Christian Institute 
as its director and was based in the Natal region from 1973. 152 This change of attitude by the 
Christian Institute ( CI) was due to the inclusion of blacks in decision-making (executive) 
positions. It affirms Worsnip's observation that once blacks and whites got to know each other, 
the stereotypes began to hold less sway, and people began to understand one another and work 
on a basis of equality. 153 
Blacks become agents of the Black Theology of liberation 
It was mentioned earlier in the chapter that Black Theology had received unqualified support in 
UCM because the majority of its membership comprised black students. 154 Strong bonds also 
existed between the UCM and SASO and this helped to contribute to a strong interest on the part 
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ofblack students in this semi-ecumenical students' organisation. Once the Black Theology Project 
had been established and had gained strong support from black students, particularly seminary 
students, the Black Theology of liberation component became more successful than the other 
projects of the Black Consciousness Movement. Two main factors provided for the relative 
success ofBlack Theology. It attracted an enthusiastic number of the Federal Seminary students 
at Alice. 155 Because this seminary consisted of nine separate denominational seminaries, a large 
number of supporters all lived close together. Goba, then a student at the Albert Luthuli 
Seminary, pointed out that this gave students ample opportunities to hold discussions and devise 
ways in which Black Theology might contribute to the black liberation movement. 156 It is alleged 
that Ntwasa became so obsessed with Cone's concept ofBlack Theology that the other students 
nicknamed him "Professor Cone". 157 This establishes the link between the USA and South Africa 
which was demonstrated in the first part of this chapter. 
The second great success of the Black Theology as part ofBlack Consciousness Movement may 
be attributed to the fact that the executive of SASO encouraged all African churches and related 
ecumenical organizations to join in the promotion of the Black Theology Project. According to 
Sipho Buthelezi, SASO realised the historical importance ofthe Inter-denominational African 
Ministers' Association of South Africa, 158 which was formed in 1945. It was approached to join 
in workshops on Black Theology. The invitation to participate was also extended to the African 
Independent Churches Association, which was an affiliate of the Christian Institute because it was 
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receiving help with theological training from them. 159 In order to include as many influential 
African denominations as possible, SASO contacted the Zion Christian Church, the largest 
Christian denomination in Southern Africa, with its head-quarters at Moria, near Pietersburg.160 
Indications show that there might have been some interest at an early stage. It is reported that 
Ramarumo Barbanus Lekganyane, the presiding Bishop of the church, was present at the "Hero's 
Week", organised by the University of the North SASO Branch in March 1971.161 However, the 
Zion Christian Church did not participate in any of the Black Theology Projects because it had 
a strong relationship with the Nationalist government. Its second bishop, Bishop Edward 
Lekganyane, is known to have received his theological training from the Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk. 162 The ZCC was against the idea of challenging the government on its racial 
policy simply because its founder, Engenas Lekganyane, had in 191 0 purchased the land on which 
the ZCC headquarters, Moria, stand, from the white farmer. 163 This may partly explain why the 
ZCC authorities adopted a neutral political stand towards the oppressors and disassociated itself 
from progressive organizations. 
Black Theology was mostly embraced by African ministers from mainline multi-racial churches. 
They had a language advantage when compared to the members of the Independent or the 
Indigenous Churches (as they prefer to be called), who could not readily read or express 
themselves in English and who, on the whole, did not realise at the time the importance of 
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politicising their churches. Because they had been the victims of unjust treatment as ministers of 
religion, inflicted both by the apartheid system and white colleagues in mission churches, these 
ministers from different denominations in South Africa, began to embrace and articulate the Black 
Theology ofliberation by using whatever platforms became available to them- including pulpits. 
Black Theology and the Roman Catholic Church 
Black Roman Catholic priests founded their own exclusive association, the St. Peter's Old Boys 
Association (SPOBA), in 1966, as a forum for discussion to address the racial imbalances within 
the structure of the entire Roman Catholic Church. 164 Within hours of its formation at the July 
conference of 1966, three recommendations were proposed. 165 The first was that a committee in 
charge of Biblical and liturgical translators should work with Africans to identify the correct 
idiomatic expressions. Secondly, composers of music were urged to develop and produce African 
melodies. Thirdly, they proposed that there be unity among all Catholic priests. 166 The church 
hierarchy twice rejected these requests in 1966 and 1968. 167 Although the period referred to here 
was before the era of Black Theology, this group was to play a vital role in exerting pressure on 
the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church when Black Consciousness and Black Theology 
became influential. It later changed its name to the "Permanent Black Priests' Solidarity Group" 
(PBPSG) and adopted the aim of mobilising all black Roman Catholic clergy in Southern 
Afiica_16s 
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It was this same group that, after its authorities had failed to respond to its requests, sent a 
memorandum entitled "Our Church Has Let Us Down" to the Rand Daily Mail in January 1970.169 
In addition to the three earlier recommendations sent to the hierarchy in 1966 and 1968, SPOBA 
protested against the results of the 1969 election to the executive committee of the Roman 
Catholic Church. It regarded it as unfair that one African from Lesotho and four whites should 
be delegated to preside over the issues which affected the Africans. 170 This group also criticized 
the church, the leadership of which comprised a large number of whites and a few number of 
blacks - while in the membership of the whole church, blacks were in the majority. They also 
protested the fact that the education of white children received far more attention than that of 
blacks because a much greater subsidy was allocated to white education. 171 It seemed obvious 
therefore that the Catholic Church was aligning itself with the apartheid policy of segregating 
people on the grounds of skin colour. 
The publication of the memorandum was reported to have embarrassed the church hierarchy -
especially since they had a public reputation for being critical of apartheid policy. Thus, for 
example, Denis Hurley, the Roman Catholic archbishop, disassociated himself from the petition 
and declined to comment when he was requested to do so by joumalists. 172 Because ofhis long-
standing identification with the black struggle, Collins was reported to have been the only white 
among the church hierarchy to have come out in support of the memorandum. 173 
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Because SPOBA often coordinated its activities with those of recognised black activists, its 
protests against church authority were viewed as part of the struggle against the apartheid being 
practised by the Catholic Church. One of the earliest Black Consciousness activists, Drake Koka, 
was among the group which supported SPOBA in a protest march against the conference of the 
South Mrican Roman Catholic Bishops held in Pretoria in September 1971.174 The memorandum 
which was handed to the church fathers by Koka emphasised the fact that blacks in the church 
were being "discriminated against. This memorandum embarrassed the Catholic Church -
especially since it had been viewed as a progressive institution by other sectors ofblack society.175 
SPOBA. also intervened in an attempt to solve a dispute between the rector of St. Peter's 
Seminary, Lebamang Sebidi, and the white members of the staff who undermined his authority, 
especially in the case of the rector's handling of students who were involved with the Black 
Consciousness Movement. 176 This conflict led to the closure of the seminary at the end of 1977. 
Conservative Catholic Church authorities still expected the black members to abide by their rules 
and regulations- even though these rules were considered to be unfair and to favour whites. The 
opinion of the church authorities was that members of the church hierarchy were not expected to 
be involved in extra-parliamentary protest. 177 When the rector, Lebamang Sebid~ and a fellow 
lecturer, Buti Tlhagale, took part in a protest march ofthe clergy to John Vorster Square to 
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protest against the banning of 19 Black Consciousness organizations in October 1977, the church 
authorities were outraged- and this contributed to the early closure ofthe seminary. 178 
The conservative approach adopted at this seminary was designed to stop students from being 
involved politically. 179 One incident which illustrates how the seminary dealt with students who 
were politically active, occurred when a final-year student, Daniel Mthombeni, was expelled from 
the seminary by the rector, Dominic Scholten. His offence was never detailed, even though he was 
then the President of the Student Representative Council. 180 The very procedure of his expulsion 
was questionable and flawed since it took place during his absence from the seminary: he received 
the dismissal note while he was attending a practical course which had been arranged by the 
seminary at Wilgespruit during the June/July holidays of 1971.181 Although this seminary played 
a substantial role in providing the students with enough education for some of them, such as 
Motl~abi, Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, Anthony Mabona, Sebidi and Tlhagale, to have emerged as 
pioneers and scholars in Black Consciousness and Black Theology, the attitudes ofthe Roman 
Catholic Church authorities were cited as among the main reasons for BC criticism of white 
liberals who took it upon themselves to speak on behalf ofblacks. 182 
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Black Theology and the Methodist Church 
A number of black theologians and ministers of the Methodist Church made distinguished 
contributions to the Black Theology of liberation. Ernest Baartman, who headed the Youth 
Department of the Methodist Church in the early years of Black Consciousness Philosophy, 
contributed substantially to the literature ofBlack Theology. Although his articles were published 
in liberal journals such as Pro Veritate, Reality, The Journal ofTheology in Southern Africa, most 
appeared, ironically, in the predominantly black publication, SASO Newsletter. His main criticism, 
echoed by others, focused on the wrong image that the church was projecting to the black 
community. 183 He criticized the church's tendency to give preference to white groups over others. 
This point concerned Moore so much that one of his papers, entitled The Death of Multi-
Racialism and the Emergence ofBlack Theology and White Theology",184 which he read at the 
meeting of UCM in August 1971, was devoted entirely to the segregationist attitudes of 
purportedly multi-racial churches. Baartman argued that, while the majority of members were 
black, whites predominated in leadership roles. 185 This was confirmed by Cedric Mayson, also=a 
Methodist minister, who pointed out that in most cases the presence of the black representatives 
in church governing bodies constituted mere window dressing. 186 Baartman's criticisms were, 
however, more generalised and he avoided a direct attack on the Methodist Church. This suggests 
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that those blacks who operated in white, liberal-dominated institutions could not express 
themselves freely for fear of offending their colleagues and the authorities. Black members of 
such institutions were therefore subjected to double harassment- from their churches and from 
the government. This created strong suspicion in the minds of oppressed people that there was 
a conspiracy between churches and the government to maintain segregationist policies. 187 
The main observation of Simon Gqubule, who was a lecturer at Federal Theological Seminary, 
was that there existed a tacit (or worse) conspiracy between the church and the government when 
it came to race relations issues. He argued that the Group Area's Act, which divided people 
according to their racial identity, could not have succeeded had it not been for the support it 
received from the churches. Since the churches allowed their properties to be repossessed by the 
government and because they agreed to build segregated churches, it was evident that there 
existed a conspiracy between the white church authorities and the government. 188 
Because of the complicity of white Methodist clergy and members, a black counter strategy 
emerged in the Black Methodist Consultation (BMC). 189 According to Kritzinger, this 
Consultation was formed because of the impact which the Black Renaissance had had at St. 
Peter's Seminary near Hammanskraal, a movement sponsored by the South African Council of 
Churches (SACC), the Christian Institute (CI) and the South African Students Organisation 
(SASO), in December 1974. 190 The Consultation was formed by a group ofBlack Methodist 
ministers in response to the directive of the conference that each denomination should establish 
187 
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its own pressure group in order to resist racial discrimination in their respective churches. 
Kritzinger, however, is of the opinion that the central aim of the Consultation, as agreed by all 
delegates, was to promote Black Consciousness philosophy in order to conscientise the black 
members of the Methodist Church. 191 
This Consultation, together with some concerned white ministers, raised dissatisfactions about 
the structure ofMethodism in South Africa, and criticised its subtle support of apartheid policy. 
A petition, which was signed by twenty-five Methodist ministers, mostly theologians who taught 
at universities and seminaries and those who worked in ecumenical organizations such as the CI 
and SACC, was sent to the conference of the World Methodist Council which was held in Dublin 
in August 1976. 192 
Black Methodist ministers also sent another letter of protest to their mother body in response to 
the government's brutal massacre of school pupils which took place first on 16 June 1976, when 
it started in Soweto and spread throughout the country. These black ministers were appalled by 
the fact that the church did not take a strong stance on these issues. The petition asked the 
Council to act on behalf of the black members of the Methodist Church in South Africa, and also 
asked them to pressurise the various governments which had links with South Africa to ask for 
the release of detainees and open up the channels for discussions with banned African political 
organizations. 193 In response to this, the World Methodist Council resolved to support the twenty-
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five signatories. In its statement, the Council stated its unqualified endorsement of any form of 
non-violent action as a means of exerting pressure on the South African government for a 
peaceful change. This was not the first such action taken by the World Methodist Council. In 
1973, it had recommended that the church disinvest its six million rand of investments in firms 
which traded with South Africa. 194 
BC ideology was already incipient within the Black Methodist Consultation. In fact, some 
members, notably Otto Mbangula and Wesley Mabuza (recently ordained ministers), were Black 
Theology and BC activists. 
Black Theology and the Dutch Reformed Churches 
The Dutch Reformed Church policy of creating four separate autonomous churches for the 
whites, Coloureds, Indians and blacks was intended to strengthen theN ational Party government's 
segregation policy. Ernie Regehr is of the opinion that since the three so-called sister churches, 
the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa for Africans, the Dutch Reformed Mission Church for 
Coloureds and the Dutch Reformed Church for Indians, were entirely dependent on the so-called 
mother church, and that by isolating each of the groups, they prevented any cross-fertilisation of 
ideas. 195 Any interaction among the members of the four groups took place only at the highest 
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hierarchical level, which was in the Federal Council ofthe Dutch Reformed Church.196 ln reality 
all policy was dictated to the three "daughter" churches by the white Dutch Reformed Church.197 
Since a!l members of the Dutch Reformed Church lived their spiritual lives in isolation from other 
racial groups in racially segregated churches, serious protest was unheard of until 1962 when 
some concerned white members, such as C.F. Beyers Naude and F.E. O'Brien Geldenhuys and 
others openly questioned the credibility of the policy of the Dutch Reformed Church.198 According 
to Naude, a sizeable number of Dutch Reformed Church members (especially whites) did not 
believe that the segregationist policy, which was followed by the church, contributed to any kind 
of racial tension until this was proven on 21 March 1960 when, in Sharpeville and Langa, the 
South African police shot dead 69 people and wounded hundreds of others as blacks protested 
in a peaceful march against the government's issuing of "passes" for the black women. 199 This 
incident was to become known as "the Sharpeville Massacre" because a number of the people 
who were killed happened to come from Sharpeville near V ereeniging. BC made a point of 
honouring the dead and commemorating the killings thereafter as Heroes' Day. 200 
The Sharpeville Massacre opened the eyes of a small group of Dutch Reformed theologians and 
ministers who felt that white conservatives needed to be educated about the living conditions of 
the majority of(black) South Africans. The massacre also led to the establishment ofPro Veritate 
in 1962, an ecumenical magazine supported by a variety of contributers, including the members 
196 Ibid, p.154. 
197 Colleen Ryan, Beyers Naude: Pilgrimage ofFaith (Cape Town, David Philip, 1990), p.67. 
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of the three "sister" Dutch Reformed Churches.201 Beyers Naude was the main founder of Pro 
Veritate. Nine months after the Sharpeville massacre, mem~ers of the SACC, in consultation with 
its affiliated mother body, the World Council of Churches, called a meeting between 7 and 14 
December 1960 at Cottesloe near Johannesburg. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
what people thought about the terrible and wanton massacre of innocent people. The Transvaal 
Dutch Reformed Church sent Beyers Naude, Geldenhuys and A. G. Geyser as their delegates.202 
At the end of the consultation, a carefully worded conciliatory statement, which was meant to 
encourage some form of change in the church (notably attempts to accommodate some degree 
of multi-racial freedom ofworship and a consultation between churches), was released.203 The 
Dutch Reformed Church disassociated itself entirely from the statement. The consequence ofthis 
statement was that Albert Geyser was tried for heresy because ofhis uncompromising support for 
the resolution. 204 From then onwards the government deeply distrusted the WCC -especially after 
this body decided to exert more and more pressure on South Africa. 205 
The negative response from the Dutch Reformed hierarchy prompted individuals within the 
denomination, like Beyers Naude, Geyser, Willie Jonker and Gert Swart, and various laymen, to 
found the ecumenical journal, Pro Veritate, in 1962.206 The main use of Pro Veri tate was that it 
made accessible for the first time the views of black ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church. 
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Some of them, such as Takatso Mofokeng, 207 Allan Boesak, 208 Sol Selepe, 209 Revelation Ntoula, 210 
and Sam Buti211 were clearly heard for the first time in the pages of this journal. Thus, while for 
decades the international community and some domestic ecumenical groups had protested on their 
behalf, black members within the Dutch Reformed Church began to speak out for themselves 
against their own mother church for the first time from the early 1970s. In this protest one can 
also see the influence of Black Consciousness and the Black Theology of Liberation on people 
in the "sister" churches of the Dutch Reformed tradition (the first article written by the black 
member ofthe Dutch Reformed Church appeared in 1973).212 More importantly, Pro Veritate 
provided a forum and showcase for BC ideas. In so doing, it performed the role of "midwife" to 
207 Takatso Mofokeng, "Hammanskraal en N.G. Kerk in Afrika: Blanke moet alternatiefvir 
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208 Allan Boesak, "Is Apartheid Kerke se Skuld?", Pro Veritate, vol 11, no 10, February 
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the fledgling ideology which was to challenge the so-called mainline churches in South Africa. 
The first real protest of the three "daughter" churches of the Dutch Reformed Church occurred 
when they decided in 1973 to defy the mother church and join the South African Council of 
Churches. 213 This only became possible in 1973 when the position of synod moderator was held 
for the first time in the history of the Dutch Reformed Church by a black person, E.T.S. Bute14 
(Buti's son, Sam Buti, was at the same time elected as a scribe). 215 The synod proposed there-
establishment of one synod for the entire Dutch Reformed Church, and the disbanding of the 
Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Church, since it was a symbol ofapartheid.216 The main 
criticism levelled against the Federal Council was that it possessed ultimate power over the so-
called daughter churches.217 The press also reported incidents of verbal attacks by the ministers 
of the Mission Church and the Reformed Church in Africa. These called for the total integration 
of the church. The most outspoken ministers in this regard of were J.J.F. Mettler from the Cape218 
and Edward Mannikam of the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa. 219 
Sechaba magazine reported in January 1970 that a Malmesbury congregation of about 500 
members defied the instructions of the Dutch Reformed authorities who attempted to force black 
213 
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congregants to recognise white members of the Dutch Reformed Church as their superiors. 220 
This incident marked the end of tolerance among members ofthe various racially defined churches 
in the Dutch Reformed fold. The power politics that were played out in this religious setting 
enormously strengthened and clarified the emergence ofblack resistance and fanned the flame of 
Black Theology. 
In addition to this, a group of African ministers from the three daughter churches formed their · · 
own ecumenical association which they called the "belydende kring" in 197 4. This "kring" (circle), 
according to Kritzinger, was established as a result of pressure from the Renaissance Conference 
in 197 4. 221 Membership was opened to whites within the Dutch Reformed Church. 222 Some Black 
Consciousness-related groups were jubilant about what they saw as an enormous victory, but the 
mother church, at its end ofthe year synod in December 1974, criticized the formation ofthe 
kring and resolved to maintain the segregation of its church according to four ¥Cial groupings 
of whites, Coloureds, Indians and Africans. 223 Its overseas partners, in the Netherlands 
particularly, regarded the kring as the true representative of the Dutch Reformed Church because 
it attempted to represent all four groups of the South African community.224 The krings major 
achievement was that it hosted a meeting attended by the evangeli6ts and the priests of the N.G. q 
Kerk family in February 1976 at the Stofberg Theological School near the University ofthe North 
in Pietersburg. 225 All forms of apartheid which were practised by the church and government were 
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rejected. A proposal was made for the establishment of a new United Reformed Church - even 
if it meant excluding the white church. 226 This meeting boosted the prestige of the black Dutch 
Reformed N.G. Church members who had earlier been accused of collaborating with a racially 
oppressive church. 227 
It became an embarrassment to the mother church that the black section of the Dutch Reformed 
Church identified itself with their fellow oppressed Africans by opting to join the South African 
Council of Churches and forming their own pressure group within the Dutch Reformed circle (the 
"belydende kring")- especially when one of them, Sam Buti, was elected president of the South 
African Council of Churches in 1977.228 They also joined the SACC after they realised that the 
World Council of Churches supported the liberation movements in Southern Africa, particularly 
the ANC and PAC, by granting funds for social and medical supplies.229 
Individual participation 
This research shows that a large number of blacks who supported Black Theology and Black 
Consciousness studied or lived in Europe or the United States of America from the end of the 
1960s to the middle of the 1970s- the peak of the Black Consciousness Movement. 230 This does 
not imply that those who were refused passports by the apartheid authorities to further their 
226 Ibid, p.16. 
227 Mabel Maimela, Interview with Takatso Mofokeng, who attended the Stofberg Meeting 
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studies abroad did not make significant contributions.231 Among these were Ntwasa, one ofthe 
pioneers of Black Theology, as was pointed out earlier in this chapter. He became the director 
of the Project under the auspices of the white liberal-led University Christian Movement. His two 
articles appeared in the Challenge of Black Theology in South Africa, edited by Moore. Ernest 
Baartman also contributed to the literature of the Black Theology at the time when such 
contributions were considered to be dangerously radical. As the head of the multi-racial Youth 
Department of the Methodist Church, Baartman got to know some liberals who had a vested 
interest in race relations. It was to liberal ecumenical publications, such as Pro Veritate, that he 
contributed two articles. 232 One of his articles also appeared in the Journal of Theology in 
Southern Africa.233 Both articles were explicit defences ofBC ideas and agendas. They posited 
political strategies which were carefully justified in religious terms. 
Those who had the privilege of studying abroad acquired skills and confidence while they were 
away from South Mrica, which they were able to use when they returned, and some of them 
became the force behind the Black Theology ofliberation. 234 Those who were prominent between 
1970 and 1977 were (notably) Manas Buthelezi, Stanley Mogoba, Simon Gqubule, Desmond 
Tutu and Allan Boesak. They rallied to Black Theology as a manifestation of Black 
Consciousness because it was the only black liberation organisation which was still allowed to 
operate legally in South Africa. 
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For the purpose of this research I shall focus only on two contributors, namely those of Manas 
Buthelezi and Desmond Tutu. The former represented those who contributed to producing 
literature on Black Theology, while the latter represented those who became activists in Black 
Consciousness activities. I have chosen Buthelezi and Tutu to draw attention to the fact that their 
involvement caused their passports to be withdrawn. This is evidence enough of the importance 
of their contributions, which, according to Beyers Naude, were recognised not only by 
oppressed African community but also by the whole world. 235 
Both Buthelezi and Tutu became internationally well known and, as a result of international 
pressure from heads of state and influential international organisations, they were both spared the 
harsh treatment that they might have received had they not been so widely known. 
Manas Buthelezi and Black Theology 
Historically, it was always a privilege for an African to be a Christian because it opened the door 
to an education. 236 Buthelezi's father was an evangelist of the Lutheran Church in Natal and it was,, 
there that his son received an education, eventually qualifying as a teacher. He eventually left the 
teaching profession and became a minister of religion in the Lutheran Church. He completed his 
postgraduate degrees in the United States, where he obtained a Ph.D. in Systematic Theology at 
Drew University, New Jersey, in 1968. During the period in which he studied in the United States, 
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he was deeply moved by the spirit of national protest among African Americans in the Civil Rights 
Movement, which was followed in tum by Black Power and the Black Theology of liberation. It 
became obvious to him that he should use what he had acquired abroad to spread Black Theology 
in South Africa. 
Buthelezi was one of the leading black theologians during the formation of the Black Theology 
in the 1970s. His writings, which dealt with a variety of topics relating to apartheid policies, were 
published in liberal ecumenical journals and magazines. The Journal of Theology for Southern 
Africa published four of his articles between 1973 and 1977.237 Three articles were also published 
in Reality in 1973 and 197 4, 238 and four articles appeared in the radical ecumenical journal Pro 
Veritate between 1973 and 197 6. 239 Finally, the South African Council of Churches journal, South 
African Outlook, published a number of his articles in which he criticised the Dutch Reformed 
Church and the predominantly conservative German Lutheran churches. 240 
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He also delivered papers at major conferences on Black Theology in South Africa and 
internationally. In South Africa, two of his outstanding papers were read at the exclusive 
Conferences on Black Theology, and they created great interest in the subject among Africans. 
His first paper was called "An African Theology or a Black Theology". This was delivered at a 
conference hosted by the UCM in Wilgespruit in February 1970. Two years later, the article was 
included in a book, Essays on Black Theology in South Africa, 241 together with some articles 
which he had produced on Black Theology for other conferences. He read another highly 
commended article, "The Christian Challenge ofBlack Theology", at the Renaissance Conference 
held at St. Peter's Seminary near Hammanskraal in December 1974.242 
As the director of the Christian Institute in the Natal reg10n where he was based in 
Pietermaritzburg from 1973 to 197 5, he used his position to act as a spokesperson for the African 
oppressed. The central purpose in all his writing was to expose the double standards of the South 
African Christian community as a whole. 243 He was critical of the white community for its 
support of apartheid policy in spite of its professed Christian beliefs. 244 His direct criticisms of the 
government infuriated the National Party and caused the government to act against him- all the 
more so because many of the civil servants in the government Department of Bantu 
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Administration were Lutherans, the denomination to which Buthelezi belonged. 245 (This situation 
had arisen because German missionaries had lived with Africans on mission stations and so had 
learned African languages.) Buthelezi and others were resentful of the fact that the descendants 
of missionaries had become supporters of apartheid. 
In December 1973 Buthelezi was banned for "harbouring Communist ideas", according to a 
report which appeared in Pro Veritate. 246 The banning meant that he was prohibited from 
engaging in public activities such as preaching, teaching, writing and travelling outside South , i' \ 
Africa. 247 Although this banning was supposed to have been effective for five years, the 
government had to modify its position because of national and international condemnation of 
Buthelezi's banning. Some hours after he was banned, his first cousin, the then chief councillor 
of Kwa-Zulu, Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi, issued a strong warning to the South African 
government. 248 This happened while Mangosutho was away in Addis Ababa attending the 
Conference on African-American dialogue on 7 December 1973.249 The Christian Institute, the 
South African Council of Churches, 250 and Lutheran Church, through the international Lutheran 
World Federation based in Geneva, put pressure on the German government to request the South 
African government to unban Buthelezi. The Journal of Theology for Southern Africa. of which 
Buthelezi was the chairman of the board, in its editorial for March 1974, joined the chief minister 
of Kwa-Zulu in condemning the ban. This unexpected pressure caused the South African 
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government to lift its ban on Buthelezi before the expiry date. This sudden lifting of the order 
shows that while the South Africa government prided itself on resisting pressure from foreign 
countries, it sometimes acceded to diplomatic intervention. In recognition of his anti-apartheid 
work, Buthelezi was awarded an honorary degree by the American Lutheran Seminary, the 
Wardburg Theological Seminary, in Dubuque, Wisconsin, on 8 May 1975.251 
Buthelezi also had a role in important community activities. His role as one of the pioneers of 
Black Theology in South Africa caused him to be called as a witness during the trial of various 
SASO and Black People's Convention (BPC )defendants, which was 
held in Pretoria in 1976 for their role in organising the VIVA Frelimo Rally planned in 1974.252 
The other significant contribution which Buthelezi rendered was his service on the Soweto 
Committee ofT en, which was founded after the June 197 6 Soweto uprising. This committee held 
ongoing discussions with the government authorities over the education crisis in black schools 
across the country.253 
Desmond Tutu 
Desmond Tutu was brought up in a variety church denominations- Methodist, African Methodist 
Episcopal and the Anglican254 - and this made him different from the other black political activists 
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in South Africa, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, when blacks tended to be anti-liberal under 
the influence of the Black Consciousness movement. His moderate approach to conflict resolution 
is reported to have been influenced by white liberals, and especially by Trevor Huddleston, whose 
role I already discussed in this chapter. 255 
Tutu became one of the first Africans to use moderate language in his advocacy of the Black 
Theology of liberation. Unlike Manas Buthelezi, whose literary contributions were made 
accessible through publications, Tutu's output was not available to the public between 1970 and 
1977. One of the most liberal academic journals, the Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 
was able to publish one article which he had written while he was an associate Director for the 
Theological Education Fund of the World Council of Churches.256 This article was obviously 
aimed at a European audience because the theme was the role played by missionaries who were 
deeply critical of African beliefs and culture as they attempted to convert blacks to a Western-
style Christianity. 257 This shows that even though Tutu was far removed from the Black Theology 
scene, being stationed as he was in Europe from 1972, he was still inspired by the spirit of African 
Theology. Simon Gqubule exaggeratedly suggests that Tutu was involved with Black Theology 
as early as 1961.258 
As the Associate Director for the Theological Education Fund, Tutu travelled in many non-
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Western Countries and was therefore exposed to the Liberation Theology ofLatin America and 
Black Theology of liberation in the United States. Both concepts, in Shirley du Boulay's 
observation, built up Desmond Tutu's self-esteem and shaped his own theological and political 
consciousness. 259 When he returned to South Africa in 1975 as the Dean of StMary's Cathedral 
in Johannesburg, Tutu began vigorously to support Black Consciousness philosophy and Black 
Theology. In his speeches and sermons he carefully blended religion and politics and the result 
was a personally unique Black Theology of liberation in a South African setting. His main 
criticism of the apartheid government was directed at its notorious removals policies between the 
late 1950s and the early 1960s, and he made special reference to District Six in Cape Town and 
to Sophiatown in Johannesburg- where he had once lived.Z60 The importance ofSophiatown for 
the Africans who lived there was that they owned the land from which they were forcibly 
removed, and this had had a devastating psychological effect on them since it meant that they 
were stripped of the basic human right to own property. For Tutu and other members ofthe 
Anglican church, Sophiatown was their religious sanctuary because the Community of 
Resurrection had a house there which was headed by Trevor Huddleston.Z61 Tutu was also highly 
critical of the government's policy of migratory labour because it broke up African families.Z62 
While he was gradually drawn to Black Consciousness philosophy, Tutu did not abide by its 
exclusivist principles. He continued to involve concerned white liberals in the pursuit of solutions 
to the racial tension which were the underlying cause of apartheid. This attitude sometimes 
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created uncertainty about Tutu's commitment to Black Consciousness philosophy in Black 
Consciousness circles.263 In a meeting in January 1976 Tutu addressed the regional group ofthe 
South Mrican Institute ofRace Relations and cautioned them for having taken a neutral position 
when racial tensions were about to explode. 264 In so doing he was pointing to a greater political 
radicalism which required more commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle by liberal 
organisations. 
His most distinguished contribution in the area of the struggle for liberation, however, was his 
engagement in discussions with the government at a time when it was not prepared to debate any 
issues with members ofblack communities. One ofTutu's most important initiatives was his letter 
to the then Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, on 6 May 1976, a month prior to the 16 June students' 
uprising which started in Soweto.265 According to Tutu, the situation around the high schools in 
Soweto was becoming explosive- and he warned the government to act to avoid disaster. 266 He 
felt that the prime minister could have averted a possible revolution by recognising the right of 
urban blacks to permanent residence in so-called "white" South Africa, by repealing pass laws and 
calling for a national convention which would include the recognised leaders of the black 
community. 267 
Tutu also acted as a spiritual father as he attempted to console and encourage victims of the 
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apartheid system. He was reported to have been encouraged in this role by liberal colleagues 
within the Anglican Church, such as Aelred Stubbs, who had known leaders of the Black 
Consciousness Movement such as Biko.268 In this capacity Tutu encouraged Leo Rakale, an 
Anglican priest, to travel to the Northern Transvaal to Lenyenye to visit Mamphela Ramphele 
who had been banished to this rural area by the apartheid government. 269 In his desire to keep 
contact with the banned Africans, Tutu visited their families in defiance of the government's 
orders. One of these visits was to Winnie Mandela in Brandfort in the Orange Free State. He was 
reported to have administered holy communion to her in the street. 270 It was in the same spirit of 
defiance and in obedience to his religious beliefs as an Anglican priest that Tutu used to conduct 
the funerals ofvictims of the apartheid system for Anglicans such as Biko. 211 While members of 
other denominations also made a contribution to the Black Consciousness Movement, evidence 
shows that members of the Anglican Church, such as Biko, Pityana, Moloto and Ntwasa, made 
a major contribution. 
The South African Council of Churches' and the World Council of Churches' anti;. 
apartheid agencies 
One of the major ecumenical bodies consistently to oppose in South Africa abuses ofhuman rights 
based on theories of racial supremacy was the World Council of Churches (WCC), to which the 
South African Council of Churches ( SACC) was affiliated. 272 They first protested most vigorously 
268 Du Boulay, Tutu: Voice ofthe Voiceless, p.102. 
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in 1960 after Sharpeville when delegates from WCC met at Cottesloe near Johannesburg in 
December. Several denominations discussed the racist tensions which had caused the senseless 
shooting of peaceful demonstrators against immoral pass law. From then on, the WCC in 
collaboration with the internal structure of the SACC and the liberation movements operating in 
exile, played a leading role in exposing the apartheid system of govemrnent.273 One of the most 
important resolutions adopted was at the Fourth Consultation held at Uppsala in 1968, where the 
assembly supported the formation of the Programme to Combat Racism. It was this consultation 
which agreed to support liberation movements financially in Southern Africa and assist them with 
humanitarian programmes that provided legal, educational and medical aid. 274 A sizeable number 
of member churches from the Western World, such as Britain and the United States, were 
opposed to the making these grants because they alleged that the programme would promote 
violence in the region. 275 
The overwhelming majority of the member churches in the WCC from African, Asian and South 
American countries did, however, support the grants276 - a fact which demonstrates how non-
Westem groups in international forums were emerging to challenge the supremacy of the West. 
A follow-up consultation on this matter was held in May 1969 at London's Notting Hill and was 
attended by many of the most influential personalities in the anti-apartheid movemene77 - among 
273 Kenneth Sansbury, Combatting Racism: The British Churches and the World Council of 
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274 . Clarence W. Hall and Dr. A.H. van den Heuvel, "Controversy: Reader's Digest and WCC 
Resolution?", Pro Veritate, vol 10, no 11, March 1972, p.3. 
275 Sansbury, Combatting Racism, pp. 14-19. 
276 
"Controversy: Reader's Digest and WCC Resolution?", Pro Veritate, p.3. 
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them people such as Tambo and Huddleston. 278 Abdul Minty, secretary of the London-based anti-
apartheid movement (and a South African), and Seretse Choabi, the director of the Luthuli 
Memorial Foundation based in Botswana, lent weight to the meeting. They were reported to have 
been among the strongest supporters of the project. 279 It is believed that they were the ones to 
suggest that the wee and its member churches should apply sanctions against corporations and 
institutions which were doing business in racist South Africa. It was further suggested that should 
the boycott fail, the churches should support resistance movement. 280 The black theologians from 
the United States who supported the principles ofBlack Power ideology also played a vital role 
in convincing the consultation of the importance of the Programme to Combat Racism. 281 
This new concept was discussed again at the meeting of the central committee ofWCC held in 
Ethiopia in January 1971, which endorsed funding of the programme to the tune of five-hundred 
thousand US dollars from a special fund of the organisation. The project was introduced in 1971 
because the United Nations had declared that year to be one of action against racism and the 
elimination of all forms of segregation. 282 In South Africa, just as in Western countries, according 
to Archbishop Denis Hurley, the SACC protested against the establishment of the Programme to 
Combat Racism (PCR). The SACC resolved not to send its annual subscriptions to the WCC but 
decided to retain its membership of the organisation. 283 
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The SAee was antagonistic to the wee for two reasons. The leaders ofSAee during the period 
under discussion were conservative white liberals, and, no matter what ideology they held, they 
were anxious to avoid confrontation with the Nationalist government. The government had been 
extremely critical of the decision of the wee to finance liberation movements (even partly). 
Secondly, according to Wolfram Kistner, a member of the executive of the SAee from the mid 
1970s to the late 1980s, the views of African members within the SAeC were hardly ever heard 
because they constituted a minority. It was the rise of Black Consciousness and the Black;' 
.J lt((t_ 
Theology of liberation in the 1970s that caused a change of mind in the wec?84 It has been 
pointed out that it was indeed BC influence that caused black members within the SACC seriously 
to reconsider their association with an organisation which they perceived to be supporting 
apartheid. Blacks were becoming articulate in support of the liberation movement.285 
Although it seemed that tension was brewing between the SACC and wee over this issue, warm 
relationships continued to exist between individual liberals within the organisation and the parent 
body. But their views were generally suppressed and hardly ever heard. One of them, Edward 
Crower, the Anglican bishop ofKimberley and Kuruman, called on the church to support guerrilla 
forces which were operating in Southern Africa. As a result ofhis call he was expelled from South 
Africa in 1972.286 A large number of the priests who held South African passports had them :· 
withdrawn and non-South Mrican citizens were simply deported. The highest number of 
deportations occurred in 1971 - a year during which ten priests were deported. 287 This happened 
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mainly because many priests were among the protesters who were angered by the detention of 
twenty-two blacks for political reasons in April 1970.288 
Apart from supporting and giving comfort to individuals, the WCC also encouraged extra-
parliamentary organisations such as the Christian Institute, which continued to articulate the plight 
of blacks living under the apartheid rule.289 
The WCC's consistent and unrelenting criticism of the evils of apartheid and their pleas for 
humanitarian aid to the liberation movements, influenced many members of the SACC to 
reconsider their attitude to the organisation. The WCC continued (mainly through correspondence 
and contributions to the SACC's publications such as Weekly EcuNews and the quarterly journal, 
Kairos) to influence opinion in South Africa through the SACC.290 Sometimes, messages of 
encouragement and support for the political liberation movements softened the opinion of 
ecumenical leaders in the country. Thus, for example, in a new year special message, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Michael Ramsey, praised those organisations which had been 
courageous enough to support the victims of apartheid . This message was well received, even 
by John Rees, the general secretary of the SACC, who was known for his opposition to any kind 
of support for the liberation movements. 291 Contacts such as these, and the gruesome political 
realities of the time, forced people to take sides and resulted in a change in the mindset of the 
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white liberal-led organisation. New attitudes began to form in the minds of individuals and these 
began to influence the SACC as a whole. Rather unexpectedly, the SACC sent two of its 
representatives, Dr Alex Boraine and Rees, together with nine other members from various 
denominations who were members of the SACC, to attend the WCC Conference that was held 
between 22 and 29 August 1973.292 The visit benefited both the SACe and the wee in the sense 
that while African and Asian members of the wee were reluctant to accept these South African 
delegates because only one black person was a member of the delegation, they were recognised 
as being true representatives of the oppressed after they had unequivocally stated their total 
opposition to apartheid policy.293 
Another positive consequence of the attendance by the SACC delegation at the wee Conference 
was that Dr Lukas Vischer, head of the Faith and Order Commission of the WCC, paid a visit to 
South Africa in March 1974 for discussions with members ofvarious ecumenical organisations 
- including the SAC C. 294 His visit seems to have encouraged the SACC to seek dialogue with 
important anti-racist organisations. Two months after Vischer's meeting, a delegation of the 
SACC which comprised both black and white members, attended the All Africa Conference of 
Churches (AACC), held in Zambia. For the first time since the exile of the liberation movements, 
delegates were able to "dialogue" with the leaders of (what racist South Africans called) 
"terrorists" in that country.295 This visit also profoundly influenced the views of the white-led 
liberal ecumenical body. They came to appreciate more and more that whites in South Africa had· 
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to make radical, credible and irrevocable moves towards racial and human justice (i.e. universal 
and not whites-only "democracy") if they hoped to avoid serious confrontation with blacks in the 
future. 
The SACC used its annual conference in July 1974 to encourage what was termed "conscientious 
objection to military service" and denounce (compulsory white) military conscription. The 
leadership of the SACC challenged the government and condemned it for making national military 
service compulsory for whites only. 296 While this statement was directed at the government, other , 
denominations supported a call for universal military service on the grounds that young white men 
were being called up to fight their fellow black citizens who had joined the liberation movements 
as "freedom fighters" (what the apartheid government's propaganda machine called "terrorists"). 
The SACC received more support on this issue from the black communities as they identified the 
call as support for the liberation struggle being waged on the country's borders. 297 Although a 
large number of whites in general were either indifferent or openly opposed to the call for 
conscientious objection to military service, the impact of the statement was overwhelming. In this 
conference, and in the annual conferences that followed, according to Kistner, discussion about 
South African racial injustice and institutionalised apartheid, tended to top the agenda.298 From 
this time onwards, blacks also constituted a majority in the SACC, and it was thus natural for 
them to focus on issues of racial, religious and political justice. 
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This chapter has examined the crucial role that was played by white liberal (but non-South 
African) clergymen in exposing the evils of the apartheid system of government and its racist 
ideologies. In spite, however, oftheir outspoken courage, committed action and fervent protests, 
uncompromising and ruthless reaction from the government and a lack of grass-roots support 
from ordinary citizens and religious circles within the country ensured that their protests would 
ultimately be ineffectual in the medium term. The government reacted to all protest by becoming 
ever more vindictive and decisive in clamping down on what they regarded as a threat to the 
"security" of South Africa- while ignoring the massive threat to the peace and good governance 
of the country that their own narrowly based racism was eliciting. 299 
After Black Consciousness emerged in South Africa in 1968, freedom fighters and ordinary 
citizens looking for justice looked more and more to the Black Theology ofliberation which was 
being inspired and informed by the ideals and aims·of American Black Power and a groundswell 
of political protest in South Africa. Most African theology students at the various segregated 
seminaries for blacks were also members of Black Consciousness and these students began to 
become ever more sophisticated in the obvious connections between white-sponsored racism and 
the political, social and economic symbiosis between church and state in South Africa. Together 
with African theologians such as Manas Buthelezi, Desmond Tutu, Simon Gqubule, Ernest ; · 
Baartman and others refined Black Liberation theology as a means of raising the awareness of the 
oppressed masses of South Africa. It was thus that the WCC's influence on the individuals within 
the SACC began to pay dividends. Because of continual pressure from black (and a few 
outspoken white) members within the council, the SACC was forced to reform itself and show 
299 Worsnip, Between the Two Fires, pp.39-72. 
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that it was sincere and unequivocal in its opposition to the institutionalised racial segregation that 
had been practised in South Africa for so long. 
103 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATIONAL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS AND THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS ORGANISATION 
This chapter will review the protean history of the relationship between the National Union of South 
African Students (NUSAS) and the South African Students Organisation (SASO), and will show how 
the failure of NUS AS as an organisation to radicalize its ideology in time to accommodate the 
realities of the black liberation struggle, led Steve Biko to take the lead in founding SASO after the 
NUSAS July Congress of 1967. The chapter will also demonstrate how the relationship between 
individuals in the two organisations and the organisations themselves, were a microcosm of the 
paradoxical and symbiotic relationship between white liberals and BC - symbiotic because BC was 
increasingly forced to rely on white liberal support as the apartheid government systematically 
destroyed BC structures and support bases wherever they could identifY them, and paradoxical 
because it was one the foundations ofBC ideology (as articulated by Biko himself) that black people 
could only liberate themselves from centuries-old white domination and suzerainty by not relying in 
any way on white support and solidarity. 
This chapter will locate further evidence of the paradoxes of this situation in the transformation which 
SASO occasioned in NUSAS itself. At first SASO became a mirror in which the self-satisfied 
complacency of many white students of the 1960s and 1970s was disagreeably reflected back to 
themselves. Later SASO implicitly and explicitly challenged NUSAS to examine the roots of its own 
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eurocentric racism and assumptions of cultural and racial superiority. At first this angered many 
whites, but later, after many false starts and reversals, which this chapter will detail, SASO (and the 
BC ideology which it embodied) became the means whereby NUSAS was able to rehabilitate itself 
(in the decade of the 1970s) from the underlying racism that was, and, sadly, still is, in many people, 
the toxic heritage of the European colonial and imperialising mentality. The ultimate paradox 
therefore (of which the relations between NUS AS and SASO serve as a prophetic microcosm), is that 
the despised and maltreated black people of South Africa were able, eventually, to liberate white 
people (a few to begin with, and many later) from the profound immorality oftheir own long-
acquired attitudes of racism and cultural egocentricity. 
The founding of SASO in 1968 reflects the wider failure of white-dominated organisations to 
accommodate on any meaningful scale the harshness of the realities of the black struggle for liberation 
from the stranglehold of centuries of European colonisation and imperialisation of the African 
subcontinent. Biko attended his first NUS AS Congress in July 1966, and it was immediately apparent 
to him that the NUSAS that he saw at that July congress of 1966 would never be able to act as a 
vehicle for disseminating the kind of radical black liberationist ideology that would free black people 
from the iniquities of apartheid rule. By 1966, the National Party government had been in power for 
eighteen years, and by then it must have been obvious to even the most complacent and ill-informed 
observer that the severity of oppression of black people in their own country would only increase in 
scope and magnitude as the years passed. Not only did the government give no sign that they were 
willing to accommodate genuine black aspirations for freedom and majority rule; as the years passed 
they deliberately cracked down more and more savagely on any signs of dissent - until their policy 
of repression and their resistance to any form ofblack majority rule culminated in the death ofBiko 
himself 
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It was Biko himself who realised that black people would never be able to free themselves from the 
blatantly racist agenda of apartheid if they did not divorce themselves completely from historical 
white liberal organisations such as NUSAS. It is difficult to realise, even with hindsight, how pivotal 
Biko's realisation was in the history of the struggle for black liberation. What confused the issue in 
most people's minds (both black and white) is that the racist attitudes of white colonists who had 
settled in Southern Africa from 1653 onwards, had always been offset by a small minority of whites 
who opposed racism in all its forms. Such white liberals raised their voices individually and sometimes 
collectively against racial and imperial injustice, and even on occasions took part in founding multi-
racial and liberal organisations such as the Liberal Party and NUSAS itself 1 
However laudable the aims and intentions of such organisations may have been, it was clear to Biko 
and to the founders of BCM in South Mrica, that they were essentially impotent to either attract 
large-scale black support or to undermine white resistance in South Africa to the policies of racial 
domination and white superiority that the National Party government was consolidating ever more 
efficiently as the years went on. Biko also saw that the majority of white South Africans were too 
isolated from black suffering, too set in their centuries-old attitudes, and too insulated from the 
extreme suffering of the great mass of black people (especially those in rural areas), to ever be 
amenable to any form ofrevisioning or radicalization. Biko saw that the majority ofwhite people 
were merely too complacent, too ignorant, and too comfortable to offer black people the kind of 
radicalliberationist ideology that could attract the attention of the black masses. It was this Damascus 
Road realisation (at the NUSAS annual conference of July 1967) that led Biko to refine his 
1 Aelred Stubbs (ed.) Steve Biko: I Write What I Like (London, Penguin, 1988) pp.34-40. 
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ideological agenda and to found SASO, the BC student organisation that was dedicated to the BC 
ideal that black people had to take charge of their own liberation- without intervention or support 
from white liberals, however well disposed or supportive they might be. 
Biko also instinctively realised (and articulated ever more clearly, until the day ofhis death) that the 
kind ofbenign but paternalistic liberalism of an older generation of white liberals such as Alan Paton 
and Edgar Brookes, which believed in a gradual upliftment of the black majority by means ofliberal 
education based on a liberal European model, would never generate the momentum needed to shake 
the foundations of white minority rule -let alone attract the attention of the mute, suffering masses 
ofblack people. It was this realisation that spurred Biko to refine his Africanist Black Consciousness 
philosophy, a philosophy that embodied the ideal that blacks should wrest control of their collective 
destiny from the hands of paternalistic white liberals, and that they - without any white support -
should free themselves from white racist domination and control. 
These BC ideals, so clearly articulated by Biko, were the spark that ignited the fires within South 
Africa that ultimately led to the conflagration of civil unrest among blacks that persuaded the South 
African government, from the mid-1980s onwards, that the indigenous people of South Africa could 
not be indefinitely controlled on a mass scale by police and military brutality, repression and the 
techniques of security police surveillance, detention, torture, intimidation and murder. Although Biko 
himself became the most famous victim of security police brutality when he died from injuries 
sustained while in police detention, his prophetic insight and intellectual brilliance led him to see 
through the confusing tangle of white liberal sentiment in organisations such as NUS AS and to define 
the path ahead. (A subsequent chapter will examine in detail the events and consequences that 
surrounded Biko's detention, torture, death, and the infamous commission of enquiry into Biko's 
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death that sparked outrage and indignation around the world.) 
This chapter examines in detail the relationship between NUSAS and SASO because NUSAS was 
the largest and most influential multi-racial liberal students organisation in existence after 1948 (the 
date of the National Party's accession to power), and because SASO was born out of Biko's 
disillusionment with the efficacy of white-dominated liberal organisations as instruments for the 
attainment ofblack liberation in South Africa. Biko (as did many other black revolutionaries) started 
his political career in earnest when he became a member ofNUSAS and attended the annual congress 
in July 1967. Since Biko was a student at the time at the Medical School of the University ofNatal, 
he was able to observe at first hand both the (largely paternalistic) liberalism and the (essentially 
racist) conservatism that characterised the student body of which he was a part, and this led him, in 
the few years until his death, to become South Africa's leading exponent of the BC agenda. 
The intricacies of the contacts and relationships between black and white students, first in NUS AS, 
and later between NUSAS and SASO, are a microcosm of the larger picture as it developed in the 
sixties, seventies and eighties, and they are relevant to the central themes of this research because they 
reflect, often with great clarity, the paradox of the mutual and symbiotic relationship between white 
and black liberals- in spite ofthe BC tenet that blacks could only liberate themselves without white 
assistance. The reasons for this paradoxical state of affairs (examined also in detail in other chapters) 
are perhaps more historical than ideological. 
As Biko and others articulated BC ideas ever more clearly, the National Party government felt ever 
more threatened and compromised, at first locally, but, after Biko's death, by mounting waves of 
international protest and boycott. As the government felt more threatened, it cracked down ever more 
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systematically on individual liberals and organisations such as NUS AS and SASO. But while NUSAS, 
in the 1960s, may not have presented much of a threat to the white minority government's claim to 
legitimacy and representivity, BC ideals, as embodied in organisations such as SASO and as 
articulated by Biko, represented more than a threat. SASO and BC, as fearful racist whites were 
quick to see, were harbingers of the demise of white racist minority rule in South Africa. Majority 
rule, in the collective mind of the Nationalist Party, was synonymous with a holocaust in which all 
white people in the subcontinent would be slaughtered - and this, logically, would mean the 
disappearance of all "civilization" and "civilized values" in South Africa. 
In the fear-ridden and apocalyptic imagination of the white racists in South Africa, black majority rule 
meant the destruction of all whites and the consequent disappearance of all the narrow sectarian 
values (the "norms") that they held so dear. It would also mean, perhaps more pertinently, the 
disappearance of the luxurious life style enjoyed by whites and financed for so long by an underclass 
of black menial labourers who were disenfranchised in the land of their ancestors. When the 
apparatchiks of the security police began fully to absorb (but not fully understand) Biko's insistence 
that black people could only liberate themselves, they interpreted this to mean Biko was advocating 
the destruction of white people and "white" civilisation. (Some of BC's more fanatical followers 
placed a similar construction on Biko's strategic thinking.) What most racists of all colours failed to 
appreciate (and some still do) was that Biko's insistence that black people could only liberate 
themselves was not a racist statement, but rather a far -sighted enunciation of the only possible 
condition for black liberation at the time. Although Biko was probably about as far removed from 
being a racist and a fanatic as any human being could be, he was a political strategist of unparalleled 
insight, intellectual acumen and prophetic vision. It is the purpose ofthis research to demonstrate that 
some of the popularizations ofBC ideology are not accurate, and that what was really happening was 
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far more complex and nuanced than populist misinterpretations would have us believe. 2 SASO was 
Biko's brainchild, his vehicle for transmitting his vision and methodology to the mute and suffering 
masses, and since SASO was born out of black student disillusionment with NUSAS's ability to 
accommodate a workable vision for black liberation, it is to an examination of the often confusing 
and perplexing relationships between NUSAS and SASO that we will now tum our attention. 
When SASO was established in 1968 and inaugurated in 1969 at the University College of the North 
(Turfloop ), one reason for its formation, according to those who helped to found it, was that they 
were increasingly despondent about multi-racial organisations which were historically dominated by 
white liberals. 3 The proponents of this move argued that, since blacks were usually in the minority 
and also disadvantaged in the sense that they were often unable to express themselves properly in 
English, they could not participate fully in such liberal organisations. 4 This be.came a major obstacle 
for those blacks who were attempting to play a full role in these organisations, 5 and was cited by Biko 
as the main reason for founding SASO. It is hardly surprising that NUS AS was criticised in this way, 
for it was the largest multi-racial student organisation in South Africa, and, as such, it was the initial 
political home of those students who, inspired by Biko, were soon to break away from NUS AS to 
form their own organisation. It is important to bear in mind that the founders ofSASO had previously 
been members ofNUSAS and that it was there that they had acquired a knowledge of the practices 
2 See, for example, David Howarth, "Complexities of identity/difference: Black 
Consciousness ideology in South Africa", Journal ofPolitical Ideologies, vol2, no 1, 1997, 
pp.SS-60. 
3 Henry Isaac, "The Emergence and the Impact ofthe Black Consciousness Movement", in 
Ikwezi, December 1976, p.10. 
4 Steve Biko, "Our Strategy for Liberation", in Christianity and Crisis, vol37, no 22, January 
1978, p.329. 
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and policy of this liberal students organisation. 6 Their subsequent disillusionment with NUS AS may 
also account for much of the tone of acrimony, bitterness, resentment and betrayal that one often 
senses in the sources which recount the complex contacts between the two organisations. 
NUSAS is probably one of the oldest multi-racial students organisations to have initiated, in a spirit 
of reconciliation, a number of deliberate political campaigns after the end of the Second World War. 
The most important of these was (ironically, in view of later events) the campaign to end 
discrimination against blacks. 7 lt was during this period that students who were members ofNUSAS, 
especially a significant number from the University of the Witwatersrand, took up the cause of 
encouraging blacks to join the organisation. 8 The group from the University of the Witwatersrand 
included members such as Brian Bunting and Ruvin Bennun, both of whom were members of the 
Communist Party of South Africa. 
Another organisation which added impetus to this movement was the Federation of Progressive 
Students, formed from the amalgamation of several students organisations such as the Young 
Communist League, the Zionist Socialist Youth Party, Hashomer Hatzair, the Youth Section of the 
Jewish Workers Club, the Progressive Asian Club, and the African Youth League. Ruth First, a 
leading activist who supported the inclusion of the blacks,9 was so active on behalf of these causes 
that she became one of the earliest white activists to oppose the implementation of apartheid 
6 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Gail Gerhart's Interview with Steve Biko, Durban, 24 
October 1972, pp.l-8. 
7 Benjamin Kline, "The National Union of South African Students: A Case-Study of the 
Plight ofLiberalism 1924-1977", in The Journal ofModern African Studies, no 23, 1985, 
pp.l44-145. 
8 Bruce K Murray, "The Second War and the Student Politics at the University ofthe 
Witwatersrand", in South African Historical Journal, no 29, November 1993, p.209. 
9 Ibid, pp.209-288. 
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principles, and one of few white women to be incarcerated for 117 days in terms of the security 
legislation which the government had especially designed to imprison political dissidents without trial. 
Eventually, after much persuasion from family members and close friends, First chose to leave South 
Africa on an "exit permit" in 1963. 10 The measure of her contribution to the struggle against racism 
and apartheid may be gauged from her tragic death while in exile in Mocambique: she was killed by 
a parcel bomb sent from South Africa in September 1982. 11 It was only fifteen years later, during an 
amnesty application by the security policeman, Craig Williamson, that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) finally heard the truth about who had murdered Ruth First. In evidence heard by 
the commission, Williamson admitted his involvement in planning various acts of sabotage against 
ANC properties and the murder of members of the ANC in exile. Ruth First was one ofhis victimsY 
When NUS AS incorporated African issues and agendas into its programmes, many blacks hoped that 
NUSAS might carry the banner for their political struggle, and so many of them, as Biko pointed out, 
were attracted to NUSAS during the 1960s, prior to the establishment ofSASO in December 1968.13 
It was therefore with great disappointment that black students eventually realised that NUSAS was 
not functioning effectively or convincingly as the vehicle of their political aspirations, 14 and their 
intense disillusionment was the reason why so many of them criticised NUS AS so persistently in the 
years which followed. 
10 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993), 
pp.76-77. 
11 Frances Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988), 
p.130. 
12 Pretoria News, 3 March 1999, p.2. 
13 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Interview with Biko, p.2 
14 Ibid, p.4. 
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Among other things, this chapter will analyse the early policies ofNUSAS as it opposed National 
Party-sponsored legislation which institutionalised discrimination against blacks in the 1950s. It is 
important to begin this analysis in the early 1950s because most of the problems which led to the 
founding of SASO originated during this period. The discussion will also include NUS AS's early 
reactions to SASO and the eventual influence of SASO on NUSAS policy. 
NUSAS expresses its concerns over black politics 
NUS AS's earliest policies were based on a desire to function as an apolitical organisation which 
would exercise itself in the prosecution of educational affairs, especially those relating to universities. 
It was therefore primarily designed to be an organisation that campaigned for the achievement of 
educational freedom. 15 In Benjamin Kline's opinion, NUS AS confined itself to the ideal of educational 
freedom because the majority of its liberal supporters were reluctant to give moral and financial 
support to an organisation which might openly and aggressively criticise segregation policies.16 
Support for these narrow aims came from liberals such as Leo Marquard, its founding member and 
first president, who had a particular interest in constitutional law, as well as from Edgar Brookes, 
who believed in evolutionary change to real democracy. 17 
Inevitably, however, racial issues became the central agenda of the organisation after the 1948 general 
15 William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, "The Aspiration 
to a Just Society", Al931/ cb6, pp.l-2. 
16 Kline, "The National Union of South African Students", in The Journal ofModern African 
Studies, p.140. 
17 Edgar Brookes, "NUSAS", in Reality, vol 7, no 5, November 1975, p.8. 
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election which brought the Nationalists into power. Students were moved by outrage to defend what 
they believed was a violation of the United Nations Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights when, 
in 1953, the National Party introduced segregation into education with the passage through 
parliament of the Bantu Education Act, the main purpose of which was to introduce segregated 
schools for blacks. 18 From 1954 onwards, therefore, members of NUSAS protested against the 
implementation of segregationist laws by sending petitions to the relevant authorities, organising 
deputations, and by holding demonstrations and initiating protests of various kinds. 19 
NUS AS's first significant protest was launched in December 1954 when its executive issued a lengthy 
statement condemning the government's apartheid policies. This statement, in which NUSAS 
reiterated its commitment to a policy of integration of white and black students, was released to the 
press and constituted an important challenge to the government. In it, the organisation expressed its 
belief that the integration ofboth racial groups would promote a spirit of understanding between the 
two student communities. 20 Later, in April 1957, the president ofNUSAS, Ernest ("Ernie") M. 
Wentzel, wrote an open letter to the Minister of Education, J.H. Viljoen, in which he protested the 
introduction of the Separate University Education Bill.21 His protest was endorsed by liberal 
organisations such as the Institute of Race Relations, which worked jointly with NUS AS on some 
issues, 22 and it gave NUS AS a degree of credibility among blacks since it defined NUS AS as part of 
18 Kline, "The National Union of South African Students", in The Journal ofModern African 
Studies, p. 141. 
19 John Daniel, "A History ofNUSAS in Action", in South African Outlook, vol104, no 
1232, January 1974, pp.3-9. 
20 
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21 William Cullen Library, University ofWitwatersrand, Johannesburg, Ernie Wentzel's letter 
to J.H. Viljoen, E7, AD.1158, p.l 
22 William Cullen Library, The University ofWitwatersrand, E.M. Wentzel to the Editor of 
Race Relations News, 27/3/1956, E7, AD/1158, p.1 
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the anti-apartheid and anti-nationalist section of the South African society.23 One should not, 
however, conclude from this that it was NUSAS policy to be actively involved in political activities 
since, at the same time, NUS AS was avoiding any involvement with extra-parliamentary organisations 
such as the Congress of Democrats and the Charterists. In fact, this very isolation from such 
progressive African movements caused some sectors ofthe South African black community to believe 
that NUSAS was gradually withdrawing and isolating itself, even at that time, from the mainstream 
of resistance politics. 24 
Subsequent to Wentzel's letter, six petitions from NUSAS were sent to parliament, and one of these 
requested that parliament permit itself to be addressed by the chancellors and vice chancellors of the 
universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, who, in the opinion ofthe student body, were 
representative of student concerns. 25 These two universities were chosen because their students were 
generally more inclined towards liberalism and progressive attitudes and were, on the whole, more 
actively involved in protest than were other South African universities at the time. As a result of 
demonstrations like this against the Extension ofUniversity Education and Transfer ofFort Hare Bill, 
NUSAS received widespread support from countries in Scandinavia, Europe, North and South 
America and Africa. 26 
At this stage, however, NUSAS was not in favour of involving itself fully in political activities. 
23 Kline, "The National Union of South African Students", in The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, p.l41. 
24 Reginald Nkosana Dzingwa, "SASO and SASM in Protest Politics 1960-1977", B.A. 
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25 Daniel, "A History ofNUSAS in Action", p.4. 
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Instead, it focused on the defence of academic freedom. This decision caused deep disappointment 
and disillusionment among NUSAS's black members, who had expected NUS AS, logically perhaps, 
to focus more and more on political issues central to South Africa. It was because of their 
disappointment, for example, that the Fort Hare University College students disaffiliated themselves 
from NUSAS between 1954 and 1957_27 
The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), whose role will be detailed later in this chapter, was 
the driving force behind the disaffiliation, believing as it did that it was unwise for blacks to be a part 
ofNUSAS since it was part of the fabric of"white imperialism". 28 The remaining black colleges, such 
as Pius XII in Lesotho, Hewat Training College for Coloured Teachers in Cape Town, the Pretoria 
Bantu Normal College, and the University ofNatal Non-European Section, were not affected by the 
withdrawal of Fort Hare, probably because NEUM was not strongly represented in these centres.29 
The withdrawal ofFort Hare from NUSAS between 1954 and 1957 emphasised the attitudes of the 
various sectors of the student community: while white students felt that their protest should be 
confined to the issue of academic freedom, black students were appalled by the fact that racial issues 
were not being adequately addressed. However, as apartheid legislation and practice became more 
and more repressive, and as pressure from international student organisations became more intense, 
NUSAS was more or less compelled to become ever more deeply involved in promoting black 
political aspirations. 30 
27 Baruch Hirson, Year ofFire. Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolts. Roots ofRevolution? 
(London, Zed Press, 1979), p.65 
28 lbid.p.65. 
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NUSAS and the black struggle between 1960 and 1967 
A series of events then took place between the years 1959 and 1960 which propelled NUSAS 
(whether willingly or unwillingly) to become more deeply involved in wide-ranging political activities 
- although outwardly it continued to expend most of its time pursuing its original policy of defending 
academic freedom. The Separate University Education Bill of March 1957, the Extension of 
University Education Bill and the Fort Hare Transfer Bill of 1958 had all passed through the Senate 
by June 1959 and were signed into law. 31 As a result, these laws were implemented in January 1960 
with the opening of the University College of the North, which was designed to cater for Sotho 
(North.::rn Sotho, Southern Sotho and Tswana), Tsonga and Venda speakers. In the same way, the 
University College ofZululand was for Zulu speakers; Durban-Westville was for Indians, and the 
University of the Western Cape was for Coloured students.32 ln pursuance ofthe same policy, Fort 
Hare was taken over as an institution for Xhosa speakers. 33 The students from these newly established 
colleges affiliated to NUS AS even though they were forbidden to do so by segregationist laws which 
envisaged that they would form their own separate student organisations. 34 
It was in the same year, 1960, that two major events, although unrelated to education specifically but 
significant enough not to be ignored by students, took place. On 21 March 1960, what was quickly 
to become known as the Sharpeville Massacre occurred and a number ofblacks were killed by police. 
31 
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The demonstrations which led to the massacre were organised by the Pan Africanist Congress and 
were part of a campaign to protest against the issuing of identity documents to black women. 35 
Because of the ensuing wave of international outrage against the killings and (by implication) against 
South Africa's racial laws, which had been the proximate cause of the massacre, the Nationalist 
government decided on a strategy to counteract this criticism. In an attempt to demonstrate how 
widespread was its internal support among the white electorate, the government called a national 
referendum to determine whether South Africa should remain within the Commonwealth as a Union, 
or whether it should become an independent Republic. 36 
The reaction ofNUSAS to these events was dramatic, and it was from this point on that NUSAS 
began more vigorously to oppose a government which they felt was becoming increasingly repressive. 
Furthermore, the Union had been outraged by the disturbing events which had taken place at the 
University College ofFort Hare. When the University College of Fort Hare, an institution with a 
proud history, was incorporated under the aegis of the Department ofBantu Education, considerable 
protest erupted, not least on the campus itself Its Principal, Professor Z.K. Matthews and four other 
lecturers resigned, 37 "rather than submit to a government directive to renounce his allegiance to the 
African National Congress".38 In addition, six other members of staff and the registrar were all 
summarily dismissed. Sixteen students were refused readmission, ten of them on the grounds of 
political activism. 39 Moreover, the Student Representative Council (SRC) was dissolved in protest 
against the new constitution which was imposed by the university's administration without any form 
35 Kline, "The National Union of South African Students", The Journal ofModem African 
Studies, p.l41. 
36 Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms, p.54. 
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39 
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of consultation. 40 Other students (apart from those directly involved in the protests) were also 
subsequently refused admission because of continuing unrest and protest on the campus. These 
injustices, combined with the effects of the Sharpeville Massacre, caused NUS AS to look for new 
ways and means to assist those black students who had been expelled to continue their studies 
privately. As a means to this end, NUS AS formed the South African Committee for Higher Education 
(SACHED).41 
The government responded to the events following Sharpeville by introducing a state of emergency 
in April1960, and various forms of protests at English-langauge universities inspired a large number 
of students, hitherto apathetic, to join NUS AS as members. About 600 students at the University of 
Natal, Pietermaritzburg, demonstrated in the streets. This was followed by an organised student 
march at the University of the Witwatersrand, and demands were made for the release of university 
students and staff from detention. 42 In 1960 solidarity began to develop between black and white 
students as they engaged in joint protest, mainly against the government's implementation of 
educational segregation. This cooperation at a grassroots level gave newly established black 
universities the impression that NUSAS was supporting their cause, and so, as Legassick suggests, 
NUSAS membership by black students increased from 1960.43 
Generally, the history of NUSAS involvement in black politics from 1960 to the mid 1960s was 
interpreted positively from a black perspective. The reason for this was that, after the two major 
40 H.J. Simons, Struggle in Southern Africa for Survival and Equality (London, Macmillan, 
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African liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC), had been banned in April 1960, NUS AS was one of the main liberal institutions in South 
Africa to speak out on behalf of oppressed blacks. When NUS AS therefore celebrated fifty years of 
its existence, the organisation was applauded for its role in South African political history while the 
trend among other English-speaking South Africans was increasingly to withdraw from political 
protest and direct involvement in effective opposition against the apartheid government. 44 It has also 
been suggested that NUS AS, because of the radical opinions held by successive presidents such as 
John Shingler, Adrian Leftwich, Jonty Driver, Maeder Osler and Ian Robertson, became an 
organisation which could not be ignored. 45 This research, however, argues that it was during the 
presidencies of both Adrian Leftwich (1961-1962) and Jonty Driver (1963-1964) that NUSAS's 
programme was radicalised. Their two successors, Maeder Osler and Ian Robertson, it will be argued, 
merely followed in the footsteps of their predecessors. 
NUSAS under the leadership of Adrian Leftwich (1961-1962) 
NUSAS organised numerous demonstrations at its affiliated English-speaking universities and were 
supported in this by progressive liberal institutions such as the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR). 46 Since it was a student organisation, NUSAS's activities tended to be more 
radical than those of other progressive organisations. 47 Three weeks into 1961, Adrian Leftwich, in 
44 
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his capacity as president of NUS AS, delivered a powerful address to a meeting which had been 
sponsored by the SAIR.R. In his speech he presented the results of research which he and his vice-
president for international relations, Hugh Lewin, 48 had conducted in December 1960, to determine 
the implications of Bantu Education policy for blacks. 49 
Under Leftwich's presidency an attempt was made to establish a close relationship between NUSAS 
and black tertiary institutions, especially the newly established and totally segregated black 
universities. Tharni Mhlambiso, who was the president of the SRC at the University ofNatal Non-
European Section, was also the vice-president of NUS AS in 1961 and 1962. The correspondence 
between Leftwich and Mhlambiso shows that, on issues relating to discrimination against blacks, 
Leftwich had consulted Mhlambiso and acted on his advice. 50 Nine years after Leftwich's presidency, 
this principle of consultation with blacks had became a cornerstone of the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM). 51 
During his presidency ofNUSAS, Leftwich attempted to bring the newly established black student 
organi~ations, the African Students Association (ASA) and the African Students Union of South 
Africa (ASUSA), which were in conflict because of ideological differences, into the liberal union.52 
48 Legassick, The National Union of South African Students, p.47. 
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One section of ASA membership supported affiliation to NUS AS, while the other opposed it. 53 This 
split originated in AS A's association with the ANC, which embraced the policy of multi-racialism that 
had been adopted at Kliptown, on 26 June 1955, as part of the Freedom Charter. 54 According to an 
interpretation from within BCM itself, the group which supported the affiliation represented moderate 
opinion among students while the other group represented radical opinions within AS A. 55 ASUSA, 
the PAC wing, with its radical stance against integration with multi-racial organisations, was strongly 
opposed to affiliation with NUS AS. 56 Sometimes conflict erupted on black campuses as these two 
groups competed for dominance. 57 When the leadership ofNUSAS took the initiative by intervening 
in the dispute between ASA and ASUSA, some black students began to believe that NUSAS was 
trying to undermine those black organisations that were not interested in joining it. 58 These disputes 
were still being debated in 1963, during the presidency of Jonty Driver, and in later years BCM 
adopted these views as a standard part of their critique ofNUSAS. 59 60 
Both ASA and ASUSA were active at the Universities of the North and Zululand.61 While Leftwich 
recognised the importance of involving blacks in the mainstream ofNUSAS activities, he seemed on 
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occasions to prefer involvement with blacks who were less assertive or aggressive. 62 He often invited 
black students who were not members of the SRC to participate in Union activities- provided that 
their interests did not conflict with those ofNUSAS. 63 From private correspondence, it has been 
established that two delegates, Molepo and Marenga from the University of the North, who were not 
on their respective SRCs, 64 were often chosen to attend NUS AS annual conferences - although this 
was in breach of the constitution. 65 (According to the NUS AS constitution, only a member of an SRC 
is eligible to participate at a national level. 66) 
Leftwich's choice of the delegates who were to attend the Maker ere Seminar held between 29 March 
and 8 April 1961 tends also to substantiate the perception that he sometimes avoided black student 
leaders of radical persuasion. 67 Private correspondence shows that an outspoken student from the 
University ofNatal Non-European Section, one Rajah, whose full identity is unknown but who was 
perceived as posing a radical threat, was not invited. Leftwich instead invited Thumba Pillay, from 
the same university, to represent the black students because he was a moderate.68 Actions such as 
these began to discredit Leftwich, the leadership and the Union itself 
62 Harry Oppenheimer Centre of African Studies Archives, Adrian Leftwich, 
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On a positive note, however, 1961 was characterised by continuous NUSAS protests, and their 
purpose was to keep reminding the apartheid government ofliberal disapproval of its interference in 
academic freedom. 69 In the spirit of protest, NUS AS supported the call of the Progressive Party for 
a National Convention in April 1961. According to Jennifer Scott, the universities of the 
Witwatersrand, Rhodes, Cape Town and Natal rallied behind a call for a National Convention which 
would be attended by all population groups in the country.70 
The passage of the General Laws Amendment Act (the so-called Sabotage Act) in 1962, which, as 
Helen Suzman has pointed out, gave the government power severely to curtail civil liberties and 
human rights by placing people under house arrest, 71 triggered various protests in English-speaking 
universities affiliated to NUSAS, and about 2 000 staff and students from the University of 
Witwatersrand and 800 from the University ofNatal in Durban and Pietermaritzburg participated.72 
This particular act, which proved to be the cornerstone of the government's repressive legislation, 
was not only opposed by the students, but also caused concern and anger among progressive groups 
in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. These protests were widely reported in the English-
language press, especially in the Cape Argus and the Sunday Times.73 
In the same year, 1962, NUSAS took yet another step which proved its commitment to the cause of 
black protest. At its July Annual Congress, Chief Albert Luthuli (the President of the ANC) was 
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elected as the Honorary President ofNUSAS. 74 He was the only black person ever to be elected to 
this post, and it was one in which he remained until his death in 196 7. 75 As if to emphasise their 
support for the black cause and challenge the government's Sabotage Act, the student body at the 
University of the Witwatersrand elected a banned black student, Dennis Brutus, to the SRC in August 
1962.76 At the University of Cape Town, Thaele77 was elected as head woman student ofUCT.78 
Adrian Leftwich's commitment to African affairs was demonstrated by the fact that he became the 
first NUSAS president to associate closely with blacks. On one of his visits to the University of the 
North, he dined with blacks and used the same sleeping accommodation as they did.79 ln any normal 
society, this fact would not be worthy of mention, but because racial issues continued to permeate 
the fabric of South African society, Leftwich's behaviour became a talking point in the student 
community, 80 more especially since the white delegates who accompanied Leftwich did not do the 
same. Leftwich tended to be more accommodating to blacks than the average liberal-minded white 
person of the time because, as Martin Legassick has observed, he enjoyed the support of a handful 
of black students in the NUS AS executive, namely Templeton Mdladlana, Kennie Parker, Bala 
Mudaly and Mhlambiso. 81 Mhlambiso was known to be influential and strongly involved in student 
political activities and, as a result, had been refused readmission to Fort Hare in 1961.82 Although 
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Leftwich's speech earned him great respect from fellow students and other liberals, he was banned 
by the government and NUS AS continued to become more and more radicalised. 83 Also, apart from 
being a card-carrying member of the Liberal Party, Leftwich was also a member of the African 
Resistance Movement (ARM), which engaged in acts of sabotage between 1962 and 1964.84 
A number ofNUSAS members such as Hugh Lewin and Baruch Hirson, who was reported to have 
had some knowledge of explosives, were also active in ARM. 85 Leftwich was severely criticised, 
mainly by white liberals, when he agreed to tum state witness during the trial of some members of 
ARM, including that of John Harris, who was executed for planting a bomb in the corridor of the 
white section of the Johannesburg railway station. 86 His involvement in ARM caused Leftwich's 
dismissal from the Liberal Party in November 1964.87 It is interesting to note that criticism of 
Leftwich came mainly from the white population, who were opposed to ARM because it was 
committed to the use of violence as a way of achieving political goals. 88 On the other hand, blacks 
supported the use of violence as a political means because they were beginning to realise that violence 
might be the only option left to them if they were ever to obtain their freedom. 
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NUSAS under the leadership of Jonty Driver (1963-1964) 
While the years 1961 and 1962 might be characterised as the period when NUS AS established strong 
links with the black universities and also accommodated old black members such as Mhlambiso from 
historically white universities by taking their views seriously, the years 1963 and 1964 may be seen 
as the period ofNUSAS1s re-assessment. During this time, its members pondered the problem of what 
might be done to provide educational alternatives to meet the needs of dispossessed black students. 89 
This kind of transformation was carried out under the leadership of Jonty Driver, the president of 
NUS AS from 1963. He, with Leftwich1s strategy of involving blacks in issues of common concern, 
was instrumental in radicalising the organisation by pushing for new programmes. He attempted to 
enlist the cooperation of AS USA members, especially in its strongholds at the University ofthe North 
and the University ofZululand.90 Other black campuses with which NUSAS kept contact were the 
Univer2ity College ofFort Hare and the University ofNatal Non-European Section.91 
The presence of assertive blacks in the NUS AS executive by 1963 was, in Neville CurtiS1S opinion, 
a contributory factor which led to a re-assessment process in the Union. Curtis argues that it was 
some of these black members, people such as Mewa Ramgobin, who exerted pressure on NUS AS 
to cater for the needs of oppressed Africans. 92 This then explains why, at the beginning of 1963, 
NUS AS reported the introduction of new programmes, such as the local and regional leadership 
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training programmes, which preceded the National Seminar in April each year.93 These ideas were 
endorsed by the National Student Association in the United States, which thought that the 
programme might be more effective than the schedule which had been followed up until then (the 
annual meeting during the July Congress).94 This sentiment was echoed by the NUSAS executive 
which believed that both the leadership training programme and the national seminar would 
compensate for any deficiencies in the annual July Congress. 95 
Another reason why NUSAS changed its policy was because of international pressure from overseas 
students who criticised NUS AS for not playing a more active role in exposing apartheid. 96 It was also 
reported that the black students who were associated with NUSAS, but who were studying outside 
South Africa, or who visited Europe and the United States to represent the Union, such as Lovemore 
Mutambanengwe, who served as an Assistant Secretary for Africa, and Billy Modise, who was 
studying in Lund, Sweden, were severely critical ofNUSAS's inability or unwillingness to include 
blacks in its leadership.97 
By the beginning of 1963, NUSAS was already far more radical in its campaign in defence of 
educational freedom. This was evident when delegates to the annual NUSAS conference marched 
with Indian high school students in Johannesburg to protest against the proposed removal oftheir 
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school to an area determined according to the racial plan of the government.98 Similarly, students at 
the University ofNatal boycotted meals for a number of days when an African clergyman was denied 
permission to enrol at the university by the Minister ofEducation.99 NUSAS memoranda were sent 
abroad to expose the kind of education which was being taught in the tribal colleges and in schools 
under the aegis of Bantu Education. 100 
In preparation for Affirmation Day, scheduled for May 1963, NUS AS sought to rally support from 
liberals who had made a public stand against apartheid policies. In March 1963, Monica Wilson, 
Edgar Brookes, Edward Roux, Guy Butler, Alan Paton, Helen Suzman and Donald Molteno were 
informed ofNUSAS's intention to fight apartheid. Their request for support was not only confined 
to those who held liberal opinions. They consulted with the leadership of the ANC, Chief Albert 
Luthuli and Oliver Tambo, and both ofthese supported the NUSAS initiative. 101 This was followed 
by NUSAS's first national seminar, which was held at Botha's Hill near Durban in April 1963. The 
agenda of the seminar was designed to elicit strong anti-government feeling. 102 The idea was born 
that, in May of each year, NUS AS would sponsor what became known as the Day of Affirmation 
ceremony, a ceremony during which people could reaffirm their commitment to academic freedom 
and human rights for all. Archbishop Dennis Hurley, the Roman Catholic Archbishop ofDurban and 
dedicated human rights activist, was the main speaker at this first seminar. 103 
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This kind of protest was a clear threat to the government which, in turn, launched a major attack on 
NUSAS. In August 1963, the prime minister, John B. Vorster, described NUSAS and its activities 
as "a cancer in the life ofthe nation". 104 He further accused NUSAS ofbeing a wing ofthe African 
liberation movement. 105 These accusations were given prominence by the pro-government South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), and the combined effect of this counter-attack resulted 
in the resignation of200 students from NUSAS at the University of Cape Town.106 The purpose of 
this campaign was to split NUSAS and destroy its credibility among students. John Daniel, who was 
actively involved in the organisation at the time, observed that these attacks on NUSAS contributed 
to the defeat of a number ofNUSAS candidates in SRC elections at English-language universities. 107 
The government's attack on NUS AS was so effective that at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
a campus on which NUS AS enjoyed considerable support, a former Pretoria University student, Raux 
Wildenboer, who had enrolled at the University of the Witwatersrand at the beginning ofl963, polled 
more votes, for example, than the well-known liberal candidates, Derek Bostock and Alan Murray. 
108 
The effectiveness of Vorster's attack and the undoubted efficacy of a relentless barrage of 
propaganada from the SABC gave conservative students a reason to believe that they might play a 
more prominent role in NUSAS. Thus, Gerrit van Zyl from the University of Cape Town, and Reinier 
Schoeman from the University ofNatal in Durban, began to be involved in NUSAS affairs from 1964 
onwards. 109 When Biko saw this trend, he divined (correctly) that NUS AS was tilting towards greater 
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conservatism. 110 Despite the intimidating and demoralising conservative presence within the Union, 
pressure from black students and international student organisations forced NUSAS to continue its 
policy of keeping in contact with black universities. Their efforts were not always fruitful because 
they were harassed by radical members of ASUSA who strongly believed that NUSAS was causing 
compromising divisions among black students at universities. 111 
The impact ofinternational pressure on NUS AS continued to affect radical students within the Union. 
Thus, Jonty Driver, president of NUSAS, delivered a speech in April 1964 which annoyed the 
essentially white conservative audience to whom it was addressed. Part of his speech reported on the 
Pan-African Student Seminar held in Dar-es-Salaam in January 1964. 112 Delegates from East, Central 
and Southern Africa criticised NUSAS for retaining its apolitical and conservative membership and 
failing to engage in revolutionary action. 113 What must have alarmed the white audience, in particular, 
was Driver's call for NUS AS to operate underground. 114 This opinion, which was revealed some years 
later, originated from the black caucus, notably Mewa Ramgobin. 115 Conservative members within 
the Union roundly condemned what they called an "inflammatory" speech116 and the consequence was 
the disaffiliation of the University ofNatal in Durban in May. 111 Driver was also personally censured 
by the student assembly at the July Congress, and was thereafter detained by the government in 
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August. He left the country in September. 118 
One of the projects initiated by NUS AS was the introduction of a prison education programme in 
May 1964.119 This programme was a response to the mass arrests ofthe 1960s when a sizeable 
number of school-going students were detained as political prisoners. The relatives of prisoners and 
concerned individuals in Cape Town helped to organise the scheme, of which NUS AS became the 
trustee. 120 Neville Alexander points out that the scheme was never given a chance to function without 
interference from government authorities. 121 Financial assistance from progressive organisations, such 
as some churches and Christian Action, of which Canon John Collins was chairperson, was 
forthcoming. This was Collins's second such project in South Africa. Earlier he had been involved in 
the International Defence and Fund Aid, which assisted victims and families of the Sharpeville 
shooting, as well as others who were political prisoners, and their families. 122 
Since the scheme was under the directorship of some ofthe older generation ofliberals such as Alan 
Paton, some applications were turned down because there were personal clashes and animosities 
between some of the applicants and some of the directors. 123 Since the government also felt 
threatened by this scheme (because it was helping activists whom the government wished to destroy), 
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they decided to target and harass the administrators of the scheme itself Two years after the 
introduction of the Education Scheme, the firm of the attorneys, Hayman and Aronsohn, was raided 
by the security police and Ruth Hayman was banned. 124 Furthermore, prison authorities forbade 
prison students to register for subjects such as political science and history - or any postgraduate 
studies. 125 Although the scheme operated under stressful conditions, a number of prominent figures 
were able to benefit from it. When Robert Sobukwe, the P AC's first president, registered for his law 
degree at the University of South Mrica (Unisa), he received financial assistance from NUSAS's 
Education Scheme. 126 
The government's attempt to curb NUSAS activities by targeting individual leaders 
During the latter part of 1964, and in the two years which followed, the government launched a 
decisive crack down on NUSAS's leadership and this attack crippled it entirely.127 The government 
justified themselves on the ground that some members ofNUSAS were also members of the African 
Resistance Movement. This was illogical since only four members were also members of ARM (Hugh 
Lewin, Leftwich, Baruch Hirson and Neville Rubin). 128 Both Leftwich and Rubin were no longer 
direct participants as they functioned as honorary presidents for NUS AS. In actual fact, they had been 
voted out of their posts in NUS AS after it had been ascertained that they were also active members 
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of ARM.I29 
The following examples illustrate the manner in which NUSAS and its sympathisers became targets 
of an unceasing campaign of security police harassment, raids and intimidation. One such raid was 
carried out on 4 July 1964 when David de Keller, an alleged member of ARM, 130 and a UCT delegate 
to the NUSAS Congress, was detained while attending the Congress. This action intimidated other 
congress delegates - precisely the effect that the government intended. Elsewhere, on the same day, 
Leftwich, Ernie Wentzel, Lewin, John Lloyd and Norman Bromberger were also detained. 131 
The South African government did not hesitate to use foreign right-wing governments to obtain help 
in tracing and_ arresting its victims. Rubin, for example, was detained by the Portuguese authorities 
while he was visiting Mozambique. Driver was detained in August just a few hours before his 
departure from the country. 132 Some students at Rhodes, Tony Carter, Gillian Cane, David Sobey and 
Gavin Trevellyan, managed to escape to Swaziland in September. 133 Thereafter, their whereabouts 
remained unknown. 
Of all the people detained, only four, namely David Keller, Anthony Trew, Stephanie Kemp and Alan 
Brookes, were ever charged with sabotage carried out while they had been members of ARM.134 
These four were sentenced inN ovember 1964. Although no evidence exists to prove that the NUS AS 
leadership ever engaged in subversive acts, the government nevertheless banned a number of 
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academics from English -speaking universities in 1965 because they were thought to have supported 
NUS AS in one way or another. 135 In addition, NUS AS's legal adviser, Ruth Hayman, was detained 
in March 1966. Until that point, the government's bannings and detention ofNUSAS leaders were 
carried without being challenged by students in any way. However, after the banning ofits president, 
Ian Robertson, in May, 136 students were so outraged that a delegation met the minister of justice, 
Vorster, in an attempt to ascertain the reasons for Robertson's banning. 137 
The government's disruption ofthe activities ofNUSAS through the banning of its leadership was 
calculated to harm the organisation's programme and they achieved precisely that effect. The only 
significant contribution made by NUSAS during these difficult years was when, at the annual 
congress of 1965, the Assembly agreed to invite the American Civil Rights leader, Martin Luther 
King Jr. and Democratic Senator Robert Kennedy, to the 1966 NUSAS Day of Affirmation ofHuman 
Freedom. 138 Although both accepted the invitation, Martin Luther King Jr. was refused a visa to enter 
the country. Kennedy, however, did attend, and his visit refurbished, if only for a short while, 
NUS AS's seriously tarnished image. 139 
It was at this point (May 1966) that the government banned Robertson, the elected president of .. 
NUSAS. This banning order was put into effect just a month before Senator Kennedy's arrival in 
June, and was designed to embarrass Robertson and the NUSAS leadership (the invitation had been 
issued in Robertson's name). One may deduce from Robertson's banning that the proposed visit by 
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Kennedy enraged the government, believing, as they did, that no one, apart from themselves, should 
ever "meddle in politics" (a favourite phrase ofNational Party politicians). 140 
Kennedy's visit to South Africa was supported by most black communities and was welcomed in 
liberal circles. 141 One of the first groups to have discussions with the senator were the black 
journalists. The meeting was attended by Lawrence Mayekiso (Rand Daily Mail), Harry Mashabela 
(The Star), Theo Mthembu and Goodwin Mohlomi (£ost), and Leslie Sehume, Manase Moerane and 
Simon Mogapi (The World). 142 Kennedy's visit to Soweto on 8 June 1966 was interpreted as a sign 
of solidarity with Africans and he was given a warm welcome. 143 In his speech in Soweto, Kennedy 
encouraged the victims of apartheid to resist and strive for change. 144 On the day before his Soweto 
visit, he paid a visit in Durban to the president of the banned ANC, Chief Albert Luthuli. 145 W.F. 
Nkomo was, on this occasion, one of the Africans to express his gratitude at Kennedy's visit to 
Soweto, and he pointed out that the senator was a true democrat who did not discriminate in terms 
of colour. 146 While Kennedy was able to meet those who were opposed to the policy of apartheid, 
the government refused to have any contact with him for it believed that his invitation by NUS AS was 
"defiant and provocative". 147 
Although there was an increase in the number ofblack affiliates to NUSAS between 1962 and 1964, 
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the pattern changed in 1965. It has also been established that black students began to lose interest and 
have serious doubts about NUS AS at around about this time, mainly because the Union was tending 
to become more and more conservative. 148 This was one ofthe reasons why, in August 1965, the 
black section of the University of Natal disaffiliated itself from NUSAS, although they re-affiliated 
three months later. 149 
The effect of the breakaway from NUSAS by black students 
Black students who were members ofNUSAS were at this stage becoming increasingly dissatisfied 
with what they regarded as the non-committal role which NUSAS played in the liberation struggle 
for all the black people of South Africa. As early as 1962, Mhlambiso had expressed his doubts about 
the organisation. 150 According to Paul Pretorius, black students became so profoundly dissatisfied 
with NUS AS in 1964 and 1965 that they began to make allegations that the Union's leadership had 
virtually no prospects of ever changing or altering government policy or structure. 151 This sentiment 
was echoed by Neville Curtis when he suggested that the Union commit itself specifically to a policy 
of ideological liberalism rather than maintain the "open-ended ideology" which was prevalent at the 
time. 152 This advice could not have been more pertinent to NUS AS in the 1960s as it increasingly fell 
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under the spell ofboth many newly elected conservative leaders at campus and national level, and its 
own widespread conservatism at a grassroots level. Black students therefore began to be convinced 
that, while elements within the leadership might continue to show an interest in accommodating black 
aspirations, conservatives at the national level would ignore such initiatives and ensure that they 
would fail at both local and regional levels. 153 
What was then obvious to black students was that the Union was regressing towards the right, and 
they began to realise ever more clearly that the only option left open to them was to break away to 
form their own organisation. But this could not be done until a leader appeared who combined 
exceptional intelligence, unusual charisma, unshakeable determination and extraordinary qualities of 
leadership. All these qualities seem to appear in the person of Steve Biko in the late 1960s.154 It was 
after Biko had attended his first NUSAS congress in July 1966 that he was able accurately to 
diagnose the major problem that beset black students in the NUSAS context. 155 According to Gail 
Gerhart, Biko was able to see that while the organisation professed the principles of integration, this 
was anything but the case in reality. 156 
If Biko had any doubts about NUS AS's genuine commitment to the principles of "multiracial 
organisation", these must have been dissipated during the 1967 NUSAS July Congress when white 
and black members were allocated racially separate sleeping accommodation. 157 Since such racist 
arrangements were standard practice at NUSAS congresses, the black students decided to use it as 
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the pretext for breaking away from the Union. 158 They caucused among themselves and formed a 
committed group to attend the non-racial, non-denominational University Christian Movement 
I 
(UCM) conference, which was scheduled to be held shortly after the NUSAS congress. After the 
UCM conference, Biko gathered what he called the remnants of ASA and ASUSA to determine what 
their position was before they formed an exclusively black students organisation. 159 
At a conference held at Stutterheim in 1968, black students agreed to form an organisation of their 
own, one that would accommodate their aspirations and address their problems. 160 After four months, 
the South African Students Organisation ( SASO) was born in December 1968. It was during this year 
that NUSAS waged a protest against the government's refusal to sanction the appointment of an 
African, Archie Mafeje, to a senior lectureship at the University of Cape Town. 161 The protest 
comprised students from the Universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand and Rhodes, and from the 
newly established University Christian Movement (UCM) under the leadership offiasil Moore.162 One 
might interpret this to mean that, while the rift was widening between politically sophisticated black 
students and NUSAS, the Mafeje issue excited protest because it constituted an interference in the 
academic freedom ofthe University of Cape Town. 163 
It may also have been a protest designed to dissuade black students from deserting NUSAS to form 
their own movement. It is also conceivable that white radical forces, especially within the UCM, were 
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extremely concerned that the anti-apartheid campaign would fracture into warring factions, racially 
divided and therefore politically neutralised. 
Tensions between NUSAS and SASO 
From the very founding of SASO, serious tensions erupted between NUSAS and SASO, and a 
hostility evolved between the two students organisations which was to last for about one and half 
years, especially at grassroots level. 164 This was a difficult time for SASO as a newly established 
organisation since it tended to work by trial and error in order to prove itself to its followers - from 
whom it needed unqualified support if it hoped to survive. It was also during this time that SASO 
radicalised its policies towards NUSAS so as to gain the support ofthe majority ofblack students, 
especially those radical black students formerly represented by the African Students Union of South 
Africa (ASUSA) and personified in the person of Aubrey Mokoape. 165 It was for this reason that 
SASO denied that NUS AS had the right to speak on behalf of oppressed groups. 166 Although SASO 
did not recognise the Union as its mouthpiece, it was careful enough to recognise it as a national 
students organisation in order not to silence it altogether or inadvertently push it into the arms of 
conservative forces. 
SASO made a tactical decision to recognise NUS AS at this early stage, chiefly so as to ensure its own 
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survival as a viable organisation. By recognising NUSAS, the leadership also hoped to avoid a 
definite split in black student allegiances since it was known that some black students, especially a 
number from the University ofthe North, were loyal supporters ofNUSAS and had strong ties with 
the organisation. 167 It has been pointed out before that one of the most influential personalities in 
students politics at the University of the North, Pat Machaka, was a close friend of the NUSAS 
president, Duncan Innes. 168 Innes and his vice-president, Horst Kleinschmidt, planned to maintain ties 
with the University ofthe North by admitting Harry Nengwekhulu, a member ofSR€ and a SASO 
affiliate, to the NUSAS executive. 169 
Curtis also suggests that SASO recognised NUSAS because the presidents of the two student 
organisations, Biko and Curtis, had consulted and decided some time before it was officially 
announced that this would take place so as to ensure the survival ofNUSAS, which was reported to 
be dramatically losing popularity when the two presidents conferred. 170 The deal between Biko and 
Curtis demonstrates that, although a widespread perception existed that the two organisations were 
implacably opposed to each other, a pragmatic relationship nevertheless existed at the leadership 
level. However, because of grassroots opposition from SASO members, this agreement did not last 
for longer than a year. A resolution to withdraw recognition from NUSAS was passed at SASO's 
annual congress in July 1970.m This withdrawal of recognition (in spite of a prior agreement at the 
highest level) shows that the hostility between the two organisations had become irreparable. This 
point will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
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On the other hand, NUSAS was in a serious dilemma as it tried to come to terms with the idea of 
having been rejected by the very blacks for whom it felt it had been fighting while other English-
speaking liberals had already withdrawn from the fray. 172 NUS AS's official position was reflected in 
a motion which was passed at the NUSAS Annual Congress in July 1969: as an organisation it 
refused to recognise the validity of SASO. 173 This motion had been carried partly because of pressure 
from notable liberals such as Donald Woods, Alan Paton and Leo Marquard. Woods, who was later 
to become a close friend of Steve Biko and who made a column available for Black Consciousness 
(BC) opinion in the Daily Dispatch, the East London-based newspaper of which he was editor, made 
it clear that the advisory panel would not support NUSAS ifit recognised SAS0. 174 This seems to 
suggest that the real aim ofthe advisory panel was to have some direct control over the organisation 
rather than merely to serve as advisors. Were it not for this meddling in its affairs, the Union might 
have been able to recognise SASO shortly after its establishment. 175 It has been pointed out that the 
natural inclination of the young leadership ofNUSAS at the time, as one may deduce from the actions 
of its president, Innes, was to sympathise with black students and their new philosophy. 176 The main 
point to note therefore is that SASO' s first one and half years of existence was a time when extreme 
tensions surfaced between itself and NUSAS, a time also when NUSAS repeatedly attempted to 
undermine SASO. SASO, on the other hand, responded to NUSAS with a degree of vindictiveness 
which merely widened the breach. Some of these incidents will now be discussed in detail. 
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An example of friction occurred when a SASO meeting was hosted by black students at the 
University of Natal (Non-European Section). What amazed these African students was the 
appearance at their meeting of four uninvited white students from the university. Halton Cheadle,177 
David Hemson (the local chairman), Jennifer Brown and Veronica Vorster, apparently all members 
ofNUSAS, were ordered to leave the SASO meeting because they were suspected ofbeing spies for 
the government. This was an embarrassing moment for the president of the SRC, Ben Ngubane, who 
tried in vain to dissuade the student body from taking this course of action. 178 
Confrontations such as these immediately soured the prospect of any cooperation between the two 
organisations. But SASO's critique of NUSAS was not simply emotive: it was based on certain 
verifiable observations and deductions. Thus, at SASO's first formation school, held in December 
1969, criticism was levelled at NUS AS for using rhetoric instead of action. 179 SASO also circulated 
an article entitled "Commission on NUSAS Reconstruction" to overseas student organisations as a 
way of introducing itself to a wider audience. 180 The NUS AS executive reacted to this attack by 
requesting a copy of the article so that it could examine the critique in detail and so that it could 
circulate copies to its various affiliated SRC centres. 181 It must have been a great disappointment for 
certain members ofNUSAS to realise that SASO's article would subvert whatever might have been 
gained when NUS AS had earlier circulated an information document of its own to overseas student 
organisations in April 1969. In this document NUS AS had explained that relations between itself and 
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SASO were good. 182 In addition to this, NUSAS had asked for financial support in order to fight 
racism and support black students. 183 NUS AS was thus acutely embarrassed by the very people whom 
it sought to benefit and this could not but exacerbate an already tense situation. 
Tension between NUSAS and SASO was nevertheless eased in 1970, especially at the executive level 
of the two organisations, when NUS AS president, Curtis, invited his counterpart, Biko, to a NUS AS 
national seminar between 23 and 28 April 1970 so that Biko might have an opportunity to explain 
SASO's strategy and objectives. 184 Biko accepted and thereafter relations and communication 
between the organisations improved. 185 Curtis and Biko also tried to soften attitudes on both sides 
by exchanging a number ofletters between NUS AS and SASO. 186 Indeed, 1970 may be regarded as 
the year in which NUSAS, because of the encounter with SASO, gradually began to reassess its 
mission and purpose in the context of political developments in the country. In a statement, Curtis 
pointed out that the aim of the seminar at which Biko was a speaker, was to overhaul the structure 
and examine the objectives of NUS AS as an organisation. 187 For two months after the April 1970 
seminar, Curtis and NUSAS vice-president, Paul Pretorius, spent six weeks visiting all NUSAS-
affiliated campuses. 188 This was followed by a questionnaire to test the opinion of affiliated campuses 
with regard to changes envisaged by the national leadership. 189 By the time of the annual congress in 
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July 1970, the leadership had acquired enough support to implement changes in the policy of the 
organisation. 190 It was, furthermore, at this congress that NUSAS invited SASO to attend a congress 
for the first time: perhaps it needed SASO to validate the changes which it intended to implement. 
SASO causes changes in NUSAS 
The July 1970 NUS AS Congress was, from the outset, a very special one in the history of the 
organisation because it was widely known that the Union hoped radically to revise its own policy and 
structures. 191 The mood of the congress was also different, and the delegates elected one of the 
strongest executives in the history ofthe Union. 192 Curtis was elected for the second time as president 
and Paul Pretorius was elected as his deputy. 
Additional members elected to the executive were Clive Keegan, Barry Streek, Ernest Ralekgetho, 
Oliver Schreiner and Rex Heinke. All these new members of the executive were members who had 
been active participants in the regional and local structures ofNUSAS. Another development was 
that regional directors were elected for the first time in the history of NUSAS for the purpose of 
consolidating the organisation. These regional directors were Paula Ensor for Natal, Steve Jooste for 
the Western Cape, Clive Keegan for the Eastern Cape, and Chris Wood for the Transvaal. 193 For the 
first time the structure of the Union was divided to take cognisance of university students and 
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students at teacher training colleges, and thereafter each group was required to hold a separate 
conference to discuss its affairs. 194 Three new organisations within NUS AS were also formed. These 
were AQUARIUS, to deal with cultural activities, under the leadership ofKeegan, and NUSWEL, 
an organisation for welfare and social work, which appointed Ernest Ralekgetho as its chief 
executive. 
The appointment ofRalekgetho to the executive of the organisation and to the oversight of the new 
NUSWEL portfolio, signified that NUS AS was serious in its professed policy of recognising and 
working with SASO. Ralekgetho was regarded as being especially suitable for these two positions 
because ofhis active involvement in both SASO and NUSAS. 195 In fact he had been the organisation's 
second choice. Harry Nengwekhulu was NUSAS's first choice but he declined the offer.196 
Nengwekhulu was undoubtedly the more radical of the two but was opposed to involvement with 
liberal institutions such as NUSAS. On the other hand, Ralekgetho, who was a student at St. Peter's 
Seminary near Hammanskraal, had no problem in associating with such organisations. 197 The third 
portfolio, NUSED, was headed by Streek, and was designed to deal with educational empowerment 
for all deserving students - irrespective of the colour. 198 
In addition to these new developments, the NUS AS executive, according to GeoffBudlender, sought 
to extend and strengthen its contacts with other overseas student organisations. Previously such 
contacts had been effected by means of correspondence. Now, however, the executive travelled 
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overseas with the aim of raising sufficient funds to run its projects effectively. During this trip, 
NUSAS executives made contact with the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), which 
had been and was to remain a strong source of income for the Union. 199 Curtis, Nettleton, 
Kleinschmidt and Pretorius travelled overseas in 1970 and 1971.200 The funds received during these 
two years were used to introduce radical methods to facilitate changes to the structure of the Union. 
Some of these funds were also used to organise protest campaigns against the countrywide 
celebrations which the government organised for the tenth anniversary of Republic Day on 31 May 
1971.201 
It was also at the 1970 congress that NUS AS officially recognised SASO and pledged not to interfere 
in black universities unless SASO requested it to do so.202 While NUSAS on the one hand had 
committed itself to work with SASO at the July Congress, SASO had withdrawn its recognition of 
NUS AS, but nevertheless affirmed that it would cooperate with NUS AS whenever the need arose. 203 
It is now clear that commitments made by the General Assembly of NUSAS were not always 
implemented by students once they returned to their various institutions of learning. Thus, for 
example, NUS AS leaders failed to abide by the agreement with SASO mentioned above in an incident 
which involved the Student Representative Councils (SRCs) of the Universities ofthe Witwatersrand 
and Stellenbosch?04 NUSAS leaders had earlier extended invitations to the SRCs of the Universities 
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of Natal (Black Section), Zululand and the North to attend the NUSAS Annual Conference of July 
196 7, but all these universities had refused the invitation. 205 Then, since there had been no SRC at 
Fort Hare from August 1960 onwards, 206 an invitation to attend the congress was extended through 
the SASO local chairman - an act that was clearly in breach of the agreement referred to above. 207 
This incident created tension, not only between the SRCs of both SASO- and NUSAS-affiliated 
centres, but also between executives of both organisations. 208 Tremendous political mileage was 
obtained from these events and the incident was reported three times under different headings in the 
May 1971 edition of SASO Newsletter09 and in the press. 21° Friction generated by incidents such as 
these sometimes created the impression that a major rift had developed between the two student 
organisations. On the contrary, however, both NUSAS and SASO were trying to understand and 
tolerate each other. The correspondence between Biko and Curtis, and Barney Pityana and Curtis, 
for example, reveals that both sides were sincerely trying to establish an understanding and mutually 
beneficial working relationship. 211 Rumours of antagonism and rifts might have arisen as a 
consequence of personality clashes between some of the leaders, a situation that in fact became 
explicit during the presidencies of both Themba Sono and Pretorius. 212 
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The main differences between NUSAS and SASO arose from the administration of the Scholarship 
Fund which was controlled by NUSAS. The beneficiaries of the fund, according to its constitution, 
were to be university students. This meant that the only black students who qualified to receive funds 
were from the University of Natal (Non-European Section). Students from the other five black 
university colleges of the North, Zululand, Western Cape, Durban-Westville and Fort Hare did not 
qualify as recipients of grants because their institutions were not full universities. 213 This was a 
patently unjust arrangement and SASO argued that money from the fund should be available to~ 
suitably qualified students for the purposes of tertiary education, whether they were at black 
university colleges or not. 
SASO also argued that the fund should be under black administration and control since black students 
who came from underprivileged backgrounds and inferior Bantu Administration schools needed 
financial assistance far more urgently than did white students. 214 It was alleged that white students 
used money from the fund for their own personal benefit. 215 In response to this, NUS AS proposed 
that the fund be administered jointly by NUSAS and SASO, but SASO firmly rejected this 
proposal. 216 
The second major point of conflict between the two organisations centred on the issue of 
representation at foreign meetings. NUSAS was of the opinion that delegates who would represent 
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the whole student body from South Africa should be chosen from both organisations. 217 SASO felt 
that each organisation should send its own separate delegations because of the enormous ideological 
differences between the two organisations.218 
The Commonwealth Student Association invited both NUS AS and SASO jointly to attend a meeting 
in January 1971. SASO refused to attend officially unless it was invited separately. Eventually it 
decided to appoint Lindiwe Mabandla as its delegate, but only after it had received a separate 
invitation from the association. 219 SASO's refusal to go along with arrangements ofthis kind was 
based on Steve Biko's contention that multiracial organisations such as NUSAS reflected the 
historical tendency of white liberals to overlook the particular needs and problems of disadvantaged 
groups. He argued that, in such situations, blacks were always left behind because of their language 
deficiencies. 220 SASO therefore needed to be separate from NUS AS so that it could register its 
independence. Although SASO was opposed to a joint delegation, it nevertheless requested NUS AS 
to process a passport on behalf of Mabandla, its own delegate. 221 Even though SASO was fiercely 
independent when the need arose, it was not averse to using NUSAS when it needed to. These events 
took place only two years after the establishment of SASO. Clearly SASO was trying to find its feet, 
and its tough stance on the delegation issue was an attempt to put into practice its own 
uncompromising principle of ensuring exclusive black control over problems relating to black 
students. 
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The Ghana conference, however, gave NUSAS the opportunity to demonstrate its solidarity with 
those black students who represented NUSAS. The secretary of NUSAS, Streek, attended the 
conference at which he issued a statement condemning the exploitation ofblack South Africans by 
foreign firms. He criticised the British government for arms sales to South Africa and reaffirmed 
NUSAS's support of sports boycotts. 222 More importantly for NUS AS, this trip further indicated its 
commitment to the unique problems of the African continent. NUSAS's credentials, however, were 
rejected by the conference, and hence it was unable to attend the conference in an official capacity.223 
To make matters worse, liberals in general were opposed to NUSAS's participation in foreign 
. 
meetings which, they claimed, would land them in trouble. One of those who criticised NUSAS for 
undertaking this excursion was its honorary president, Alan Paton, who felt offended because 
NUS AS officials had not consulted him before undertaking the trip. 224 He pointed out that "he did 
not want to see leading students ofNUSAS exposing themselves to grave penalties which might have 
tremendous consequences for their lives and careers". 225 More specifically, Paton did not approve of 
Streek's statement in support of the arms embargo and the sports boycott. 226 This might have been 
the reason why Paton hinted that he would not stand again for the position of honorary president of 
NUS AS in 1972.227 Perhaps Paton had hoped that NUS AS would overlook his doubts, but when the 
post of honorary president was given to Helen Joseph, who was living under banning restrictions, 
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Paton was astonished228 and asked the NUSAS leadership why they had nominated Joseph instead 
of (presumably) himself.229 
The choice of Joseph rather than Paton was appropriate during this period of political change in 
South Africa. Ideologically, Joseph was far more progressive than most white South African liberals 
including Paton, who still believed that whites had a special obligation to speak on behalf ofblacks. 230 
Paton's relationships tended to be with middle class blacks, one of whom was Mangosutho Buthelezi, 
and both Paton and Buthelezi were convinced advocates of federal government for South Africa.231 
Joseph's radical progressive ideology had enabled her to work jointly with other black organisations 
opposed to apartheid without the elements of condescension which were evident in Paton's personal 
style. As national secretary of the Federation of South African Women (FSA W), Joseph had been one 
of the leading delegates to march to the Union Building on 9 August 1956 in protest against the pass 
laws. 232 
By 1971, it had become clear that the NUS AS leadership was gearing up to radicalise the 
organisation. The introduction of a new approach in leadership training was evidence enough to 
prove that it meant to overhaul the whole structure and ideology ofNUSAS in order to meet the 
challenges ofthe 1970s. The leadership clinched a deal with the Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre in 
228 Archives, Alan Paton Centre, University of Natal, Pietermarizburg, Correspondence, 
Paton to Curtis, 25 November 1971, pc1/9-30. 
229 Archives, Alan Paton Centre, University ofNatal, Correspondence, Paton to Streek, 
pc/9-29; Streek to Paton, pc/9-31. 
230 Archive, Alan Paton Centre, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Correspondence, 
Paton to Michael Stent, 11 November 1975, Pcl/9-55. 
231 Archives, Alan Paton Centre, University ofNatal, Pietermaritzburg, Correspondence, 
Paton to Mangosutho Buthelezi, 31-12-1965, Pcl/5/1/10. 
232 Cheryl Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa (London, Onyx Press, 1982), 
p.122, pp.l89-201. 
152 
Roodepoort, which was owned by the South African Council of Churches (SACC), whereby the 
SACC agreed to help NUSAS to sponsor its members for a radical leadership training programme 
known as T -Group or sensitivity training.233 NUSAS was not the first organisation to use this 
approach. Both the progressive University Christian Movement (UCM) and the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM) are reported to have used the method in the early stages after their 
establishment. 234 
NUSAS signalled its intention to radicalise itselfby adopting the same methods that had been used 
by both the UCM and the BCM. It was an approach that had originated in the United States in the 
early 1970s and it had proved its efficacy in empowering people to cope with the radical changes that 
were engulfing society at that time.235 The programme, known as Personal Responsibility and 
Organisation Development (PROD), was under the directorship of Eoin O'Leary.236 Although 
NUSAS felt that the introduction of this method constituted a step in the right direction, these plans 
angered the government. The Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre was already in bad odour with the 
government for associating itself with organisations which were vehemently opposed to government 
policies, and so the government decided to make NUSAS, UCM and the South African Institute of 
Race Relations (SAIRR) the subject of a special commission ofinquiry. 
The commission began its work in July 1972 and its brief was to examine the role played by liberal 
extra-parliamentary organisations and decide whether or not their activities were in violation of South 
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African law.237 In spite of the fact that this commission, later to be known as the as the Schlebusch 
Commission (after its chairperson, Alwyn Schlebusch),238 was unable to implicate NUSAS in any 
wrong doing, restrictions were nevertheless imposed on many liberal organisations including NUSAS. 
The worst restriction imposed was that NUSAS was forbidden to obtain funds from outside South 
Africa. In addition, the director of the sensitivity training programme, O'Leary, was summarily 
deported after he had been living in the country for over thirteen years. 239 Other facilitators of the 
programme, such as Ann Hope, were initially harassed by the government. Eventually her South 
African passport was confiscated in August 1972 and she was forced to leave the country on an ~i 
",}!Yn 
permit and an Irish passport after she had been living in South Africa for a number of years. 240 
The NUSAS leadership gathered for their regular annual leadership seminar at Howick in Natal 
between 24 and 28 April 1971. The theme of the seminar was "Students and action in society", and 
it was addressed by seven speakers who were regarded by the government as politically radical. Each 
speaker was assigned a specific topic: Curtis (the president) spoke on "Student as rebel: a position 
paper on student action"; Pretorius (the deputy-president) spoke on "An approach to student power"; 
Keith Gottschalk (a master's student from Cape Town) spoke on "Economics and race"; Dr Richard 
Turner (a lecturer from Durban) spoke on "The power of contemporary radical thought"; Ramgobin 
(Director ofPhoenix Settlement and a SASO member) spoke on "Satyagraha and its significance to 
the youth of South Africa"; Streek (Secretary General ofNUSED) spoke on "African socialism"; 
Ensor (Natal Regional Director) spoke on "Black Power", and Ralekgetho (Secretary General of 
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NUSWEL) spoke on "Black power in South Africa". 241 
There was a three-fold purpose in the presentation of these seven papers. Firstly, they gave an 
overview of the historical background of the South African policy of segregation. Secondly, they 
assessed ways and means of challenging the apartheid system. Lastly, they endorsed the emergence 
ofBlack Consciousness philosophy.It now became apparent at the seminar that participants regarded 
BC as the basis for an alternative method which blacks could use to fight apartheid, and this means 
that official NUSAS recognition ofBlack Consciousness can be traced from July 1971. It also means 
that, from that time on, there was a firm foundation for cooperation between SASO and NUSAS in 
terms ofthe sharing of ideas and plans for each organisation. This point is elaborated below. 
Members ofNUSAS, UCM and SASO thought radical training, introduced during the 1970s, would 
be a swift and effective means to break down the racial barriers and segregation which had been 
institutionalised by apartheid rule. 242 It was for this reason that the government was absolutely 
opposed to any form of radical training. In addition, programmes were run by progressive individuals 
who openly and unapologetically criticised the government.243 Finally, NUSAS had completely 
alienated the government by using the Wilgespruit Conference Centre staff to prepare its participants 
for this particular seminar. 244 In spite of government displeasure with the anything related toT -Group 
methodology and practice, NUSAS was taking a step in the right direction. As a result of the radical 
training method, the NUSAS leadership, and Pretorius in particular, were able to announce at the 
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beginning of 1972 that NUSAS would employ various means to change its structures and 
approach. 245 In an interview with the Danish Newspaper, Berlingske, Pretorius expressed his wish 
to move the Union away from white liberal idealism. They were, he said, looking to radical changes 
in the structure of society and they realised that the country would at some time in the future be ruled 
by a black majority government. 246 NUS AS critics, on the other hand, alleged that the Union was 
adopting this policy mainly to impress the West, which was pressurising progressives to act against 
the government. 247 In spite of such criticisms, the method continued to be utilised by NUSAS for 
another two years, until the April Seminar of 197 4. 248 
Radicalism in NUSAS between 1972 and 1977 
Relations between NUSAS and SASO in the years between 1972 and 1977 were characterised by a 
mutual understanding and respect for each other's territory. NUSAS only became involved in what 
was seen as SASO's sphere of influence after careful consultation in each instance.249 From 1972 
onwards, affiliated campuses were regularly asked whether they were practising the new methods 
which had been introduced at the seminar. Pretorius also visited a number of campuses to recruit new 
members and to brief them about NUS AS ideology. The main topic discussed during these visits was 
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the nature of relationships between NUSAS and SAS0.250 
At the beginning of the same year, a circular letter, which NUSAS requested from SASO, was sent 
to NUSAS's affiliated centres. This document explained SASO's attitude to NUSAS in some 
detaiL251 In a covering letter which accompanied the document, Pretorius explained how, in his view, 
the emergence and growth of SASO was a direct challenge to white students, and how it was 
therefore imperative for organisations such as NUSAS to reconsider and reformulate their role in the 
context of the South African political situation. 252 1t was because of this that NUS AS tried to educate 
its members about the tenets of BC at the April seminar of that year. Pretorius delivered a paper 
entitled, "Where to now, white students?", and in it he traced the history ofNUSAS's dilemma and 
suggested what structural changes might be needed in the organisation. 253 
The second paper at the April seminar was read by Nicolette Westcott, and focused on the 
indoctrination of South African society. Her view was that social integration was a necessary 
medicine for a polarised society and she explained how the evils of apartheid indoctrination might be 
undone by racial integration. 254 The last paper at the seminar, entitled "Economy of apartheid", was 
read by David Remson. In it he criticised the apartheid government for benefiting one section of the 
South African community economically to the detriment of the majority of citizens. The central 
message of his paper was how the South African economy had grown and flourished because the 
exploitation of cheap labour had been built into the system. The wages paid to blacks, he maintained, 
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were lower than those paid to any of the country's other population groups.255 
As a result of these activities, eight members ofNUSAS, namely Pretorius, Ensor, Phillipe le Roux, 
Curtis, Sheila Lapinsky, Keegan, Chris Wood and Turner were served with five-year banning orders 
on 27 February 1973.256 But the bannings failed to deter the organisation from maintaining solidarity 
with SASO and with individuals in the black community who were considered to be relevant to the 
struggle for black liberation. This continued contact was exemplified by the invitation to Stanley 
Mmutlanyane Mogoba to address the April seminar of 1973. His paper was entitled "The 
contemporary black movement as it has developed from its forerunners", and in it he traced the 
development of Black Consciousness from the birth of the Freedom Charter in 1955, when the 
representatives of the Congress of Democrats, the Indian Congress, the ANC, and the Coloured 
Peoples Congress, formulated the Charter. Mogoba detailed how a radical group, who were later to 
form the PAC in 1959, rejected the Kliptown charter because of its multi-racial nature. 257 Their point 
of view was that whites always dominated blacks and that blacks in these organisations were always 
relegated to a subordinate role. Mogoba pointed out the obvious similarities between the views of 
the PAC and those ofthe BCM.258 He suggested that white students, ifthey wished to assist blacks 
to liberate themselves, should direct their attention to educating their own fellow whites. 259 
Not all supporters ofNUSAS or SASO were in agreement about these issues. Ernest Wentzel, a 
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former president ofNUSAS ( 1957) who had been detained by the security police for three months, 260 
and who was one of the lawyers representing victims of the Sharpeville massacre, delivered a paper 
at the 50th NUS AS Annual Conference in July 1973. In this paper he criticised the NUS AS 
leadership for being too accommodating ofblack opinion at the April Seminar. He also criticised the 
virulence of the SASO attack on NUSAS.261 Eventually, however, Wentzel changed his mind about 
BC ideology and became one of the leading lawyers to defend the accused at BC trials. 262 It is also 
important to note that, four years after his attack on SASO, Wentzel was one of the four lawyers 
retained by the Biko family to represent their interests at the inquest into the death of the founder of 
Black Consciousness and SASO, held in the three weeks beginning 14 November 1977.263 One might 
speculate about the processes which led Wentzel to change his mind. Firstly, although he was 
obviously opposed at the time to the hard line taken by the SASO leadership, he must have very 
quickly become outraged when he became aware of the cruelty of the government onslaught against 
the SASO leadership. Secondly, he might have become convinced, within the space of a few years, 
of the validity of the SASO principle that black people alone should be responsible for the 
prosecution of the struggle for black liberation. 
Wentzel's ideas at the time were, however, repudiated at the December 1973 Seminar, and this serves 
to demonstrate that NUSAS had finally understood the importance of the Black Consciousness 
critique of the South African political situation at the time. It was at this seminar that a great deal of 
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attention was given to BC themes. Four executive members ofNUSAS, who were politically active 
and sympathetic to the BC cause, delivered papers which became the basis for extensive discussion. 
Eddie Webster delivered a paper entitled "Black Consciousness and the white Left". 264 His paper 
. analysed three central themes ofBlack Consciousness philosophy and their implications for the white 
Left in South Africa. He also provided an historical overview of the course ofblack protest against 
white domination. Unlike Mogoba, who traced the roots ofBC from 1955, Webster suggested an 
origin as early as 1920, when the Garveyist slogan of "Africa for Africans" had already become 
influential. He nevertheless agreed with Mogoba's observation that the refusal to ratifY the 1955 
Kliptown Freedom Charter was a milestone in the process whereby blacks realised that they needed 
to take control of their own liberation struggle. Webster saw, however, that BC was different from 
other earlier black organisations in that its exclusivity principle embraced both the Indian and 
Coloured communities because they had also been racially defined by the apartheid regime as 
belonging to those groups which had become the targets of discrimination. 265 It was therefore 
essential, Webster said, for whites to realise the pivotal role that BC was to play in the liberation of 
both the oppressors and the oppressed. Finally, he outlined the reasons why he believed that BC 
should take the lead in the struggle for liberation. 266 
At the same seminar, GeoffBudlender delivered a paper entitled "A historical perspective on student 
action"/67 in which he recognised the contribution made by NUSAS to areas such as medical 
scholarships, projects, workshops, and campaign action. He made a plea that NUSAS should 
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participate in social and political life beyond campus boundaries, 268 and suggested that NUS AS should 
support radical initiatives such as the sponsorship of non-racial sport, and the right ofblack workers 
to strike. 269 He also proposed that NUS AS should accept the validity of the role which BC had 
defined for itself, and he intimated that South Africa should prepare itself for black majority rule. 270 
The most radical paper of the four was delivered by Karel Tip, and was entitled, "Whites and the 
dynamic of change". 271 He encouraged NUS AS to transform itself in an unprecedented way: he 
suggested that blacks be allowed to take the lead in implementing radical transformation within 
NUS AS itself 272 He enunciated the idea that whites who were interested in change should undergo 
a process of transformation that would permit a mutation from liberal consciousness to black 
consciousness.273 Tip's challenge was that whites should be shown the deficiencies and dangers of 
white liberalism. Once this had been done, whites would be able to co-exist with blacks as true equals 
in a genuinely non-racist society. He observed that liberals were not prepared to commit themselves 
in practice to the complete elimination of oppression and exploitation from the lives ofblacks. Their 
implicit agenda, he said, was to preserve intact the hard core of inequality and therefore maintain the 
structures of white domination and repression. 274 He believed that the BC Movement would soon be 
in a position to take a lead in the campaign against apartheid. 275 He was also one of the few whites 
with sufficient prescience to warn South Africans at the time about the dangers inherent in the 
creation of a black bourgeoisie who might inadvertently become a buffer zone between whites and 
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the truly dispossessed majority ofblacks.276 
The last paper of the seminar was delivered by Charles Nupen, president ofNUSAS, and it detailed 
the kinds of action which were envisaged by the leadership for 1974 (the paper was entitled 
"Guideline to student action in 1974").277 He pledged full support for the BC movement as it fought 
for a just and open society, and he conceptualised the role of white students to be one of support for 
those projects which were initiated by progressive black institutions. 278 He questioned the integrity 
of those liberals who became passive when they no longer found themselves in positions of 
leadership.279 
It is important to understand the reasoning which informed the radical stance ofNUSAS at this time 
and the unconditional support which it offered to BC at the end of 1973. The leadership of SASO 
and other BC activists were either in jail or had been restricted by government banning orders as the 
apartheid regime tried to undermine the entire black protest movement. 280 SASO's records show that 
164 of its members were banned by the end of April 1973.281 The government, when it eventually 
fully appreciated the extent of the threat which SASO activities posed to its supremacy and the 
stability of the apartheid state, began to crack down in earnest on the SASO leadership.282 
Another indication that NUSAS's policy was influenced, whether consciously or not, by SASO 
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principles, may be discerned from its accommodation ofblacks on the executive of 1974. Students 
from the University of the Witwatersrand elected a black president, Ian Kitai, from Zola. He was 
subsequently also elected to the office of chief executive in AQUARIUS (Social and Welfare). 283 
Another black, Sindi Sayenda, was elected as secretary ofNUSED and she was also the first African 
to be appointed to oversee the disbursement and administration of funds. The South African Medical 
Scholarship Trust (SAMST) and South African Students Education Trust (SASET) fell under the 
jurisdiction of her portfolio. 284 These two trusts formed part of the NUS AS scholarship fund, and 
their rightful administration had been the cause of the disagreement between SASO and NUS AS in 
1970 and 1971. That a black should even be appointed to such a position, speaks for the continuing 
influence that SASO ideology was having on NUSAS. 
Further evidence that NUSAS was keen for its members to understand and sympathise with the BC 
point of view may be deduced from the political affiliations of the speakers who were invited to 
deliver the opening addresses at their annual congresses. Between 1970 and 1975, all those who 
delivered opening addresses, apart from Wentzel, were connected in some way to BC.285 Fatima 
Meer, for example, was invited to the annual congress ofJuly 1970 in Eston, Natal/86 and her paper, 
entitled "NUSAS in the seventies", acknowledged and confirmed the role played by NUSAS in 
pursuance and promotion of non-racialism. 287 Meer' s paper was not uncritical ofNUSAS, and she 
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reprimanded NUSAS for ignoring the most pressing needs of the oppressed people of South Africa. 
And then, since the paper was read a few days after SASO had withdrawn its recognition from 
NUSAS at its own congress, she took the opportunity to explain the reason for this withdrawal of 
recognition.288 David Thebehali, who was involved in the formation of BC, attended the 1971 
NUSAS congress which was held in Durban.289 AllanBoesak, known as one of the pioneers ofBlack 
Theology in South Africa, was invited to attend in 1972,290 while Manas Buthelezi, also a prominent 
black theologian, presented a paper in 1974 when the congress was held at the University ofNatal 
in Pietermaritzburg. 291 In 1975, Bishop Alpheus Zulu, an Anglican priest who was also one of 
pioneers of Black Theology, was requested to address the 1975 congress but declined because of 
prior commitments.292 Instead, Beyers Naude, founder member ofthe Christian Institute (founded 
in 1963), was able to give an opening address at the 52nd Annual Congress held in Durban.293 
The central theme of all these papers was to clarify the aims and objectives of SASO and the BC 
movement at large, thereby promoting understanding and good relations between SASO and 
NUSAS. Between 1974 and 1976, none ofNUSAS's activities really devolved on the theme of 
NUSAS-SASO relations, except that sporadic protests relevant to the wider liberation struggle were 
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undertaken by the Union. 294 (This observation does not preclude contacts at the leadership level to 
improve and maintain contacts between NUSAS and SASO.) For its part, NUSAS continued to use 
the controversial T-Group method at the 1974 April Seminar.295 At grassroots level, however, 
NUSAS was at its lowest web. The Union's records show that, in 1974, only two affiliated SRCs had 
paid their yearly subscriptions. 296 
The 1976 records reveal that students in general were becoming apathetic as they lost interest in 
NUS AS or succumbed to the blandishments of the widespread and coordinated propaganda onslaught 
which the government waged against NUS AS. 297 It has also been suggested that NUS AS became 
·more and more inactive as its financial problems increased. The overseas organisations, as indicated 
earlier in this chapter, which hitherto had supplied NUSAS with funds, were no longer in a position 
to provide assistance. Even worse, NUSAS was declared an "affected organisation" just after the 
findings of the Schlebusch Commission were released in 1972, together with other liberal 
organisations such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the University Christian 
Movement (UCM), and the Christian Institute (CI). 298 In the opinion ofthe Geneva-based South 
African News Agency at the time, NUS AS had become particularly conservative at local and regional 
levels. A sign of the prevalence of this conservatism was that, when the fortunes ofNUSAS were at 
a particularly low ebb, the white right-wing South African Federation ofEnglish Speaking Students 
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surfaced. This organisation was formed in 1971.299 It was active mostly at the University of the 
Witwatersrand where it operated a journal called Campus Independent. 300 It has been suggested that 
this group controlled many activities on campus during the period when the university was without 
a proper SRC. It has also been argued that the same group was sponsored by government agencies, 
particularly BOSS and the security police?01 Others believed, as did the writer of an editorial in 
Reality. that NUS AS had deliberately opted for a low profile because the state was acting ruthlessly 
against individuals in the organisation. The case ofBreyten Breytenbach, who was sentenced to nine 
years in jail, was cited as an example. 302 
The harassment of NUSAS leadership had been part of a long, ongoing battle between the 
government and individual members who were thought to be radical. As John Daniel, a former 
president ofNUSAS, observed: the government had succeeded by 1974 in dealing a body blow to 
nearly all political organisations which either promoted or sympathised with the African liberation 
struggle. 303 The evidence shows that the government had intensified its harassment and intimidation 
of influential !llembers ofNUSAS from 1973. During that time, eight past and present NUSAS office 
bearers, including NUS AS Advisory Panel member and University ofNatallecturer, Turner, had been 
banned. This all happened in February, on the same day that the findings of the Schlebusch 
Commission of the Enquiry into the activities ofNUSAS were released.304 
If one is to understand why the government cracked down so ruthlessly at the beginning of 1973, one 
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has to take into account the intensity ofNUSAS protest activities carried out in 1972.305 IfNUSAS 
failed to be a significant political player in the quiescent years after 1973, it was probably because its 
leadership had been effectively paralysed by bannings, deportations and government restrictions, not 
to mention systematic harassment by the security police. 
It was only after the Soweto uprisings of 16 June 1976 in protest against the imposition of Afrikaans 
as a compulsory medium of instruction in schools when so many black high school students were 
killed by the South African police, that NUS AS re-emerged in active support of the black cause. 306 
These brutal events ignited a wave of national and international criticism, especially from liberal and 
human rights critics of the apartheid regime, and the pressure of events obliged NUSAS to reassess 
its policies. This reassessment was first discussed at the seminar of December 1976.307 On this 
occasion NUSAS first introduced the concept "Africanisation", then a new tool for analysing the 
political situation. The concept was used in two ways. Firstly, the Africanisation policy was used in 
an attempt to make white students in particular think again about emigrating from South Africa. Many 
white students were leaving the country because of fear and uncertainty about the future of the 
country. 308 Secondly, the terms" Africanism" and" Africanisation" represented a new way for NUS AS 
to respond to the challenge ofBlack Consciousness. Participants in the seminar felt that white students 
would only really ever understand the full implications ofBC philosophy and practice ifthey were 
educated and conscientised about all aspects of African life, thought and practice. This process 
represented an attempt to propagate a new kind of Africanism which transcended the boundaries of 
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narrow sectional or political interests for white students who still essentially regarded themselves as 
Europeans, even after centuries of living in Africa. 309 
The programme was divided into three parts. Project B would undertake research which would be 
published by NUSAS. Another aim of this project was to create a data base of relevant reference 
sources which could be used by researchers. 310 Two educational programmes were planned to operate 
between March and August of 1977.311 From March to May, topics for discussion would focus mainly 
on the history of the black political struggle in South Africa. Speakers invited to be part of this 
programme were either supporters and sympathizers ofBC, such as Boesak, Beyers Naude and Peter 
Randall, who worked for the Christian Institute, or experts in African Studies. Those invited included 
Martin West, who spoke about African Culture, Hermann Giliomee, who spoke about Political 
Science, and Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, who spoke about African Law.312 From June to August, 
topics focused on problems endemic to the Southern African region, topics such as "Migrant labour 
in South Africa", "White Africans in Rhodesia", and "Namibia-Sersfontein/Tjongarero" .313 In addition 
to these proposed programmes, it was agreed that the Africanisation project would be furthered by 
other activities such as lectures, seminars, films and plays at local and regional levels. 314 
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During the annual July congress in 1977, various reports from affiliated centres confirmed that the 
campaign for Africanisation had been effective and had also served the purpose of making NUS AS 
a viable political force again. This was reflected by attendance at the congress, where attendance 
figures were higher than they had been for years. 315 Critics of the Africanisation programme felt, 
however, that it was far too revolutionary. They argued that the programme had been introduced by 
radical elements whose only interest was to reshape NUSAS ideology so that it would conform to 
their own ideological premises. They also felt that the white community in South Africa would find 
it difficult to comprehend (let alone identify and associate itselfwith) specifically African culture and 
concerns on the profound level envisaged by the programme. 316 
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that while other liberal institutions in South Africa had 
been reluctant to transform themselves radically and to oppose the apartheid regime in any way that 
could make a significant difference, NUSAS, having been spurred into genuine self-criticism by the 
acerbic yet carefully reasoned and justifiable criticism of SASO over the period of roughly fifteen 
years (1965 to 1979), had transformed itself into an organisation partly dominated by its conservative 
(white) support both at grassroots and national level, into an organisation which had made its peace 
with SASO and which had accepted all the essentials of the SASO critique of the South African 
political situation. NUSAS had thus in effect been transformed in the long run by Biko himself, who 
did not live to see his life's work materialise, but who, as the most influential of the founders ofSASO, 
had created the apparatus that spelled doom for the old kind of paternalistic liberal organisation that 
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NUSAS had been when he joined it. Biko had found a NUSAS heavily under the spell of the kind of 
well-meaning but paternalistic liberalism of old-style liberals such as Paton and Brookes, and he 
rapidly became convinced that no amount of well-meaning white liberalism could ever effect the 
changes in the mass mind of South African blacks, that would be necessary if they were ever to obtain 
their freedom from centuries of colonial and imperial political and cultural domination. 
Biko therefore formulated his celebrated BC doctrine of"Black man: you are on your own", and he 
(and others) created SASO to be the vehicle for attaining black liberation without any white support 
or involvement whatsoever. But such were the complexities of South African politics at the time that 
both SASO and BC were more or less compelled to rely on white liberal support in order to survive 
the harshest days of National Party government repression. This is one of the great paradoxes of 
South Africa politics - the paradoxical symbiosis between BC theorists such as Biko, the founder of 
SASO, and mainly white organisations such as NUSAS. 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how SASO was born out of dissatisfaction with 
NUSAS, and how, after many years of sometimes bitter and angry hostility between the two 
organisations, and many false stops and starts, NUS AS was ultimately transformed into a much more 
radical organisation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STEVE BIKO AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BLACK 
CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT 
When the Black Consciousness Movement (BC) emerged in the late sixties, its increasing success 
and growing prominence were largely attributable to the efforts, charisma and influence of Steve 
Biko himself As the movement continued to grow, it was variously criticised and applauded by 
supporters and detractors in various quarters. 
Firstly, there were those on the political right who felt threatened by the emergence of an 
ideology propagated by a new generation of African university students who were both articulate 
and confident about who they were and what they were striving for. It was hardly surprising 
therefore when members of the Nationalist Party government went out of their way to discredit 
BC, and it was clear that the government was alarmed by the political momentum of a movement 
which enjoyed widespread support in black communities. 
Jimmy Kruger, then minister of poliCe and prisons, led the attack on BC and slated the 
organisation for employing a dangerous and destructive ideology which provoked confrontation 
with whites. 1 Kruger's opinions were received with great seriousness among conservative white 
South Africans, who viewed the organisation as being both radical and revolutionary. They felt, 
1 
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furthermore, that BC was communist-inspired and that Biko himself was a communist because 
he called for radical changes in the economic and the social structure of the country. 2 
Conservatives in the international community, who had an interest in South Africa, also tended 
to support this particular point of view. One of these was Karl Beyer, a German journalist who 
had been based on the African continent for over two decades. He believed that Biko was being 
used as a political football by the American government, and opined that the United States was 
using Biko as an instrument to destabilise South Africa. He also believed that the United States 
government was conveniently using Andrew Young, the African American ambassador to the 
United Nations, to befriend Biko and his associates.3 As I have already mentioned in an earlier 
chapter, conservative white South Africans were convinced that African-Americans were using 
their links with BC as a means of imposing their own radical ideology on the South African 
movement. Such views became the received opinions of the pro-government press, and the 
newspapers that propagated them were lauded as patriotic by the apartheid government. It was 
the Citizen that transmitted these interpretations to English-speaking readers, while Beeld 
performed the same function for Afrikaners. 4 The government used these newspapers to wage 
its propaganda war, primarily against BC, but also against other organisations. 
The conservative assessment ofBiko's political significance by the critics ofBC is unsustainable 
because it contradicts both Biko's clearly articulated views and BC principles. In an interview with 
Dick Clark, United States Democratic senator and chairperson of the Committee on African 
Affairs in December 1976, Biko stated categorically that BC opposed American policy towards 
2 The Star, 5 Jan 1978, p.19. 
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South Africa because he felt that the United States was too accommodating ofthe apartheid 
regime, in that their government had failed to challenge the implications of racial segregation in 
any way that might have exerted meaningful pressure on the Pretoria regime. 5 
Further evidence that BC policy was not dictated by the United States, as alleged, was contained 
in the organisation's announcement at its annual general meeting in June 1977. The executive of 
the Black People's Convention (BPC) issued a statement to the effect that it was opposed to the 
erroneous impression created by the United States that it spoke on behalf of oppressed South 
Mricans. 6 BPC was a wing ofBC, established in 1972 with the aim of accommodating adults who 
were interested in political activism, but who could not be affiliated to SASO since the latter was 
a student organisation. Recruits included members of the banned African National Congress 
(ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC), and various non-political associations such as the 
Interdenominational African Ministers' Association of South Africa (IDAMASA), the Association 
for the Educational and Cultural Advancement of African People (ASSECA), the African 
Independent Churches Association (AICA), the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), 
and the St. Peter's Old Boys' Association. 7 
That Biko was not a puppet of a foreign government may also be deduced from his refusal to take 
up residence in the United States after the Carter administration had received confidential 
information that his life was in danger. 8 Even as Biko declined the invitation, he must have been 
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aware that his life was at risk. He knew that he was a prime target of the apartheid regime at a 
time when many lesser -known activists were being murdered in prison in "accidents" or "suicides" 
that were cynically reported as factual. His continued presence in South Africa was, he felt, an 
exemplification ofBC's principled refusal to collaborate with those governments which, directly 
or indirectly, continued to facilitate the survival ofthe apartheid regime.9 Biko was not the first 
African leader to have refused an offer of emigration. The president of the ANC, Albert Luthuli, 
had also turned down a request to settle outside South Africa and remained in South African as 
an expression of his solidarity with the plight of all oppressed Africans. 10 
It was generally assumed among the leadership of the Black Consciousness Movement that Biko' s 
international reputation would cause the apartheid government to refrain from actually threatening 
his life. They believed, not unrealistically, that Biko's fame as a key figure in BC made him 
untouchable. 11 Recent revelations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission12 now indicate 
that, had Biko agreed to emigrate at that time, he would not have been murdered. 
The second group who reacted to Biko and BC were white liberals in South Africa, who tended 
on the whole to be sympathetic to the BC cause. Although most were not directly supportive of 
the organisation (only a few, like David Russell, were), many influential liberals tried to 
understand what BC stood for, and, because of their long years of association with Biko and other 
members ofBC, tended to sympathise with the organisation. Among those who were particularly 
9 South African Outlook, vol 107, no 1275, November 1977, p.l30. 
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appalled by the apartheid government's draconian repression ofBC was a group ofliberals which 
included Aelred Stubbs, David Russell and Donald Woods. (Their relations with Biko and BC are 
discussed later in this chapter.) In their defence of Biko, they disputed the assertion of pro-
government apologists that Biko was a communist-inspired radical revolutionary. Instead, they 
regarded Biko as a moderate in the mould of Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC.between 1952 
and1967Y 
Barry Streek, who had worked closely with Biko in the early 1970s as secretary of the- National 
Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and who therefore knew him well, confirmed from 
his own experience what these liberals had been saying, namely that Biko was far from being a 
radical revolutionary. He suggested that Biko differed from other leaders of the liberation 
movement in that he was politically more sophisticated. 14 After the 1976 Soweto uprising and the 
death ofBiko, this point of view became popular as a critical response to the way in which the 
government had handled both incidents. This is demonstrated by a number of articles which 
appeared in the liberal press, especially the South African Outlook, which gave wide coverage to 
the Black Consciousness Movement for the first time in six years after BC's inception. 15 
Anothf:r white liberal journalist and political commentator, Denis Beckett, then assistant editor 
of the predominantly black newspaper, Weekend World, 16 also strongly criticised the 
government's position on Biko and BC. Beckett's position on a newspaper which reflected the 
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opinions of the African majority, enabled him to understand the African's plight in a way that was 
incomprehensible to the majority of whites who had had little experience of what black South 
Africans really thought and felt. His criticisms of the ways in which the government had handled 
the uprising of 1976, and particularly the death ofBiko in detention, as well as the banning on 19 
October 1977 of the organisations and publications that supported the ideology of Black 
Consciousness, were firmly based in fact and experience. 
Beckett's criticism ofthe government's banning might also have been given additional impetus 
from his personal experience as a journalist when his own newspaper, the Weekend World, was 
banned. He himself had experienced at first hand the fiustration caused by banning. It is also 
important to note that, by and large, liberals and the liberal press tended to become vociferous in 
their comments only after the Soweto uprising and the death ofBiko. Observations made in this 
regard by Christopher Merrett tend to confirm his opinion that white liberals, on the whole, 
largely ignored black opinion until violence erupted. 17 
Similarly, Paul Gaston's observation about the relations between white liberals and African 
Americans in the United Stated has important resonances in the South African context. He argues 
that, generally speaking, American white liberals tended to denigrate politically active blacks who 
took a too radical stance on issues, and he noted their tendency to canonise African Americans 
in the civil rights movement only once they had been martyred for their cause. He specifically 
referred to the American liberal perception that Malcolm X was the most radical embodiment of 
Black Power ideology. After his death, however, the same people who had vilified him respected 
17 Christopher Merrett, A Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in 
South Africa (Cape Town, David Philip, 1994), p.9. 
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him as a hero. 18 Biko, in the same way, had been largely ignored by the very liberals who 
subsequently made capital out of his martyrdom. It was only after his death that he became a hero 
and a cult figure. Some of these same white liberals were highly critical ofBC philosophy during 
its early years. 19 
The South African white press (including the liberal white press) tacitly maintained and endorsed 
the government's policy of segregation through its association with the South African Society of 
Journalists, which disallowed black membership.20 It was, however, not only the white liberal 
press which was reluctant to report on the proceedings ofBC while it was still in its infancy. The 
World, a newspaper which targeted a black audience, also failed to give BC publicity for quite 
some time after its inception, 21 although it continued to report events which took place elsewhere 
in Africa and in the United States. 
The World reported in detail events which related to the Black Power Movement and the role 
played by African Americans in such events. The irony of this situation was that far more 
momentous developments were taking place at that very time in South Africa than those that were 
happening abroad. The World was owned by white liberals who failed (for whatever reasons) to 
appreciate the importance, before Biko' s death, of fully understanding and attempting to convey 
18 Conversation with Paul Gaston, University of South Africa, History Department, 25 Sep 
1996. 
19 Woods, Biko, pp.54-60. 
20 The World, 31 May 1977, p.4. 
21 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Johannesburg, "SASO letter to Presidents ofSRC, National 
Students Organisations and Overseas Organisations, February, 1970", pp.4-5. 
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to its readership the political aspirations of South African blacks. 22 This newspaper's first report 
about BC was not directly about the organisation itself. It reported on the annual conference of 
the South African Institute of Race Relations, which was held in January 1971.23 The World 
reacted to a statement made by Rex Heinke, deputy vice-president ofNUSAS, on behalf of the 
organisation, when he attempted to explain the importance and contribution ofBC to his liberal 
audience. 24 
It was white liberal students, who, in contrast to journalists, were the first group to raise the issue 
of BC in the press. This is an indication of the collaboration, often behind closed doors, which 
took place between the two student organisations, NUSAS and SASO (this was analysed in the 
previous chapter). The importance of this NUSAS conference was later superseded by that 
organised by the 
Abe Bailey Institute for Inter-racial Studies, which was held in Cape Town. (The significance of 
this latter conference is discussed in detail in the section of this chapter which describes the 
contribution which Barney Pityana made to BC in general, and to SASO in particular.) 
The World first reported its views about Black Consciousness in March 1971 when SASO was 
invited to a reception to mark the founding of the Donaldson Orlando Community Centre in 
Soweto.25 On the one hand, the impression was created that The World, under the editorship of 
Manasse Moerane, a well-known veteran activist, was a newspaper that truly represented the 
22 Elias L.Ntloedibe, Here is a Tree: Political Biography of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe 
(Pretoria, DB Print Services, 1995), pp.8-9. 
23 The World, 6 Jan 1971, p.4. 
24 
"Tribal universities could lead to S.A.Black Power- expert", The World, 8 Jan 1971, p.3. 
25 Shadrack Kumalo, "Future ofBlacks Lies in Learning", The World, 9 March 1971. 
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opinions ofblack people. On the other hand, The World was prevented from reporting freely on 
black political activities as such reportage might have offended both the liberals, who controlled 
the paper, and the government, which, it was believed, indirectly financed some newspapers but, 
at the same time, censored the free flow of information. 26 There are two other reasons why 
Moerane was reluctant openly to support BC at this point. Firstly, he had been a member of the 
ANC when the organisation was still legal in South Africa. Secondly, he was a brother-in-law to 
Govan Mbeki, one of the most prominent figures in the ANC, who was serving an extended 
sentence on Robben Island at the time. 27 Many members of the ANC were reluctant to join BC 
because they favoured a multi-racial policy, which they did not see in BC. The press in general 
was hesitant to support BC during its early years. Percy Qoboza, editor of The World, was a case 
in point. Later, however, he supported BC so vigorously that he was eventually detained in 1977, 
when The World and other BC-related organisations were banned. 28 
The third strand of reaction to Biko and to the BC Movement may be identified in the statements 
which emanated from its proponents and apologists, people such as Sipho Buthelezi, 29 Themba 
Sono, and others30 who, while defending the radical and revolutionary principles ofthe movement, 
attempted to interpret them with clarity and precision to their constituents. They justified the 
harsh and uncompromising rhetoric of the movement for two main reasons. Firstly, they 
maintained that BC was directed at black constituents who were the victims of racial segregation. 
26 
"SASO Memorandum to Presidents of SRC, National Students Organisations, and 
Overseas Organisations, February 1970", pp.S-6. 
27 Ellen Kuzwayo, Call me Woman (Johannesburg, Ravan Writers Series, 1996), p.100. 
28 
"The World of Percy Qoboza", The World, 4 July 1972, p.4. 
29 Sipho Buthelezi, "The Black Consciuosness in South Africa", in CEAP A, vol 1, no 1, 
December 1987, pp.23-26. 
30 Temba Sono, "Some Concepts ofNegritude and Black Identity", in SASO Newsletter, 
June 1971, pp.16-19. 
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It was essential, they felt, for BC to conscientise these people and make them realise that they 
would have to liberate themselves without relying on assistance from white South Africans, 
irrespective of ideology or political inclination. 31 Hence the adoption (later to be explained in 
detail by Mosibudi Mangena) of the slogan, "Black man, you are on your own".32 Secondly, they 
specifically addressed the white community in general and liberals in particular when they asserted 
that blacks were no longer prepared to be oppressed and were, from thenceforth, determined to 
challenge all forms of discriminatory government. 33 
These three kinds of reaction to Biko and to BC tend to confirm that Biko's role was central in 
the history of the Black Consciousness Movement in this country. The purpose of this chapter is 
therefore three-fold. The first part deals with Biko as a person and with the factors that influenced 
him to become involved in the establishment of the BC movement. The following points will all 
be discussed under this heading: Biko's interpretation of the role of white liberals; his views on 
group or collective leadership as opposed to individuals running the organisation; the Pan 
Africanist Congress as a political influence; and the effect of radical literature, which widened 
Biko's scope of interpretation. 
The second section deals with Biko' s influence on individuals who were later to play major key 
roles in the formation and implementation of the Black Consciousness Movement. The 
31 
"I write what I like, by Frank Talk: Fear, An Important Determinant in South African 
Politics", in SASO Newsletter, vol1, no 4, September 1971, pp.I0-12. 
32 Mosibudi Mangena, On Your Own: Evolution ofBlack Consciousness in South 
Africa! Azania (Braamfontein, Skottaville, 1990), pp.20-25. 
33 
"I write what I like, by Frank Talk", in SASO Newsletter, vol2, no 1, January and 
February 1972, pp.9-10. 
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contributions ofBamey Pityana and Harry Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, both of whom where co-
founders ofBC and who worked closely with Biko, will be discussed. 
Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement: Biko's view of white liberals 
One of the most idiosyncratic contributions made by Black Consciousness ideology, as compared 
to that of the ANC, was its condemnation of the role which was played by those white liberals 
who often took the leading part in the struggle for black liberation. BC's criticism of the role of 
white liberals is similar to the criticism levelled against white liberals by the PAC. Both 
organisations were opposed to white liberal interference in African affairs even though white 
liberals claimed to be advancing the cause ofblack liberation.34 They believed that the apartheid 
system only oppressed and discriminated against blacks. They further believed that because 
liberals were part of the white community and therefore inadvertently or directly benefited from 
this discrimination, they were unable completely to understand black suffering or to identify 
themselves with the black cause. 35 
There were, however, slight differences of emphasis between the two organisations. BC used the 
word "black" to signify Africans, Indians and Coloureds. 36 The PAC, on the other hand, used the 
34 C.R.D. Halisi, "Biko and Black Consciousness Philosophy: An Interpretation", inN. 
Barney Pityana, Mamphela Ramphele, Malusi Mpumlwana and Lindy Wilson ( eds ), Bounds of 
Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Conciousness (Cape Town, David Philip, 
p.l04. 
35 Benjamin Pogrund, How Can a Man Die Better: The Life of Robert Sobukwe 
(Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1997), p.l 05; Ntloedibe, Here is a Tree, p.51. 
36 Mamphela Ramphele, A Life (Cape Town, David Philip, 1995), p.60. 
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word "Africanist" to include any group of people who lived in the country and considered 
themselves African enough to identify with Africa and who consequently disidentified themselves 
from the exploitative settler mentality. 37 Ironically, the PAC failed to attract white support. Only 
one white man, Patrick Duncan, signed up as a member and worked in collaboration with the 
organisation. 38 When it became clear that the PAC was failing to attract white members, the ANC 
accused the PAC of collaborating with the Nationalist government. This allegation was based on 
deductions about the private meeting which was thought to have been held early in 1959 between 
Robert Sobukwe, president of the PAC and his executive committee, and a Broederbond front 
organisation, the South African Bureau ofRacial Affairs (SABRA). 39 The allegation was false and 
Sobukwe and his executive were reported to have turned down the invitation. The ANC tried to 
discredit the PAC on a number of occasions, mainly because the latter had broken away from the 
ANC. Such accusations nevertheless continued to surface from time and time, especially in the 
period after the schism. 
Duncan's membership of the PAC (as the sole white member) has been attributed to the manner 
in which he threw himself into the struggle for black liberation and his unconditional support for 
the organisation. As editor of the Cape periodical, Contact, Duncan strongly criticised the 
establishment of the South African Congress of Democrats. The PAC was opposed to this 
multiracial organisation because it perceived it to be dominated by white communists. According 
to David Everatt, Duncan launched an attack on the influential role played by the communists in 
37 UNISA Archives, Centre for African Studies, Pretoria, AI 53, Robert Sobukwe, "The Pan 
African Congress Venture in Retrospective, September, 1960", pp.6-7; Kogila Moodley, "The 
Continued Impact ofBlack Consciousness in South Africa", in The Journal ofModem African 
Studies, vol29, 1991, p.240; Ntloedibe, Here is a Tree, pp.Sl-54. 
38 Merrett, A Culture of Censorship, p.44. 
39 Ntloedibe, Here is a Tree, p.7. 
182 
the formation and signing of the Freedom Charter at Kliptown on 26 June 1955. Everatt also 
observed that it was because of his anti-charterist opinions that Duncan managed to dissuade the 
Cape Liberal Party, of which he was a member, from associating with the ANC. 40 
The abiding impression that Biko and BC were virulently anti-liberal, was, however, essentially 
exaggerated and distorted. Biko' s main criticism of the liberals was what he believed that they 
were (for whatever reason) upholding a double standard. He alleged that they continued to enjoy, 
while supporting the African liberation struggle, the privileged status inalienably accorded to them 
as whites by the racist apartheid system. Biko therefore believed that their call for an end to 
discrimination could not be genuine. 41 This view was endorsed by Philip Frankel who felt that 
whites could not be involved in the political struggles of blacks since they were ipso facto also 
members of the oppressing class. 42 
Biko and other protagonists of BC felt that white liberals had missed the opportunity to 
demonstrate that they were serious in waging war against apartheid so long as they remained 
members of the exclusively white ruling class. In Biko's opinion, this identification compromised 
white liberals and opened them to accusations of adhering to a double standard. Having also 
observed that white liberals had failed to effect concrete changes, they decided on two lines of 
action. Firstly, they were of the opinion that whites were ignorant about relationships that existed 
40 David Everatt, "The Politics ofNonracialism: White Opposition to Apartheid, 1945-1960", 
D.Phil., Oxford University, 1990. pp.258-260. 
41 Steve Biko, "Black Souls in White Skin?", and "White Racism and Black Consciousness", 
in Aelred Stubbs CR (ed.), Steve Biko: I Write What I Like (London, Penguin Books, 1988), 
pp.33-40 and pp.75-86. 
42 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Philip Frankel, "Black Power in South Africa", New Nation, 
October 1972, p.6. 
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between racial groups and that they needed to be educated in this regard. 43 BC therefore argued 
that white liberals should embark on a project of educating their own communities, a process 
which, if it were successful, would contribute positively towards the overall cause of liberation. 
Secondly, they decided that whites might be allowed to work in and for black organisations on 
the condition that they were prepared to serve under black leadership.44 Liberals reacted badly to 
these conditions and believed that they had been unfairly criticised. Such a reaction cannot be 
dismissed out ofhand. For the first time in the history of the struggle, it seemed as if white liberals 
had been radically rejected by the very people whom they thought they were helping. 45 In their 
frustration at being so utterly and completely rejected, white liberals retaliated by accusing BC 
of being the ugly step-child of the Nationalists. 46 
This reaction serves to demonstrate the extent to which white liberals failed to understand the 
finer nuances of Biko's views and BC principles. Biko's own opinions were seized upon and 
misinterpreted. In an interview with Gail Gerhart, Biko reiterated that he bore white liberals no 
grudges.47 He emphasised that he stood for the BC principle of not collaborating with white 
liberals only because they were retarding the cause of black liberation. 48 in reality, however, BC 
depended heavily on white liberal collaboration. Although opinions circulating at the time 
43 Steve Biko, "White Racism and Black Consciousness," p.80. 
44 Strini Moodley, "Black Man You are still on Your Own", Rand Daily Mail, 10 Sep 1982. 
p.9. 
45 Archives, Alan Paton Centre, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Alan Paton, Letter to 
Gatsha Buthelezi, 5/9/1971, PCl/5/4 6-9. 
46 Sath Cooper, "Main Address," Azanian People's Organisation, February 1983, p.13. 
47 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Quoted from Gail Gerhart's interview with Steve Biko, 
Durban, 24 Oct 1972, pp.20-24. 
48 Donald Woods, "My friend Steve Biko," Rand Daily Mail, 14 Sep 1977, p.17. 
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managed to create a lasting impression that both Biko and BC were anti-liberal, the opposite in 
fact was true. 
Nengwekhulu's opinion, for example, was that neither SASO nor BC were anti-liberal in their 
policy. It remains a fact, however, that the opposite impression was bruited about by certain 
members of SASO and BC, who were radical and outspoken in the expression of their views. 49 
Nengwekhulu's most telling point was that it was difficult for BC to trust the whites to such an 
extent that they could be allowed to continue to lead the liberation struggle. 50 Mgwebi Snail 
pointed out that, when Biko criticised white liberals, he was merely cautioning them and urging 
them to make a make a deeper commitment to the struggle. 51 A similar opinion was expressed by 
Mangena who observed that the organisation was not against interaction with white organisations 
as such, but suggested that the thrust ofBC was that blacks should be given a chance to organise 
themselves and be the champions of their own struggle. 52 
The essentially pragmatic political agenda ofBC impelled it (to no lesser extent than other forces 
ranged against the apartheid regime), to exploit access to liberal media, financial resources and 
political sympathy in order to promote its own agenda. Even while they criticised white liberals, 
BC was being helped to popularise its ideology by liberal institutions such as the University 
49 Private Collection, University ofPretoria, Ranwedzi H. Nengwekhulu, "Black 
Consciousness: A Philosophy for Unity and Action- Towards the Development of an 
Ideology," p.1 0. 
50 Private Collection, Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, Black Consciousness Movement of South 
Africa: To the Assembly of the International University Exchange Fund, Geneva", November 
1976, University ofPretoria, p.2. 
51 Mabel Maimela, Interview with Mgwebi Snail, University of South Africa, Department of 
History, 17 Sep 1994. 
52 Quoted from Messina's interview with Mangena, Harare, 15 Jan 1992, p.15. 
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Christian Movement (UCM), the Christian Institute, and the liberal white press. 53 (This anomaly 
was discussed more fully in chapter three where relations with NUS AS are described.) 
Although misrepresented as such, Biko himself was clearly not anti-liberal in any simplistic way. 
His point of view was far more complex and he had a profound respect for the role played by 
prominent white liberals in the struggle. Mathews Phosa has emphasised the important role that 
certain white liberals played in Biko' s life. 54 The examples below illustrate Biko' s respect for and 
appreciation of white liberals, and show how he was constantly urging them towards deeper 
commitment and involvement. 
Biko's high expectation of white liberals as a group was a barometer of the extent to which he 
trusted particular white liberals. Certain liberals had made such a favourable impression on the 
young Biko that he acknowledged their influence and contribution, even in later years. One such 
individual was superintendent AP. Macnamee at Ginsberg where Biko's mother, Alice, worked 
as a domestic between 1951 and 1955 and where he had played with his mother's employer's 
children. 55 This was something which was not common in the South African racial context at the 
time and these happy memories remained with Biko until his later life. Macnamee' s genuine 
kindness was also evident when he obtained employment for Biko's mother at Grey Hospital when 
she left his employment at the end of 19 55. 56 
53 Karis and Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge, pp.71 and 73. 
54 Mathews Phosa, "Steve Biko's Legacy," Sowetan, 9 Sep 1997, p.8. 
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Ae1red Stubbs, principal of the Federal Theological Seminary in Alice, was another white liberal 
who met Biko during a difficult period for the family. Biko, his brother Khaya, and a number of 
young boys in their neighbourhood had been arrested in 1963 because they were suspected of 
being members ofthe PAC underground movement, Poqo. 57 Stubbs played an important role in 
securing a light sentence for Khaya. 58 The relationship between Biko and Stubbs was further 
strengthened through a correspondence initiated by Biko when he was a student at a private 
Catholic high school in Natal between 1964 and 1965.59 Biko's correspondence with Stubbs 
influenced both men deeply, and, in addition, Stubbs became the mentor for certain Anglican 
theological students, such as Drake Tshenkeng, Stanley Ntwasa and Rubin Philip. These students, 
all SASO members, were later to become champions of Black Theology, 60 and were destined to 
play important roles in propagating BC at grassroots level once they had been ordained as priests 
and assigned to parishes. Their precise roles were discussed in chapter two. 
Stubbs's role as spiritual father and mentor to Biko was clearly an important influence on the 
young Biko, but BC also received extensive material assistance and moral support from Stubbs. 
Stubbs sympathised deeply with the organisation and understood its point of view. For this and 
other reasons, Stubbs went to great pains after Biko's death and after the banning ofBC and its 
publications, to compile a collection ofBiko' s most essential articles from among those which had 
been published in the SASO Newsletter. He edited these articles and they were published, first 
by Bowerdean Press in 1978, and later by Penguin Books in 1988, under the title, I Write What 
57 Woods, Biko, p.70. 
58 Aelred Stubbs, "Martyr ofHope: A Personal Memoir" in Steve Biko. I Write What I Like, 
pp.174-175. 
59 Bernard Zylstra, "Steve Biko and Black Consciousness in South Africa", Acta Acadernica, 
vol25, no 3, 1993, p.30, quoted from Biko's interview with Gerhart, p.15. 
60 Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p.3, picture 5. 
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I Like. One of Stubbs's motives for collecting and publishing these articles was to inform the 
world at large about BC ideology and to give readers the opportunity to decide for themselves 
whether BC was indeed influenced by communism, as had been alleged by the South African 
Bureau of State Security (BOSS).61 
David Russell was another white liberal who acted as a mentor to Biko. He was a parish priest 
in the Anglican Church in King William's Town. He ministered to the residents ofDimbaza, a 
resettlement area for blacks who had been forcibly removed from areas in and around Middelburg 
and Burgersdorp near Cape Town so as to create residential areas for whites in 1971. Russell was 
severely critical of the insufferable conditions endured by these people in his parish, and he tried 
in vain to negotiate with the government to improve the appalling conditions in which resettled 
residents were forced to live. When he found that the government was unwilling to help in any 
way at all, and after he had buried 3 8 children in the first two months of 1971, Russell embarked 
on a ninety-hour fast and vigil on the steps of St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town, as a way of 
drawing attention to the suffering of the black children in Dimbaza (and elsewhere) who were 
dying of malnutrition. 62 Two years later, in 1973, he decided, as another form of protest, to 
attempt to live only on R5 per month for six months in order to test whether it was possible for 
any human being to survive on such an amount each month. 63 At the end of each month, he 
compiled a report which he sent to the minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in 
which he detailed how difficult it had been for him to survive on R5 per month. 64 As a result of 
61 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993), 
p.l87. 
62 Jennifer Scott, "The Black Sash: A Case Study ofLiberalism in South Africa 1955-1990", 
D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. p.200. 
63 South African Outlook, December 1973, p.26. 
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this imaginative form of protest, the pro-government Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk decided 
to establish a number of factories to alleviate unemployment in the area. 65 
Black activists were impressed by Russell as he increasingly and personally drew public attention 
to the iniquities of forced removals and involuntary resettlement. Even before Russell became 
acquainted with members of BC, his name was familiar among them. 66 Once the Black 
Consciousness Movement had been established, it was again Russell who persuaded the Anglican 
Church (the Church of the Province of South Africa) to allow BC to use an unused Anglican 
church property at 15a Leopold Street in King William's Town as offices for the organisation in 
1973.67 Through his intimacy with members of BC and his familiarity with the apartheid 
bureaucratic mentality, Russell was able to understand how the government ·and its security 
apparatus were using various means to sow dissension and disunity among blacks. He was, as a 
result, one of those white liberals who successfully managed to expose the activities of the police 
who had been covertly creating rivalry between township residents and hostel dwellers in the 
Eastern Cape. 68 This eventually culminated in his arrest on 8 August 1977. He was also prevented 
from entering any of the squatter camps around Bellville after he had been released on a bail of 
fifty Rand. 69 He then, together with other clergymen, issued a pamphlet which exposed the role 
of the police and which was circulated to progressive members of parliament. 70 His continual 
involvement with and sympathy for BC prompted the government to take strong measures in · 
general against Anglican clergy in South Africa. Russell was one of the few white liberals whose 
65 
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house and office were raided on the day of the banning ofBC and its related organisations on 19 
October 1977, and he was banned for five years after the raids. 71 The personal and intimate 
relationship between Russell and Biko was so strong by this time that, when Biko was banned in 
March 1973, it was Russell who broke the news to Biko's mother. 72 
That Biko expected white liberals to make a serious contribution to the political struggle, may be 
deduced from his collaboration with individuals who made a genuine effort to contribute to the 
upliftment of Africans and the black liberation struggle. One such white liberal was Anne Hope,~~ 
a founder of the Grail movement, a lay Catholic women's movement. Hope ran training courses 
based on Paulo Freire's methods for both SASO and the Christian Institute. She also conducted 
training courses in Freire's method ofthe conscientisation of oppressed groups in Johannesburg 
and Swaziland, 73 and, in compliance with a request from Biko, conducted an intensive leadership 
training for SASO members in the four months between December 1969 and March 1970.74 
Paulo Freire devised his methodology in South America as a means to combat adult illiteracy, and 
it was especially favoured by BC because of its suitability for adult education (a priority of the 
organisation), which had proved that literacy training methods, such as Freire's, stimulated 
creative and independent thinking while at the same time conscientising people politically. 7s Once .... , 
BC leaders had been trained in the method, they successfully applied it in some ofBC's literacy 
71 
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projects. One of these successes was the Winterveld literacy training project which was overseen 
by Mamphela Ramphele and Mangena during the summer vacation ofDecember 1971.76 
It is significant that BC chose Winterveld as one of the areas in which to experiment with this 
method. Although a number of community projects were sponsored by BC in other regions, this 
was the first of its kind to be conducted in the Transvaal. In addition, Winterveld, an area about 
thirty kilometres north of Pretoria, was historically important because it had been a dumping: 
ground in the 1950s for the victims of forced removals and was a place in which the inhabitants 
suffered extreme poverty and degradation and a lack of amenities of any kind. A number of the 
inhabitants of Winterveld had been removed from areas in and around Pretoria, areas such as 
Marabastad, W almansthal and Lady Selbome. Because it had become so overpopulated and the 
locus of so much poverty and distress, BC deliberately targeted the area in order to teach Africans 
to be self-reliant in a way that would improve all the conditions of their lives. This purpose 
informed BC's strategy when recruiting membership in African urban areas. BC policy was thus 
to entice Africans to participate in community and cultural programmes before they could be 
recruited into joining politics. 77 
Biko was therefore not simplistically anti-liberal, although it was all to easy to interpret BC's 
analysis in such a way. Rather, he hoped that white liberals would become more involved in those 
areas where it was impossible for Africans to uplift themselves on their own. Evidence of this 
attitude may be found in Biko' s relationship with Donald Woods, the editor of the Daily Dispatch, 
76 Quoted from Messina's interview with Mangena, p.ll. 
77 Harry Mashabela, "What's Wrong with Black Politics?", Race Relations News, vol52, no 
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a newspaper based in East London. Since his detention in March 1973, it had become virtually 
impossible for Biko to function normally in Black Consciousness projects. He agreed to Woods's 
proposal that he [Woods] should request Kruger, the minister of the police, prisons and justice, 
to relax Biko's banning order in August 1975.78 11 was hoped that, if the minister agreed, it might 
be possible for Biko to resume his duties in the organisation. 79 Although it was naive on the part 
of both Woods and Biko to imagine that Kruger might in any way agree to their request (he, of 
course, refused), the attempt demonstrates the extent to which Biko was prepared to rely on help 
from white liberals in the furtherance of the liberation struggle. 
Emphasis on group leadership rather than individual leadership in BC 
The other special contribution which is credited to Biko and which is regarded as one of the 
foundation stones ofBC philosophy, was his insistence on group leadership rather than individual 
leadership or the cult of personality (or personalities). 80 Biko probably adopted this idea from the 
ANC, which has always emphasised collective leadership. The difference between the ANC and 
BC in this regard is that, while the ANC elects its leaders from among all suitably qualified and 
competent members, BC believed in training as many leaders as possible and in giving to each the 
opportunity to exercise leadership at the highest level of the organisation. This idea took root in 
Biko' s mind after he had begun to appreciate that political organisations and governments often 
78 Woods, "My friend Steve Biko," Rand Daily Mail, 14 Sep 1977, p .15. 
79 Woods, Biko, p. 100. 
8
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fail because of a lack of genuine collective leadership. Biko realised that leaders are often 
corrupted by too much power. 81 
Biko knew that the survival ofBC in the 1970s was unlikely because the government had a policy 
of deliberately detaining black opposition leaders and taking them out the mainstream of political 
activity. 82 He therefore always emphasised the importance ofworking in a group so as to avoid 
the collapse of the movement if its leaders were prevented from functioning. Nengwekhulu has 
pointed out that Biko believed that group solidarity was vital for the Black Consciousness 
Movement to survive. 83 Because BC adhered strictly to this policy, it was able to survive the 
worst of the onslaught against it. 84 It was with this in mind that Biko and Nengwekhulu were 
directly involved in programmes for leadership training. Immediately after the formation of the 
South African Students Organisation (SASO), BC's first project was to organise leadership 
training so that there would be competent leaders within each region. The first formation school, 
as it was called, was held at the University ofNatal in December 1969.85 
Survival itself depended on having as many potential leaders as possible, and BC wished to avoid 
repeating the mistakes which had been made by other liberation movements such as the ANC and 
81 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, p. 48; "South African Students' Organisation: 
Report on the 1st National Formation School," 1 to 4 Dec 1969, pp.l-15. 
82 Steve Biko, "South African Students' Organisation: Historical Backround", in SASO 
Newsletter, February 1970, p.5. 
83 Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, "The Meaning ofBlack Consciousness in the Struggle for 
Liberation in South Africa," in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel, (eds.), Political Economy of 
Africa: Selected Readings (London, Longman Group Limited, 1981 ), p. 200. 
84 Muntu Myeza, "Mobilise and Consolidate the Liberatory Efforts of the Oppressed," in 
Azania People's Organization, February 1983, p.ll. 
85 Karis and Gerhart Collection, "File Wilgespruit: Private Document into Commission of 
Inquiry into Certain Organisations", p.36. 
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(especially) the PAC. After the PAC had been founded and was less than a year old, its eloquent 
and articulate leaders were all based in the Transvaal, particularly in Johannesburg. The 
organisation failed to place leaders throughout the country and, in the end, this oversight militated 
against the success of the organisation. This was evident when the leaders of the PAC, under their 
president, Sobukwe, marched to Orlando police station to give themselves up for arrest in a 
campaign against the pass laws. The entire leadership was jailed and the organisation was left 
without anyone to deliver instructions to its supporters. 86 As a result ofthis error of judgement 
on the part ofPAC, the organisation could not function effectively beyond 21 March 1960, and, 
ever since then, the organisation has failed to recover its early vigour and popularity. 87 In contrast 
to this, BC deliberately deployed its leadership in regions throughout the country. Until 1973, 
SASO leadership was visible in the Southern Transvaal (Johannesburg) and in Durban, Natal. 
SASO's influence in Natal was immense because influential SASO leaders such as Steve Biko, 
Barney Pityana, Sath Cooper and Strini Moodley lived in Durban. In 197 4 Biko was banished to 
King William's Town and Pityana to Port Elizabeth in 1973.88 
A formation school is one way to ensure the presence of capable leaders in each region and this 
concept was discussed in chapter three. Formation schools did, in fact, train and place SASO 
leaders in each region. When Biko was called to testify at the trial of SASO and BPC leaders 
between 3 and 7 May 1976, the accused represented many different regions. For example, 
Moodley, Cooper and Aubrey Mokoape represented the Natal region. Patrick "Terror" Lekota 
represented the Orange Free State. The Southern Transvaal was represented by Muntu Myeza and 
86 Pogrund, How Can A Man Die Better, p.349. 
87 Buthelezi, "The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa", in CEAPA, p.27. 
88 Millard, Steve Biko: Black Consciousness in South Africa, p.281. 
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Nkwenkwe Vincent Nkomo, while Pandelani Nefolovhodwe and Gilbert "Kaunde" Sedibe, from 
the University of the North, represented the Northern Transvaal.89 
In order to train and empower as many leaders as possible, the movement, following Biko's 
suggestion, adopted a policy of electing its president for only one term. 90 Biko believed that this 
policy would enable the organisation to allow as many potential leaders as possible to have the 
opportunity to practise leadership skills and would, in addition, promote the principle of group 
leadership. 91 For this reason, it has been alleged that Biko declined to be elected president of 
SASO for a second term but pushed rather for the nomination of Pityana, who became its 
president in 1970.92 Biko believed that the one-term policy would prevent any one personality 
from dominating the organisation and that it would therefore ultimately save it from corruption, 
dictatorship and personality cults. 93 
PAC ideology and Biko's political influence 
Unlike some students who first learn about politics at university, Biko came from a politically 
active family. His mother confirmed this in later years after his death when she averred that some 
distant relatives of theirs had been members of PAC when it was still a legal organisation.94 There 
89 Ibid, p.155; Thoko Mbanjwa, (ed.), Black Review 1974/75 (Durban, Black Community 
Programmes, 1975), p.83. 
90 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, pp.23-25. 
91 Millard, Steve Biko: Black Consciousness in South Africa, p.130. 
92 Aelred Stubbs CR, "The story ofNyameko Barney Pityana", in South African Outlook, vol 
111, no 1300, October 1979, p.l50. 
93 Woods, Biko, p.190. 
94 
"Steve Biko's last goodbye", Daily Dispatch, 17 August 1978. p.4. 
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are indications that the family remained loyal to the PAC even after it had been banned. Because 
there were numerous discussions about PAC policy in his home, Biko became familiar with 
political issues at an early age. He also had access to political literature. 95 He listened avidly to 
many political debates and discussions about PAC ideology. Such debates, he later maintained, 
raised his political awareness.96 It was, however, at Lovedale High School that his political 
interests were sharpened by debates in which topics were invariably dominated by political 
questions. Although he only studied for a very short while (three months) at Lovedale, the 
institution served to conscientise him politically.97 This has been confirmed by Pityana, who has 
suggested that Lovedale was the cradle which nurtured Biko's subsequent political involvement. 98 
Later, at the Medical School ofthe University ofNatal, Biko forged strong ties with friends from 
PAC circles. Mokoape, who was known on campus for being a member of the African Students' 
Union of South Africa (ASUSA), the student wing of the PAC, became one of Biko's 
confidantes. 99 Mokoape had been involved in the PAC since its inception in 1959. According to 
Progrund, he was (at age of 16) the youngest person among those PAC activists who were 
arrested on 21 March 1960.100 Biko was inspired by his conversations with Mokoape about PAC 
policy, and he found such interchanges both challenging and intellectually stimulating. 101 It was 
this strong bond between Biko and ex-members ofPAC that enabled prominent former members 
ofP ACto play a prominent role in the organisation when the Black People's Convention emerged. 
95 Wilson, "Bantu Stephen Biko: A Life", p.18. 
96 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, p.16. 
97 Ibid, p.16. 
98 N. Barney Pityana, "Introduction: Bantu Stephen Biko: In perspective", in Aelred Stubbs 
CR, (ed.), Steve Biko: I Write What I Like, p.4. 
99 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko. pp.2-4. 
100 Pogrund, How Can a Man Die Better, p.l34. 
101 Ramphele, A Life, p.60. 
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According to Sipho Buthelezi, Paul Tsotetsi, the first chairperson of the Johannesburg Central 
Branch of the BPC, was a hard-core cadre of the PAC before it was outlawed in 1960. He further 
pointed out that Zeph Mothopeng was active in the organisation until it was banned in 1977.102 
Although a staunch member ofP AC, Mothopeng showed his sympathy with Black Consciousness 
philosophy by accepting an invitation to the 7th SASO General Students' Council in July 1975, 
where he read a paper entitled, "Imperialist penetration into African universities". In this paper 
he proposed the then revolutionary concept that blacks should be in charge of the administration 
of black universities. 103 
Because it seemed as though there were some strong similarities between the PAC and BC, one 
group of exiled PAC members identified itself with the development of the Black Peoples; 
Convention. It claimed to have had a direct influence on and control of the organisation. The 
group, nicknamed "the Sobukwe executive", was based in London under the leadership ofNana 
Mahomo and Matthew Nkoana. 104 Mahomo was a prominent member of the PAC, together with 
Philip Kgosana, and they organised demonstrations immediately after the Sharpeville shootings. 105 
Biko's intellectual precedents in PAC ideology did not, however, mean that he was not open 
minded enough to accommodate contributions made by other black political organisations. On 
the contrary, he was reported to have consulted supporters of the ANC06 and of the Non-
European Unity Movement (NEUM). 107 Biko was able to accommodate both ofthese African 
102 Buthelezi, "The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa in the late 1960s ", p.30. 
103 SASO Newsletter, July/August 1975. vol 5, no 2, p.4. 
104 Buthelezi, "The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa in the late 1960s ", p.31. 
105 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, p.41. 
106 Pityana, "Introduction: Bantu Stephen Biko", p.ll. 
107 Halisi, "Biko and Black Consciousness Philosophy", p.101. 
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organisations because he was essentially open-minded and had had the opportunity of working 
with individuals with an ANC background, people such as Pityana. 108 Because BC was basically 
in harmony with the wider aims of the ANC, PAC and NEUM, the organisation received support 
from the remnants ofthese organisations who remained in the country. They were able to identify 
themselves with BC to the extent that it embodied some of the elements of their own banned 
organisations. 109 
While former PAC members were actively involved in BC, former ANC members, such as Nthato 
Motlana, who served as one of the Board ofDirectors ofBlack Community Programmes, one of 
the BC projects between 1973 to 1976, were also involved. 110 His activism during the 1970s and 
1980s resulted in Motlana' s detention. This was received with disbelief and condemnation because 
Motlana was viewed as a moderate by liberal establishment organisations when compared to 
members ofthe Black Consciousness Movement. 111 Similarly, Winnie Mandela, known to have 
been associated with the ANC because her jailed husband was one ofits leading members, played 
a substantial role in the formation ofthe Black Women's Federation (BWF) in December 1975, 
and was subsequently detained because of her activities in the BWF. 112 
108 Maimela, Interview with Nengwekhulu, University of Pretoria, Department of Public 
Administration, 20 May 1996. 
109 Halisi, "Biko and Black Consciousness Philosophy", p.101. 
110 Archives Unisa, Centre for African Studies, Black Community Programmes 1976 Report, 
#AAS 167, p.2. 
111 Joyce Harris, "A letter to the PM", Rand Daily Mail, 4 August 1976, p.16; Post, 18 
October 1979, p.7. 
112 Asha Rambally, (ed.), Black Review 1975-76 (Durban, Black Community Programmes, 
1977), p. 110. 
198 
It has been claimed that members of the exiled ANC, especially those who held Africanist 
principles, were behind the formation of the BPC. 113 Whether or not this was the case, it is true 
that, since BC attempted to embrace elements from the ideologies of other African political 
organisations, it was easy for those in exile to claim that they had made a contribution to the 
establishment of black organisations. This explains why Neville Alexander, known to have been 
an ex-supporter ofNEUM, was also a supporter ofBC after his release from Robben Island. 114 
Because he was a banned person, Alexander was allowed only severely restricted contact with 
others. He nevertheless wrote articles on BC which were published internationally. One of these 
articles circulated in South Africa only after the unbanning of the black liberation movements in 
1990.115 Alexander, however, had remained in secret contact with BC leadership, and with Biko 
in particular. The nature of their contact is discussed in a later chapter. 
BC' s policy of accommodating, wherever possible, the policies of other African and liberationist 
ideologies, and of acknowledging as authentic those contributions made by banned organisations 
and their leaders, who were either in exile and in prison, inspired ordinary people to support its 
tenets. 116 This principle of acknowledging the contribution of banned African organisations, was 
part and parcel ofBiko's policy. Before his death in detention in 1977, he held that the role of the 
BC Movement, as it was still operating legally in the country, should be to unify all authentic 
African liberation organisations (by which he meant mainly the ANC and PAC). 117 The same 
113 Buthelezi, "The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa in the late 1960", p.32. 
114 Wilson, "Bantu Stephen Biko: A Life", pp.66-67. 
115 Neville Alexander, "Black Consciousness: A Reactionary Tendency?", in Pityana et al, 
Bounds ofPossibility, pp.238-251. 
116 Pityana, "lntroduction:Bantu Stephen Biko", p.l1. 
117 
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opinions were held by members of the ANC, especially those in exile. They had accepted the fact 
that BC was a force with which it had to negotiate since it was the only legitimate organisation 
which was allowed to operate in the country at that time. 118 This might have been the reason why 
Biko pursued this particular principle. It was later alleged, on the day when Biko was arrested 
with Peter Jones, who was the head of Black Community Programme in the Eastern Cape 
region, 119 that Biko was heading to Grahamstown and that the purpose of the visit was to have 
confidential discussions with both members ofBPC and with Alexander. 120 
At this time, Biko was gathering relevant information and opinions as he examined the viability 
of making a strategic trip overseas. The former director of the International University Exchange 
Fund based in Geneva, Switzerland, Lars Gunnar Erikson, has disclosed that Biko's visit abroad 
was intended to discuss the viability of forming a United Front of the BC, the ANC and the 
PAC. 121 The plan, however, was unsuccessful as it was intercepted by agents of the South African 
government security apparatus, possibly the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). 122 Evidence of 
Biko's secret plan to leave South Africa was used by the government as a justification for Biko's 
arrest. 
Furthermore, the government cited Biko's alleged involvement in plans to overthrow the 
Nationalist government as their reason for Biko's August 1977 arrest. 123 Another unconfirmed 
118 Govan Mbeki, Sunset at Midday: Latshoni Lang emnini! (Nolwazi Educational Publishers, 
1996), p.36. 
119 The Star, 27 Feb 1979, p.26. 
120 Unisa Archives, The Biko Inquest, vol4, November 1977, p.161. 
121 The Argus, 26 Feb 1980, p.25. 
122 Maimela, Interview with Nengwekhulu. 
123 
"Commentary: What is Black Consciousness?", Pretoria News, 20 Sep 1977, p.12; Rand 
Daily Mail, 9 Feb 1979, p.13; Weekend World, 18 Sep 1977, p.5; Phil Mtimkulu, "When 
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and speculative report, which was heard at the United States Senate terrorism hearings by the 
South African exile Nokonono Kave, stated that the ANC had conspired with the government in 
Biko's arrest. 124 She argued that his distinguished leadership and the ever-increasing popularity 
which BC was gaining among the rank and file of ordinary people would jeopardise the extent of 
ANC support in the country. 125 The Kave statement, however, was categorically denied by both 
the ANC and the Biko family. 126 Her reasons for attempting to implicate the ANC in a plot to 
arrest Biko was that, since she had been in exile and was then in the process of returning to South 
Mrica, it suited her to try to discredit the ANC. She was apparently attempting some kind of 
secret agreement with the South African government, an agreement which would have guaranteed 
her immunity from harassment in the South African satellite homeland of the Ciskei. 127 One might 
have expected that this incident would have been elucidated in the current Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission hearings. Since, however, the Biko family is opposed to the TRC 
process, the circumstances which led to his arrest continue to remain a mystery. 
Another opinion about how the government came to know about Biko's secret plans to leave the 
country was proposed by Biko's former secretary, Hester Joseph, when she suggested that one 
of the board members of the Black Community Programme in Natal was a government informer 
and that he had divulged the plan. 128 The BC also gained politically from having to some extent 
incorporated the ideas of other prominent African political organisations when, in later years, it 
Kruger Raised Laughs", Weekend World, 18 Sep 1977, p.S. 
124 Daily Dispatch, 22 April 1982, p.2. 
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became easier for the victims of June 1976 uprising (mostly obvious products ofBC thinking) to 
be accommodated in the ANC and the PAC while in exile. 129 It has been suggested that quite a 
number of the students from that time later trained in ANC military training camps. 130 
The reason why more exiles joined the ANC rather than the PAC (even though BC's ideology was 
in many ways closer to the latter than it was to the former), was that the PAC was portrayed by 
many Western countries as being far more radical than the ANC. As a result, PAC became 
unpopular and received far less material support. The only country which actively supported the 
PAC was the People's Republic of China, which only offered military training. 131 On the whole, 
therefore, the PAC received funding which was inadequate to support a large number of recruits 
and so, as a result, few ofthe 1976 students joined the PAC. 
How Biko's interest in literature broadened his political views 
Bik:o was a gifted child and his exposure in early childhood to politics evoked in him a strong 
desire to enrich and expand his knowledge of politics. By the time he entered university, he was 
therefore already politically sophisticated to an unusual degree, and his knowledge of political, 
economic and social ideas enabled him to give definite shape and direction to Black 
Consciousness philosophy. BC members were notable for their interest in political literature and 
even when in prison they attempted to lay their hands on banned texts, especially those ofKarl 
129 Kogila Moodley, "The Continued Impact of Black Consciousness in South Africa", in The 
Journal ofModern African Studies, vol29, no 2, 1991, p.250. 
130 The World, 30 Dec 1976, p.l. 
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Marx. 132 Biko took it upon himself to analyse texts for their suitability and relevance to BC ideals. 
Such texts originated mainly from three geographical areas and they were concerned chiefly with 
the analysis and criticism of the phenomenon of racism. 
African literature was the first and primary focus of Biko's investigations because he was 
concerned to locate the significance of African identity in Africa itself 133 The 1960s was also the 
decade during which African countries were obtaining independence from their erstwhile colonial 
rulers, and so the literature which was being produced before and during this period was relevant 
to the historic colonial enslavement ofblack South Africans and the general conditions in which 
blacks found themselves in South Africa. Such literature, of course, tended to be extremely radical 
and it concentrated its critique against the colonial powers and their apparatus of oppression. 134 
Biko made the point that articles which were chosen for discussion evoked favourable responses 
from members. 135 He pointed out that his favourite African authors were Senghor, Diop and 
Fanon. 136 It has been suggested that Frantz Fanon's writings influenced Biko to use the blanket 
term "oppressors" to refer to whites and that white liberals were included in the class of 
oppressors. The oppressed were only blacks, but "blacks" in Black Consciousness interpretation 
included Africans, Coloureds and lndians. 137 Fanon's writings could not fail to exert a powerful 
influence since their central themes were an analysis and critique of colonialism, capitalism and 
132 Quoted from Messina's interview with Mangena, p.4. 
133 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, p.ll; Godwin Mohlomi, "Black search for 
identity and dignity", The World, 15 July 1976, p.2. 
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135 Ibid, p.ll. 
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racist ideology. 138 His work was widely influential. While it shaped BC thinking, it was also crucial 
in informing analyses of political conditions in the West and the rest of the world. 
Another African author who influenced Biko was Aime Cesaire. His literature dealt mainly with 
racial issues and so was invaluable to Biko as he tried to understand and unravel the complexities 
of the South African racial, political, social and economic situation. 139 Biko kept himself abreast 
with political developments in Africa by reading literature written by the heads of African 
countries. In his writings, he frequently quoted excerpts from speeches and writings of Ghana's 
Kwame Nkrumah, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere. The latter had 
formulated his own African brand of socialism and was a major critic of the apartheid regime.140 
Similarly, Malawi's president, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was one ofBiko's favourites on account 
of the militancy of his views during the early years of his presidency. 141 Biko' s main focus of 
interest at the time was on news of political developments from the rest of the continent, 142 and, 
because of his interest in the literature and news from the African continent, his followers in BC 
became similarly absorbed. 143 
A book which Biko found helpful for analysing and understanding the government's philosophy 
about racial segregation144 was the South African book which was banned at the time but which 
was available through underground connections: it was Edward Roux's Time Longer than Rope: 
138 Halisi, "Biko and Black Consciousness Philosophy", p.l09. 
139 Biko, "White Racism and Black Consciousness", p.75. 
140 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, p.l3. 
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142 Quoted from Gerhart's interview with Biko, p.35. 
143 Private Collection, Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, "Black Consciousness: A Philosophy For 
Unity and Action Towards the Development of an Ideology", p.5. 
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the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa. 145 African American literature also played 
a substantial role in shaping Biko's BC philosophy in South Africa. Terms such as "black", 
"pride", "self-determination" and "psychological liberation", which were the main contributions 
made by BC philosophy to attaining total liberation, were reported to have originated in African 
American literature. 146 
Biko, however, and other forerunners of the Black Consciousness Movement, such as Mangena, 
categorically denied the allegation which was constantly levelled by the government and other 
critics of BC that BC was a mindless replication of the radicalism of African American Black 
Power. 147 The oppression suffered by the two communities was different in kind. They argued 
that, on the one hand, American oppression developed out of slavery while, on the other hand, 
South African oppression had developed from the consequences of colonisation. 148 Government 
critics merely attempted to undermine BC in crude political ways and so in the end failed to learn 
whatever useful lessons they might have learned from accepting the existence ofBC and meeting 
the challenge which it offered. 
When Biko found articles challenging and thought-provoking, he circulated them among SASO 
members who held radical opinions. 149 Among such articles were some by Stokely Carmichael, 
the 1966 leader of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Also circulated was 
145 Edward Roux, Time Longer Than Rope: The Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South 
Africa (New York, Madison, 1966). 
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Carmichael and Charles Hamilton's book, Black Power: The Politics ofLiberation in America.150 
Pityana reports that works by personalities influential in the Black Power and Civil Rights 
movements, writers such as Eldridge Cleaver, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr., were also 
often read and discussed. 1s1 
Some articles were utilised specifically for the way in which they answered to the current political 
dilemmas in which students found themselves. For example, one of the articles, "The Black 
University", discussed problems frequently encountered by black students when coping with a 
European-orientated curriculum. 1s2 The main way in which radical African American literature 
seems to have been useful was that it helped people to learn to fend for themselves without 
reliance on white liberals. This was the main emphasis in the writings of Malcolm X and Stokely 
Carmichael. 
It is also interesting to note that once SASO had been established, the organisation had access to 
the radical literature published by Panaf, and that these included titles by K warne Nkrumah, Mao 
Tsetung, Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael. One of these articles, "The Spectre of Black 
Power", postulated that Africans were exploited by Europeans all over the world, irrespective of 
Iso Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics ofLiberation in 
America (New York, Random House, 1967), p.198. 
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geographical locality. The article suggested alternative ways of challenging such racial 
exploitation. 153 
Although liberals acclaimed Biko' s distinguished contribution to poetical theory and revolutionary 
strategy after his death, the South African government never relented in its campaign to discredit 
him. A major attempt to blacken his reputation posthumously and to distort his contribution to 
BC appeared in the form of a mysterious (but suspicious) book entitled, Steve Biko: Martyr of 
the Revolution. In an attempt to simulate verisimilitude, the supposed African author, "James 
Mbabane", claimed to have been Biko's intimate friend. 154 It is fairly clear now that the 
government's intention in sponsoring these fraudulent memoirs was to try to create scepticism 
about the authenticity and accuracy ofDonald Woods's book, Biko, which was circulating widely 
throughout Europe and the United States and which depicted apartheid as the brutal system it 
actually was. However, intensive investigation on the part ofboth European and South African 
journalists eventually proved that "James Mbabane" was unknown to either members ofBiko's 
family or members of his political circle. 155 
153 Kwame Nkrumah, The Spectre of Black Power (London, PanafPublications Limited, 
1968), p.15 
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Biko's influence and the spread of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa 
A number of individuals played a prominent role and made a substantial contribution in the early 
stages after the founding ofBC. Those who contributed most had been Biko's close associates 
before the movement gained popularity. To a large extent, their contact with him encouraged 
them to be involved in politics and venture into political activism. Two close associates ofBiko 
who were especially committed to the struggle in the early days, and who will therefore be 
examined in this subsection, are Pityana and Nengwekhulu. The former played a key role in the 
early growth of the organisation, while the latter's contribution was made mainly in the 
development of international connections. 
Nyameko Barney Pityana and Black Consciousness 
Pityana got involved with the Black Consciousness Movement by joining SASO. He had known 
Biko since they were both at high school in Lovedale, and had both been expelled, along with 
other students, because they participated in a strike in 1963. Pityana' s greatest contribution to the 
organisation was made when BC was still being built up. A strong friendship based on common. ;• 
political goals began in the winter holiday of 1967, when Biko visited Pityana at New Brighton 
in Port Elizabeth, after the former had just returned from the annual congress of NUS AS at 
Rhodes University, Grahamstown. 156 
156 Pityana, "Introduction: Bantu Stephen Biko", pp.4-5. 
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By then he was at Fort Hare University and Biko was a student at the University ofNatal Medical 
School. Pityana was the first member of BC to have been associated with a multi-racial 
organisation before the formation of SASO in 1966. In 1968 he was elected president of the 
Anglican Students Federation (ASF), a multi-racial religious organisation. 157 Blacks were not 
happy in these multiracial gatherings because they were dominated by the whites who always 
tenanted the leadership, but it was in these very institutions that they equipped themselves with 
the necessary skills to lead. As a result of his participation in multi-racial gatherings, Pityana 
became an asset to the organisation once it had been founded, as he was one of those to gave 
SASO a firm foundation and a sound direction. 158 
The 1967 meeting was followed by another one a year later during the winter holidays of 1968. 
The two men had agreed to introduce political activities at Fort Hare University where Pityana 
would be in a position to coordinate such activities. Immediately after the re-opening of the 
university, a meeting of the students was called, which was chaired by Pityana. One of the issues 
raised was student dissatisfaction with the general running of the administration. 159 The meeting 
resolved to address these problems with the university authorities. There was, however, a strike 
before the meeting could take place. As a result, the university authorities expelled twenty-one 
students, including Pityana, Justice Moloto, Chris Mokoditoa and Hlaku Rachidi. 160 All of those 
who were expelled from the Fort Hare University in 1968 were subsequently involved in the Black 
Consciousness Movement until the banning of the organisation in October 1977. Both Moloto 
157 Aelred Stubbs, "The Story ofNyameko Barney Pityana.", in South Africa Outlook, 
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and Mokoditoa were on the University Christian Movement (UCM) executive between 1969 until 
its closure in 1972, while Rachidi was the last president of the Black People's Convention (BPC). 
This has been discussed earlier in the thesis. 
After Pityana's expulsion from Fort Hare, he based himself at New Brighton, Port Elizabeth. 
When SASO was formed he was the regional representative and worked with students from Fort 
Hare, such as Ben Langa and JeffBaqwa. 161 Biko was elected SASO president at its inauguration 
in July 1969 at the University of the North, and Pityana later succeeded him as its president in July 
1970 at the second annual congress. 162 As the second president of SASO, Pityana continued to 
build SASO on the foundations which Biko had laid. One of the problems which Pityana had to 
confront was how to maintain balanced and constructive relations between SASO and NUSAS, 
especially because the former suspected the latter of interfering in black student activities. One 
such incident occurred when the SRCs of the Universities ofStellenbosch and the Witwatersrand 
invited the black universities of Fort Hare, Natal (black division), Zululand and Tur:floop to 
celebrate with them the tenth anniversary ofRepublic Day on 31 May 1971.163 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding SASO's future as a black student movement, a number 
of the students were not yet sufficiently convinced of its viability to support it. Pityana, in his 
capacity as its president, played a major role in persuading wavering black students to throw in 
their lot with SASO. He embarked on a national tour to recruit new students to the organisation. 
His greatest success occurred on a trip to Fort Hare in March 1971, when he helped students 
161 
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there to establish an SRC that would support founding a branch of SASO on the campus. 164 He 
also visited the University of the Western Cape in March 1971. So many students were impressed 
by his persuasive and eloquent appeal that a large number of them joined SASO immediately. This 
was followed by the formal establishment of a branch in May.165 
Pityana also kept in contact with non-students who were interested in the organisation. He once 
read a paper which explained the philosophy and the objectives ofBC at a conference held at the 
Donaldson Orlando Community Centre in Soweto in March 1971.166 In order to encourage and 
support student activities there, Pityana attended the SASO week organised by the University of 
the North's local committee of SASO, where he delivered an opening address entitled, "The 
Challenge of the 70s" .167 
SASO leaders realised that Pityana's contribution to the growth and development of the 
organisation was so vital that the executive requested permission from the University ofNatal to 
allocate them an office from which Pityana could operate in a full-time capacity as the general 
secretary of SAS0. 168 He was then given an office by the university in Taylor Residence. He 
subsequently moved to Durban in 1971, whereupon he and Biko together purchased a four-
roomed house in one of the local townships where the two families lived together until February 
1973, when Biko was banished to King William's Town and Pityana to Port Elizabeth. These were 
the first two banning orders imposed on members ofBlack Consciousness. 169 As with most of the 
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executive and organising members of BC, Pityana's active role was terminated by continued 
bannings and detentions by the racist government between 1973 and 1979, and these continued 
until he left the country and went into exile. 170 
Randwedzi Harry Nengwekhulu and Black Consciousness 
Another contemporary of Steve Biko who played a leading role in the formation of SASO and 
the BC Movement was Randwedzi Nengwekhulu. Most ordinary Africans living in the rural areas 
where there is little or no access to media such as newspapers and radio were often unaware of 
the ferment of new and radical ideas among the oppressed blacks of South Africa. Nengwekhu1u 
was such a person. He lived in Vendaland, where he attended high school until1966. Since he 
paid regular visits to his father who had a house in Chiawelo in Soweto, he eventually became 
politically aware, a fact attributable to his exposure to newspapers which he found in his father's 
house. His reading made a profound impression on Nengwekhulu, who, until then, had been 
politically illiterate. As a result of these holiday visits and his early politicisation, he became one 
of the few students at a rural high school in the northern part of the country to become involved 
in student politics at an early age. 171 Nengwekhulu reached political maturity when he enrolled at 
the University of the North in 1967. SASO was the first student organisation in which he became 
a full member and participant. He was even more radical than either Biko and Pityana. 172 
Nengwekhulu's radicalism became the subject of criticism among adult white liberals who were 
170 Stubbs, "The Story ofNyameko Barney Pityana", p.lSO. 
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uncomfortable with his uncompromising style when approaching issues. His style was often 
offensive to white liberals but, in reality, he had never had any opportunity (in rural Vendaland 
and ~he Northern Transvaal) to learn the kind of personal trust and interactive skills which might 
have enabled him to be less abrasive towards white liberals. 
Liberal students, however, felt differently about Nengwekhulu. They saw and appreciated his 
sound leadership potential. NUS AS, through its president Duncan Innes and vice-president Horst 
Kleinschmidt, offered Nengwekhulu an executive post within the organisation as part oftheir 
strategy to keep the University of the North as a member of NUSAS. 173 When Nengwekhulu 
declined the offer, it was accepted by Ernest Ralekgetho, a student from St. Peter's Seminary, 174 
who took over the new portfolio of Nuswel, which was responsible for welfare activities and 
which had been created in 1970.175 
Nengwekhulu, like Biko, may be considered one of the architects and builders of the BC 
Movement He was one of that first group to develop a political outlook of their own, a world 
view which was embodied in the philosophy ofBC. 176 According to Ramphele, Nengwekhulu and 
Biko were the first facilitators of the leadership training programme (manifested in formation 
schools), which played such an important part in building up the strength ofBC. 177 
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Nengwekhulu played an active role in the launch ofSASO in 1969. He also led SASO delegations 
to the first and the second conferences held in Bloemfontein on 24 April 1971 and at the Jabulani 
Amphitheatre in Soweto between 17 and 19 December 1971, where an attempt was made to 
launch a new broader black political organisation: the Black People Convention (BPC).178 The 
need to establish such an organisation arose out of the fact that SASO was intended only for 
students. The Black People Convention was therefore launched in 1972 to cater for the political 
aspirations of those who were not students, but it continued to maintain strong links with SASO 
and was profoundly influenced by BC ideology. 
Nengwekhulu's strong political convictions and some of the statements he issued in interviews 
and speeches made him quite unpopular as early as 1971. 179 One such incident was his address 
during the commemoration of Sharpeville in March 1971, when he described whites as people 
with violent attitudes and a "strange people with their strange logic". 180 On this occasion Biko 
warned Nengwekhulu against the use of inflammatory appeals which might incite audiences to 
dangerous action. 181 Together with Themba Sono, the SASO president, and Pityana, the general 
secretary, Nengwekhulu represented SASO to plead with the university council for the 
readmission of expelled students at the University of the North, after the Tiro affair. 182 
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Supporting the reinstatement of these students at the university was of crucial importance for 
SASO. The University of the North was SASO's stronghold. Abram Tiro was the president of the 
SRC which had affiliated to SASO. He was expelled from the university after he had delivered 
a speech at the graduation ceremony on 29 April 1972. In his speech he had criticised, in a general 
way, the systematic cruelties and atrocities of Bantu Education. Tiro accused the university 
authorities of perpetuating racism, even at graduation ceremonies, by giving preferential seating 
to white guests who had little stake in what was taking place, while black parents who had 
accompanied their own children were either seated in the back rows or had to stand outside the 
hall because there was no accommodation for them. 183 Tiro's speech contained political 
expressions which were commonly used in SASO gatherings. 
At the Annual General Student Council which was held between 2 and 9 July 1972, Nengwekhulu 
was elected as a permanent organiser for SASO. This post was to last for three years. Then, when 
he was banned the following year, Tiro had to fill the vacan~y. 184 
N engwekhulu' s main responsibility was to facilitate communication between the national, regional 
and branch levels of SASO. He first travelled between Johannesburg and Durban since the main 
centre of SASO activity was Durban. Nengwekhulu's main priority was to involve high school 
students in protest activities. He strongly supported the idea of involving the youth in politics.185 
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This explains his establishment of a number of student organisations in the Transvaal region. 186 
His presence was reported at the launching of the foundation of the Africa Students' Movement, 
the Springs Students' Association, and the Nigel Student Association in August 1972.187 
Nengwekhulu supported the introduction of literacy projects in areas where there was a high 
incidence of illiteracy. Subsequently, he moved a motion in support of fully-fledged and semi-
independent literacy projects which would be run by SAS0. 188 He was one of the first members 
of SASO to be arrested in 1972 by the security police for being "an idle or undesirable Bantu", 
and was charged for having been in Johannesburg illegally. 189 This shows the extent to which his 
political activities as SASO's permanent organiser angered and annoyed the government. Although 
he was perceived as radical from a white point of view, he managed nevertheless to work together 
with white liberals in their organisations which offered financial benefits to SASO. He represented 
SASO in the University Christian Movement and on the Christian Scholarship Fund as a 
committee member. 190 He addressed a conference hosted by the South African Institute of Race 
Relations. In his address he attempted to explain the policy and philosophy of the BC Movement 
and suggested the role which the white community, and especially white liberal organisations, 
might play in the strategy of political liberation for Africans. 191 
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The post of permanent organiser ofSASO exposed Nengwekhulu to the international community. 
After his banning in February 1973, and while banished in Sibasa, he was a contact person 
between individual students and international organisations that were keen to offer funds for the 
benefit of Africans. It was reported that he enjoyed an intimate relationship with Lars-Gunnar 
Eriksson, the Swedish director of the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) based in 
Geneva. 192 
The relationship between BC and the Swedish Fund was established through Aubrey Mokoape 
who visited Scandinavia immediately after the formation of SAS0. 193 It was through such 
initiatives taken by Mokoape that it was possible for Nengwekhulu, as the first permanent 
organiser, to have contact with the IUEF. The BC self-help projects were funded mainly by the 
IUEF, under the supervision of N engwekhulu. 194 These funds were first used in 1972 to assist 
those students who had become the victims of the University of the North (Tur:floop) expulsion.195 
The reason why the IUEF became interested in SASO was that it was competing to secure 
dominance over SASO. The IUEF recognised the importance of the emergence of such a radical 
organisation, something which the international community had been watching with interest and 
anticipation. 196 
There is some evidence to support the belief that IUEF was interested in having influence over 
SASO. The director of IUEF, Eriksson, was not prepared to admit that funding oppressed 
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students benefited them, and maintained that the organisation's interest in student organisations 
such as SASO was merely to provide them with the funds for education and training 
programmes. 197 Ken Owen in the Sunday Times suggested that it was because of his strong links 
with members ofillEF that N engwekhulu was able to receive funds via old friends in NUS AS and 
that, because of this assistance, he managed to flee the country and settle in Botswana on 18 
September 1973.198 Nengwekhulu's version, however, differs from Owen's and he maintains that 
he left the country of his own accord. 199 Owen twisted these facts so that it might appear that both 
NUSAS and BC were being funded at the time by radical organisations with the aim of 
destabilising the country. Owen was trying to compare the role played by the former NUSAS 
member, Craig Williamson, who worked for the IUEF but who was also a spy for the South 
African government, with that ofNengwekhulu, who was a mediator between the IUEF and BC. 
When Nengwekhulu fled to Botswana in 1973, he became the movement's most senior member 
(second only to Tiro) to settle and establish a strong power base there. 200 He played the role of 
external affairs director of the Black People's Convention and acted as a link between the 
organisation in South Africa and the exiles, and international community. 201 
One of the international organisations with which radical blacks were most involved was the 
illEF. Nengwekhulu therefore became the illEF coordinator after he had fled to Botswana. He 
organised scholarships for needy black students (mainly within South Africa) who belonged to 
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BC.202 Because ofNengwekhulu's involvement, it has been suggested that, between 1975 and 
1977, the IUEF made substantial grants towards BC programmes. However, apart from the 
funding discussed above, the IUEF sponsored students and defended them after the Soweto 
uprising of 1976 by means of the Zimele Trust Fund. However, the IUEF was not the only 
funding institution which provided financial assistance to this trust. According to Ramphele, a 
large amount was donated by Mondragon, a company in Spain.203 Zimele Trust's initial success 
was shortlived because the first administrator, Mapetla Mohapi, was killed while in detention on 
5 August 1976. He was succeeded by Pumzile Majeke, who was also subsequently detained.204 
The Union ofBlack Journalists, the Ginsberg Education Fund and Ithuseng Centre also received 
funds from the IUEF. 205 The Ithuseng Centre was founded by Ramphele after she had been 
forcefully removed from King William's Town in May 1977, where she had worked as the 
superintendent at the Zanempilo Clinic, before being banished to Tzaneen. 206 
Nengwekhulu became one of the few members in exile to act as a link between the IUEF and BC 
activists and BC projects. For example, the Soweto Action Committee, the Youth Centre in 
Umtata, the Ipopeng Clinics in the Northern Transvaal and Winterveld near Pretoria, all survived 
because of financial assistance from the IUEF. 207 Other international bodies which extended their 
financial assistance were the Board of Methodist Church, predominantly a black organisation 
based in New York, and the World University Services (WUS). The latter was reluctant to 
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support SASO at the beginning when it was requested to do so because of SASO's resistance to 
cooperation with NUSAS.Z08 
208 Maimela, Interview with Nengwekhulu. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WOMEN AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the contribution which black women made to BCM, and 
how, during the difficult days of the heyday the apartheid regime, various individual white liberal 
women, such as Helen Joseph, Hetty du Preez and Josie Palmer, and white liberal women's 
organisations, such as the South African Federation ofWomen (SAFW), helped black women 
activists to keep the flame of political protest alive. This was imperative since those men who 
were the natural leaders of the BCM, were either dead or in detention. Others were in hiding and 
on the run from the apartheid regime's security police, or had taken refuge in foreign countries 
- to await the day when they might return to claim what was justly their own. The role that 
women played in BCM at this time was part of that wider symbiotic (but paradoxical) 
relationship between white liberals and BC activists in the 1960s and 1970s, that is central to the 
topic of this research. There is another aim too. My research challenges the patriarchy ofBC by 
showing that the ideology and movement was sustained by women as well as men and that a 
more gendered interpretation is important in defining the nature ofBC. 1 
Although the contribution which women have made to social justice and the political liberation 
of South Africa is a vast topic (a topic which, in many ways, has scarcely been touched upon by 
researchers and analysts), my (more narrow) focus in this chapter will be on how a few selected 
1 Kogila Moodley, "The Continued Impact ofBlack Consciousness in South Africa", Journal 
of Modern African Studies 29 (2) 1991, pp.237-251. 
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women (and I have not been comprehensive) laid the foundations for the realisation of political 
and social justice, and how specific women in the BCM later built that edifice into an enduring 
monument that even now forms a part of the political and ideological landscape of South Africa. 
It is my opinion that no comprehensive treatment of the history and contribution of BCM can 
ignore the role played specifically by women. What makes this contribution unique is that black 
women had so many more obstacles - impediments historically unique to women - which they 
had to overcome before their dreams of social, economic and political justice could be realised. 
For the purposes of clarification, I shall emphasise three points. The first is that a particular 
group of women were drawn into the struggle, not because they had freely chosen a political 
career, but because the involvement and suffering of their male partners, their husbands, sons 
and relatives, forced them into situations in which they had no choice but to become involved 
in all the hazards of the political struggle. These women played a decisive role in defending, 
preserving and propagating the ideals of BCM. The second point is that there was a group of 
women who became BCM activists because of their spouses' involvement in the organisation. 
They became active in BCM out of a sense of solidarity with their husbands. The third point is 
that while, in most liberation movements, women often became politically prominent merely 
because they happen to be the wives of male activists, there was an influential group of South 
African women (married, unmarried, with and without partners), who joined the movement and 
worked successfully and prominently alongside their male counterparts as equals in the struggle .. 
In spite of the substantial role which African women played in South African history, African 
women have been largely marginalised in political literature- even though they have frequently 
played more important roles in the struggle against apartheid than either their black or white 
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male counterparts. It has often been pointed out that black women have been politically active 
throughout the liberation struggle in South Africa. Their militancy was particularly reflected in 
the education campaign and in various protest marches. 2 They protested for example against 
forced removals in well-documented demonstrations against the compulsory issuing of identity 
documents to (black) women.3 
Many black women (unlike their white counterparts) became involved in political activism as a 
result of circumstances that left them very little choice. Circumstances such as poverty and 
discrimination forced many black women into the kind of political activism which inevitably 
compromised their family commitments and the patriarchal expectations of many African 
communities. Few white women engaged in political activism at the time in South Africa could 
have understood the enormity of the sacrifices their black counterparts were compelled to make 
in their fight for freedom. 4 Because of the stark racism of the police and security apparatus at 
the time, white women activists were, on the whole, not subjected to the extremes of danger, 
inconvenience and deprivation that were the daily lot of black women in general, and women 
activists in particular. 
The political activism of black women in South Africa may be defined by the fact that a black 
woman in· the South African context is oppressed in three ways: in terms of race, class and 
2 Diana E.H. Russell, Lives of Courage: Women for New South Africa (London, Virago 
Press, 1990), p.24. 
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gender. 5 
Firstly, the South African legal system, as it evolved over three centuries, created all kinds oflegal 
disabilities for women in general, and black women in particular. This process, which gathered 
impetus after 1948, the date of the National Party's accession to power, defined Africans as 
inferior to Europeans. 
Secondly, European women in general regarded African women as inferior- a perception that was 
part of the racist legacy of imperial ideologies and the colonisation of Southern Africa by 
Europeans. During the three centuries after the settlement of the Cape by whites, even the poorest 
white women in Southern Africa became accustomed to having black women in their houses as 
domestic workers. The colonisation of Africa and other parts of the world, which gathered 
momentum during the latter half of the nineteenth century, made the dissemination of spurious 
theories of the racial superiority ofEuropeans a growing preoccupation among Europeans. These 
intellectually compromised and noxious theories, which grew up wherever Europeans settled and 
colonised indigenous people, provided an urgently needed rationale and alibi for the imperial and 
colonial agenda and choked relations between European settlers and the indigenous people whom 
they were quick to exploit. 
A conscious historical assumption of racial and cultural superiority on the part of Europeans 
helped to soothe any disagreeable qualms of conscience which more sensitive and thoughtful 
white settlers might have had about the racial cruelties and injustices perpetrated on indigenous 
5 Denise Ackermann, Jonathan A. Draper and Emma Mashinini (eds), Women Hold up Half 
the Sky (Hilton, Cluster, 1991), pp.25, 132. 
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people. It also made it easy, and somehow natural, for many white people to regard blacks (and 
black women in particular) as members of an inferior race of human beings. Because huge 
numbers ofblack women were constantly exposed to the racist attitudes oftheir employers in the 
intimate circumstances of domestic labour, they often bore the brunt of European racism. The 
good nature and respectful attitudes ofblack women domestic servants to their employees were 
regarded as proof of their essentially inferior nature as a race - a bizarre and malignant attitude 
that was to find its fullest and most grotesque expression in the institutionalised racism of 
apartheid after 1948. 
Although no female domestic worker could hope to keep her job unless she were utterly 
obedient, respectful and subservient (in addition to being punctilious in the performance ofher 
menial duties), most black women were, by nature and custom, respectful and obedient. Many 
even endured the most appalling abuses of their human rights and the violation of their dignity 
and integrity without murmur or complaint. It must have seemed to many whites that the 
supposed inferiority ofblacks was more than evident from what they could empirically observe. 
While many whites could "prove" (ifthey cared to) the inferiority ofthe black races by quoting 
texts from the Bible, most felt no compulsion to justify what must have seemed obvious. Thus, 
although blacks in general were regarded as racially and culturally inferior to whites, black 
women had to bear the additional stigma of being women. 
Thirdly, black men also treated African women as inferiors because their own self-respect and 
self-esteem had already been ravaged by the brutality inflicted by an occupying race bent of 
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reducing indigenous people to total servitude, both physical, psychological and spiritual. 6 
As has already been mentioned, South African law did not, until comparatively recently, accord 
to women the same rights and privileges as men. These legal disabilities merely formalised and 
emphasised the complacent perception among white racists that black people were indeed racially 
and culturally inferior to whites. Black women therefore bore a double burden: they were black 
and they were women. Their lives were governed both by white laws and indigenous customs. 
Not least, the extreme suffering, poverty and deprivation of many black families, left no margin 
for kindness in human relations, and black men who had been brutalised and abused by their 
white male employers were likely to take out their frustrations on their womenfolk - the only 
people (under the circumstances) whom they could abuse with impunity. Thus the cruelties and 
inequities of institutionalised racism and colonialism poisoned even the most intimate 
circumstances of black family life and relations among black people, even when they were 
temporarily absent from the defining surveillance of whites. Given the vigilance of hostile white 
observers and the magnitude of self-censorship internalised by black women, it is scarcely 
surprising that the literature which describes the role played by black women in political activism 
has been sparse. 
Gugu Hlongwane supports this point ofview. 7 She explains the absence of writing about women 
by women in terms of the creative environment needed for autobiography and bigraphy. Writing 
6 Hilda Bernstein, For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South 
Africa (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1985), pp.22, 28-
34. 
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is a creative act that presupposes some degree of self-esteem. It is also almost impossible to write 
coherently and meaningfully in the absence of a stable social and economic context. Writing is 
an act of faith in oneself that implies the existence of some kind of continuity between the self 
(the writer) and sympathetic other selves (readers). Historically, black women have had very little 
control over their circumstances and their environments. Although they have suffered acutely 
from the effects of illiteracy and restrictive patriarchal attitudes, even in traditional society, some 
have found within themselves the necessary courage, self-esteem and determination to document 
and comment on their own history- even in the most discouraging and degrading circumstances. 
In the 1980s, material assistance and encouragement from various white women writers enabled 
texts by African women to became moreo generally available. One of the first black women to 
write specifically about women's issues, Christine Qunta, included references in her writing to the 
contribution made by Southern African women in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Namibia and 
South Africa. 8 Since Qunta was in exile when she wrote the book and since she had no access 
to relevant documentary sources and archives, the book understandably fails to focus in any 
depth on the role played by South African black women. 
Another writer to investigate and report on women issues in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s 
was Cherry} Walker, who became one of the first white women historians to write about women's 
issues.9 Her book focuses on the role and contribution of women in South African society. Other 
important literature on women appeared in the later 1980s. Among what was written at this time 
(texts which are among the most important sources for this research) are texts by Hilda 
Christine Qunta, Women in Southern Africa (Johannesburg, Skotaville, 1987). 
9 Cherry} Walker, Women Resistance in South Africa, 2nd edition (Cape Town, David 
Philip, 1991). 
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Bernstein, 10 Diana E.H.Russell, 11 Denise Ackermann, Jonathan Draper and Emma Mashinini, 12 
Julia Wells, 13 and Ingrid Obey. 14 It is worth noting that their five books, which were written 
mainly by white women, were based on interviews with black women who were active in the 
struggle for political and gender liberation. Although it would obviously have been preferable for 
African women had been able to write their own stories, it is significant that it was liberal white 
women who helped oppressed black women to explain the role they had played in the liberation 
struggle - another instance of the ambivalent relationship between white liberals and those who 
espoused the ideals ofBC. Given the restricted circumstances in which black people lived during 
the apartheid era, it was almost impossible for black women to write explicitly about their 
experiences or find an audience for their writings. 
Bernstein explains the conditions in which women found themselves under the apartheid system. 
Russell's book is based on interviews which she conducted with various women who were 
actively involved in politics. Her account carries particular authority because she interviewed 
women both in South Africa and in exile and contrasted the experience ofthese two groups. Both 
Bernstein and Russell were once resident in South Africa. White women were moved to write 
about the lot ofblack women under apartheid because of their own observation ofthe extreme 
cruelty perpetrated on the black community- a cruelty that affected every citizen in South Africa. 
Russell decided to do research on women precisely because she felt that not enough had been 
10 Bernstein, For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa. 
11 Russell, Lives of Courage. 
12 Ackermann, Draper and Mashinini, (eds), Women Hold Up. 
13 Wells, Now We Demand, pp.105-140. 
14 Ingrid Obey (ed.), Vukani Makhosikazi: South African Women Speak (London, Catholic 
Institute for International Relations, 1985), p.266. ' t~-' v~ 
~ -· ~ -, 
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written about the contribution of women to politics. 15 The only hindrance, as Russell pointed out, 
was that she was unable to interview women from the rural areas as she was not conversant with 
any of the African languages. 16 Russell's point tends to underline my view that in-depth research 
of this kind cannot be properly conducted by researchers who are not conversant with the 
relevant African languages. 
Ackermann's book mainly elaborates the role played by women in various churches. Her edited 
book is a landmark in South African women's studies because six of the contributors were 
African women who described their experiences of oppression in the churches. Some of the 
information recorded might not have been reported had the researcher been a man, for they 
pertained specifically to women's issues. Thus, for example, the denial of ordination to women 
(because they were women), and the reluctance of the congregation to receive holy communion 
because the minister was pregnant, were fully reported. 17 
Wells reported on the efforts of African women, especially members of the Federation of the 
South African Women between 1955 and the 1960s, to conscientize women in general, including 
those in rural areas and small towns. The book also reported what was happening in remote areas 
which were normally overlooked by researchers. 18 Obey's book describes the activism of black 
women in labour, trade unions, under forced removals and in politics. 
15 Russell, Lives of Courage, p .14. 
16 Ibid., p.23. 
17 Roxanne Jordaan, "The Emergence ofBlack Theology in South Africa", in Ackermann et 
al, Women Hold Up Halfthe Sky, p.126. 
18 Wells, We Now Demand, pp.105-114. 
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It is important to examine the role played by women before the formation of BCM for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to demonstrate that the failure to recognise the contribution of 
BCM women was not unique to that particular group, and that this kind of oversight and 
omission was universal in all racial and political groups in South Africa where male domination 
was traditional. Secondly, it is equally important to acknowledge the role played by women prior 
to the founding of BCM because they were able to keep the flame of political activism and 
protest alive during the difficult times when the African liberation movements were banned in the 
1960s, through the medium of non-political organisations which were run by women and which 
had no overt political agenda. The implication of these two propositions is that any description 
of what constituted the beliefs and praxis ofthe BCM at the time defined by this research, would 
be incomplete and therefore misleading without a proper examination of the role played by 
women, both before and after the founding of BCM. Many of the streams of earlier African 
women's protest found expression in the role of women in BCM. 
The importance of the role of women in the liberation struggle is confirmed by the now legendary 
saying which was later widely used as a slogan: "You struck a women. You have struck a 
rock. "19 Because many of the women who were also involved in political activism in BCM 
brought a particular point of view to the organisation, it is essential to understand their 
contribution before one can appreciate how different kinds of activism and protest developed and 
were maintained. 
19 Obery, Vukani Makhosikazi, p.233. 
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The role of women prior to the Black Consciousness Movement 
Prior to the formation of BCM, women played crucial roles in ( 1) political liberation 
organisations which were dominated by black men, (2) exclusively women's organisations, and 
(3) non-political organisations. These select few were the ones who prepared the way for 
women's participation in community political and social activities in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
examples cited below will illustrate the efforts which some of them made. They took the lead in 
protest activism such as the campaign against pass-laws; they fought for their rights in informal 
settlements, and they vigorously resisted unfair treatment in employment practice as early as in 
the 1940s. 20 Their pioneering protests galvanised African women under apartheid and informed 
the activism ofwomen who embraced the ideas and strategies and ideas ofBC. 
The trade unionist and member of the ANC, Elizabeth Mafekeng, was actively involved as a 
member of both organisations and became one of the first female activists to be ruthlessly 
harassed by the apartheid regime. This form of intimidation was intensified when she was 
banished from Paarl to Vryburg in 1959. Eventually, since she could no longer endure the 
pressure, she escaped to Lesotho with her eleven children.Lilian Ngoyi, widowed at a young age, 
spent most of her life as an activist from the 1940s until her death in the early 1980s. She became 
a national figure, and often participated in political and social gatherings as a keynote speaker, 
inspiring a whole generation of later activists. She was the first African to hold an executive 
20 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 
1983), pp.l3-20 and 279. 
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position as the national president of South African Federation ofWomen (SAFW), a multi-racial 
organisation. 21 Because of her continuous bannings, she became unemployed and struggled to 
earn money by sewing in her tiny house. 22 Her passionate involvement in politics and dedication 
to her ideals made a lasting impression on the women pioneers in the BCM. She was often 
quoted in speeches made by BC women as they canvassed support for a new, confident self-
image among blacks. Moodley, who made a distinguished contribution in her capacity as the 
president of the Food and Canning Worker's Union (FCWU), also played a conscientising role 
in BC. She was instrumental in organising workers to protest against the unfair labour practices 
of their employers, and, in the process, she politicized many workers, especially women.23 Even 
after the banning of the ANC in 1960, she played a substantial role in the emerging BCM of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. 24 
It is a major contention ofthis research that those liberal white women in South Africa, who were 
involved in one way or another in political activism, were usually more progressive and far-
sighted than their male counterparts when it came to preparing African women to assume 
leadership positions. Women like Hetty du Preez, who played an important role in organising 
women's participation in the Garment Worker's Union (GWU), and Josie Palmer of the 
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), were instrumental in identifying talented African 
women and teaching them leadership skills. 25 The most notable white liberal woman in this regard 
21 Christopher Merrett, A Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in 
South Africa (Cape Town, David Philip,1994), pp.27 and 101. 
22 Bernstein, For their Triumphs and for their Tears, p.ll3. 
23 Ibid, p. 79. 
24 Helen Joseph, Side by Side: The Autobiography ofHelen Joseph (Johannesburg, 
Ad.Donker, 1986), p.197. 
25 Walker, Women Resistance in South Africa, pp.98, 129 and 135. 
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was Helen Joseph. She became a political activist in the late 1940s after having spent some years 
in India as a teacher. She was a member of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and 
the ANC, and was a leading member of the SAFW. Joseph was particularly effective in teaching 
leadership skills and strategies to Mrican women. She also taught them how to communicate 
with their constituents at grassroots level and she provided them with an intellectual critique of 
the apparatus of state oppression: its inherent racism; its institutionalised poverty; and its social, 
economic and gender discrimination. 26 Joseph's greatest triumph was her mentoring ofLilian 
Ngoyi, the first African women to address a crowd at the International Women's Day in 1955, 
a day to celebrate the role ofwomen in the world. 
Although Joseph and Ngoyi continued to work together, Joseph insisted on playing only a 
supportive and secondary role. An example of how successful this mentoring relationship was, 
may be seen in the events of 9 August 1956 when Ngoyi was the main speaker at a march 
organised by the SAFW. Ngoyi, who was president of the organisation, led a protest march to 
the Union Buildings against the government's policy of forcing African women to carry identity 
documents. At this protest march, the famous slogan "Wathint' abafazi W athint' imbokodo, 
Uzokufa" (You have tampered with the women; you have struck a rock; you will be destroyed) 
was uttered for the first time. Thereafter it was adopted as the slogan for women organisations. 27 
Ngoyi's exceptional courage in leading the organisation may be partly attributed to the 
encouragement she received when in 1955 she attended the meetings of the International 
26 Joseph, Side by Side, p.52-53; Katryn Spinks, Black Sash (London, Methuen, 1991), 
p.241. 
27 Julie Frederikse, They Fought for Freedom: Helen Joseph (Cape Town, Maskew Miller 
Longman, 1995), p.21. 
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Congress of Women which were held in Lausanne (Switzerland), East Germany, China, the 
USSR and England in that year. 28 Ngoyi was inspired to meet women who were able to argue 
authoritatively and convincingly against oppression, and doubtless their example challenged her 
to do the same in South Africa. Ngoyi, Joseph and Dorothy Nyembe, as leaders of the protest 
movement, all burned their identity documents during the 1956 march and asked the police to 
arrest them. 29 Nyembe pointed out that, as a woman, she was encouraged by the president of the 
ANC, Chief Albert Luthuli, who had said that "men and women are equal and it all depends on 
one's dedication". 30 It was because of this principle, which she took to heart, that Nyembe never 
felt inferior to men or was in any way intimidated by politics. 
Nyembe also played a vital role as an activist when she entered politics in the mid 1950s.31 As a 
result of her activities she was arrested on a number of occasions between 1956 and 1969. In 
1969 she was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment- fifteen years - under the provisions of 
the terrorism act. 32 What happened to her during her imprisonment tends to confirm the 
suggestion that women prisoners were treated far worse than men. She alleged that she was not 
allowed to study, she was denied newspapers, and visits from her family were forbidden. In the 
first years of her detention, she was not allowed to receive the letters which her family had sent 
to her because they had been written (naturally enough) in Zulu - and not in English or 
Afrikaans. 33 
28 Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa, p.168. 
29 Kirstin Olsen, Chronology ofWomen's History (London, Greenwood Press, 1994), p.285. 
30 Julie Fredrikse, The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa (Johannesburg, 
Ravan Press, 1990), p.54. 
31 Obery, Vukani Makhosikazi, p.259. 
32 Prisoners of Apartheid: A Biographical List of Political Prisoners and Banned Persons in 
South Africa (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1978), p. 91. 
33 Berstein, For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears, p.101. 
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The fact that white liberal women were preparing African women to take leadership roles long 
before this became one of the major concerns of BCM, shows that liberal women had a much 
greater sensitivity than their male counterparts to both the immediate and the long-term needs 
of the political struggle against apartheid. A few white liberal women had realised the importance 
of having the victims of apartheid themselves act as executives of their own fate in the forefront 
of the battle against oppression. They instinctively realised that African women would be far 
better able to articulate their plight because they themselves were most directly affected by the 
remorseless brutality of apartheid laws and intentionally oppressive and discriminatory state 
structures. The mentoring role of white liberal women proved to be an important part ofblack 
women's armoury when BC began to speak for Africans during the exile ofthe ANC and PAC. 
The contribution made by non-political women's organisations 
Non-political women's organisations played an important role by incorporating political issues 
into their agendas for discussion, particularly after the 1960s when all liberation movements were 
banned. Since these organisations accommodated women who were politically inclined, the same 
group of women became leading political activists during the early 1970s when BCM was in its 
formative stage?4 Non-political organisations therefore that nurtured and prepared women who 
were to assume leadership positions in BCM once the movement became coherent in its political 
philosophy. The importance of this research is that it shows how some leading BCM women 
were actually the products of these organisations. In addition, these agencies exposed many 
34 
"Building a Nation: Black Women Power", in SASO Newsletter, vol 5, no 2, July/August 
1975, p.7. 
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women to practical politics for the very first time. 
Two such non-political organisations are the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) 
and the National Council of African Women (NCAW). Because these organisations functioned 
in tandem, their origins, objectives and operational strategies were almost identical. This 
therefore meant that, while, in theory, they were supposed to have been non-political 
organisations, in practice they grappled with political issues. Although the YWCA's initial 
objectives were to identity and attempt to solve the common problems which were unique to the 
African community, the organisation soon became highly politicised. The YWCA deviated from 
its initial objectives because of the country's racial composition. Because it was impossible in the 
South African apartheid context to separate social activities from political ones, the YWCA had 
no choice but to tackle both social and political issues since both equally affect the well-being of 
all Africans. The organisation was fortunate to be led by women who were both politically aware 
and orientated to practical action. The distinguished Ellen Kuzwayo was its general secretary 
between 1963 and 197 6, and was influential in deciding on the type of the people who would be 
invited to address their meetings. 35 Meetings held in urban areas in particular were often 
addressed by ANC political activists who were Kuzwayo's close associates.36 
Africans in urban areas were more politicised than those in the rural areas because they bore the 
brunt of the evils and cruelties of the apartheid system on a daily basis. William Frederick 
Nkomo, an ANC veteran, educationist and a former president of the liberal South African 
35 Ellen Kuzwayo, Call me Woman (Johanesburg, Ravan Writers Series, 1996), pp.160-179. 
36 The World, 19 November 1971, p.7. 
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Institute of Race Relations, was often invited to address their meetings. 37 Manasseh Moerane, 
the first African editor of The World. a black newspaper, also occasionally delivered political 
addresses at YWCA meetings.38 In the rural areas, however, meetings usually focused on the 
general welfare of communities and their struggle against poverty. 
The National Council of African Women (NCAW) was an affiliated sister body ofthe exclusively 
white liberal organisation, the National Council of Women of South Africa (NCWSA). The 
NCAW became a haven for the political activities of Africans during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Because it avoided taking an openly political stance and because it publicised its continued and 
close association with the NCWSA, it was not perceived as a threat to the government. (Other 
organisations were not as successful as the NCA W in keeping a low political profile.) The 
NCWSA even managed to avoid banning during the 1960s, although it was a forum for political 
activity. It has been reported that the NCAW maintained a strong relationship with the NCWSA, 
and that the NCWSA's leaders, such as Edith Rheinalt and Dr Thelma Gutsche, were frequent 
visitors at NCA W annual conferences. The advantages that the NCA W were able to preserve by 
means of this relationship, illustrate how important the link with liberal organisations could 
sometimes be for African organisations during a time of unprecedented state repression. 39 This 
did not necessarily mean that the NCAW disassociated itself entirely from political topics. 
Occasionally the organisation invited Africans to address meetings on current affairs and these 
topics were inevitably politically relevant to the position and conditions ofblacks in South Africa. 
At its annual conference in December 1971 the N CAW, for example, invited Barney Pityana, 
37 The World, 10 July 1969, p.3; 23 November 1969, p.6. 
38 The World, 17 Dec 1971, p.3. 
39 Rhoda Tshikane's Private Collection, Atteridgeville, "National Council of African Women 
1937-1958: Come of Age Conference", pp.9 and 15. · 
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president ofSASO, to address the conference. Pityana's address so influenced the delegates that 
they voted a special grant to SAS0.40 It was during the same conference that Drake Koka, a 
founding member ofboth SASO and the Black People's Convention (BPC), also spoke about the 
concerns and vision ofBCM.41 
The role played by BCM women 
Although much BCM literature describes the role played by male activists, far less has been 
written about the women who were to become as influential in many ways as their male 
comrades. Perhaps the predominantly male orientation ofBCM literature can be attributed to the 
fact that more men than women in the organisation were writers and researchers, and that these 
men generally tended to begin to write at an earlier age than did their women comrades. 
Whether they made a conscious decision about it or not, it became convenient for BCM men to 
ignore the influence and contribution of women. 42 A few examples might suffice to illustrate this 
point. Vuyelwa Mashalaba, one of the co-founders and a prominent member ofSASO, was Steve 
Bike's classmate at the University ofNatal' s medical school. She played a major role in recruiting 
women into the organisation. She also headed the SASO Publication Commission as early as 
1969.43 Mamphela Ramphele was also a medical student at the same university, and found herself, 
40 
"National Conference Could be the Biggest ofBlack Organisations", The World, 15 Dec 
1971, p.3. 
41 
"Nkomo Urges All to Meet in Convenant ofLife at Prayer Day", The World, 17 Dec 
1971, p.S. 
42 Moodley, "The continued impact ofBlack Consciousness in South Africa", p.244. 
43 Archives, Unisa Centre for African Studies, "The Minutes of SASO General Students 
Council9-15 July 1970", A 153, p.5. 
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in her capacity as SASO chairperson at the University ofNatal branch in 1970, staying overnight 
with Biko at the Beatrice Street head office of SASO, to help him compile articles which were 
required for publication in the SASO Newsletter.44 Thoko Mbanjwa was editor of a SASO 
publication for two years. The importance of such contributions by women has failed to be 
adequately acknowledged.45 
Women became actively involved in the activities of BCM in many different ways. Their 
involvement was designed to further the cause ofthe emancipation ofthe entire oppressed South 
African nation. Thus, while they were indeed aware that black women were specifically 
oppressed in terms of their colour, class and gender, their most immediate concern was to 
challenge discriminatory laws based on race. Sam Moodley, who was one of the BCM women 
activists, emphasised this point of view when she observed that many women supported the 
primary liberation struggle out of their own free will- without diverting any available resources 
toward women's issues.46 This heroic self-denial of women's immediate interests was a conscious 
choice and strategy made by individual black South African women activists. Ruth Mompati, who 
became a member of the ANC's National Executive in the 1960s, made exactly the same point 
about the role of women in women's liberation. Her point was that, while she recognized the 
seriousness of the problems of sexism and discrimination with which women were forced to 
grapple, she believed that the national struggle should be accorded priority at that time.47 A vital 
factor to consider here is that most black women in BCM and their predecessors were generally 
44 Mabel Maimela, Interview with Mamphela Ramphele, Midrand, 26 Jan 1996. 
45 Thoko Mbanjwa (ed.), Black Review 1974/1975 (Durban, Black Community 
Programmes, 1975). 
46 Private Collection, Ernest Messina, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, "Ernest 
Messina: Interview with Sam Moodley, Durban", 9 July 1992, p.3. 
47 Russell, Living of Courage, p.1 08. 
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uninterested in feminism because they viewed it as being the particular preserve of white women 
academics. Because of this supposition, they probably failed to appreciate the relevance of 
women's issues to the struggle for black liberation in a racist South A:fiica. 48 
Such attitudes were not unique to BCM women. Among white liberal South African women, a 
similar opinion prevailed. Thus, when Kathryn Spink interviewed officials of the Black Sash 
about women issues, their response was that, in general, South African women believed that "the 
struggle for women's rights should be left out of the present phase and attended to after 
liberation", and they urged women to throw in their lot with the common struggle. 49 This attitude 
of members ofthe Black Sash might have been based on their daily experience ofworking in the 
advice offices which they had created to help the victims of apartheid laws. In encounters with 
black women in these offices, they swiftly perceived that most of the suffering ofblack people 
was not related specifically to gender discrimination, but was rather a consequence of the 
discriminatory laws that affected the lives of all black people. They therefore felt that racial 
segregation should be eradicated before other forms of discrimination could be addressed. 
Another factor that influenced attitudes related to the widespread censorship of information 
which was practised by the apartheid government. Also, since feminist literature was very rarely 
available in this country, South African women were not, on the whole, at that time, well 
informed about or strongly drawn to feminist issues. It is, therefore, important to bear in mind 
that the all-embracing nature of the struggle against racism and oppression tended to over-
shadow all other concerns. Black women (if they thought about it at all) were of the opinion that 
48 Ibid, p.257. 
49 Spink, Black Sash, p.18. 
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feminism was an ideology designed for white women - which meant that feminism itself was 
racially defined. Had sufficient (particularly black) feminist literature been available at the time, 
black women would have known that feminism is of universal concern to all women, and indeed 
to all human beings. But at the time, black women gave everything they had to support their male 
comrades who were in the forefront of BCM activities. 50 
Such assertions leave one with a nagging feeling that not everything has been satisfactorily 
explained. Admittedly, feminist literature was scarce in South Africa at the time. But there must 
have been many who were interested in the subject - especially since, by the 1970s, the women's 
rights movement had become international in scope. It seems implausible to suggest that South 
African women were totally uninterested in their fundamental rights and freedoms as part ofthe 
liberation package. It seems much more likely that pressure from male comrades more or less 
forced women to deny their feminist agenda and focus exclusively on the struggle for liberation. 
This assertion is even more believable when one remembers that a number of liberation 
movements in some neighbouring countries ofSouthern Africa were reported to have encouraged 
women comrades to support a total liberation struggle rather than focus (even peripherally) on 
the attainment of women's rights 51 -a fact that confirms my scepticism about any rather too neat 
explanation of what all black women purportedly thought and believed at the time. 
SASO literature often emphasised that women fought in the struggle for complete liberation and 
50 Mamphela Ramphele, "The Dynamics of Gender within Black Consciousness 
Organisation: A Personal View", inN. Barney Pityana, Mamphela Ramphele, Malusi 
Mpumlwana and Lindy Wilson (eds), Bounds ofPossibilities: The Legacy of Steve Biko and 
Black Consciousness (Cape Town, David Philip, 1991), p.215. 
51 Stephanie Urdang, "Women in National Liberation", in Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon 
Stichter (eds), African Women South of Sahara (London, Longman, 1984), pp.156-169. 
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that they were not seduced into diverting their energy towards women's liberation, which was 
usually characterised as a tainted ideological product of white society. 52 The attitude ofBCM 
women seems therefore to suggest that they were expected to take part in the liberation struggle 
-while no hint was ever given that they were thereby ultimately jeopardising their own liberation 
by deferring to an exclusively male-generated agenda that accorded no special importance to 
women's issues. It would have been far wiser ifBCM women had insisted at the time that the 
cause oftotalliberation could never be divorced from a recognition of the universal importance 
of women rights and issues. 
The women who participated in the activities of the organisation were attracted to BCM for 
many different reasons. Some of them, such as Hester Joseph, became involved because ofher 
work. She served as Biko's secretary at the Beatrice Street headquarters in Durban. 53 It was only 
after she had been in this job for quite sometime that she applied for membership ofBCM. The 
same is true of Nobuhle Haye. She later married Mapetla Mohapi, a prominent figure in the 
organisation. She was employed by the Eastern Cape branch of the Black Community 
Programme as Biko's secretary in King William's Town after she had been retrenched from 
teaching. 54 Her prominent involvement in BCM surfaced more because of a personal tragedy. Her 
husband was killed while in detention on 5 August 1976. She, her family and BCM as a whole 
did not accept the government's complacent "explanation" that Mohapi had committed suicide. 
She decided, with the help of the organisation, to sue the minister of police for damages arising 
52 
"Building a Nation: Black Women Power", SASO Newsletter, vol5, no 2, July/August 
1975, p.7. 
53 Mabel Maimela, Conversation with Ernest Messina, University ofthe Western Cape, Cape 
Town, 13 April 1996. 
54 The Weekend World, 7 August 1977, p.4; Ramphele, A Life, p.84. 
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from Mohapi's death. She challenged, in court, the claim that the alleged suicide note written on 
toilet paper had in fact been written by her husband at all. In order to arrive at the truth, SASO 
sponsored two handwriting experts, Dr Julius Grant from Great Britain and Professor Clarence 
Bohn from the United States of America, as expert witnesses for the plaintiffs. 55 While these two 
international experts were of the opinion that the writing on the note was not Mohapi's, the 
counsel for the government, Colonel J.F. Fourie and Sergeant K.F.C. Landman, both swore 
under the oath that the note was genuine. 56 By opposing the state so openly, Mohapi inevitably 
became a high-profile enemy of the apartheid state. It was therefore hardly surprising when she 
was detained at the same time as Biko in Port Elizabeth. The security police were looking for any 
information they could find to implicate Biko in charges of attempting to overthrow the 
government. 57 As a result of this and other political activities, Mohapi Was kept in detention for 
six months and released only in March 1978. 58 
The second category of women to become BCM activists were the spouses of the activists 
themselves. These women were reported to have become involved out of solidarity with their 
husbands or partners. This gesture of affirming solidarity was not unique to BCM women. Such 
commitments have already been noted before: the willingness of women to support their partners 
even at the risk of their own lives. For example, the National Committee for Liberation (NCL ), 
later known as the African Resistance Movement (ARM), was a white radical underground.· 
55 
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movement which had been established in 1962 and which remained operational until1964. In the 
ARM, Myrtle Berman supported her husband Monty, who was a founder member, and she 
herselfbecame active to the extent that they hid explosives in their house, thus putting themselves 
at risk should the police ever have found out. 59 Similarly, Mary Turok, the wife of Ben Turok, 
was actively involved as a member ofthe Congress of Democrats. Both ofthem were banned, 
as a result, in 1962.60 
Wendy Woods, wife of the former editor of the East London Daily Dispatch, became personally 
involved in BCM matters through her husband's acquaintance with BCM members. When Donald 
Woods was banned in October 1977, she attended Bike's inquest, which was held in Pretoria in 
November and December of the same year. 61 After the Woods family had fled the country, 
Wendy continued to support her husband. As a banned person in South Africa, Donald was not 
allowed to write in or be quoted in any South African newspapers. It was Wendy therefore who 
responded to criticisms of her husband which appeared in the South African Afrikaans 
newspapers, Beeld and Burger, while they were in exile in Britain. 62 
While some BCM wives and partners were independently willing to take up the political 
challenges, others were forced by circumstances to support the organisation. A few examples will 
suffice. Nontsikelelo Biko, widow of Steve Biko, is a clear example of a wife who was not 
59 Joshua N. Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid (UWC, 
Bellville, Mayibuye Books, 1994), p.235. 
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particularly interested in politics. 63 After her husband's death in detention on 12 September 1977, 
she found herselfin the eye of the storm as numerous BCM activists assisted her at her husband's 
inquest. She was therefore thrust into the limelight and her name became synonymous with that 
of her celebrated husband in the eyes of the world. 
Then there was Joseph Mdluli's widow, Lydia, who felt the need compelled publicly to identify 
herself with BCM activities. She also became the centre of attention in an inquest into her 
husband's bizarre death while he was in police custody in March 1976. Mdluli had been detained 
because it was alleged that he was organising a terrorist army. 64 Ultimately the government had 
to pay Lydia Mdluli an out-of-court settlement ofR15 000. 65 This kind of settlement by the 
government was a tacit admission of guilt, particularly so because even the government's own 
pathologist had contradicted the security police's derisory claim that Mdluli's death had been 
caused by "force" applied to his neck as a result of "falling over a chair". 66 
Gwen Mokoape's husband, Aubrey, was Biko's political confidant, and although she was not 
actively involved in BCM politics, she had to support her family alone, 67 and was known to give 
hospitality to a number of activists, even while her husband was in detention. 68 Her case is 
another example of the many unsung and unknown wives and partners and mothers of political 
63 Mandla Tyala, "What Biko's Wife Tells Their Sons", Eastern Province Herald, 11 April 
1983, p.7. 
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activists in detention. These women endured the hardship of keeping families going on their 
own.69 
Pityana's wife, Nosidima (Dimza), was ostracized by hospital authorities because of her 
husband's political activities. She had been retrenched as a nurse in the Livingstone Hospital at 
the end of 1973,70 and, although no reason was given, it is likely that her sacking was motivated 
by her husband's political involvement. Actions such as these were common in South Africa. The 
apartheid authorities intimidated the partners of the activists in the hope that they would quit their 
political activities. Furthermore, treatment such as that meted out to Pityana's wife, including the 
harassment and intimidation of close members of the activist's family to discourage activism 
altogether, often paradoxically compelled wives into a far more committed sphere of political 
action. This explains why political activism in South Mrica, particularly in the black community, 
often remained in the family. Pityana's younger brother, Sipho, was politically active in student 
politics to the point where he wisely fled the country. The Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and Biko 
families also confirm the truth that political activism runs in certain black families. 71 
Dimza was later employed by the Institute of Race Relations in the Eastern Cape region to run 
a youth programme in Port Elizabeth in 1975. Because ofher detention in 1976, which resulted 
in her losing her job at the Institute, she subsequently found a job with the Eastern Cape Council · 
of Churches. 72 Her employment by these organisations shows that while the government actively 
69 SASO Bulletin, vol 1, no1, June 1977, p.6. 
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persecuted political activists, liberal institutions often went out of their way to assist those who 
were victims of discrimination. 
Another category of women who espoused BCM political activism came from those parents 
whose children were politically active. In many of these cases, parents initially opposed their 
children's involvement in political activities but, in the end, came to support and defend their 
offspring with all the resources they had. Parents were especially moved to action when they saw 
the extent to which the security police harassed and tortured their children as they attempted to 
test their democratic rights. Parents of activists sometimes found themselves involuntarily 
participating in activism. 73 This explains Mamphela's opinion that parents contributed to the · 
liberation struggle even when it was an unconscious participation. 74 A typical example was Biko's 
mother, Alice, who was initially opposed to her son's involvement in politics. She even sent him 
a Bible in a vain attempt to dissuade him from involvement in political activism while he was at 
the University ofNatal.75 Her attitude, however, changed when her son was banned in March 
1973 and restricted to Ginsberg. Her home was thereafter reported to have been the 
"headquarters" of the Black Consciousness Movement. She provided them with accommodation 
and supplied them with food. 76 Those who were regular visitors at Biko's family house recalled 
that Alice liked to prepare them Umngqusho, a staple dish among Xhosa people. 77 
Finally, there were those women who, although not influenced by their partners, freely chose to · " 
73 Truth and Reconciliation, vol 3, p.46. 
74 Mamphela Ramphele, "The Dynamics of Gender Within Black Organisations: A Personal 
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share the political lives of the men in the political struggle. One of the earliest women to be 
initiated into student politics, according to Biko, was his fellow medical student, Vuyelwa 
Mashalaba. 78 It is also reported that those women who subsequently played leading roles in BCM 
were often associated with Biko in one way or another. These women included professionals: 
nurses, particularly in the Natal region, social workers, teachers, medical doctors and ministers' 
wives (the women's wing ofthe Inter-Denominational African Ministers' Association of South 
Africa).79 As one of the earliest woman who participated in the political activities ofBCM, 
Mashalaba recruited many fellow women students into politics. She also played a prominent role 
in the formation of SASO. As she seemed to have been the only woman who had a clear grasp 
of the complexities of student politics at the time, she was elected to the national executive of 
SASO, thus becoming the only woman among its five members.80 Because of her experience in 
recruitment, she was assigned to oversee a number of projects. 81 It is significant to this research 
that Mashalaba was elected to head the publication commission, while her deputy was Andy 
Chetty. 82 The point to be made is that she was appointed to the chairmanship of the commission· 
over a man because of her ability and commitment. 
The objective of the publication commission was to facilitate communication between black 
people employed by the liberal press. The aim of this exercise was to persuade people of the : 
validity ofBC ideology so that they could report events in black politics from a BCM rather than . 
78 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Johannesburg. Gail Gerhart: Interview with Steve Biko, 24 
October 1972, Durban. p .14. 
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from a liberal point of view. The publication project failed to achieve this goal because it had 
insufficient material and financial support to implement its training programme. 83 Had it been 
successful, BCM would have managed to introduce an African interpretation into journalism and 
literature in South African politics. Another aim of the commission was to encourage students 
from the black campuses to engage in SCM-orientated journalism by supplying them with articles 
for publication. 84 Once BCM was banned, the idea of encouraging students from the black 
campuses to write articles became futile. It is regrettable that this project failed because it was 
a cornerstone ofBCM principles. 
Mashalaba was often encouraged to recruit women students to affiliate themselves to the 
organisation. On one occasion, in her capacity as a member of the executive, she was assigned 
to give a talk to the students at University ofFort Hare, accompanied by Pityana, in May 1971. 
It was later reported that she had profoundly impressed a number of students, especially women 
who had hitherto felt neglected and overlooked in politics. 85 It was also Mashalaba who 
influenced Ramphele to join her in student politics. Ramphele, unlike Mashalaba, had no 
reservations about confronting BC men. She treated men as equals and expected in tum to be 
treated as an equal by them. 86 In the end, Ramphele predictably became the only woman in SASO 
and in BCM to have her contribution acknowledged- although such acknowledgement was only 
grudgingly given in some BC circles. Although she confessed her ignorance of politics prior to 
83 
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her entrance to medical school in 1968,87 she adapted so quickly that by 1970 she had been 
elected as chairperson of the University of Natal branch of SAS0.88 By then she was already 
deeply involved and had joined other SASO students in running a clinic to help the poor at the 
Alan Taylor Residence.89 In December 1971, she had been assigned to lead a student work camp 
to Winterveld to test the viability of setting up a community health centre.90 In the following year 
(1972), she spent extra hours at the organisation's head office at 86 Beatrice Street in Durban, 
where she assisted in the editing ofSASO articles which were being prepared for publication.91 
After working for a while in a government hospital, she was employed as the medical officer in 
charge at Zanempilo Community Health Centre when it was officially opened in January 197 5. 92 
The security police frequently attempted to isolate members ofBCM by banishing them to various 
communities which were believed to be their places of origin. Ramphele became a victim of this 
tactic when, in May 1977, she was banned and transported from King William's Town and 
banished to Lenyenye township near Tzaneen, an area to which she was actually a stranger. 93 But 
even there, weighed down by financial difficulties, harassed and intimidated by agents of the 
government, she managed to build confidence in the community to which she had been banished. 
She turned out to be an asset to the community and became the first doctor ever to practise in 
87 Ramphele, "The Dynamics of Gender within Black Consciousness Organisation: A 
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Lenyenye. 94 Ramphele eventually managed to build a community health centre, Ithuseng, reported 
to be the first of its kind in the then Northern Transvaal. 95 Her banishment to Lenyenye therefore 
eventually benefited SASO and BCM rather than the government, which had aimed to isolate her 
from the rest of BCM community. This remote area received a number of visits from foreign 
journalists, diplomats and members ofBCM, all of whom all visited Ramphele.96 Projects which 
she introduced enabled members of Lenyenye community to accept her as one of them. She in 
tum used opportunities to politicise those who consulted her at the centre. This kind of practice 
was widely used in BCM circles. The rationale was that once people had been contacted in the 
community through some or other project, they could then be introduced to political ideas.97 
During Ramphele's banishment to Lenyenye she maintained contact with exiled members ofBCM 
who acted as couriers of financial aid from foreign organisations such as the International 
University Exchange Fund (IUEF). This project was organised by Ranwezi Nengwekhulu, who 
had already made contact with the IUEF when he went into exile in Botswana on 18 September 
1973.98 The IUEF was interested in BCM at this time because it was competing to secure the 
control ofBCM. The IUEF had appreciated the importance ofBCM as a resistance movement 
which could challenge the whole apartheid system - provided it was given enough financial 
support. 99 
94 Zwelakhe Sisulu, "In Naphuno This Doctor is Just Nurse", Rand Daily Mail, 5 May 1978, 
p.8. 
95 Daily Dispatch, 16 May 1983, p.3. 
96 Rand Daily Mail, 5 May 1978, p.8. 
97 Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, "The Meaning of Black Consciousness in the Struggle for 
Liberation in South Africa", in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel (eds), Political Economy of 
Africa: Selected Readings (London, Longman Group Limited, 1981), pp. 199-201. 
98 Sunday Times, 19 October 1980, p.28. 
99 
"IUEF Now Battling to Stave offLiquidation", The Star, 3 November 1980, p.2. 
251 
As someone who had had prior experience of community health work in Taylor Residence, the 
Winterveld Self-Help Project and the Zanempilo Heath Care Centre (as superintendent), 
Ramphele managed to subvert the government's intention to neutralise her influence. 100 As funds 
became available, the lthuseng Health Centre in Lenyenye became a vital part of the community 
and it came to be respected as a project that was owned and managed by black people. Ramphele 
needed to prove to herself that she could single-handedly make a success of the Ithuseng Health 
Centre - and this she did. Contributions such as hers emphasise the fact that BCM women used 
whatever opportunities they could find to advance the cause of the organisation. Such 
contributions have only been noted by women writers - a fact that illustrates the androcentrism 
ofBCM. 
Another woman who was actively involved in the early development of SASO and the entire 
BCM, was Manana Kgware. 101 At the time she entered student politics she was a student at the 
University of the North and a close associate ofPat Machaka, co-founder ofSASO. She was also 
a contemporary ofOnkgopotse Ramothibi Tiro and Nengwekhulu. 102 Tiro was the SRC president 
of the University of the North, who was acclaimed and criticised (depending on one's point of 
view) when he delivered a powerful speech at the graduation ceremony on 29 April1972 in which 
he chastised the university authorities for allocating seats to the parents of black graduands at the 
back of the hall. In the same speech he lashed out at "Bantu education", which had been designed 
to provide an inferior education for black students. 103 Since she was an associate of the founder 
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members of SASO, Kgware participated in a number of planning sessions with Biko and others 
at the University of the North, between January and June 1969, in preparation of the anticipated 
launch of SASO in July 1969 at the same venue. 104 These facts explain why, according to 
Ramphele, Kgware was among the four women students (three from Natal), who played key roles 
in the launching ofSASO. The other three were Thembi Nkabinde (nee Sibisi) from the University 
of Zululand, and Mashalaba and Ramphele from the University of Natal (Black Section).105 As 
one of the pioneers of SASO, Kgware worked together with her male counterparts in managing 
the newly established organisation. 
Kgware was appointed to SASO 's Commission ofNational Relations, and also worked as Biko's 
assistant during the preparations for the first General Students Council of SASO, which was held 
in July 1970.106 Once she was no longer connected to the University of the North as a student, 
she continued to be actively involved in extra-parliamentary politics. This deepening of political 
commitment after university was not typical of how most activists' careers evolved. Most 
students, after having been in student politics at university, tended to scale down their activism 
on entering their careers. Kgware's life took a different course. Having left university, she served 
as an executive member of SASO in the Orange Free State, and made a vital contribution to the 
formation school which trained leaders. She also served on the executive of the Lesotho/Orange 
Free State region of the UCM. 107 Kgware opted to continue with a full-time political career 
because politics was, on her mother's side at least, a family tradition. Although her father was not 
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very interested in politics, both her brother and mother were keen activists. Her brother Bobo was 
one of the executive members of the University Christian Movement (UCM)- which again 
demonstrates the link between BCM and white liberals. 108 He was the only African to accompany 
the founders ofUCM, Basil Moore and Gerald Ray, to the international students' conference on 
Christian movements for the UCM, which was held in Ohio in the United States of America in 
December 1967.109 Furthermore, Manana's mother, Motlalepula, was known during her student 
years to have been politically active. 110 
Years after her involvement as a student, Motlalepula Kgware again became part of the liberation 
struggle during the 1970s. She became one ofthe most important middle-aged women to make 
a contribution to BCM activities. 111 She joined in student politics because her husband was a 
professor of Comparative Education at the University of the North, the cradle ofBCM. She was 
one of the few older black women to speak out courageously against the iniquitous system of 
"Bantu education" -more especially as it was practised at university level. 112 Her close contact 
with radical students and their activities led her to appreciate and understand the plight of 
students. She was the only person connected to the university to criticise it for expelling Tiro from 
the university because of his 29 April1972 speech at the graduation ceremony. 113 A former pupil 
of hers, Malegapuru William Makgoba, reports that, as a school teacher at one of the prestigious 
black high schools in the Northern Transvaal (Hwiti High School), Kgware converted a number 
108 University Christian Movement Newsletter, First Semester 1971, p.2. 
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of young students to BCM ideology. 114 She was one of the few women activists at the time to 
oppose investment by foreign companies in apartheid South Africa. 115 
Because Motlalepula Kgware was deeply respected and admired as an older person of profound 
political acumen, she was elected the first president of Black People's Convention in December 
1972.116 She was also elected president ofBPC because the organisation appreciated her political 
contribution and had confidence in her leadership skills - in spite of the fact that she was a 
woman. Ramphele fills in this picture by suggesting that Kgware's maturity and ability to reach 
out to both young and old were appreciated117 - making her an obvious choice for the position 
of president. Her responsibilities were on other occasions exaggerated by some men in the 
organisation, who claimed that her appointment as the president contradicted the perception that, 
as early as the beginning of the 1970s, blacks in general and BCM in particular, disregarded 
feminist principles and underestimated women's roles in BCM and the liberation struggle. 
Debora Matshoba was another woman who made a valuable and sustained contribution to BCM. 
Her political activism dated back to the 1960s, when, as a member ofY oung Women's Christian 
Association (YWCA), she was elected as chairperson ofthe Youth Department in 1964. When 
SASO was founded in 1969, Matshoba, while still a student at the University ofZululand, rushed 
to join so that she could participate in student politics. Her experience in the YWCA made it easy 
for her to contribute frequently and authoritatively to discussions relating to student and current 
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politics. She was noted as one of a few women in SASO conferences who publicly challenged 
men when it was necessary to do so. She never failed either to support the most radical motions 
at conferences. 118 Matshoba's outspokenness, particularly in radical politics, earned her the respect 
and trust of men in the movement. It did not come as a surprise when she was the only woman 
nominated to attend the Paulo Freire Method on Literacy, conducted by another woman, Ann 
Hope, in Johannesburg. 119 (Hope's influence on BC training was discussed earlier in this thesis 
to underscore the cross-fertilisation of white liberal and BC ideas.) 
As a student, Matshoba blocked the establishment of the exchange programme initiated by the 
SRC of the University of the Orange Free State in 1974. It had hoped that the exchange 
programme would facilitate the establishment of social relations between the two SRCs and, 
ultimately, the two universities. 120 Matshoba felt that the time was not ripe for oppressed black 
students to engage in amicable social relations with white students who were part of the 
oppressing group, and that such an arrangement could easily undermine the force of the liberation 
struggle. 121 
At the end of 1974, Matshoba gave her full support in the General Students Council to the 
establishment of what was to be called the Socio-Political Education Programme. The purpose 
of this programme was to conscientize the black community at large against participating in 
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government-sponsored projects. 122 As an alternative to these governmental projects, SASO set 
up its own projects, beginning in Upper Gqumashe and Mpheko. 123 Because these programmes 
were so successful, others were established to serve the needs and interests of the black 
population. 124 
Like other women dedicated to the struggle, Matshoba's main concern was to initiate women into 
political participation because she realised that the "nation's political maturity was measured by 
the political awareness of its women" .125 She was a most powerful and convincing advocate of 
women's involvement in politics, and she compared the political participation of South African 
women to that of women in the liberation struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. It was 
precisely because of her devoted work in student activism and other political areas that she was 
almost continuously banned by the government. 
The extent ofMatshoba's influence became clear when the government detained and subsequently 
imprisoned her at Modder Bee prison near Benoni, together with a number ofBCM activists on 
19 October 1977. When other detainees were released early in 1978, Matshoba was kept in prison 
and was made to serve an additional six months of political detention. 126 This may be seen as a 
measure of her personal political effectiveness among black students and other oppressed people 
of South Africa. After her release she was banned for five more years and restricted to the district 
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of Krugersdorp. This last restriction devastated her family life even more since she was now 
separated, by the requirements of the banning order, from her husband.127 It was widely and 
plausibly believed among activists that the apartheid government had deliberately broken up the 
family and other relationships among activists in the hope that they would become personally 
demoralised, dispirited and weakened, and thus rendered politically ineffectual. 
Nomsisi Kraai also played a leading role in the establishment of SASO. She emphasised the 
importance of the leadership training courses at national, regional and local/branch levels.128 She, 
Matshoba and Ramphele constituted a formidable team of women who had heated exchanges with 
the men during the annual general meetings of students councils which were usually held during 
the July school holidays. 129 Apart from her duties on the executive of SASO in the Transvaal 
region, Kraai was often selected to give talks at formation schools. Like Mashalaba and 
Matshoba, she directed her speeches at women as she tried to persuade them to become involved 
in political activities. 130 She contributed to the formation of the Soweto Cultural Association 
(SCA), Shigomo, which was founded shortly after the death ofMtuli Shezi in December 1972.131 
Shigomo was dedicated to memorialise Shezi and keep alive the memory of his brutal killing. 
Shezi had just been elected as the first vice-president ofBPC in early December. He was the first 
member ofBCM to be martyred for his ideology. He died of injuries sustained after having been 
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pushed into the path of a moving train by an employee of the railways in Germiston. 132 The 
dedication of this cultural association was fitting in the sense that BCM was acknowledging the 
role he had played in making cultural regeneration an important part of the organisation•s 
agenda. 133 Shigomo was later merged with the Lenasia Cultural Group to form the People•s 
Experimental Theatre (PET), and Kraai served as its first secretary.134 She wrote a number of 
articles in which she recorded the historical background ofblack theatre. 135 
Another woman in BCM who played a leading role in the male-dominated organisation was " , 
Thenjiwe Mtintso, a very close friend of Ramphele. Mtintso joined SASO at the University of 
F art Hare in 1972 where she had enrolled for the bachelor of science degree. She was among the 
students who organised a strike during 1972 and 1973, which led to her banning from the campus. 
She became involved in the BPC in King William•s Town where she was directly influenced in her 
political thinking by Biko himself 136 Her first employment was at the Dependents Conference of 
the Border Council of Churches, which materially and psychologically supported ex-political 
prisoners and detainees. 137 
Mtintso contributed to the advancement of the BCM mainly through the medium of her 
journalism. She joined the Daily Dispatch in East London as a reporter in August 1975,138 after 
Biko had requested its editor, Woods, to employ her on the grounds (quite apart from her natural 
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ability) that she was a person of political sophistication who enjoyed a wide range of contacts in 
the black comrnunity. 139 In a way, this was an attempt to realise BCM's strategic principle 
(mentioned earlier in the chapter) ofinfiltrating liberal newspapers so that BCMjournalists might 
report black issues from a BCM and not a "Bantustan" point of view. Her employment meant that 
she would join other black male journalists employed by white liberal newspapers. 140 At this time 
there were hardly any black women journalists reporting political issues in major liberal 
newspapers. This is not surprising since there were few male black journalists in the first place. 
The Daily Dispatch had Leslie Xinxwa in addition to Mtintso. 141 A few of the others whouu-.,rtr .. ..t 
for the white liberal press and who were pro-BCM were Jan Tugwana ~nd Daily Mail),142 
Enoch Duma (Sunday Times), Wiseman Kuzwayo (Daily News, Durban), Qurash Patel ffiill!y 
News, Durban), Mateu Mononyane (Rand Daily Mail) and Nat Serache @ill!d Daily Mail). 143 
Mtintso was a leading member of the Association of Black Journalists, and the Writers' 
Association of South Africa (W ASA) -an organisation that propagated BCM principles. 144 
Apart from reporting daily events in the Daily Dispatch from a BCM point of view (a different 
perspective from other reporters employed by the newspaper), Mtintso continued to play her part 
in the broader political liberation struggle. It was because of her continuous involvement in; 
politics that she experienced most forms of detention permitted by the government's security' 
legislation in both South Africa and the Transkei. Prison experiences toughened her to a point that i 
139 Gastrow, Who's Who in South Africa Politics, p.213. 
140 Pretoria News, 5 October 1977, p.14. 
141 Daily Dispatch, 29 September 1978. p.14. 
142 John Kane-Berman, Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction (Johannesburg, Ravan, 
1978), p.32. 
143 Daily Dispatch, 6 February 1978. p.8. 
144 The Citizen, 7 July 1978, p.2. 
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she became one of the few BCM women who was completely fearless in her opposition to the 
apartheid government. 145 For example, she was a key witness in the case of her fellow BCM 
member, Mapetla Mohapi, who was murdered (as was mentioned earlier) on 5 August 1976, 
while in detention at the Kei Road police station near King William's Town. 146 Her evidence was 
vital in the case since she was the last person to see Mohapi alive when they were both being held 
in custody at the Kei Road police station. 147 Her evidence was also crucial because she was able 
to reveal that her interrogators had hinted that, if she continued to be uncooperative, she would,\'' · · 
die in the same way as Mohapi. 148 This vital information, revealed by Mtintso, strongly suggests 
that the security police had murdered Mohapi. This evidence was given by Mtintso before she 
went into exile in Lesotho in 1978- thereby obtaining some relief from the continuous harassment 
which she had to endure at the hands of agents of apartheid. 149 
Finally, the most notable collective achievement ofthe women ofBCM was the founding and 
establishment of the Black Women's Federation (BWF) in Durban in December 197 5. 150 The BWF 
acted as an umbrella body for organisations of black women from all walks oflife. 151 Its objective 
was to work for solidarity among black women and their organisations. 152 Its first president was 
a leading South African scholar and activist, Fatima Meer, who helped to give the organisation 
145 Kuzwayo, Call me Woman, pp.210-211. 
146 Post, 15 October 1979, p.1; Eastern Province Herald, 17 January 1980, p.9; Post, 4 July 
1980, p.4. 
147 The Friend, 12 January 1980, p.8. 
148 
"Exile Says She Was Throttled", The Argus, 18 January 1980, p.3. 
149 The Friend, p.8. 
150 
"The Black Consciousness Movement", A People's History, Resistance in South Africa 
(Cape Town, NUSAS Publication, 1980), p.30. 
151 Ramphele, "The Dynamics of Gender within Black Consciousness Organisation", p.216. 
152 Maimela, Interview with Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, University ofPretoria, Department of 
Public Administration, 20 May 1996. 
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proper direction. 153 Meer was an obvious choice as the BWF' s first president because she had had 
extensive experience in running women's organisations. She had served in the Executive of the 
Federation of the South African Women (FSAW) in 1954154 and had always been at the epicentre 
of the political struggle. Meer, together with Nokuthula Luthuli and some women from Natal, 
also led the fasting and prayers on 31 May 1960 as a sign of solidarity with the political prisoners 
who had been arrested in the wake of Sharpeville. 155 She was an obvious choice to be the first 
president of the BWF- not least because she was not easily deterred by the techniques which the 
apartheid government or the security police used to harass, intimidate and frighten activists. 156 
The BWF geared itself to working in more practical ways than most of the existing liberation 
organisations. Less than a year after its establishment, there followed the landmark 16 June 1976 
uprisings in which students in Soweto were shot and killed by the police during a peaceful 
demonstration against the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of teaching in their schools. 
Members of the BWF went into the thick of the fighting to help the families and relatives find and 
identify those who had been killed. 157 
The BWF's second most important challenge occurred the following year when a group 
comprising members of the BWF and many members of the YWCA confronted police on 24 
October 1977. On this occasion, a number of activists had gathered at the YWCA centre in Dube 
to undertake a trip to King William's Town for the burial ofBiko. The security police's plan was 
153 Olsen, Chronology ofWomen's History, p.336. 
154 Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa, p.l55. 
155 Mary Benson, South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright (London, International 
Defence and Aid Fund, 1985), p.227. 
156 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, vol4, p.306. 
157 Bernstein, For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears, p.103. 
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to prevent the journey from taking place by intimidating those who hoped to go. These women, 
however, confronted the police so bravely that the police eventually abandoned their cowardly 
attempt to prevent Biko's friends and comrades from attending his funeral. 158 Such interventions 
in volatile and dangerous situations by members of the BWF confirm that its members were 
willing to put their lives at risk by engaging in physical confrontation with the ruthless operatives 
(whether security police or others) of apartheid. 
But political activism was only one facet of the BWF agenda. Wherever it could, it moved to 
uplift standards ofliving, especially in the rural areas, by introducing literacy projects and nutrition 
and health classes. It also compiled, printed and distributed a booklet which informed women 
about their legal rights. 159 Perhaps the BWF's greatest achievement, realised two years after it had 
been founded, was the organisation ofthe ground-breaking conference at the St Ansgar's College 
in Roodepoort between 6 and 8 September 1977. The theme of this second BWF annual 
conference was "The inefficiency of Bantu Education", and a number of experts in the field of 
education, including Oscar Dhlomo and Nomatemba Sithole, facilitated the discussion. The 
keynote address of the conference was delivered by Dorothy Height, national president of the 
National Council ofNegro Women in the United States of America, who was known to have 
opposed the involvement of African-American women in the white American women's liberation 
movement. 160 During the conference, Height spoke at length about the role of women during the 
civil rights struggle in the USA. 161 Her invitation to address the black South African women's 
organisation underscored the fact that black South Africans identified themselves more with the 
158 Kuzwayo, Call me Wom!ll, pp.48-50. 
159 Bernstein, For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears, p.105. 
160 Lema, Black Women in White America, p.589. 
161 Women's Supplement to the World, 15 September 1977, p.l. 
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African Americans than with Africans on their own continent because of the similarity in the 
nature of their oppression in both societies. 
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the distinctive contribution which black women made 
to BCM, and how, in the period when BC was being systematically repressed by the apartheid 
state, various individual white liberal women worked actively to help black women activists to 
become leaders in their own right. The role that many black women played in BCM at this time 
was sometimes an outcome ofthat wider, symbiotic but paradoxical relationship between white 
liberals and BC activists in the 1960s and 1970s, that is central to the topic of this research. In 
pursuance of this aim, this chapter has demonstrated that women specifically played a central role 
in the national liberation struggle and placed themselves in the forefront of the battle. They 
worked hardest in conscientizing blacks to join BCM. Participants such as Mashalaba recruited 
a number of her female colleagues into politics. Ramphele made a distinguished contribution as 
the first superintendent of the Zanimpilo Community Centre. Her experience in King William's 
Town enabled her to establish another community health centre in Lenyenye near Tzaneen, the 
place to which she was banished. Motlalepula Kgware became the first president of the Black 
People's Convention when it officially established in 1972. Kraai was able to head the cultural 
organisation ofBCM, while Mtintso worked as a journalist to implement BCM strategy among 
other journalists. It is essential to recognise the contribution of these and other women to the 
liberation struggle in South Africa so that further research in gender studies and other disciplines 
maybe done. 
This chapter has also shown that while, in earlier days, women's political organisations were led 
and dominated by the wives, mothers and partners of those organisations, this was not always the 
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case with BCM. Many members ofBCM were independent women who expected to be treated 
as the equals of their male counterparts and who took the lead in the founding, running and 
maintenance of the movement. They did not, however, realise the importance of insisting on the 
inclusion ofwomen's issues on the political agenda early on in the liberation struggle in South 
Africa. In spite of this, these women exemplified the attitudes of a new generation of black 
women who were no longer prepared to exercise leadership as second-class revolutionaries in 
exclusively female organisations devoted to trivia or secondary support. They demanded to be 
at the centre of decision making and praxis in the entire BCM and the force of their intellect and 
personalities and the quality of their courage and dedication made it impossible for anyone to deny 
them their legitimate aspirations - especially in the late 1970s when feminism was spreading as 
a force to be reckoned with throughout the world. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BIKO'S DEATH AND THE INQUEST 
The significance of the deeply flawed and suspect inquest that followed Biko's death, was that it 
represented a climax in the symbiotic and cooperative relationship between white liberals (both 
local and international) and the man who had been the founder of the Black Consciousness 
Movement in South Africa. As a person of action and a distinguished intellectual whose whole 
life and vision were focused on ways and means of freeing South Africans from inhumane and 
brutal institutionalised racism, it is unlikely that Biko ever envisioned himself as a martyr. And yet, 
if need be, he was the kind of person who would have given his life for the accomplishment of his 
cause. 
Although the first truly democratic election was held in South Africa in 1994, Biko himself might 
have been pleased to know that the events which followed his death in many ways signalled the 
beginning of the end of apartheid and white power in South Africa. Although Biko himselfhad 
enunciated the Black Consciousness doctrine that only black people (without the aid or assistance 
of white liberals) could liberate themselves from the burden and yolk of apartheid, the drama that 
played itself out in the inquest was one in which the actors were either white liberals or whites 
who supported, either tacitly or aggressively, the maintenance of the apartheid state and the belief 
that black aspirations for ordinary democratic human rights in the lands of their ancestors was 
tantamount to "communism" and a desire for "a violent overthrow of the state". 
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One of the many ironies of the inquest that followed Biko's death was, for example, that there was 
fundamental disagreement between the two white liberal pathologists (who maintained that Biko 
had sustained multiple blows to the head) and the state pathologists (who maintained that Biko 
had sustained one massive blow to the head- the blow which (they maintained) had ultimately 
led to his death. It was exactly such disagreements, as well as numerous evasions, lies and half-
truths, many of which only emerged during the persistent and arduous cross-examination of 
witnesses by the white liberal advocates whom the Biko family retained to represent their 
interests, that made it evident, right from the beginning, that the inquest was a cover-up, and an 
ultimately futile exercise in what today is called "damage control" by the deeply compromised 
servants of the apartheid state. 
If it had not been for the part played by white liberals, white liberal organisations, white liberal 
newspapers, the murder of one of South Africa's most distinguished political activists might have 
been swept under the carpet and the liberation for which Biko had lived, fought and died, might 
have been indefinitely retarded. When it became apparent to the international community that the 
inquest was designed to obscure rather than to elucidate what had really happened to Biko, 
international outrage and disgust on a scale hitherto unprecedented in South Africa broke over 
the heads of the apartheid government. Although the minister of police and prisons, Jimmy 
Kruger, had uttered the infamous words, "It leaves me cold" when he heard ofBiko's death in 
police detention, he was soon afterwards made to eat his words as a storm of protest, anger and 
disbelief swept around the world. Paradoxically, much ofthis anger emanated from white liberal 
sources, both local and international. And yet, the involvement of white liberals, organisations and 
institutions as players and auxiliaries in the struggle for black political freedom, neither 
contradicted nor invalidated Biko's central beliefthat only black people (without white assistance) 
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could and would eventually liberate themselves. 
This research examines the central paradox of the BC position, namely that although Biko called 
on Africans to liberate themselves, Biko himself, and his organisation, for reasons beyond their 
control, were profoundly dependent on the support of a whole range of white liberals who chose, 
each in his or her own way, to become involved in the struggle of black people that was the 
central aim of Black Consciousness. As government measures against black organisations and 
individuals became ever more draconian and brutal, white liberal support ofBC in many ways 
helped to keep the flame of protest burning. The paradox is that although Biko's realisation that 
black people could not depend for their liberation on the old-style white liberalism represented 
by people such as Alan Paton, it became ever more necessary, as individual BC and other black 
leaders were detained, killed or removed from the scene, for someone to keep protest against 
government oppression and apartheid alive. In the abnormal circumstances of the times, the only 
people in South Africa who had sufficient freedom and means to oppose the government and 
support the BC agenda, either directly or indirectly, were white liberals and the organisations that 
they represented. 
To accept such a proposition is not to invalidate the truth of Biko's perception that it was 
necessary for black people (without white interference) to take charge of their own destiny. The 
. 
central thesis of this research is that, in spite of the existence of such an ideal, there existed a 
necessary synergy and symbiosis between BC and white liberal individuals and organisations, 
which was caused by the unequal circumstances of the times, and without which the struggle for 
black liberation might have been retarded for many more years. The central drama of these years 
(the late 1960s and the 1970s) was Biko's death and the passion, fear, bigotry, cruelty and fury 
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which it aroused on both sides of the political spectrum - and among people of all colours and 
political persuasions. It is to this event, and its repercussions, that we now shall tum. 
When Biko died in mysterious circumstances on 12 September 1977 in police custody in Pretoria, 
he was the forty-sixth political activist to have been killed since 1963. In spite of this, no police 
or government authority had ever accepted responsibility for any of these deaths. The first 
detainee who had died had been Bellington Mampe. He had died on 1 September 1963, and the 
cause of his death had never been disclosed. 1 In most cases where detainees died in detention, the 
police routinely attributed the cause to "suicide", although few African people were deceived by 
such pronouncements. Inquiries into the probable causes of death were held in fewer than ten of 
the 46 cases. Between 1976 and 1977, only four inquests were widely reported in white liberal 
media such as newspapers, journals and in the circulars ofliberal organisations.2 
There are two related reasons why these particular inquests were publicised and reported during 
those two years. Firstly, more political activists had been killed during those two years than at any 
other time. Thirteen people were reported to have been killed in 1976 and fourteen were killed 
in 1977.3 Secondly, BC was already widespread and flourishing in the 1970s, and had the support 
of a sizeable number of black communities. The government hoped to suppress BC activities by 
detaining the BC leadership and therefore intimidating the masses who looked to them for 
freedom. In pursuance of this aim, the government neglected to supervise the activities of the 
1 Francis Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC (Harare, Zimbabwe 
Publishing House, 1988), p.177. 
2 Unisa Archives, Centre for African Studies, Diakonia News, (Durban, St Andrew's Centre), 
November 1977, p.10. 
3 Prisoners of Apartheid: A Biographical List of Political Prisoners and Banned Persons in 
South Africa (International Aid and Defence Fund, London, 1978), p.177. 
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security police, thus giving them a ·free hand to detain and maltreat the leadership ofBC without 
any of the usual democratic or legal safeguards accorded to prisoners. In fact, the government 
believed that the security police were helping to undermine and ultimately abolish Black Power, 
which they deemed to be ideologically Marxist. 4 The first inquests were those of Joseph Mdluli, 
who died on 19 March 197 6 in Durban, 5 and Mapetla Mohapi, an active member in BC circles, 
particularly in the Eastern Cape region, who died on 5 August 1976 at the Kei Police Station in 
King William's Town.6 
Mamphela Ramphele was one of the two doctors who represented the family at the autopsies. 
Ironically Biko himself had agitated for an inquest into the death ofMohapi, little knowing that 
he himself would soon die in similar circumstances in police custody. The third inquest was into 
the death ofPhakamile Mabija, who had died on 7 July 1977 when he allegedly fell from the sixth 
floor window of the Transvaal Road Police Station in Kimberley. 7 
The fourth person to die was Steve Biko and his death, with all its subsequent ramifications, 
provide the main focus of this chapter. Biko's death and inquest generated an enormous amount 
of publicity and were widely reported in national and international media. It was this that 
prompted Hilda Berstein to note that the inquest was a high drama, filmed by television cameras 
and attended by reporters, experts and interested parties from many countries. 8 There are a 
4 House of Assembly Debates, vol 74, columns 7033-7034. 
5 
"Death in detention", Diakonia News, 1977, p.10. 
6 
"Family ofMohape is suing Minister", Eastern Province Herald, 18 Aug 79. See also 
"Police caused husband's death, says wife", Cape Argus, 16 Oct 79. 
7 Tony Saddington, "Phakamile Mabija", South African Outlook, vol107, 1977, p.l39. 
8 Hilda Berstein, no. 46 Steve Biko (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for 
Southern Africa, 1978), p.29. 
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number of reasons why Biko' s case received such attention. After Biko' s death, the government 
had been dismissive of an inquest. Then, two months after his death, it changed its mind and called 
for an inquest. Their political motivation was that an inquest would prove beyond doubt that the 
organisation which Biko had led was indeed revolutionary. 
These events were taking place during the build-up to a national election in South Africa, and the 
National Party confidently expected to attract a majority of votes from those who supported the 
hard line which they had adopted with regard to the detention and treatment of detainees. The 
official opposition party, liberal in its policies and outlook, also used the inquest to its own 
advantage, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Some of these liberals, who outspokenly 
criticised the police when the revelations of the Biko inquest became public, had known Biko 
either as a companion or a co-worker. 9 More importantly, Biko had had international connections. 
Before his death he had acted as a spokesperson when he had willingly granted numerous 
interviews to foreign non-governmental and governmental organisations which opposed apartheid. 
He had been outspoken in these interviews in spite of knowing that he would attract the hostile 
attention of the South African government and its operatives. For example, in December 1976 
Biko was interviewed by the American Democratic senator, Dick Clark, who, in his capacity as 
the chairperson of the Senate Committee on African Affairs, interviewed Biko about the role of 
the United States in South Africa. 100 It was therefore logical that Clark would be among the first 
prominent people from overseas to query the official version ofBiko' s death. Clark himselfhoped 
that the inquest into Biko's death would get to the bottom ofthe matter, and his role in the events 
9 
"Steve Biko and Frankenstein", Reality, vol 9, 1977, pp.2-3. 
10 
"Memorandum from B.S. Biko to General Dick Clark on American policy towards 
Azania (South Africa)", 1976, pp.l-6. 
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that followed is discussed in detail when reference is made to the role that the international 
community played in reaction to Biko' s death. Also included will be a discussion of how the 
liberal press, the liberal opposition and the international community reacted to the findings of the 
COlll1lllSS10n. 
About a month before his death, Biko had allowed himself to be interviewed by Bernard Zylstra 
of the Canadian Institute for Christian Studies. The text of the interview was published only after 
Biko's death as the group felt that earlier publication might have jeopardised Biko's life at the 
hands of the South African government. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the inquest. Because of the connections and 
relationships which Biko had established and nurtured with foreign individuals and organisations 
during his lifetime, there was, after his death, immediate pressure on the South African 
government to establish an impartial board of inquiry. One of the first to ask for such a inquest 
was Clark, two days after Biko's death. 11 
Then follows a description of the inquest into the cause of Biko' s death, with special reference 
to how it was organised and the role that white liberals (such as counsel who represented the Biko 
family) played. The main participants in the commission will be named and the responsibilities 
which were allocated to them will be described. Because most of the main participants supported 
the apartheid government and opposed everything that Biko stood for, it was more or less 
inevitable (barring any unforeseen but unlikely mistakes made by pro-state witnesses under cross-
11 The World, 15 Sept 1977, p.6. 
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examination) that the verdict would go the way that it did. In describing the proceedings of the 
commission, emphasis will be laid on the way in which (white liberal) counsel for the Biko family 
extracted crucial evidence from uncooperative witnesses - and very nearly managed to derail the 
rehearsed cover -up that the authorities had clearly hoped the commission would be. Lastly, under 
this ca·i:egory, an analysis of the most important evidence which emerged will be attempted to 
show what that evidence revealed about Biko's death at the time and about others who died in 
detention in similar circumstances. 
How the commission was organised 
Before one goes into detail about how the commission was constituted, it is interesting to note 
the importance of the venue that was chosen for the sittings. The Old Synagogue in the centre of 
Pretoria (a national monument long decommissioned as a Jewish place of worship) was already 
a familiar place for hearing political cases involving anti-apartheid dissidents. While the November 
1977 case was mainly a case about BCM, the building had been used for the infamous Treason 
Trials held between 1956 and 1961. When Winnie Mandela and 21 activists were tried in 1969, 
that trial also took place in the synagogue. Thus the ANC faced its accusers in this building, as 
did the South West African People's Organisation (SW APO), some of whose members were tried 
there in the late 1960s. 12 
12 George Bizos, No One to Blame? In Pursuit of Justice in South Africa (Cape Town, David 
Philip, 1998), p.58. The significance of this trial was that it was the first trial to be held under 
the Terrorism Act. Also Sam C. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology 
and Foreign Policy (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1975), pp.155-161; Prisoners 
of Apartheid, pp.l67-175. 
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Because the commission consisted mainly of state employees, it was hardly surprising that the 
findings and verdict of the commission exonerated, to the greatest possible degree, both the 
security police and doctors who had been involved with Biko while he had been in detention. The 
state-appointed M.J. Prins, the chief magistrate of Pretoria, presided over the proceedings. 
Because Biko had been severely injured and traumatised while in detention, and because of the 
alleged negligence of the doctors who had attended him in their official capacity as state 
employees, it was, from the outset, obvious that expert medical evidence would be required. 
Professors Isador Gordon and J.A. Olivier were therefore appointed as assessors with specialised 
medical knowledge. The three government departments whose employees were also implicated 
in the case, were legally represented. Advocate K. von Lieres and T .D. Reeds represented the 
state. The police were represented by Advocates P.R. van Rooyen and J.M.C. Smit, while W.H. 
Heath represented the Department of Prisons. The Department of Health had no legal. 
representation but the state's legal representative, Advocate B. de V. Pickard, represented the 
medical practitioners in question. P.J. Erasmus represented the Law Society of the Transvaal. 
Since all the legal representatives mentioned above were either directly or indirectly state or semi-
state employees or else were involved in some way or another with the ruling establishment and 
its institutions, it was to be expected that the commission would find in favour ofthe government.:~ 
The Law Society of the Transvaal invited two international legal experts from Britain and the 
United States, Sir David Napley from the United Kingdom and Louis Pollack from the USA, to 
attend as observers. It seems as if these two observers were only invited because there had been 
some concern among liberal members of the South African Law Society that the proceedings of, w 
the commission would be biased. It was felt, in these quarters, that there should at least be a few 
274 
neutral observers who might be in a position to judge the proceedings with some degree of 
objectivity. In the long run these observers favoured the white liberal establishment because their 
reports, published overseas, portrayed white liberals as defenders of the African majority who 
were the main victims of the racist apartheid laws. Another consequence of the attendance of 
these two observers was that the Black Consciousness Movement, of which Biko had been the 
symbol, received positive recognition. Both observers viewed BC as a legitimate organisation 
which operated within the legal parameters of South African society, and hence they could find .. 
no justification for the brutal detention and murder of its followers. 13 
Their reports were valuable sources of information about the inquest, unlike those ofjournalists 
who reported events on a daily basis. Napley and Pollack successfully documented the 
proceedings from the first sitting to the last. In the United States a number of civil rights 
organisations disseminated these reports. Pollack reported to various media, while Nap ley's views 
were taken up by anti-apartheid organisations, including the London-based International Defence 
and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. 14 
Biko' s family was represented by a team of three leading liberal advocates who had already · · 
defended a number of political activists, the majority of whom were black. They were Sydney W. 
Kentridge, Ernest Wentzel and George Bizos. The latter had been involved in the early 1960s in 
the ANC Rivonia trial and had eventually become Nelson Mandela's family lawyerY 
13 Sir David Napley, "A view from the old synagogue", Sunday Times, 1 Jan 1978. 
14 Berstein, no. 46 Steve Biko, pp.137-140. Appendix A: "Report by Sir David Napley, 
British Law Society, invited as an independent observer by the Association ofLaw Society 
in South Africa, Steven Biko Inquest." 
15 Karis and Gerhart Collection, Johannesburg. Quoted from transcript of Gerhart's interview 
with George Bizos, 30 Oct 1989, New York. 
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Kentridge had appeared on behalf of the defendants in the case which had arisen as a result of the 
Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960,16 and had also appeared for the defendants from the 
Black Consciousness Movement who had been charged for being involved in illegal gatherings 
when they had held rallies around South Africa to celebrate the liberation ofMozambique from 
Portuguese rule. 17 He was well known as a defence advocate for defendants in BCM political 
trials. 18 Wentzel was one of those who represented the families of Sharpeville victims with the 
assistance of the International Defence and Aid Fund, which was under the management of 
Anglican Bishop Ambrose Reeves. 19 Wentzel also served as legal advisor to Robert Sobukwe, 
president of the Pan Africanist Congress. 20 
This then was the team of advocates which was instructed by S. Chetty' s BC firm oflawyers to 
represent Biko's family. The very fact that Chetty's firm instructed these three white liberal 
lawyers suggests that there existed a trusting relationship between BC and Kentridge, Wentzel 
and Bizos. What was most striking about this case was that, although it was a political case, 
counsel for the Biko family refrained from raising political issues but rather restricted itself to 
proving legal and procedural irregularities which would implicate the state in Biko's murder. 
16 Ambrose Reeves, Shooting at Sharpville: The Agony of South Africa (London, Victor 
Gollancz, 1960), pp.ll1-141. 
17 Arnold Millard (ed), Steve Biko: Black Consciousness in South Africa (New York, 
Vantage Books, 1979), pp.281-286. 
18 Michael Lobban, White Man's Justice: South African Political Trials in the Black 
Consciousness Era (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966), p.l33. 
19 Frank Philip, "Richard Ambrose Reeves: Bishop of Johannesburg 1949-1961 ". MA 
dissertation, Unisa, 1995, p.181. 
20 Benjamin Pogrund, How Can a Man Die Better: The Life of Robert Sobukwe 
(Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1997), p.45. 
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The other group which was subpoenaed to appear before the commission as witnesses were state 
employees who had been involved with Biko in the last twenty-three days of his life. Eight 
security guards were among these witnesses, five of whom comprised the morning shift. Major 
Harold Snyrnan had been in command of this group, while Captain W.P. (Petrus) Siebert, 
Sergeant Gideon Niewoudt, and Warrant Officers Ruben Max and J.J. (Jacob) Beneke had also 
been involved as security policemen of rank. It was alleged during the inquest that the morning 
shift had consisted of five members because two of them were able to speak Xhosa, Biko's 
mother tongue. 21 This seems to imply that, from the outset, the aim of the security police 
interrogation of Biko was to degrade and humiliate him, imagining, as they might have, that he 
would have had difficulty in understanding any questions posed to him in English. Such an 
arrangement also served to bring horne to Biko the importance which his captors attached to 
Afrikaans, as opposed to English. The night shift was commanded by Lieutenant Winston Eric 
Wilkens and included Warrant Officers Coetzee22 and Henry Fouche. 23 All security police who 
testified were based in Port Elizabeth. There was, however, a Major Richard Hansen from King 
William's Town. He was subpoenaed to give evidence to the effect that Biko and BC were 
committed to violence and were indeed violent in their actions. This was clearly demonstrated 
under cross-examination when Hansen claimed that Biko had assaulted Warrant Officer Hattingh 
in 197 5 at King William' Town. 24 
The three medical doctors, based in Port Elizabeth, Ivor Lang, the district surgeon, Benjamin 
21 Inquest, vol2, p.86. Also Inquest, vol4, p.257. 
22 The author has been unable trace Warrant Officer Coetzee's full name either from the 
records ofthe Inquest or from the records of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
23 Donald Woods, Biko (London, Penguin Books, 1979), p.291. 
24 Woods, Biko, pp.255-156. See also Inquest, vol 5, pp.288-294. 
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Tucker, the chief district surgeon, and Colin Hersch, a specialist, as well as the newly appointed 
Andre van Zyl from Pretoria, all gave evidence. The pathologists who performed the post-mortem 
on Biko' s corpse were also involved in the commission. Initially the team consisted of three 
members. Two of these were the eminent South African pathologists, Professor Johan David 
Loubser of Pretoria, 25 and Professor Ian Simson, then head of the Department of Anatomical 
Pathology at the University of Pretoria.26 Biko's family was represented by Dr Jonathan 
Gluckman, a liberal, who was then the press officer for the Southern Transvaal branch of the 
South African Medical and Dental Association.27 It is now believed that counsel for the Biko 
family had requested Dr Gluckman, because of his liberal political persuasion, to act on behalf of 
the family. They hoped thereby to obtain a more objective joint pathologists' report than might 
have been the case if no liberal had been present. 28 However, because ofthe complexity ofthe 
whole post-mortem procedure, Gluckman realised that they in fact needed another person who 
was an expert in the field. This resulted in requesting the services of Professor Neville Sydney 
Proctor, an anatomical pathologist at the University of Witwatersrand, who joined the team on 
the second day ofthe post-mortem. 
It is worth noting that, although the four pathologists performed the post-mortem jointly and 
agreed on its findings, namely that Biko had died as a result of head injuries, there appeared to 
be differences of opinion as to how such injuries might have been sustained. The two liberal 
pathologists acting on behalf of the family, Gluckman and Proctor, pointed out that more than one 
blow to Biko's head was the cause of his head injury. With hindsight this suggests that repeated 
25 Inquest, vol16, p.1140. 
26 Inquest, vol 22, p.1566. 
27 Sunday Express, 27 Apr 1980. 
28 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1993), p.225. 
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violent blows to Biko' s head, inflicted by security policemen, were the proximate cause of his 
death. On the other hand, however, the state pathologists, Johan Loubser and Ian Simson, were 
of the opinion that only one heavy blow had been inflicted to Biko' s head and that this had caused 
the head injuries which were identified by the pathologists. 29 It is now clear that the two state 
pathologists were attempting to support the accounts of events given in evidence by the security 
police, namely that Biko had sustained a single head injury on the morning of7 September 1977 
when he had "become aggressive" (according to state evidence) after he had been confronted by 
information that implicated him and Peter Jones in the distribution of pamphlets in black 
townships around Port Elizabeth. 30 
The family pathologists, especially Gluckman, were eager to reveal the results of the post -mortem 
before the government announced them since these results constituted a prima facie case against 
the authorities, suggesting, as they did, serious and culpable negligence in the handling and care 
of political detainees. Gluckman was the first to share the results with Helen Suzman, a prominent 
member ofthe opposition in parliament.31 This was clearly a deliberate move on Gluckman's part 
since Suzman's portfolio was that oflaw and order, and Gluckman must have perceived the 
importance of this information for Suzman and the world at large. 
In contrast to Gluckman's eagerness to make the findings public, the two government pathologists 
were hesitant, aware of the implied criticism of the modus operandi of the government and, more 
especially, their servants, the security police. Loubser especially must be singled out for blame in 
this regard. He had studied and lived overseas, in Britain and the United States. It might have 
29 Inquest, voll8, pp.l281-1320. 
30 Inquest, vol 5, pp.ll9-133; pp.l33-286. 
31 Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms, p.225. 
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been expected that a professional such as Loubser would have been able to follow the dictates of 
professional ethics and comment objectively on the obvious implications of the forensic evidence 
without regard for any personal or political allegiances he might have had. 32 Perhaps in the end 
Loubser was too much a product of his environment. He was based and worked in the heartland 
of conservative pro-government Pretoria as chief pathological anatomist at the two segregated 
local hospitals, H.F. Verwoerd (for whites and coloureds only) and Kalafong (for Africans only). 
In the end Loubser steadfastly opted to bias the evidence so as to support the version of events 
which seemed to exonerate the security police. 33 
The government on the other hand had ensured that it was difficult, especially for foreign 
correspondents and other interested persons, to have free access to the information and to follow 
with ease and understanding the court proceedings. Napley, for example, was unable to follow 
the proceedings when they were conducted in Afrikaans. 34 The state tried by all means possible 
to conduct the inquiry in Afrikaans. The reason for this, according to the court, was to 
accommodate the security police, who, the court claimed, were more easily able to give evidence 
in Afrikaans than in English. 35 Kentridge, however, appealed for the proceedings to be conducted 
in English since his clients could not understand Afrikaans. He refused Von Lieres's suggestion 
that Biko's family should be provided with an interpreter.36 As a result ofKentridge's protest, 
three quarters of the proceedings were conducted in English. This hardly solved the problem for 
32 Inquest, vol 20, p.1461. 
33 Inquest, vol 22, p.1566. 
34 Sunday Times, 1 Jan 1978, p.9. 
35 Woods, Biko, p.229. 
36 Inquest, voll, pp.ll-13. 
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those who did not understand Afrikaans since key witnesses from the security police continued 
to testify in Afrikaans. The doctors, however, all testified in English. 
Another indication that the state was less than keen to make information readily available was the 
fact that there was no sound system in the court. Although a large national and international media 
contingent was present throughout the proceedings, no sound system was provided. When media 
representatives realised what was happening, they signed a petition requesting the installation of 
a sound system which they offered to finance themselves. The fact that the magistrate turned 
down this request seems to indicate the invisible but ever-present guiding hand of the government 
on the whole trial enterprise. 37 It seems as if the state was convinced all along that it would be 
difficult to prove that the security police and the local state surgeons in Port Elizabeth had 
deliberately conspired to murder Biko. State-biased witnesses had the advantage of a period of 
two months before the commencement of the commission to conceal and rehearse evidence which 
might otherwise have incriminated both the security police and the doctors. It therefore fell to the 
Biko family counsel (who were liberals) and to the two liberal pathologists in the team to 
somehow extract information from uncooperative security police and doctors in order to 
incriminate them. 
37 Woods, Biko, p.229. 
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The proceedings of the commission 
The inquest lasted for about two weeks. Before intensive cross-examination began in the 
courtroom, a selection of items allegedly used by the security police to interrogate Biko while he 
was in detention in Room 619 of the Sanlam Building in Port Elizabeth, were exhibited in court. 
Also, a selection of gruesome photographs taken during the post-mortem, indicating the injured 
areas of Biko' s head, were conspicuously labelled and handed in as part of the evidence. 38 
The commission commenced with an announcement of the names of all the participants. 
Thereafter the chief state pathologist gave the results of the post-mortem which served to show 
that an injury (or injuries) to Biko's head had been the cause ofhis death. The first six days ofthe 
inquiry were occupied by intensive cross-examination of the security police, particularly Colonel 
Johannes Goosen, officer in charge ofEastem Cape police headquarters. Also cross-examined 
were Major Snyman, leader of the morning team which had interrogated Biko, and Wilken who 
had headed the evening team. Siebert, who was a member ofSnyman' steam, was cross-examined 
in order to determine what role he had played when he accompanied Biko as he was driven to 
Pretoria in the back of a Land Rover during the night of 11 September 1977.39 
The second group to take the witness stand were the four medical doctors who had treated Biko 
while he had been in detention. It took Kentridge three and half days to establish that the doctors 
involved had deliberately neglected Biko's welfare because they had accepted security police 
38 Inquest, vol 1, pp.4-6. 
39 Woods, Biko, pp.233-302. 
282 
advice that Biko was not really ill but was merely shamming illness. Both Lang and Tucker 
became the focus ofKentridge' s intensive cross-examination, mainly because both seemed to have 
been grossly negligent in their capacity as doctors while caring for Biko, and because it also 
seemed that they had conspired with the police to prohibit Biko any access to the outside world.40 
The pathologist, Dr J.D. Loubser, was called by Biko's family counsel to clarify how it might be 
possible for a qualified physician to misdiagnose the condition of a seriously ill patient.41 The 
fourth doctor, Andries van Zyl, was called to give evidence regarding the patient's condition upon. ~· ·. 
'· 
his arrival in Pretoria. 42 
Gluckman seems to have been a controversial figure amongst the participants in the commission. 
Both Van Rooyen and Von Lieres opposed a request by Kentridge to allow Gluckman to give the 
court his personal opinions about the results of the post-mortem examination. It was only after 
a lengthy argument during which Kentridge convinced the court about the importance of 
Gluckman's evidence, that the magistrate ruled in favour ofKentridge's request. 43 Gluckman's 
evidence is discussed in the section below. As though intending to undermine Gluckman's 
evidence, Van Roo yen, Von Lieres, Pickard and Heath requested that Dr Simson, one of the state 
pathologists, be given an opportunity to clarify some statements made by Gluckman.44 Van ·. ·" 
Rooyen was the only person to question Simson. The last three to be called in conclusion ol 
evidence were Goosen, Fouche, and Beneke. 45 On the day prior to the announcement of the 
40 Inquest, vols 9-15. 
41 Inquest, voll6, pp.ll40-1200. Also Inquest, vol16, pp.ll40-1200. 
42 Inquest, vol 20, p.1449-1456. Also Barney Pityana, Mamphela Ramphele, Malusi 
Mpumlwana and Lindy Wilson, Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black 
Consciousness (Cape Town, David Philip, 1991), pp.82-83. 
43 Inquest, vol20, pp.l461-1471; pp.1477-1565. 
44 Inquest, vol22, pp.l624-1662. 
45 Inquest, vol23, pp.l663-1680; pp, 1686-1714; 1716-1723. 
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verdict, Kentridge, on behalf of the Biko family counsel, gave some reasons why the security 
police might plausibly be charged for the death of Biko while he had been in their custody.46 
Opposing this, Van Roo yen, Von Lieris and Heath suggested that there was insufficient evidence 
to incriminate the police. 47 
On the final day, 2 December 1977, the magistrate, in his verdict, exonerated both the police and 
the doctors as he claimed that there was no substantial evidence which indicated negligence on 
the part of the doctors concerned. The magistrate however indicated that he was sending copies 
of relevant documents to the Association of the South African Medical and Dental Council, which 
might further investigate the conduct of the doctors. 48 This step might have been due to the 
influence of Professor Isidor Gordon, one of the assessors, who evidently remained less than 
convinced by the evidence given by the doctors. 49 
An evaluation of all the proceedings makes it clear that it was the government's intention to 
protect the security police from any responsibility for Biko's brutal treatment and subsequent 
death while he had been in their custody. However they probed, Biko's family counsel had been 
unable to extract the incriminating evidence which they required, and both the state doctors and 
the police had been consistently evasive under cross-examination. On occasions it was even 
obvious that they were lying. This was evident, for example, when the police, especially high-
ranking officers such as Colonel Goosen and Major Snyman, contradicted themselves. As a result 
46 Inquest, vol 24, pp. 17 46-183 0. 
47 Inquest, vol25, pp.l746-1926. 
48 H.J. Simons, Struggle in Southern Africa for Survival and Equality (London, Macmillan 
Press, 1997), pp.209-211. 
49 Inquest, vol 21, pp.l481-1541. 
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they were called more than once to testify. The same evasiveness and contradictions were evident 
in the testimony of the doctors, leaving the magistrate with no alternative but, as has already been 
pointed out, to send documents for further assessment to the South African Medical and Dental 
Council. 
Furthermore, the long delay (two months) before the commencement of the inquest suggests that 
those responsible for Biko' s death needed time to collaborate in fabricating or concealing 
evidence and rehearsing testimony which would exonerate them from blame while proving that 
Biko himself was a dangerous revolutionary and a threat to the safety and welfare of the apartheid 
state. To prove their point, the court was provided with copies of affidavits alleged to have been 
made by Biko's associates such as Peter Jones, Patrick Titi and Noble Mohapi, confirming that 
Biko had been involved in the distribution of pamphlets around black townships in Port Elizabeth. 
It was established, during cross-examination by Kentridge, that the affidavits had been written 
after Biko' s death, and that they were therefore part of a wider tissue of lies and fabrication. 
A last observation about the proceedings must refer to the role played by Gluckman, the only 
liberal to have had an opportunity to take the witness stand. He was the only one, amongst all 
those to give evidence, to cooperate with Biko's family counsel in supplying vital information 
from the pathological findings. Gluckman gave crucial information about the Biko blood sample 
,•, ' :f ~ 
which had been taken to a medical research laboratory. 5° This point is discussed fully in the next.·· ·.·, 
subsection. It was unfortunate, to say the least, that the police failed to appoint an independent 
body to investigate the case prior to the commencement of the commission. A lot of vital 
50 Inquest, vol21, p.l553. 
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information could have been uncovered by unbiased experts if the government had decided to 
follow such a route. Although the government twisted every way it could to conceal important 
evidence, some crucial and damning evidence was eventually brought to light. 
The most important evidence and revelations about Biko 
Since the evidence of the commission comprises twenty six volumes, justice could only be done 
to both Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement if this entire thesis were exclusively 
concerned with the commission itself Since the evidence of the commission is relevant only to 
one section of this chapter, I shall apply myself only to essential evidence which supports the 
contention of my thesis, and that concerns the role played by white liberals in assisting members 
of the Black Consciousness Movement and its activities. This section therefore deals with three 
points of evidence which were extracted by the team ofliberal advocates acting on behalf of the 
family. The first point is the attempt made by the police to cover up the fact that Biko had been 
murdered, thereby exonerating themselves from blame. The second point addresses the conspiracy 
between the security police and the three doctors who treated Biko while in detention. The third 
point analyses the attempt made by the apartheid regime apparatchiks to humiliate and discredit 
Biko, thereby intending to discredit all resistance movements in general, but BC in particular. 
On the day after Biko died, police headquarters in Pretoria requested Colonel Goosen to present 
a report elaborating the circumstances and events which led to Biko' s death. This report was sent 
by telex and explained in full how and at what time Biko's head injuries had been inflicted. The 
report also explained that, because of these injuries, Biko' s condition had deteriorated to such an 
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extent that he was in a semi-coma, and that Goosen had decided, with the approval of the doctor, 
to send Biko to Pretoria on 11 September 1977.51 What makes this telexed report so crucial (apart 
from its content), is that it seems almost certain that it was intended only for the eyes of the 
relevant authorities at police headquarters. Given how momentous this report was, it would 
certainly have constituted a vital piece of evidence, and should therefore have been on exhibit with 
other items of evidence. But the telexed report was never adduced or exhibited as evidence and 
it seems that Goosen confidently expected that its contents would remain forever off the public 
record. In fact, Goosen, under cross-examination by Kentridge, denied that he had sent any other 
information to head office except the affidavits which were part of the exhibit. 52 He eventually 
conceded, under intense cross-examination by Kentridge, that such a report existed. Kentridge 
then requested Brigadier Zietsman53 to produce the telex. 54 Upon examination, it was discovered 
that the contents of the telex differed from the substance of the affidavits which had been 
produced under oath by every person who had been involved with Biko during this critical time. 
None ofthe affidavits had made any mention ofBiko's head injuries, whereas Goosen's telexed 
report had ascribed Biko' s head injuries to the fact that Biko had, during the course of his 
aggressive behaviour, injured himselfby bumping his head against a wall. 55 The fact that Biko had 
any injuries at all was initially what no policeman concerned was willing to admit, and this shows 
that there had been an intention among those concerned to perpetrate a cover-up. Even after the 
post-mortem had shown that Biko had sustained one or more violent head injuries, no policeman 
51 Inquest, vol24, p.1785. 
52 Inquest, vol 5, p.343. 
53 The author could not trace Zietsman's first names in any of the available sources. 
54 Inquest, vol24, p.l785; p.l785. 
55 Inquest, vol24, pp.1783-1785. Also Inquest, vol6, p.498. 
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admitted to any knowledge ofhow these injuries might have been sustained until Warrant Officer 
Beneke agreed, under pressure of cross-examination by Kentridge, that Biko had hit his head on 
a wall on 7 September 1977.56 
Records reveal that, when Biko' s condition began to deteriorate on 7 September, Dr Lang was 
requested to examine him. As a result of this examination, Lang gave Biko a clean bill ofhealth. 
Police regulations require that this conclusion should have been inscribed immediately in the 
occurrence book. This was never done. It was only on 8 September, after Major Snyman had 
realised that Biko's condition was becoming serious, that an entry was made. 57 During cross-
examination Snyman pointed out that, since Lang had assured them that Biko was in good health, 
he had seen no reason to record this fact in the occurrence book. They had known that Biko had 
been a medical student for four years and hence assumed that he was expert in shamming sickness. 
The police found it necessary to say that Biko was feigning illness because he had already been 
seriously assaulted on 7 September during interrogation. Kentridge suggested that the police 
concerned needed to assert that Biko had been feigning sickness because he had in fact already 
been seriously assaulted on 7 September, and their assertion was required in order to effect an 
eventual cover-up. Police statements about Biko's wild behaviour were a necessary part of the 
conspiracy to conceal the evidence and protect themselves against any later accusations by Biko 
himself Kentridge also argued that the police, knowing that Biko was a law student, feared that, 
if released, he might have pressed charges against them. It was with this in view, Kentridge 
averred, that the police entered the accusations of wild behaviour in the occurrence book: they 
were anticipating the day when they might have to defend themselves against charges arising from 
56 Inquest, vol 6, pp.497-498. 
57 Inquest, vol3, pp.l26-127. 
288 
the consequences ofBiko's extremely serious injuries. The occurrence book, Kentridge argued, 
would have been proper evidence to discredit Biko' s claim. 58 This proved to be the case because 
the occurrence book was adduced as evidence by the police. The occurrence book, however, 
deliberately omits any record of the later allegations that Biko was feigning illness, and it only 
mentions that he stubbornly refused to answer questions. 59 
Another aspect of police cover-up occurred when they took Biko to Sydenham Hospital at night. 
Drs Lang and Tucker had examined him during the day and had suggested that he be sent to 
Sydenham Hospital for examination by Dr Hersch, a specialist.60 It was only Kentridge's cross-
examination that established why Biko was taken to hospital that night even though Lang and 
Tucker had examined him and made their recommendation about further specialist examination 
in the afternoon- a step to which Goosen had agreed that same afternoon. Goosen testified under 
oath that he had made the decision to have Biko taken to hospital under cover of darkness so that 
he would not be seen by any of the black employees at the hospital. Goosen felt that these 
employees might divulge information about Biko' s condition to the media and to members of 
Biko's family. 61 In order to conceal Biko's injuries as much as possible, only white members of 
the security force were permitted to attend to him. 62 Two black security police, however, did see 
Biko. They were Constables Khotlele and Mozwani63, who helped Biko to balance himself in the 
ward while the white security policeman, Beneke, merely looked on. 64 
58 Inquest, vol3, pp.127-132. 
59 Inquest, vol 3, p.128. 
60 
"Room 619", Frank Talk, vol 1, no 4, September/October 1984, p.l. 
61 Inquest, vol 6, p.384. 
62 Inquest, vol6, pp.384-386. 
63 The researcher was unable to locate the first names of these men in available records. 
64 Inquest, vol 23, p.l726. 
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There is further evidence that attempts were made to keep Biko' s identity and condition secret 
when the specialist ordered a sample of Biko' s blood to be tested at the Institute of Medical 
Research in order to determine whether he suffered from any form of physiological abnormality. 65 
The name on Biko's blood sample was changed to "Stephen Njelo". The Biko family counsel 
discovered this only a day before the medical doctors were to appear in court to be questioned 
about the authenticity of the blood sample. It was found that the name "Biko" had been deleted 
from the blood sample and the name "Njelo" had been written in its place.66 The only explanation 
for this is that one of the security police, Goosen in all probability, had written a fictitious name 
to conceal Biko' s true identity from any of the staff at the Institute of Medical Research. It was 
at this juncture in the trial that Professor Gordon, one of the learned assessors, registered his 
reservations about the ethical probity of the medical doctors who had treated Biko.67 
This was not the first time that the South African government had concealed the identity of top 
activists while they had been under medical treatment. Robert Sobukwe was treated in the same 
way when he had been admitted to the Karl Bremer Hospital in Belville, near Cape Town, for the 
removal of his prostrate gland on 1 February 196 7. His identity was only revealed after he had 
been discharged.68 
65 Inquest, vol 14, p.1033; pp.1100-1105; p.1100. 
66 Inquest, vol14, p.1100. 
67 Inguest, vol22, pp.l615-1619. Although Goosen had hoped that the information about 
Biko's condition would be concealed, speculation implicating the police was rife. (Qaily 
Dispatch, 13 Sept 1977, p.3). Suspicions were also raised by Pityana who commented that the 
doctors were influenced by the police when they decided not to pursue the full truth about 
Biko's death. The doctors were struck off the medical roll about eight years afterwards when 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigated the matter in full. (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, (Cape Town, Juta, 1998), vol4, pp.109-
114. 
68 Pogrund, How Can a Man Die Better, pp.35-40. 
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There is further evidence of an attempt by the police to veil the truth in the announcement, soon 
after Biko' s death, of the minister of police that Biko had refused food for a number of days prior 
to his death and that this had caused his death. It was obvious that the minister's announcement 
had been based on information supplied by the security police. This fabrication was yet another 
attempt to protect the security police proactively against any possible blame for Biko's death. 
Even that evidence which was made available for public examination underscores the falsity of 
the minister's assertion since photographs ofBiko taken immediately after his death show that no 
dehydration of the prisoner had taken place.69 Similarly, police testimony that Biko had not eaten 
since 5 September was a lie in view of the evidence that later came to light, namely that warders 
saw Biko on a number of occasions struggling to feed himself as his condition worsened and he 
became weaker and weaker. 70 
While the "hunger strike" issue demonstrated the heartlessness of the justice system, the fact that 
the security police were able to inflict ultimately fatal injuries on a prisoner in detention and then 
extensively cover their tracks, demonstrates the absolute power which (with the approval of the 
authorities) the security police wielded over political prisoners in detention. Also, the 
prevarication of the authorities in trying to explain Biko's death seriously damaged South Africa's 
international image as they attributed the cause ofBiko' s death, firstly to an alleged hunger strike 
and then, after the post-mortem, to brain injuries. 71 The police were not unsupported in their 
69 Woods, Biko, Plates 32 and 33. 
70 Woods, Biko, p.289. 
71 
"Kruger on Biko: Transcript from a tape recording of the account of the imprisonment, 
treatment and death of Steve Biko given by the Minister of Justice, Mr Kruger, to the 
Congress ofNational Party last Wednesday" Daily Dispatch, 21/09/77 in the South African 
Outlook, Volume 107, September 1977 pp.142-143. 
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attempts to cover their tracks after Biko' s death. They implicated the doctors who dealt with Biko 
in their cover-up, and the relationship between the police and doctors is the subject of the 
following subsection. 
Conspiracy between the police and the doctors 
A certain amount of chilling evidence exists which suggests that the long-standing relationship 
that existed between the security police and medical doctors who cared for political detainees was 
so close that the latter ignored their professional ethics and obligations towards patients in their 
dealings with detainees- Biko in particular. Because of this state of affairs, conspiracy between 
security and state doctors became inevitable. 72 The following points substantiate the existence of 
collusion and conspiracy between medical practitioner and police and they explain why Biko died 
partly as a result of gross medical negligence and the unethical behaviour of the physicians who 
were primarily responsible for his well-being . 
As the police began to realise that Biko was acting abnormally, as a result of the head injury, they 
summoned the district surgeon, Dr Lang, to examine him. Instead of allowing Lang independently 
to reach his own conclusions about Biko' s condition, Goosen intervened with medically irrelevant 
perceptions of his own about Bike's condition. He emphasised to Lang the fact that Biko had 
been a medical student for four years and was therefore expert in feigning illness.73 In Goosen's 
view, as expressed to Lang, Biko's extremely grave condition was only a figment oftheprisoner's 
imagination and nothing other than pretence. Goosen also told Lang that Biko was a political 
72 Inquest, vol 5, pp.313-314. 
73 Inquest, vollO, pp.707-708. See also, Bizos, No One to Blame, p.64. 
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activist who was liable to become aggressive when confronted with the suggestion that he had 
been implicated in subversive acts. It is clear that Goosen's unwarranted and emphatic 
interference in the doctor-patient relationship was deliberately intended to intimidate Lang into 
believing that Biko was undeserving of proper medical attention at the very moment when Biko 
was most critically in need of proper medical care. 74 
Biko was thus degraded to subhuman status by agreement between a policeman and a doctor. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Lang permitted himself to examine Biko in an 
ordinary clerical office and not in a medical consulting room. Lang examined Biko in Room 619 
in the Sanlam Building- the same room in which the interrogations ofBiko had taken place. Lang 
examined Biko on a mat, the same mat which served as Biko's bed.75 Furthermore, Biko was 
examined in the presence of Goosen, thus negating the privacy and confidentiality which is an 
indispensable part of the doctor-patient relationship. But Goosen's presence was quite deliberate, 
for, if he had left the office during the examination, it is highly probable that Biko would have told 
Lang about how he had been assaulted during interrogation, just as he had told the magistrate on 
2 September about the unfair treatment he had been subjected to at Walmer police station. 76 
Conspiracy between Goosen and Lang is further demonstrated by the fact that Goosen requested 
Lang to issue the certificate on 7 September. The certificate itself was a tissue of lies and 
evasions. In his examination, Lang noticed that Biko' s ankles and wrists were swollen, that part 
of his lip was cut and that his chest was bruised, but no mention of these conditions were made 
74 Inquest, vollO, p.718. Also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, 
vol4, pp.lll-116. 
75 Inquest, vollO, p.717. 
76 Inquest, voll, p.49. 
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in the certificate. 77 Moreover, the certificate indicated that the doctor was called to check on the 
patient who refused to talk, whereas the affidavit which was prepared after Biko' s death indicated 
that Goosen called Lang to treat Biko because he suspected that Biko might have suffered a 
stroke. 78 It is thus clear that the issuing of a certificate was intended only to be used to exonerate 
, 
the police from all blame for Biko's death. If the certificate had reflected the truth about Biko's 
condition, then the security police who detained him (Goosen chief among them) could not have 
been accused of torturing and assaulting Biko while he was in detention. 79 
The police feared that Biko would bring charges of torture against them ifhe ever managed to get 
out of detention alive. In such an eventuality, Dr Lang's certificate would have constituted 
acceptable evidence against such claims and would have helped to refute all charges against them. 
Even the fact that Biko' s blood sample was free to be tampered with (as was related earlier in this 
chapter), suggests that Lang and Tucker preferred to turn the blind eye, thus allowing Goosen's 
point of view to prevail in all situations where an ordinary doctor would have taken responsibility. 
That the name was able to be falsified on Biko's blood sample also demonstrates the extent of 
conspiracy between Biko's doctors and the security police80 - which is exactly what BCM 
activists (lllaku Rachidi81 in particular) had believed all along, and which they had emphasised at 
Biko's funeral. Biko's blood sample was not accompanied by the required medical signature, 
which suggests that even the doctors hoped that they might, in the event of trouble, escape from 
77 Pityana, Bounds of Possibility, p.82. 
78 Inquest, vollO, p.705. 
79 Berstein, no. 46 Steve Biko, p.77. Also Inquest, vol 10, p.703. 
80 House of Assembly Debates, vol 74, columns 7081-7096. 
81 Unisa Archives, Documentation Centre for African Studies, Hlaku Kenneth Rachidi, 
"Tribute to Steve Biko- King Williamstown, 22-9-77", pp.1-3. 
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being held responsible for their actions. 82 Gluckman's opinion is that the security police had even 
infiltrated the laboratory where Bike's blood specimen was kept, without Hersch's knowledge. 
(Gluckman passed this information on to Helen Suzman, a member of the Progressive Party, 
which was vehemently opposed to the National Party.)83 
Tucker allowed himself to be used by police when he agreed to permit Biko, who by then was in 
a semi-coma and medically in an extremely grave situation, to be transported from Port Elizabeth 
to Pretoria .in the back of a Land Rover without any normal amenities or facilities for someone 
in a critical condition. Initially, Goosen had promised that Biko would be transported by 
ambulance after he had failed to secure military transport. 84 Even more disturbing was the fact that 
Biko was given blankets for his bed and another blanket for a pillow. In addition the doctor in 
charge did not ensure that the patient was accompanied by a medical report. Instead Tucker 
instructed the policeman, Major Fischer, to ask the district surgeon in Pretoria to telephone him. 
This action confirms the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's later findings that when a patient 
was a detainee, he or she was not accorded the same rights and consideration as were other 
prisoners, since detainees were regarded as enemies of the state. 85 The absence of a medical report 
made it difficult for the district surgeon in Pretoria to diagnose Biko' s condition. As a result, he 
had to rely on information given to him by the security policemen, Wilkens, Siebert and Fouche, 
who had accompanied Biko on the long trip from Port Elizabeth. They told him that Biko was on 
82 Inquest, vol20, pp.l472-1473. 
83 Inquest, vol21, p.l504. Also Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms, p.225. Gluckman 
knew that Suzman would raise this explosive information in parliament to expose the torture 
and murder of detainees in prisons. Gluckman's act particularly angered the minister of police, 
Jimmy Kruger. 
84 Inquest, vol13, pp.915-927; p.933; p.388. 
85 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, vol4, p.IIS. 
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a hunger strike. 86 On the grounds ofthis information, Biko was administered vitamin B complex 
and was put on a drip. 87 
If the doctor had acted independently of police influence and pressure, then he would have 
insisted that Biko be transferred to the Port Elizabeth provincial hospital where there were 
sufficient facilities. Under cross-examination, both Lang and Tucker pointed out that Goosen had 
emphasised the importance of taking Biko to the military hospital because he was a security risk. 
This policy was applied to many prisoners in detention. 88 The real reason why Biko was 
transferred to Pretoria, and not treated in the Port Elizabeth provincial hospital or in a local 
private hospital in Port Elizabeth, was that the police knew that Biko was an eminent figure in the 
Eastern Cape and was therefore easily identifiable, whereas fewer people would recognise him 
instantly in Pretoria. This move was therefore designed to conceal his identity. 
All available evidence thus points to extreme negligence and dereliction of duty on the part ofthe 
doctors as they willingly deferred to and conspired with the police. The extent of their negligence 
is probably better documented than is that of the police because of the willingness of Gluckman 
to reveal information which damaged the reputation ofthe doctors and because Professor Gordon 
was able to ask technically relevant medical questions which no ordinary lay person could have 
asked. It was because of this revelation of irregularities and negligence that an appeal to 
investigate the matter further was made. Because of this outcry, the magistrate, Marthinus Prins, 
86 Inquest, vol23, pp.1704-1709. 
87 Inquest, vol 20, p.1449. 
88 Inquest, vol13, pp.919-991. Also, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, vol5, 
pp.250-251. 
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referred portions of the inquest record to the South African Medical and Dental Council 
(SAMDC). 89· 
A team, chaired by the then president of the SAMDC, was appointed to investigate these 
allegations of misconduct. 90 Initially, the liberal establishment expected that the investigating team 
would be impartial in getting to the truth of the matter since the SAMDC was a statutory body 
theoretically independent of government pressure and intervention. 91 Liberals became suspicious 
when the team seemed to be delaying investigations. Finally it was established that all members 
of the investigating team, except one Pieter Schutte, were government appointees.92 Because 
government appointees were investigating the case, it took many years before it was finally 
resolved. The liberal press of the time records that the investigating team failed to act with any 
expedition, even though they were pressured by the World Medical Association, because the 
government interfered to protect the team. 93 Also, the importance of the magistrate's decision to 
send portions of the record of the inquest to the SAMDC was reflected by the way in which this 
move on Prins's part was well received by members of the South African medical profession, 
some of whom joined in the chorus of criticism of the doctors involved. They called for further 
investigation into the doctors' conduct. 94 A number of individuals and groups within the medical 
89 
"Magistrate acts on Biko doctors", Rand Daily Mail, 7 Jan 1978. See also Sunday 
Times, 15 July 1979. 
90 
"Action against Biko's doctors?", Cape Argus, 2 May 1978, p.l. 
91 
"Probe on Biko's doctors", Cape Argus, 15 April1980, p.3. 
92 
"Angry Medical men ask: How did this finding get out? Biko doctors: Blazing row looms", 
Sunday Express, 27 April 1980, p.l. 
93 
"State may take legal action if medical men pursue inquiry" in Sunday Tribute, 29 
October 1978, p.3. 
94 
"Biko: old wounds re-opened", The Daily News, 1 May 1980, p.27. 
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profession, in and around Johannesburg in particular, proposed the expulsion of the doctors 
concemed.95 
The most prominent organisation to react to the conduct of the doctors, as it was revealed by the 
inquest, was the South African Council of Churches (SACC). The SACC was the first liberal 
organisation to register its concern and pleaded with the South African Medical and Dental 
Council to speed up the investigation. In fact, the ombudsman for the SACC, Eugene Roelofse, 
pursued the matter by following the progress of the Council's investigation.% Apart from the fact 
that the SACC was a progressive organisation, and hence was interested in Biko' s case (as it had 
been in previous related cases where the violation of human rights had taken place), there were 
also other reasons why this organisation prioritised this issue. 97 By 1977 the SACC had a number 
of influential Africans, some of them in leadership positions, in its ranks. Some of these Africans 
were associates ofBiko, and had shared the same platform with him during conferences hosted 
by the Black Consciousness Movement. Their presence as members of the SACC had given the 
organisation a direction which differed slightly from the direction which it had previously had. The 
SACC had tended to be more politically oriented after the mid 1970s. 98 It was more interested in 
political issues and less in ecclesiastical ones as it realised that the racial divisions imposed by 
churches were in line with the government's political policies. 
95 
"Action against Biko's doctors?", Cape Argus, 2 May 1978, p.l. 
96 
"Man ofMostert's calibre needed in Biko inquiry- Roelofse", Cape Times, 16 Nov 1978, 
p.S. 
97 Hans Brandt (ed.), Outside the Camp: A Collection ofWritings by Wolfram Kristner 
(Johannesburg, South African Council of Churches), p.145. 
98 Philippe Denis (ed.), Facing the Crisis: Selected Texts of Archbishop D.E. Hurley 
(Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications, 1997), pp.192-197. See also Cuthbertson, Greg, 
"Christians and Structural Violence in South Africa in the 1970s", in Vorster, W.S. (ed.), 
Views on Violence (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 1986). 
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Finally, the conduct of the doctors in particular prompted a radical response from Amnesty 
International, which criticised all the proceedings. This organisation sent a threatening letter to 
Professor Gordon, South Africa's chief state pathologist, who had been an important assessor 
during the inquest. He was held responsible for the acquittal of the doctors. It was Amnesty 
International's expectation that Gordon would lead all cross-examination related to medical 
questions, a normal requirement ofinternationallaw.99 
In conclusion, one should note that there was no proper response in spite of all the protests . 
against the conduct of the doctors. The protests, however, did serve to keep the Biko issue alive 
for decades to come, both in South Africa and internationally. 
The campaign to discredit Biko 
Most of the evidence led by the state was intended to demonstrate that Biko was a violent man 
at the head of an organisation committed to the violent overthrow of the state. It was for this 
reason that Biko, together with Peter Jones, was arrested at a road block on their return to the 
Eastern Cape from Cape Town on 18 August 1977. A great deal of evidence given by police who 
interrogated Biko in detention testified that he had been involved in planning and writing a. 
pamphlet which was being distributed around the black townships of Port Elizabeth on the very 
day that he was arrested. 100 It was alleged that Biko had confessed to being responsible for the 
99 
"Torture allegations scandalous- Kruger. Last word on Biko- nobody criminally 
responsible", Citizen, 18 May 1978. 
100 Inquest, vol 5, pp.229-230. 
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pamphlet after he had been confronted with written statements from his associates, Patrick Titi 
and Jones, who were also implicated in the planning and distribution of the pamphlet.101 However, 
it was only much later, during the court proceedings, that it became evident that Biko could not 
have made any such confession concerning the pamphlet. The alleged statements were in fact 
written after Biko' s death. Titi was forced to write an affidavit on 16 September 1977 while Jones 
was forced to write one on 20 September 1977. 102 The truth of the matter emerged under oath 
when Warrant Officer W. 0. Beneke testified, under pressure from the Biko family counse~ that ·. · 
the security police had invented the story that Biko had actually confessed to writing and · 
disseminating the pamphlee03 
The Cape Town visit was unrelated to the matter of the pamphlet. Chapter four has already 
analysed in detail the reason for Bike's Cape Town visit: he was attempting to resolve a dispute 
between members of BC and a non-aligned group. The allegation that Jones had written an' 
affidavit implicating Biko was also untrue. After his release from detention in February 1979, 
Jones revealed that Biko had had no knowledge ofthe pamphlet. The only event which could have 
been connected to the pamphlet was that 18 August was the first anniversary of the student 
uprising in the townships of Port Elizabeth. The pamphlet might have been issued by students or : 
by unidentified operatives of the state who worked with the South African Security Poli~ 
(BOSS), which was, at that time, infiltrating BC by planting spies in the organisation.104 Asha 
Moodley was another close associate offiiko who disputed that the pamphlet originated from BC. 
Since Moodley worked in the printing department, she would have known if the organisation had 
101 
"Biko riot men still not charged", Sunday Express, 13 Aug 1978, p.7. 
102 Inquest, vol4, pp171-172. 
103 Inquest, vol24, pp.l973-1973. 
104 Woods, Biko, pp.377-398. 
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printed such a pamphlet. 105 The pamphlet episode serves to demonstrate the extent to which the 
police were prepared to go to discredit Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement. 
Calling Major Hansen of King William's Town to testify during the inquest shows the extent to 
which the authorities were prepared to go to depict Biko as a violent man dedicated to 
revolutionary action. The state's argument continually emphasised that Biko was a violent person 
and that his violence manifested itself when he was under pressure. 106 Hansen related a story in 
which he alleged that, while Biko was detained at King William's Town in 1975, he assaulted 
Warrant Officer Hattingh without any provocation. He also related a series of events which 
allegedly took place between 197 5 and 1977. The thrust of these allegations was that Biko had 
behaved violently towards police authorities. 107 Hansen's evidence supported police allegations 
that Biko had assaulted Warrant Officer Beneke on the 7 September 1977 during an interrogation. 
Overall, however, his testimony did not prove that Biko was a habitually violent man. The counsel 
for the Biko family was more plausible in its assertion that the police conducted a deliberate 
campaign over a long period to smear Biko's name and caricature him as a violent individual. 
Even so, one cannot rule out the possibility that there had been an exchange ofblows between the 
security police and Biko in Room 619 in the Sanlam Building in Port Elizabeth during the 
interrogation process. 
It is highly probable that either Biko was unresponsive to police questions or that (being as 
intelligent as he was) he ran circles around his interrogators and that either or both of these factors 
105 Ernest Messina, Private Collection, University of the Western Cape. Quoted from 
Messina's transcript interview with Asha Moodley (Durban, 10 July 1992), p.22. 
106 Inquest, vol 5, p.294. 
107 Inquest, vol 5, pp.288-293. 
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infuriated them to such an extent that they attacked him physically in various ways and that he 
responded in kind. Clearly the police were not used to an African who was able to answer all their 
questions with a lucidity and reasonableness which they themselves could not muster. Also, they 
were completely unaccustomed to an African who "answered back". Wood argues that Biko's 
brilliance and the power of his personality must have so humiliated and angered the police that, 
out of sheer fiustration, they more or less lost whatever self-control they might have possessed 
and assaulted him gravely - without realising the gravity of the consequences that might ensue 
for themselves. 108 
The extent ofthe police campaign, and of Goosen's campaign in particular, to discredit Biko was 
such that they had minutely detailed Biko' s alleged personal history and an account ofhis political 
activities to the doctors with the purpose of co-opting the doctors into cooperating with their 
purposes. In this they were successful. They discredited Biko to such an extent in the eyes of the 
doctors that they thereafter regarded Biko as some kind of dangerous subhuman creature, 
undeserving of ordinary human compassion. Thus it was that the doctors failed to note Bijco's 
earlier injuries, including the swelling caused by the chains on his wrists and ankles. They were 
clearly not appalled when they noticed that Biko's urine had soaked into his blankets and trousers. 
Nor did they challenge police testimony that Biko had sat in a bath of water with his clothes on. 109 
This catalogue of cumulative negligence demonstrates that the doctors collaborated to such an 
extent with the police that they lost or willingly surrendered all independent judgement. They, like 
108 Donald Woods, "No matter who beat Biko to death, Kruger and Vorster were to 
blame", Sunday Independent, 12 September 1977, p.11. 
109 Inquest, vol 24, p.l756. 
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the security police with whom they conspired, regarded Biko as an enemy of the state, as a 
terrorist who did not deserve to be treated like a patient. They had realised that, should they 
succeed in breaking him down and discrediting him, they might succeed in their larger aim of 
destroying the entire Black Consciousness Movement. If they had succeeded in breaking his spirit, 
they might have been able to use him for propaganda purposes in attempting to demoralise other 
activists who were still engaged in political activities. 
Thus the main aim ofBiko's torture and interrogation was to humiliate and discredit him, and so 
break his determination and resolve. When they failed in that, they attempted to use the inquest 
to discredit Biko after his death by portraying him as a violent and unstable man. They also used 
this state-generated fantasy as the pretext for banning a number of individuals, organisations and 
publications a month after Biko' s death and three weeks before the commencement of the inquest 
on 14 November 1977. Those banned in this way on 19 October 1977 were the entire Black 
Consciousness Movement; its associate organisations, the liberal Christian Institute together with 
its magazine Pro Veritate; prominent members ofBC; the members of the Soweto Committee of 
Ten; some executive members of the Black Journalists; the editor ofthe World, including the 
newspaper itself; and the Weekend World. 
What have I tried to demonstrate in this chapter is that the inquest that followed Biko's death 
represented a climax in the symbiotic and cooperative relationship between white liberals (both 
local and international) and the man who had been the founder of the Black Consciousness 
Movement in South Africa. It was Biko's death in detention and the subsequent inquest 
(unsatisfactory though it was) that brought the harsh realities of racial suppression in South Africa 
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to the attention of the whole world for the first time in way that it was impossible to ignore. My 
main contention in this chapter has been that if it not been for the part played by white liberals, 
white liberal organisations, white liberal newspapers, the murder of one of South Africa's most 
distinguished political activists and thinkers might have remained forever obscured by the 
suppressive security apparatus of the apartheid government. It that had happened, the liberation 
struggle for which Biko lived and died might have been indefinitely retarded. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE LffiERAL REACTION TO THE BIKO INQUEST 
In this chapter, the role played by the white liberal press and the white liberal opposition in 
parliament will be analysed in detail, and the outrage, indignation and protest of the international 
community as it reacted to the findings of the· inquest, will be discussed. 
While the press in general voiced various opinions about the revelations issuing from the inquest, 
callous remarks made by minister of justice, police and prisons, Jimmy Kruger, about the 
circumstances which led to Biko' s death and verdict itself echoed around the world. Some 
newspapers of the time, such as the Citizen1, received financial assistance from the government, 
and the pro-establishment Afrikaans newspapers such as Beeld and Rapport, which routinely 
supported and defended government policies, found themselves in something of a dilemma when 
faced with the issues surrounding Biko. It was clear enough to anyone that evidence given during 
the court proceedings implicated employees of the government. If the South African press 
subscribed to a culture of editorial independence then, irrespective of where their party loyalties 
lay, they would have had to have been critical of the government. Far from being independent, 
pro-government newspapers attempted either to take a neutral stand or to denounce members of 
the liberal establishment whom, they felt, were insufficiently patriotic to protect South Africa 
1 Elspeth Rosemary McKenzie, "The relationship between the Progressive Federal Party, 
the English language press and business, with special reference to the 1983 referendum", 
MA dissertation. (Pretoria, University of South Africa, November 1992), p.l61. 
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against international criticism. 2 Ironically, however, these very newspapers contributed to keeping 
the discussion alive because, the more they defended the government's position, the more appalled 
were the liberal press which, in turn, searched for more and more information to discredit such 
a defence.3 
The entire Biko issue was kept alive by consistent reporting by members of the liberal English-
speaking press throughout the country. Their criticisms were mainly directed against the 
government, its inability or unwillingness to take action against the police in whose custody Biko 
had died, the manner in which evidence was concealed in order to avoid the prosecution of those 
who might have been implicated, and their refusal to probe more deeply into the whole affair.4 
Liberal extra-parliamentary organisations such as the Black Sash, the South African Institute of 
Race Relations and the South African Council of Churches, rallied together to challenge the 
government with regard to the role which it had played. These organisations were supported in 
their efforts by the official opposition party in the House of Assembly, the Progressive Federal 
Party. 
Before attempting to delineate the role played by the liberal English-speaking press, I shall first 
describe the circumstances in which the liberal press found itself to be solely responsible for the 
coverage of the Biko saga within South Africa. When the two popular newspapers for black 
readers, the World and the Weekend World, were banned on 19 October 1977, only the liberal 
2 Citizen, 2 Feb 1978, p.6. See also Citizen, 3 Feb 1978. 
3 
"World won't forget Biko - Suzman11 , Cape Argus, 18 May 1978, p.1. 
4 Rand Daily Mail, 1 Feb 1978, pp.1-3. See also Post, 7 Feb 1978. 
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press was left to report those issues for which these two newspapers had been banned. It is 
important to remember at this stage that, because of the monopoly of two newspaper publishing 
companies, the Argus Group and South African Associated Newspapers (SAAN), there existed 
no black press in South Africa in terms ofblack ownership and staff. Both the World and the 
Weekend World were usually referred to as "black" newspapers. This was because the staff of 
these papers each included Africans who were assigned to report issues of interest and relevance 
to a black readership. Because their content pertained to relevant black issues, African patronage 
of the two newspapers increased, and they became even more popular when reporting critical 
political events began to supersede the space allocated to sport and crime from about the early 
1970s. This trend was given momentum when Percy Qoboza replaced Manas Moerane as its 
editor. Because of the pervasive influence of the Black Consciousness Movement, which 
dominated the interpretation of politics among black South Mricans, Qoboza, as a BC 
sympathiser, was ideally suited to be the editor ofboth the World and the Weekend World. It was 
because of Qoboza's influence that the style and content of reporting in the two newspapers 
changed. Political reporting occupied more and more space in the columns of these newspapers, 
and circulation improved to a point where, when they were finally banned altogether, they had the 
second largest circulation in South Africa, namely about 146 000 readers per day. 5 
When the crackdown on the BCM finally came on 19 October 1977, a large number of activists 
were detained. A total of 62 detainees were held under section ten of the security act. This meant 
that the state believed that it was necessary to detain them so as to avoid the spread of violence 
in the country. 6 Most of these detainees were not even members of the BCM. The majority were 
5 Carolyn Dempstar. "Ideological unity is far from dead." Star, 19 Sept 1981, p.21. 
6 
"The 62 who are held", Daily Dispatch, 20 Feb 1978, p.7. 
307 
members of cultural, welfare, charitable and church groups who were outspoken against 
apartheid. 7 Included among these was Ellen Kuzwayo, who headed the charitable organisation, 
the Young Women Christian Association, for some years. By the time of her arrest she was a 
member of the Soweto Committee ofT en. 8 The remainder of the detainees, estimated at between 
700 and 800, were detained under the various acts which had been designed to control the black 
population, including the notorious section of the security act which denied detainees access to 
any legal representative, a family physician, or visits from family members. 9 
Since all influential black opinion had been deliberately silenced by government crackdown, 
African reaction to Biko 's inquest was virtually non-existent. Africans who might have been 
available to comment were either intimidated by the government crackdown or else they were in 
hiding and so the press had no knowledge of their whereabouts. It is for these reasons that 
reaction to the inquest was reported solely from the point of view of the liberal press who, 
through their special township editors, became, to some extent, surrogate reporters on matters 
of vital interest to black readers. 
The two most important South African newspapers to report the Biko affair were the East 
London-based Daily Dispatch and the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail. The reasons for this were 
as follows. Both papers had had liberal-minded editors in the late 1960s. The Rand Daily Mail had 
Benjamin Pogrund and Alister Sparks, while the Daily Dispatch was edited by Donald Woods 
7 Francis Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC (Harare, Zimbabwe 
Publishing House, 1988), p.180. 
8 Ellen Kuzwayo, Call Me Woman (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986), p.222. 
9 
"Biko Confession:- no charges against two detainees", Sunday Express, 20 Apr 1978, p.3. 
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until he was forced to quit his position because of his banning on 19 October 1997.10 These 
editors could not have failed to realise the importance of including African political events in their 
coverage as African resistance during this period was gaining momentum. 
A second reason was the relationship which existed at the time between the respective editors of 
the two newspapers and leading black activists - relationships which could not but have 
influenced the two editors. As a reporter in the early 1960s, Benjamin Pogrund was a personal 
friend of the founder member and first president of the Pan Africanist Congress, Robert Sobukwe. 
From the contents of Sobukwe' s biography, which was written by Pogrund, one notices that the 
latter was naive about the effects of apartheid on Africans until he met Sobukwe. It was also 
because of his friendship with Sobukwe that Pogrund started to challenge the apartheid laws, 
using legal procedures such as the writing of letters to the minister of justice. 11 Similar 
circumstances affected Donald Woods. In 1973 he was introduced to Steve Biko by Marnphela 
Ramphele who insisted that Woods, as editor, should give the BCM its own column to enable the 
organisation to propagate its own point of view. Until then only homeland leaders had had the 
opportunity to disseminate their opinions through the medium of the newspaper. 12 As Pogrund 
had written Sobukwe's biography, so Woods published a biography of Steve Biko in 1978. 
It is worth noting that, although the two pairs were devoted and friendly, each pair nevertheless 
had its own agenda. The activists used the advantage of such relationships to disseminate their 
10 Elaine Potter, The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African 
Newspapers (Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), p.158. 
11 Benjamin Pogrund, How Can a Man Die Better: The Life of Robert Sobukwe 
(Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1997), p.117. 
12 Donald Woods, Biko (London, Penguin Books, 1987), p.65. 
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views as widely as possible. On the other hand, by reporting African issues at the time when such 
reporting was rare in most papers, both editors were ultimately recognised for the part they 
played. More importantly the editors represented the white liberal press as the group which 
reported black aspirations. 
The two newspapers took the lead in employing blacks with radical views, either BC sympathisers 
- as in the case of Zwelakhe Sisulu, employed by the Rand Daily Mail, and Thenjiwe Mtintso, 
who was a member of BC before. it was banned. The latter had worked for the Daily Dispatch 
since the mid 1970s. 13 Other black radicals who followed her on the staff of the Daily Dispatch 
were Leslie Xinwa and Wellington Sangotsha. 14 The Johannesburg-based newspaper, the Post, 
was the third largest paper to attract black readers. After the banning of the World and the 
Weekend World, the Post filled the gap for many black readers. The Argus Group introduced a 
new editor for African readers on 30 October 1977. 15 It was logical, therefore, that the Post 
should employ remaining staff members, such as Joe Latakgomo, who had been employees ofthe 
two banned newspapers. 16 Furthermore, both Percy Qoboza and Phil Mthimkhulu, were 
employed by the Post after having served five months in detention. 17 It seems that blacks were 
attracted to the Post because its style of reporting from 30 October 1977 was similar to that of 
both the World and the Weekend World 
13 Daily Dispatch, 3 Mar 1978, p.8. 
14 Daily Dispatch, 15 Aug 1979, p.9. 
15 Les Switzer and Donna Switzer, The Black Press in South Africa and Lesotho: A 
Descriptive Bibliographical Guide to African. Coloured and Indian Newspapers. Newsletter 
and Magazines 1836-1976 (Boston, Massachusetts, G.K. Holl, 1979), p.116. 
16 William A Hachten and Anthony C. Gifford, Total Onslaught: The South African Press 
under Attack (Braarnfontein, MacMillan Publishers, 1984), p.132. 
17 Post, 9 Nov 1979, p.2. 
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The Star was the fourth liberal newspaper to report the Biko affair. The rest of the liberal 
newspapers in South Africa, such as The Natal Witness, The Natal Mercury, and The Eastern 
Cape Herald, reported matters relating to Biko rather perfunctorily. On the whole, the liberal 
press benefited from the banning of the two black newspapers because African readers 
countrywide boosted its circulation figures. 18 
What follows is a discussion of the four main areas in which journalists from the liberal press 
made a contribution towards reporting and keeping the Biko affair alive. Firstly, they focused their 
attention on reporting parliamentary debates in which Biko figured in some way or another. There 
was a legal reason for this. Because of the censorship of information relating to detainees, 
parliament was the only place in which uncensored discussion about the condition of detainees 
could take place. Journalists used this loophole to evade prosecution, and disseminated 
information by simply quoting from the parliamentary record. 19 Secondly, outside parliament, the 
liberal press attempted to keep abreast of developments affecting political detainees in general, 
particularly those who were detained under section six of the terrorism act. They especially 
targeted this group for surveillance because these detainees were denied various basic human 
rights such as visits from next of kin, legal representative or even a family physician. Also, there 
had been a long history of detainees under this act dying in mysterious and unexplained 
circumstances. Biko himself had died while being detained under section six of the security act. 
Journalists merely reported without comment what members of the opposition in parliament said 
about all matters relating to detainees under section six. The third area which was investigated and 
18 House of Assembly Debates, vol 72, p.329. 
19 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1993), p.54. 
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reported by liberal journalists was to be found in the court proceedings throughout the country 
where the cases of the political detainees were heard. 
The impact of parliamentary debates on the Biko inquest 
Political correspondents covered parliamentary debates relating to the Biko incident for the first 
six months of 1978, that is, for the duration of the first session of parliament of 1978. Much of 
what was reported devolved on the National Party's attempts to defend the various roles played 
by its operatives and employees, namely the police and doctors who were accused by the 
opposition of having been responsible for Biko's death. 20 The focus of this attack was Jimmy 
Kruger in his capacity as minister of justice, police and prisons. From the opening of parliament 
in early January, the newspapers reported that Kruger was adamant that the government had done 
everything in its power to find the truth about the circumstances which had led to Biko' s death 
in detention. 21 
Kruger went as far as blaming the legal counsel for the Biko family, led by Kentridge, for 
criticising the police and doctors concerned in spite of the fact that they had, according to him, 
done the best they could after they had discovered that Biko was ilL 22 Thus Kruger, as the .,_ . 
responsible minister, bore the brunt of the liberal newspapers' attacks. It was clear also that the 
newspapers expected Prime Minister John Vorster to act promptly against Kruger, either by 
2
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instructing him to conduct further investigations into the Port Elizabeth security police, or by 
firing him. The prime minister refused to comment on the issue as he believed that the minister 
of justice was fully in control of the situation. 23 Perhaps Vorster reckoned' that the effects of 
sacking Kruger would be more harmful to the government than a determination merely to ride out 
the storm. Biko' s death in detention was a matter of no importance to the majority of white voters 
who were voting at the time for the National Party. Most of them had scarcely ever heard 
anything about Biko or about the Black Consciousness Movement. Those who had heard ofBiko 
dismissed him as an arch revolutionary and agitator who had been misguidedly used by communist· 
instigators whose aim was to overthrow the South African government. 24 
Other important information which was brought to the surface by liberal political journalists 
related to the stand taken by the minister of foreign affairs, R.F. Botha. Unlike the rest ofthe 
National Party cabinet and members of parliament, who remained silent on this issue or who 
defended what the police had done, Botha criticised the minister of justice. He was as appalled 
as were members of the opposition party by Kruger's insensitivity in his handling of the Biko 
affair. Kruger's first statement to the national and international press had stated that Biko had died 
from the effects of a hunger strike. 25 Botha felt that Kruger should have verified the authenticity 
of this information before issuing a press statement. (This statement was soon afterwards retracted 
in another statement by Kruger.) 
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Botha believed that false information such as this could only materially and diplomatically harm 
South Africa's standing with the Western powers who were supporting South Africa. He feared 
that the West would terminate its relationship with South Africa because of the way in which 
Kruger was handling the situation.Z6 Botha was the only person in the National Party cabinet to 
criticise his colleague (indirectly thereby supporting the opposition party). This was perhaps a 
unique event inside a party which tended to stand united, especially when under pressure. 
Before being nominated to the post of foreign minister, Botha had worked for some time in the 
United States as the South African ambassador before being recalled at the end of 1977. He had 
therefore been exposed to representatives from other countries, many of whom were at liberty to 
express independent opinions rather than to follow a party line. His experiences in the United 
States must have affected him to some extent. His interpretation of the Biko affair was clearly 
different from that of the majority of ordinary white South Africans whose opinions were 
decidedly conservative, especially in any matter relating to racial issues. An important point worth 
emphasising is that Botha was chiefly concerned that Kruger's mishandling of the Biko case could 
seriously harm South Africa's relations with the West. He was less concerned about establishing 
proper relationships with black South Africans as a way of minimising the racial tensions which 
had been engendered by Biko' s death in detention. His main concern was to preserve intact the 
artificially high standards ofliving enjoyed by white South Africans, and, in his view, the only way 
to accomplish this was by ensuring that South Africa would not become the target of Western 
economic and diplomatic sanctions. 
26 
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While Kruger was, by his own admission, unmoved by Biko' s death at the beginning of the 
parliamentary session in January of 1978, he was, after wave upon wave ofhostile criticism had 
washed over him and over the government in the months that followed, eventually mortified and 
subdued. Towards the end of that first parliamentary session, in May, he was no longer as 
aggressive and arrogant about the issue as he had been at the beginning. He changed his tack and 
adopted a more conciliatory attitude by acknowledging some errors of judgement by both the 
police and the doctors in their treatment of the deceased. 27 He conceded that he had been 
emotional during the opening of the parliament. He took the initiative in ordering a clarification 
of issues which were still of central concern and which had not been resolved. He demanded to 
know why he had not been informed about Biko' s changing condition. He also wanted to know 
why Biko was transferred to the Pretoria Prison Hospital when he should clearly have been 
treated at the Port Elizabeth provincial hospital instead. 28 
Thus it was that the liberal press gave as much exposure to the Biko affair as they were able to 
do within the strictures of the law. The National Party in the meantime had failed to defend itself 
convincingly against allegations ofthe legalised torture and murder of an innocent man. With this 
in mind, one might say that liberal journalists were instrumental in informing the South African 
community at large about all debates in parliament which touched upon the Biko affair. These 
same journalists may be credited for the significant role that they played in putting pressure on a 
recalcitrant and arrogant government at a time when all radical black voices within South Africa 
had been effectively silenced. 
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The monitoring of political detainees 
While the political correspondents in parliament covered all questions and debates which had any 
bearing on Biko, others from the liberal newspapers drew the public's attention to the plight of 
political detainees. A number of these detainees were Biko's associates. By reporting on the 
whereabouts of detainees, the conditions under which they lived and the various laws under which 
they were detained, the liberal press continued to expose the degrading and inhuman treatment 
to which detainees were exposed as the emergency regulations were applied. Also, by reporting 
the plight of detainees who were associates ofBiko, newspapers were indirectly keeping the Biko 
affair under discussion. 
As I have already indicated, a large number ofblacks were arrested and detained in October 1977. 
Although they were imprisoned all over the country, most were incarcerated in the Transvaal and 
the Eastern Cape, where BC was most active and from where most of the leadership came. For 
the same reason, reporters most frequently visited and reported on detainees in these two 
provinces, and it follows therefore that the Rand Daily Mail, the Post, the Star and the Daily 
Dispatch were leaders in reporting about detainees. The first three in this list of papers reported 
on detainees in the Transvaal, especially those at Modder Bee prison where the key figures in BC 
and other BC sympathisers were detained. The Daily Dispatch reported on detainees in prisons 
in and around Port Elizabeth, King William's Town and Grahamstown. The prison in Port 
Elizabeth accommodated prisoners held under section six of the security act, while those who 
were held under section ten were imprisoned in Grahamstown prison. Those held under section 
ten of the act were at least allowed visits from an attorney and a member of the family, while 
those held under section six of the act had no such access. Because of this contravention ofthe 
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normal human rights of prisoners, and the absence of proper safeguards, the prison in Port 
Elizabeth acquired the sinister reputation of being a place where the rights of political activists 
were seriously violated during the 1970s. Soon after Biko was detained on 18 August 1977, many 
of his close associates who had worked with him at Zanempilo Centre were detained on 26 
August 1977. These included people such as Thami Zani, the Black People's Convention's 
publicity secretary, Noble Mohapi, and Asha Rambally-Moodley, the editor ofBlack Viewpoint, 
later known as Black Review. 29 
The above-mentioned activists, all of whom were detained under section six, were detained on 
the pretext ofhaving been involved in the production and distribution of the pamphlet which had 
been issued in Port Elizabeth on 18 August 1977. After the police had interrogated Patrick Titi 
and Peter Jones and their investigations had run into obstacles, they hoped that they would be able 
to get more information about the pamphlet from Zani and associates. More detentions took place 
after Biko' s death. Ray Magida, chairman of the local branch ofBPC, and Fikile Mlinda, the field 
worker for the Zemele Trust Fund, were detained three days after Biko's death.30 It seems that 
the authorities hoped to sabotage Biko' s funeral arrangements by these detentions. The two were 
reported to have been part of the committee which was arranging Biko's funeral. 
Thus, by the end of September 1977, most of the BC activists were in prison. The police 
crackdown on BC-related organisations and one of its supportive liberal organisations, the 
Christian Institute, on the 19 October, mainly affected the leadership of these organisations and 
29 Daily Dispatch, 16 September 1978, p.9. 
30 Daily Dispatch, 16 September 1979, p.9. 
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sympathisers who were based mostly in the Transvaal but also in other areas, such as Natal and 
Western Cape. In the Transvaal, most of the detainees who were detained on 19 October were 
held under section ten of the security act. The reasons why they were detained under section ten, 
which was considered to be a less draconian provision than section six, was that section ten 
permitted prisoners to receive visitors, but, more importantly, it allowed the police to detain even 
when no act of violence or intimidation had been committed. 
Some of these detainees were internationally known figures because Biko's death had been 
extensively reported abroad, especially in those Western countries on which South Africa 
traditionally relied for material and diplomatic support. The government could not afford to detain 
them under section six, the infamous provision under which so many people had been killed while 
in detention. Some of these detainees were prominent figures in their own right, such as Kenith 
Rachidi, president of BPC, Qoboza, editor of the World and recipient of Harvard's Nieman 
Fellowship for Journalism, Aggrey Klaaste, deputy editor ofthe World, Nthato Motlana, chairman 
of the Soweto Committee ofTen, Kuzwayo, general secretary for the Young Women's Christian 
Association and a member of the Committee ofTen,31 Aubrey Mokoena, executive member of 
BPC and the Committee ofTen, and Debora Matshoba, also a member ofBPC. 
The two groups of political detainees who were monitored and which I will discuss below, are 
those who were detained between 26 August and 25 September 1977, and those who were 
detained on 19 October 1977. A constant monitoring of detainees was maintained by the liberal 
press working in conjunction with extra-parliamentary liberal organisations such as the Institute 
31 Kuzwayo, Call me Woman, p.222. 
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ofRace Relations, the Black Sash and the Urban Foundation, which was founded in November 
1976?2 The names of detainees were frequently published in various newspapers and there was 
speculation about their condition. It was because of such constant public reminders in newspapers 
about the identities and condition of detainees that the government decided to transfer all political 
prisoners who had been arrested and detained in 1977 in Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown. This 
took place early in 1978. Those who were transferred included Asha Rambally-Moodley, Ray 
Magida, Fikile Mlinda, Barney Pityana, Nohle Mohapi, Nosipho Keti and Xoliswa Ngabeni- all 
re-detained under section ten. 33 
The motive which the police had for initially detaining all of them in Port Elizabeth, apart from 
the fact that the security police wanted them to be near the place where Biko was detained on 18 
August 1977, was that the place was known for its ruthless treatment of detainees. By detaining 
them in Port Elizabeth when they (apart from Pityana) had come from King William's Town, the 
security police hoped to dissuade BCM members at large from continuing with any forms of 
political activism. The implicit threat was that they might end up joining their colleagues in the 
notorious Port Elizabeth Walmer police station.34 The brutality which characterised the Port 
Elizabeth security police was not out of line with the attitudes of most of the white community 
in the Eastern Cape. Port Elizabeth had long been an ultra-conservative community in which both 
English and Afrikaans-speaking people still believed in the superiority of whites over blacks. As 
a counterpart, African nationalism was so powerful that the two races were bound to clash. 35 
32 Ibid, p.204. 
33 Daily Dispatch, 16 Sept 1979, p.9. 
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The Transvaal liberal newspapers mainly reported on detainees at the Modder Bee prison, 
although they occasionally covered the plight of detainees in other prisons. Newspapers probably 
concentrated their attention on Modder Bee prison because it was there that members of the 
Soweto Committee ofTen were detained. The Transvaal newspapers used the same tactics which 
were used in the Eastern Cape, namely to publish the names of detainees in articles. Percy Qoboza 
received more coverage than his co-detainees. It did not come as a surprise therefore when 
Qoboza was amongst the first group of detainees to be released in March 1978, after he had been 
in prison for five months. 36 
Although the liberal press had pressurised the government to either charge or release detainees, 
Qoboza' s release might have been precipitated by pressure from outside South Africa. As I have 
already pointed out earlier, Qoboza had been a recipient of Harvard's prestigious Nieman 
* 
Fellowship for Journalism and the directors of the fellowship were concerned about his safety. 
Because Biko' s affair was still fresh, the United States government applied pressure on the South 
African government to guarantee Qoboza's safety. Notwithstanding the fact that the justice 
department had assured the USA of Qoboza' s safety, he received only two visits from a USA 
consular official, Richard Stemple, who was based in Johannesburg, on 31 October 1977 and on 
19 December 1977. 37 This pressure from the United States influenced the department of prisons 
to be lenient on Qoboza because he was reported to have had a radio, something which was 
unheard of for other detainees who could only receive letters and reading materials on a daily 
basis. 38 It was also unusual for the minister of justice to visit a particular detainee. However, due 
36 
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to pressure from the USA government, the minister of justice, police and prisons, Kruger, visited 
Qoboza only a week before his release. 39 This ministerial visit also served as a publicity exercise 
on the part of the government who wished the international community to believe that prisoners 
were being well cared for. This was especially demonstrated when Kruger later made a press 
statement to foreign journalists after his visit to Qoboza. 
Another way in which the liberal press informed the public about the cruelty of the South African 
security police was by publishing the names of those detainees who had died in detention at 
various prisons within the country. This information also served to indict the government for its 
negligence with regard to the safety of political detainees. 4° Furthermore, the South African 
Institute ofRace Relations working in conjunction with the Detainee Parents Support Committee, 
compiled a list of detainees who had been killed between 1963 and 1977. The highest mortality 
was recorded in 1976, when thirteen died, and in 1977, with fourteen deaths reported.41 
Apparently, the same list was smuggled out of South Africa and was recorded in the files of the 
International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF). 
The largest number of detainees were killed during 197 6 and 1977 when the activities of the Black 
Consciousness Movement were at their height. This seems to suggest that the security police were 
unable to cope with the pressure of keeping the whole country under control, and so vented their 
frustration and brutality by murdering detainees and then inventing spurious stories which 
"explained" these "mysterious" killings. It is worth noting that only one person died after Biko in 
39 The Cape Times, 3 Mar 1978. 
40 
"Detainee in death plunge", Daily Dispatch, 11 Jul 1978, p.11. 
41 
"Thermometer ofjustice: mystery of dead detainees", Star, 11 Mar 1982. See also Meli, 
South Africa Belongs to Us, p.178. 
321 
November 1977, and this took place in 1978. This demonstrates the impact ofthe inquest into 
Biko's death and the restraining effect which the coverage from the liberal press had on the 
security police. 
Coverage of the court proceedings 
The liberal press also focused their scrutiny on the various regional courts where the cases of 
political detainees were being prosecuted. It was clear from the outset of the inquest that the 
security police and doctors who were the principal state witnesses were lying and falsifying 
evidence. If state witnesses were able to fabricate evidence for the Biko inquest, which had 
attracted a vast audience of various political and ideological persuasions, both nationally and 
internationally, then it was obvious that they would continue to do so in magistrates' courts, which 
were less exposed to the public view. The liberal press, after the Biko inquest, therefore attended 
all court proceedings which related to detainees, and this took up much of their journalistic time. 
What liberal press reporters noticed in magistrates' courts was that, even after all the evidence 
had been carefully heard and weighed, magistrates frequently made rulings which went against 
political detainees. 42 
In order to understand why political defendants were likely to be negatively prejudiced in 
magisterial courts, one has to appreciate that most magistrates would have been biassed to some 
extent when hearing a case and that this bias would have been influenced by their particular 
42 Daily Dispatch, 25 Jan 1978, p.S. 
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political and social beliefs. 43 Many magistrates were ordinary conservative Afrikaners who had 
been born and bred in rural areas where they had never been challenged in any way whatsoever 
by Africans whom they traditionally regarded as docile and simple-minded people. When they 
were therefore confronted by articulate, outspoken and well-informed defendants, it is hardly 
surprising that their rulings usually went against the defendants concerned. 44 
Another security police modus operandi noted by the liberal press was how the security police 
intimidated detainees who had been caught committing minor offences to tum state witnesses 
against their co-accused. If that method failed, they were forced into making false statements 
against themselves. Since all detainees, however, were already familiar with such tactics, they 
would merely change their statement when giving evidence in court. The two examples given 
below are typical of how the security police, in the 1970s, intimidated witnesses to make false 
confessions. The first case was related to a thirteen-year-old youth who had been charged with 
the murders of Sergeant Msebenzi Mtintsi and Constable Lionel Mrazi at Mdantsane in the 
Eastern Cape on 25 September 1977, the day on which Biko was buried. The youth was arrested 
because he had witnessed killings carried out by older youths, aged between eighteen and 
nineteen, who had already fled the country. He was forced under interrogation by Sergeant W. 
Ncoko and Lieutenant E. Mostert to agree that he had committed the killings. 45 The second 
example of intimidation took place during a court hearing in the Pietersburg regional court. 
Members of the South African Student Movement (SASM) appeared in connection with acts of 
43 Michael Lobban, White Man's Justice: South African Political Trials in the Black 
Consciousness Era (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), p.l5. 
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violence when they staged a protest against Bantu Education in Venda. 46 As in the first case, they 
changed their statements in court because they had originally been intimidated into making 
statements which incriminated them. Ironically this particular protest was staged in the week 
following Biko's death and was doubtless influenced by the Biko tragedy. 
Another important issue on which the liberal press focused in its news coverage of political 
detainees, was the inaccessibility of legal representatives to their clients. Because of the 
restrictions imposed on detainees in terms of section six of the act, it became difficult for their . 
legal advisors to consult with them as often as they wished to. It has since also been established 
that the security police, acting in the interests of the government, intimidated detainees who were 
to appear as witnesses against the state to such an extent that some opted to withdraw before the 
case was resumed. This ploy was deliberately used on political detainees who were witnesses 
against the state and who hampered the expeditious conclusion of cases by causing frequent 
remands. 47 Another difficulty for political detainees was caused by the way in which the state 
hampered counsel for the defence who wished to consult with their clients. Because of the 
obstacles put in the way of communication, defending counsel would frequently have no idea of 
where his or her client would be appearing in court. The client thus appeared undefended and 
would be much more likely to lose a case. 48 
In conclusion, it may be said that the liberal press opened the eyes of the public to grave abuses 
of the human rights of innocent detainees and informed them about matters that the authorities 
46 Post. 26 May 1978. 
47 
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would have preferred to have kept secret forever. The liberal press did this by reporting relevant 
parliamentary debates, writing articles about the conditions of detainees and by giving extensive 
coverage to the proceedings of court cases in which detainees were the defendants. Many black 
people at the time believed that the state was committing various kinds of atrocities and serious 
abuses of ordinary human rights under the cloak of convenient legalities and impenetrable state 
procedures. When the liberal press, through its coverage of all matters relating to detainees, 
proved that this was true, it gave the government fewer opportunities to hide their tracks and deny 
their intentions and involvement. This kind of public press exposure also encouraged members of 
the official opposition party in parliament (the Progressive Federal Party) to remain as vigilant as 
they had been from the beginning. The role played by liberal members of parliament is the subject 
of the following discussion. 
The reaction of the liberals to the results of the inquest into Biko's death 
Bike's death in detention was horrifying in itself, but the revelation ofhow he met his end, as it 
was related during the inquest, caused yet more shock and disbelief. As I have already pointed out' 
earlier in this chapter, there was no publically expressed black point of view about these events 
since members ofBC and other organisations had been banned, and the World and the Weekend 
World had also been banned. The only ones therefore who remained to criticise the government 
and call them into question (in South Africa) were white liberals. Some liberals commented on 
events as individuals representing no particular organisation or movement. One ofthese was Alan. 1 
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Paton, who was concerned about the repercussions of the commission's findings on the Western 
powers and who viewed South Africa as a champion in upholding freedom and justice in Africa. 49 
There were also extra-parliamentary liberal organisations such as the Black Sash, the South 
African Institute of Race Relations, aided by liberal periodicals such as Reality and The South 
African Outlook, who voiced their criticism on the subject. Other liberals who took the 
government to task over the Biko affair, were members of the official opposition party in 
parliament, the Progressive Federal Party, who criticised the government in parliamentary debates 
which were widely covered by the liberal press. It is obvious that liberals in various sectors shared 
a common ideological outlook and so were able to work together. 5° 
When parliament re-opened on 2 7 January 1978 after having closed the previous year on 24 June 
1977, it was faced with three major political events that needed to be tabled and debated in 
parliament. These three related events were the death of Biko on 12 September 1977, the 
crackdown on the BCM and its affiliates on 19 October 1977, and the inquest into Biko's death 
between 14 November 1977 and 2 December 1977. Everything pointed to the government being 
fairly and squarely to blame for these circumstances. 51 On the other hand the official opposition 
party used these issues to enhance its political strength. Because of the magnitude of the three 
related topics, the aim of the opposition was to keep them under discussion long enough for the 
government to be embarrassed. Indeed the Biko affair in particular was under discussion for 
almost the entire first session of parliament. Ordinarily each opposition member was in charge of 
49 
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a particular portfolio, and he or she was expected to take charge once the vote was tabled for 
discussion. What is most interesting about the Biko affair is that a large number of members from 
the official opposition party, including its leader Colin Eglin, as well as Alex Boraine, H. Schwarz, 
S.S. Vander Merwe and J.D. Basson, joined in grilling the government for its insensitive and 
callous attitude toward the whole Biko affair. 52 
One would have expected Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, who was also a member of the PFP and 
who was becoming prominent within the party, to have commented about the Biko affair. For 
some reason there is no mention of any comments made by Van Zyl Slabbert in Hansard. The 
absence ofhis comments might have been related to the fact that the Biko affair did not fall under 
his portfolio. He tended to concentrate on issues relating to the departments of Bantu 
administration and health and the suffering and injustice caused by the forced removal of blacks 
from areas which were then designated exclusively for white occupation. 53 Van Zyl Slabbert's 
major political achievement was the role he played in securing the release ofhis fellow Afrikaner, 
the poet Breyten Breytenbach, whom he had known since 1973 when they had shared a platform 
discussing Afrikaans literature at a University ofCape Town Summer School. 54 
Helen Suzman was the leading critic of the government because the Biko affair fell under her. 
portfolio oflaw and order. In addition she had been a member ofthe opposition since 1953, and 
' 
this had made her the longest-serving member of the opposition against the National Party. Such 
experience must have helped Suzman to tackle the government head-on. She made use of 
52 House of Assembly Debates, vol 74, 1974, columns 7112-7115. 
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assistants to thoroughly research all available facts about the Biko case before confronting the 
minister ofjustice, police and prisons with embarrassing facts, in the face of which he would often 
have no convincing replies. 55 To the National Party, the Biko affair was a thorough 
embarrassment on all levels, and they wished it would merely fade away, but, because of 
Suzman's continuing attacks, the issue was kept alive far longer than anyone had dared to 
anticipate. She raised the issue in parliament fifty-three times. 56 This explains the ire of the 
National Party member of parliament, J.J. Lloyd (Pretoria East), who called Suzman a "Biko 
addict". 57 Others within theN ational Party were of the opinion that Suzman was exaggerating the 
importance of the Biko issue to impress foreign powers. 58 This view was supported by South 
African Party member, J.W.E. Wiley (Simonstown), who felt that the issue had been given 
attention at the expense of other matters. 59 This seems to demonstrate the similarity of opinion 
between the South African Party and the National Party on issues which related to law and order, 
specifically as they affected blacks in general. 
It was of prime importance for the PFP, as the official opposition party, to pursue the government 
in every way with regard to all matters pertaining to the Biko affair. Apart from embarrassing the 
government by this course of action, the PFP benefited in other ways as well. The PFP came into 
existence on 5 September 1977, a week before Biko's death, as members of parliament joined 
together to form a new party from the remnants of ailing government-opposed parties including 
the United Party, the newly formed New Republic Party, the Progressive Reform Party and the .· 
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Democratic Party. 60 
The primary purpose of such a coalition was to consolidate the PFP' s position as an effective 
official opposition to the National Party. Since the National Party had been virtually unopposed 
throughout the 1970s (except by the somnolent and ineffectual United Party), the government had 
continued to consolidate its authority and whittle away civil liberties in bill after bill under the 
guise of protecting the security of the state. The PFP replaced the United Party which, according. 
to Suzman, had ceased to function in an oppositional capacity.61 For the first time in many years ' 
liberals were able to attract a number of voters. The November 1977 election gave the PFP a total· 
of seventeen seats, out of the 165 which constituted the House of Assembly. 62 The PFP coalition 
was formed with the intention (among other ideals) of opposing the restrictive legislation which 
caused immense suffering to the black majority in South Africa. Biko's episode emerged at an 
opportune moment for the PFP. Since it was, on any count, a major political issue both nationally 
and internationally, it gave the PFP a heaven-sent opportunity to flex its muscles as the new 
official opposition to the government. It was essential for the PFP to respond vigorously as an 
opposition, and it was able to do so because the Biko issue was tabled in January 1978, during 
the very first sitting attended by the PFP in its oppositional capacity. 
Furthermore, there was a great expectation that the PFP would somehow be able to influence:H· 
national policy in a way that would permit the country's political system to accommodate black 
disfranchised South Africans in a democratic and politically meaningful way. In addition, the 
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liberal establishment in general had had a long-standing relationship with the international 
community, particularly with the United States of America and Great Britain.63 These two 
countries were the leading critics of the government's policies in general but also of their handling 
of the Biko affair in particular. Although the British government maintained a low profile with 
regard to their dissatisfaction with South Africa, it was the anti-apartheid organisations, especially 
those based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which uncompromisingly attacked the 
apartheid regime for its policies and especially for the detention, torture and murder ofBiko. It 
is probable that the PFP' s position was strengthened by the support of human rights organisations 
within countries, even when the governments of those countries were slow and reticent about 
openly condemning the apartheid regime. 
The success of the PFP was a mixed blessing for those who longed for a new democratic order 
in South Africa. Because the PFP had won 17 seats in parliament and were vigorously opposing 
the government in the first sitting of 1978, especially with regard to the Biko affair, an erroneous 
perception was formed in some quarters overseas that South Africa was in fact a democratic 
country which permitted criticism of the government and which was concerned with issues of 
human rights. Hardly anything could have been further from the truth. This very notion of having 
a liberal opposition vocally opposing a racist "majority" government had been vigorously opposed 
by BC. This opposition was based on the perception that liberals in parliament were powerless 
to change government policies or even to block government legislation.64 Although this was true 
63 Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms, p.l35. 
64 GeoffBudlender, "Black Consciousness and the Liberal Tradition: Then and Now", in 
N. Barney Pity ana, Mamphela Ramphele, Malusi Mpumlwana and Lindy Wilson ( eds ), 
Bounds ofPossibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness (Cape Town, 
David Philip, 1991 ), p.229. 
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to a large extent, the liberals in parliament were nevertheless able to discomfort the government 
both nationally and internationally, and discredit it and its functionaries by opposing and delaying 
the passage of controversial bills for as long as possible. They did this by vigorous opposition and 
by utilising the vagaries of a parliamentary procedure which had been based on the Westminster 
system. 
The focus of all the opposition's efforts in 1978 (and Suzman played a leading role in 
consolidating the attack), was to drive home the connection between Biko's death in detention 
and the provisions of the notorious section six of the terrorism act. People detained under this act 
were denied the right to be visited by a legal representative, a physician, or by the next ofkin. This 
meant that only the security police had access to detainees, who quite logically were then left 
without any safeguards against the arbitrary brutality and violent whims of their state-sponsored 
and protected captors, the security police. The act itself had been opposed by Suzman when it was 
introduced by the then minister of justice, Piet Peiser, in 1967.65 
The opposition party exposed all the consequences of the terrorism act. A major consequence of 
the act was that the security police were simply a law unto themselves. They were answerable 
really to nobody (except in theory) and they made life and death decisions about detainees who 
had been deprived of all safeguards and human rights in the name of state security. This became 
evident when Jimmy Kruger issued evasive, contradictory and totally unconvincing reports about 
the alleged "cause" of Steve Biko's death. If there had been any real control over the security 
police by the police authorities, Kruger would never have been embarrassed by having to negate 
65 Suzman, In No Uncertain Tenns, pp.97-98. 
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his own initial statement in parliament to the effect that Biko had died as a result ofhis own self-
imposed hunger strike. In fact, the huge number of deaths prior to Biko' s, followed by insultingly 
simplistic and unbelievable "explanations" (slipping on soap in showers, falling from high 
windows) issued by the security police themselves, merely proved what everybody in South Africa 
already knew: the security police were effectively answerable and accountable to nobody. It was 
only the results of the post-mortem itself which forced Kruger to backtrack on his own first 
fatuous statement that Biko had died from the effects of a hunger strike. The pathology reports 
were made public and Kruger was forced to agree that Biko had died from the consequences of 
severe injuries inflicted to his head. 66 
The liberals in parliament used the Biko affair to force the government to look more closely at the 
number of detainees who had been killed while in detention. 67 The blame for these deaths was laid 
at the door of the minister of justice and of the prime minister. To ensure that no more deaths in 
detention took place, the opposition tabled official questions about the whereabouts and welfare 
ofBiko's associates, particularly Jones and Titi.68 Although it may seem that the role played by 
the liberal members of the opposition was ineffectual and unimportant in the context ofthe larger 
picture, it cannot be denied that their questions in the house and their continual harrying ofthe 
prime minister and the minister of justice in that session of 1978, put the brakes on the unlimited 
power oflife and death which resided in the hands of the security police, and almost completely 
halted the number of deaths in detention (for which there were always rational "explanations") 
66 House of Assembly Debates, vol 72, 1978, columns 116-119. 
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after the death of Biko. For this alone, the liberal opposition of the time should be given due 
credit. 
During that session of parliament, both Vorster and Kruger were repeatedly called upon to resign 
because they had failed to act promptly and punish the culprits. 69 Of course, the call to resign was 
merely the reflection of a (British) parliamentary tradition, but the government was sufficiently 
embarrassed in the long run for Kruger later to adopt what may almost be called a more cautious 
(and less arrogant) attitude towards the issue of the welfare of people detained under section six 
of the act. It was even announced in a debate that the department intended to introduce some 
measures that would ensure the safety of the section six detainees. This included the appointment 
of two jurists who would have the right to visit the detainees at any time without prior notice, and 
permission for detainees to select a doctor of their own choice who would be allowed to examine 
detainees on a regular basis. 7° Furthermore, the minister promised to issue strict measures 
ensuring that the security police no longer took the law into their hands to a point where the 
safety of the detainees was not guaranteed. 71 It was also as a result of pressure from the liberal 
opposition within parliament that the minister of police had requested the Port Elizabeth head of 
the security police to furnish him with the information relating to those circumstances which had 
permitted gross irregularities in the medical treatment ofBiko, irregularities which resulted in his 
death.72 
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In reality, nothing much changed as a result of these promises. However, the security police 
became more circumspect in their treatment of detainees arrested under section six of the 
terrorism act. While before Biko' s death, during 1977 alone, eleven detainees were reported to 
have died in detention, 73 after the publicity surrounding Biko' s death, only Bonaventura Malaza, 
Mbulelo Rocky James and Mzukisi Nobhadula died in the customary "mysterious" 
circumstances. 74 
International reaction to Biko's death and the results of the inquest 
Although South Africa had not been of any primary interest to the international media, the Biko 
inquest attracted high-powered international journalists who observed and reported on the inquest 
from beginning to end. As a result of the publicity engendered, various governments were forced 
to react officially to the Biko revelations. Most Western governments had already protested 
strongly immediately after Biko's death. The governments of the United States, West Germany, 
Britain, Belgium and France recalled their ambassadors. Also, nine countries ofthe European 
Economic Council delivered a formal protest to the South African government. This was followed 
by action on the part of the United Nations Security Council who imposed a mandatory arms 
embargo against South Africa. France was thereby forced to block the delivery of four South 
African warships, while Canada withdrew her commercial consuls stationed in Johannesburg.75 
The results of the inquest made such a negative impact internationally that the South African 
73 House of Assembly Debates, vol 76, 1978, column 103. 
74 Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, p.179. 
75 House of Assembly Debates, vol 72, column 28. 
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government found itself faced with unprecedented criticism, not only from non-governmental anti-
apartheid organisations, but at the level of government itself. Western governments, who had 
hitherto accorded the South African government almost unconditional recognition and support, 
found themselves forced into an awkward position by the insensitivity of the government over the 
Biko issue. They were left with no alternative but to act officially against the South African 
government. 
Two countries who took the lead in this regard were the United States of America and Britain. 
The latter avoided confrontation and preferred private diplomatic strictures. 76 Perhaps Britain at 
this stage still hoped that the South African government might play a substantial role in assisting 
them in the solution of the Rhodesian problem, and that they might even be persuaded to resolve 
. 
its own domestic problems without violence. Moreover, British companies had made substantial 
investments in South Africa and undoubtedly benefited from the bullish performance ofthe South 
African economy with its draconian management of internal unrest and abundant availability of 
unorganised and officially unpoliticised cheap labour. 
Material expediency and self-interest naturally superseded moral imperatives in the minds of the 
British government of the time. However, the fact that London was the base of a number of 
outspoken anti-apartheid organisations meant that clearly heard international statements of 
outrage about Biko' s death were issuing from Britain, if not from the British government itself. 
The United States government at the time was more aggressive in its condemnations, probably 
because of the Democratic Party presidential incumbency. As a liberal party, it had had a history 
76 Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: the ANC. the South 
African Communist Party in Exile (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992), p.94. 
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of support for human rights in other countries. The Democratic Party has traditionally been more 
sensitive to human rights issues than the conservative Republican Party, which prefers to follow 
a policy of"non-interference" in the domestic affairs of foreign countries. The following section 
concentrates on the United States and Britain in order to demonstrate the points of criticism 
which were levelled at the South African government. 
United States's reaction to Biko's death and the verdict of the commission 
Senator Dick Clark, chairperson of the Committee for Sub-Saharan Mrican Affairs, became the 
leading spokesperson on behalf of the American government in raising doubts about the efficiency 
and legitimacy of the security, legal and health systems in South Africa. As has already been 
mentioned in chapter four and at the beginning of this chapter, Clark knew Biko personally and 
so he had more than a politician's interest in arriving at the truth about Bike's death. He felt that 
the only option left for the US was to register its dissatisfaction over the verdict by imposing 
economic sanctions against South Africa. 77 
Senator Clark's anger over the Biko issue derived from the fact that he had known Biko 
personally. As stated in chapter six, he had had a personal interview with the deceased which had 
left him convinced that Biko was a moderate who could have been an asset to the country -
provided that the South Mrican government were to have a sincere desire to identifY and talk to 
recognised South African black leaders. Furthermore, the United States, through its 
77 
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representative, Ed ward Mezvinsky, proposed that the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
re-open the investigation into the death ofBiko. The US government retained grave dqubts about 
the South African government's explanation ofBiko' s death. 78 The United States felt that, as an 
independent body, the Human Rights Commission would be able to uncover the truth. Tom 
Downey, a Democratic congressman, researched and compiled a list of 200 names of South 
African political prisoners. He persuaded his fellow members of congress each to adopt a political 
prisoner and to constantly monitor his or her personal safety.79 This was yet another practical 
attempt to focus international attention on the plight of South African political prisoners. 
Another non-governmental participant to react vigorously against the Biko verdict was Louis 
Pollak, already alluded to for his contribution. He was invited to attend the inquest as an 
independent observer by the South Mrican Law Society.80 In his report on the inquest Pollak 
criticised the whole court procedure, especially the way in which the security police and doctors 
were evasive in answering questions. Also he criticised the magistrate for having passed a verdict 
which exonerated all the main culprits from any form ofblame or punishment. His criticisms were 
so influential that anti-apartheid organisations, particularly the Committee for Civil Rights Law, 
called for further investigation into the matter. 81 It was Pollak's report that made it clear to many 
people that neither the freedom of the press nor a fair legal system existed in South Africa. 82 
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Many influential American universities in particular joined in the chorus of protest against the 
Biko verdict. The following example demonstrates the way in which students targeted their 
universities for continuing to invest in companies operating in South Africa. Harvard University 
students invited two exiled South African activists who had left the country in the 1960s, namely 
Dennis Brutus and Chris Nteta, along with the former editor of the Daily Dispatch, Woods, to a 
protest march which was preceded by a rally at which these three South Africans were the main 
speakers. 83 The participation ofboth Brutus and Nteta in the protest march and its preliminary 
rally underlines the fact that the superficial tensions which existed between the ANC and BC 
members in exile did not deter the two from participation. In addition their cooperation signified 
that Biko was not only an icon for the Black Consciousness Movement but represented a potent 
unifying symbol for all South African black liberation movements. The students' pressure on 
Harvard's administration was so powerful that the university was forced to reconsider its policy 
of investments in US firms doing business in South Africa. 84 
African-Americans contributed in their own way to keep the memory ofBiko and the philosophy 
he died for alive. Some established personal relationships with Biko's family. One of the oldest 
African-American political organisations, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People (NAACP), honoured Biko with a posthumous Humanitarian Award (Biko was 
the second recipient of this award). The first person to receive this award had been the American 
superstar, Stevie Wonder. 85 The award ceremony was held in Biko's hometown, King William's 
Town, in his house in the Ginsberg Township. A United States member of the House of 
83 Daily Dispatch, 13 Apr 1979, p.3. 
84 Time, vol 12, no 3, 17 July 1978, pp.40-47. 
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Representatives, Andrew Macguire, who was visiting South Africa at the time, presented the 
award on 30 July 1978.86 
It is worth noting that members of the Black Consciousness Movement attended the ceremony 
without any restriction orders being imposed on them. The government decided to keep a low 
profile on this occasion, particularly as they realised that part ofMacguire's brief when in South 
Africa was to determine whether there existed freedom of association and freedom of the press, 
freedoms that were enshrined in the American Bill ofRights. By not intervening in or restricting 
this particular ceremony, the government attempted to create the illusion that it was tolerant of 
the free association of other political groups. In addition to the role played by NAACP, Biko's 
. 
memory and philosophy were kept alive by a number of cultural and religious organisations such 
as the American Friends Service Committee. This organisation helped to educate the public about 
the cruelty of the apartheid system of government. With the help of American liberal newspapers, 
which continued to hold the Biko affair up to the light of public scrutiny even after the South 
African minister of justice had threatened to close Biko's file, Biko's death continued to 
embarrass and haunt the recalcitrant apartheid regime. 87 
Anti-apartheid protest in Great Britain 
The anti-apartheid movements and other concerned groups in Britain played a far more substantial 
role in protesting against the Biko verdict than did their counterparts in the United States. In the 
first place, they did not wait long before they acted on the news ofBiko's death. One of the first 
86 
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concerned British groups to act was a British film crew which sent some of its members to South 
Africa to make a film based on Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement. The documentary 
included interviews with key members of BC as the film was shot before the arrest of the 
leadership on 19 October 1977. As a result, the crew was able to obtain first-hand information 
about Biko and the entire movement. 88 Ironically, this documentary was aired for the first time 
to the British nation on 19 October 1977- coinciding with the date of the first police crackdown 
on the BCM. The film caused a sensation as it provided hot first-hand information about Biko and 
the BC philosophy. When the verdict was announced on 2 December 1977 it must have hardly 
surprised the British public: they had been prepared by the film. The film fuelled anger among 
anti-apartheid movements, but the verdict justified their decision to protest. 
Soon after the verdict was announced, the same documentary was screened to an enormous 
number of viewers in the rest ofEurope. The documentary, entitled "The Life and Death of Steve 
Biko" was shown in France at the International Television Festival ofMonte Carlo, where it was 
rated as one of the best. 89 Other countries to buy transmission rights included Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Iceland. Non-European countries which bought rights included Jamaica, New 
Zealand, and Nigeria, as well as a number of television stations around the United States of 
America.90 The excellence of the film as the source of information placed Biko and the movement 
he represented squarely under world-wide scrutiny. Both the New York Times and the New York 
Post commented favourably on its presentation.91 An attempt was made by the South African 
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government through its media to minimise the effect of the film abroad. 92 This ponderous and 
belated attempt to manipulate overseas viewer reaction was naturally yet another exercise in 
futility. The tragic story which the film unfolded was able to speak for itself in a way that made 
any South African government opinions seem irrelevant. 
Another way in which anti-apartheid organisations kept the Biko affair under the spotlight was 
by disclosing the names of the security police who were responsible for the death ofBiko since q, 
they had been his chief interrogators. Their names were published in British newspapers.93 It was 
only in South Africa that the public was denied the right to know the names of the perpetrators. 
Hence the South African white community were left suspended in ignorance, knowing far less 
. 
than foreign countries about what was happening under their noses. Such concealment of 
information gave the white community, the beneficiaries of the apartheid system, the impression 
that the National Party was on the right track in dealing with radical political opposition. This 
explains why the National Party won the election ofNovember 1977 with a majority, a sure sign 
of support for the party after Biko's death. 94 The British media also made use ofDonald Woods 
who escaped the country in early January 1978. As a journalist and close friend ofBiko, Woods 
was well informed about the circumstances surrounding the death ofBiko and he was able to 
supply the British with the names of the security police responsible for Biko's death. 
An organisation ofBritish jurists joined the protest by condemning the findings of the magistrate. 
The evidence given in court, the jurists explained, proved without any doubt that Biko had died 
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as a result ofbrain injuries inflicted on him by either one or more security police.95 These British 
jurists supported the US representative to the United Nations, Mezvinsky, by calling upon its 
government to influence an international body, preferably Amnesty International, to intervene. 
The role of Amnesty International is discussed below. The response of the British jurists 
mentioned above was issued after they had read a detailed report prepared by Sir David Napley, 
who had been invited to attend to the inquest along with Louis Pollak from the United States. His 
report, like that of Pollak, condemned the South African legal system unequivocally. The report 
to a large extent blamed the magistrate for failing to charge the security police for responsibility 
for Biko's death (this has already been discussed at the beginning ofthis chapter).96 
Internationally recognised church leaders joined in criticising the South African government for 
its callous and arrogant attitude to the Biko affair. In his address to the House of the Lords, the 
Archbishop ofCanterbury, Dr Donald Coggan, called on the South African government to reopen 
Biko's inquiry. He further proposed the introduction of new legislation that would prevent 
incidents such as Biko's death from being repeated.97 Coggan's call for the reopening ofBiko's 
inquiry was followed by a festival which was organised by a non-political body, the Bloomsbury 
Society, led by the Guyanese musician, Ian Hall. Although the purpose of the service was the 
commemoration and celebration of the lives of Biko, Albert Luthuli (President of ANC) and 
Martin Luther King (the American Civil Rights leader), the main purpose of the event was to keep 
the Biko affair in the public eye. 
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This was evidenced by the fact that the speeches of the day concentrated on Biko. The inclusion 
ofboth Luthuli and King must have been strategic. The organisers planned to attract an audience 
by including the names of both Luthuli and King since both were well known internationally for 
the role they had played as political activists. Both had received the Nobel Peace Prize. A number 
of eminent clerics attended to honour the occasion, as did officials from the British government. 
Judith Hart, Minister for Overseas Development, addressed the crowd. The secretary-general of 
the Commonwealth, S.S Ramphal, while avoiding blaming anyone specifically for the death of 
Biko because the Commonwealth was strongly influenced by British policy, recognised the role 
played by Biko as the leader of Black Consciousness in South Africa.98 
Literature was another area where some individuals and other Biko associates, demonstrated their 
anger over the Biko verdict by writing critically about the South African government. This 
literature became important as it served as a source of information for those who were unfamiliar 
with the brutalities of the apartheid government. Three important books, mentioned below, were 
written about Biko. The first, entitled Biko, was written by Donald Woods and was published in 
1978 by Penguin Books. It is divided into two sections. The first discusses the way in which the 
apartheid system affected blacks, the circumstances of his first contact with Biko and his 
associates in BC, his confrontation with the system itself, and his escape from the country. The 
second section was contributed by his wife, Wendy, and concerns the inquest into Biko's death. 
Woods had been unable to attend the commission as he was a banned person. The second book 
was written by Aelred Stubbs, and was entitled Steve Biko. I Write What I Like. It was published 
by the Bowerdean Press. It was a compilation of essays written by Steve Biko and contained some 
98 Roger Omond, '·No comfort for Pretoria", Daily Dispatch, 18 Jull978. 
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of the interviews which he had had with international personalities. Aelred Stubbs, as pointed out 
in chapter four, was also an associate ofBiko who had known his family when Biko was in his 
teenage years. In this book readers were able to read Biko's own views about current political 
events and judge for themselves as to whether he was as radical as the state claimed. The third 
book was written by Hilda Berstein. Entitled no 46 Steve Biko, it was published by the 
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. It dealt mainly with the inquest and 
included an appendix of Sir David Napley's report. These three books supplied the public with 
relevant information, and tried to depict the horror and tragedy of the South African political 
condition. It did not come as a surprise that these three books were all banned in South Africa. 
A later book was written by the South African exile, Wessel Ebersohn. It was called Store up the 
Anger and was published by the London publisher, Victor Gollancz. This book articulated the role 
usually played by the security police in relation to the treatment of the political prisoners. Like the 
other three books on Steve Biko, Store up the Anger was also banned. The reason given for the 
ban by the Publications Control Board was that it was not a novel but a documentary propaganda 
work masquerading as literature about the life of Steve Biko.99 Not every South African 
supported the Publications Control Board's decision. As always, liberals in South Africa opposed 
the ban. It was J. Dugard' s opinion that there was a great need for South Africans to be exposed 
to such literature. He believed the book would promote a better understanding of the moral 
problems oftorture and unlawful interrogation.100 
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The other international body which reacted with outrage to the Biko verdict was Amnesty 
International. As already pointed out earlier, it levelled its criticism at Professor Isador Gordon 
from the University of Natal Medical SchooL Amnesty International felt that Gordon, as an 
official assessor on the Biko inquest, should have influenced the presiding magistrate, Marthinus 
Prins, to charge the police and the doctors for being responsible for Biko's death. 101 The 
organisation went to great lengths to expose the conditions in which political detainees in South 
African jails found themselves. It compiled a list ofhuman rights violations perpetrated against 
prisoners. This information was used internationally for purposes of research and information. The 
report, more than any other document available to the international community, harmed South 
Africa's image in the outside world. This explains why it was banned in this country.102 
In conclusion, Biko' s case attracted so much interest world wide that even those countries which 
had always supported the apartheid regime against the "Third World", for example, had little 
alternative but to s1 1pport sanctions against South Africa as a means of punishment. In South 
Africa itself, although the Nationalists naturally down played the effect ofBiko's death and the 
inquest which followed, it was obvious to even hardcore supporters that the ruling party had to 
be more cautious in future. More particularly, they had to attempt to control the security police 
in such a way that they would treat detainees less violently in future. 
Liberal South Mricans in general profited from the Biko affair. For the first time a liberal party, 
the PFP, had sev.enteen members in parliament. This enabled them to oppose the ruling party more 
vigorously than bef:.)re. The liberal press also profited because their news coverage attracted a 
101 Citizen, 18 May 1978, p.8. 
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large new readership. On the other hand, although the Black Consciousness Movement was 
silenced by the banning and detention of its leadership, the Biko affair ultimately favoured the 
organisation. The publicity given to the inquest served to highlight the importance of the 
movement nationally and abroad. Biko was viewed as a hero and symbol ofBlack Consciousness. 
This might have bel~n the reason why, two years after the banning ofBC, the Azanian People's 
Organization, based on the principles and policy ofBC, was formed with Biko's name and ideals 
as a rallying point The banning ofBC did however favour the African National Congress in the 
sense that the organisation's underground movement infiltrated South Africa immediately after 
the banning when confusion among black political leaders was at its height. 103 
103 Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, pp.l80-182. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EPll..OGUE 
BIKO: BEYOND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS AND LffiERALISM 
Some observations about Biko's universality 
I have decided, in this last chapter, to take one last critical look at some of the central tenets of 
Black Consciousness philosophy and at the character around whom all these dramatic events 
revolved, Biko himself. In the proces&, I shall ask few questions that are central to the topic of this 
research and offer some provisional answers which, I hope, may shed a little light on the perennial 
misconceptions that seem to beset Biko and Black Consciousness scholarship. IfBiko had not 
performed the role to which destiny so manifestly called him, it is conceivable that the course of 
history in South Afiica might have run along very different lines. 
It has been my purpose throughout this research to explicate and lay bare the roots of the 
apparent paradox in BC philosophy that Biko was profoundly hostile to liberalism while current 
and past scholarship (and, indeed, Biko' s own words) seem to suggest that he was profoundly 
influenced by the "universal" liberal values of human freedom, dignity, individualism and self-
determination. My whole purpose in examining in some depth the extent to which the main 
determinants ofBlack Consciousness have shaped irreversible changes to the political and social 
landscape of South Afiica in the past thirty years has been preparatory to attempting to answer 
"Was Biko (and therefore Black Consciousness itself) hostile to liberalism?" 
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Provisionally, I would like to suggest that while Biko and the BCM were indeed deeply hostile 
to the kind of liberalism that was represented by the traditional white liberalism of the Liberal 
Party and its leading exponents such as Alan Paton, Biko himself was neither anti-liberal nor anti-
white, but in many ways drew his inspiration from concerns that are central to the kind ofliberal 
thinking that became influential in Europe at the time of the Enlightenment and the French and 
American Revolutions. In making such a claim, I do not wish to minimise the importance of the 
impact of Africanist, Marxist and African American ideas on Biko's philosophy. 
Biko as quintessentially African 
In claiming Biko as a universal genius whose legacy is continuous with that of some of the 
greatest political and religious thinkers in history, I do not wish to deny that his roots are 
essentially African - or that his vision, which nowadays seems so relevant in so many different 
contexts, was anything other than quintessentially African. The key, in my opinion, to Biko's 
universality arises out the essentially traditional African ideal of communal solidarity that does not 
oppose the interests of some falsely constituted "self' to the interests of a suffering community. 
To be sure, one may adduce numerous examples of African leaders (such as Mobutu Sese Seko 
or Idi Amin) who have betrayed the African virtue of communal solidarity and sold their countries 
down the river. But in Biko one finds a person who was faithful to the best in traditional African 
culture. He embodies in his legacy an ideal of service and self-giving and a refusal to compromise 
with the dark currents that flow beneath the surface of all cultures. This, in my opinion, qualifies 
him to stand among the enduring benefactors of the human race. Nor is it fanciful, I believe, after 
cold examination of the evidence, to locate his contribution to human well-being as one that will 
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endure long after his contemporaries (both detractors and supporters) have finally been forgotten. 
His status which I claim for Biko' s genius resided, in my opinion, in his ability to incorporate 
many of most fruitful currents of European, American and African political, social and 
revolutionary thought into a synthesis that was uniquely his own. I would also like to suggest that 
Bike's personality, reputation and influence loom larger today than they have ever done before 
and that this seemingly irresistible process of finding contemporary relevance in Biko' s thought 
suggests that the roots of his philosophy were watered by what is best and most enduring in 
European, African American and African thought. What Biko envisaged as necessary solutions 
for the seemingly intractable problems of South Africa during the darkest days of apartheid, now 
seem on closer inspection to be applicable mutantis mutandis to many of the problems of that 
affect the world at the beginning of the new millennium. 
What separates a thinker of universal significance from a person who provides particularistic or 
localised solutions to problems is the extent to which the universal thinker comprehends in his or 
her life, utterances and actions what remains eternally relevant and pertinent to the human 
condition and the dilemmas which beset the human race - however dramatically the external 
components and artefacts of human culture change as the centuries pass. 
Biko was profoundly A:fricanist in his inability to divorce his theory and actions from the 
specificity of particular human lives in their space-time particularity. In his case specificity meant 
the condition in which Africans in South Africa found themselves after three centuries of 
colonialisation- especially as this three-centuries old process of colonisation became crystallised 
in the period ofNational Party rule after 1948. In the short period during which Biko was at his 
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most active (the brief few years between his early student days and his death at the hands of the 
security police), the plight of Africans had worsened exponentially. 
All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of a man, completely 
defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of 
oppression with sheepish timidity .... The only vehicle for change are those people 
who have lost their personality. The first step therefore is to make the black man 
come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride 
and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be 
misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the land of his birth. This is 
what we mean by an inward-looking process. This is the definition of "Black 
Consciousness". 1 
It was Biko's insistence that human pride in all aspects of one's self, one's condition and one's 
heritage are logically prior to any programme of physical emancipation of improvement in one's 
material situation. While some commentators have criticised Biko for not paying sufficient 
attention to the physical dimensions of black suffering, I contend that Biko' s determination to 
instil proper self-respect and unqualified self-regard into a shattered, demoralised and impotent 
people was strategically necessary - for how can a people who have been conditioned into 
believing themselves to be inferior otherwise take control oftheir own destiny and demand their 
liberation from their oppressors? To pursue the point: part ofBiko's critique oftraditional South 
African white liberalism was his realisation that their insistence on gradualism in liberation theory 
1 Biko, quoted by Toussaint, "Fallen among angels", page 24. 
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and praxis (by means of education and the "civilisation" of the oppressed majority until they 
became less offensive to the controlling white racist minority) constituted a fatal impasse for the 
liberation struggle. Biko knew from his own observation ofhis fellow citizens that people who 
had been psychologically and spiritually emasculated would never be able to claim (let alone 
demand) what was theirs from their oppressors. 
Did Biko fail to create a programme to combat material poverty? 
Biko had been criticised for his failure to concentrate on improving the physical conditions of 
blacks or for working out a detailed programme of statements about the kind of social polity in 
which all the citizens of liberated South Africa would eventually live. While admiring Biko's 
"interesting, often original and thought-provoking writing on the differences between African and 
European cultural and social patterns", Toussaint criticises Biko for prioritising "consciousness, 
thinking and ideas" while regarding "the material basis of society [as being] secondary, almost 
unimportant" _2 In similar vein, Marx writes: 
The Black Consciousness strategy for attracting followers was based more on 
spiritual than material motivation, with the movement promising the gratification 
of group solidarity fostering a positive self-image. Material incentives for joining 
the movement were shunned, since leaders feared that encouraging a focus on 
material gains would reinforce efforts by state and capital to mollify black with 
2 Toussaint, "Fallen Among Angels", p.24. 
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reforms.3 
In the words of the SASO' s Policy Manifesto, SASO was dedicated to "the liberation of the Black 
man first from psychological oppression by themselves through induced inferior complex ... , 
secondly from physical oppression" [my emphasis].4 
The pnmacy of psychological emancipation from conditioned feelings of inferiority and 
worthlessness were not therefore merely an oversight on the part ofBiko and the revolutionary 
cadres whom he inspired. What Howarth has to say tends to confirm my deduction that Biko had 
made a deliberate choice in granting primacy in the struggle for what he [Howarth] calls the 
"spiritual" rather than "material" liberation. 
Drawing on Fanon, Biko argues that a central dimension in the constitution and 
reproduction of white domination is the "dehumanization" of blacks, their 
reduction to pure form, which induces an attitude of fatalism and the 
internalization oftheir own oppression. This privatization of anger and resentment 
toward white domination leads to political paralysis, and a spirit of resignation. 5 
In spite of the clear evidence that Biko's dichotomy between the material/physical and 
psychological/spiritual was an intentional and premeditated issue of long-term liberational 
3 Anthony W. Marx, "Race, Nation and Class Based Ideologies of Recent Opposition to 
South Africa", p.316. 
4 South African Students Organisation, "Policy Manifesto" (1970), quoted by Marx, op.cit, 
p.316. 
5 David Howarth, "Complexities ofldentity/Differences: Black Consciousness Ideology in 
South Africa", Journal ofPolitical Ideologies, p.61. 
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strategy, some ofBiko's critics have denounced him for his failure to attune his policies to the of 
dialectics of poverty and the imperatives ofthe material base oflife. Toussaint writes: 
Society, clearly, is seen as being determined by its own ideas and beliefs. Where 
ideas and beliefs themselves spring from, how they are themselves arrived at, is 
not to be examined: for in the beginning is the idea. And so, logically, the new 
ideas of Black Consciousness which he himself is expounding, also arise 
nebulously in the mind, not from the substance of African life or South African 
society; its source is to be found in a replacement in the mind of those other ideas 
of white liberalism which preceded them - a sort of disembodied, rotating 
consciousness, in which liberalism grows out of mental disenchantment with white 
conservatism, black consciousness out of disenchantment with white liberalism. 6 
This criticism ofBiko is, in my opinion, unfair, for it fails to take into account the carefully crafted 
programme of social community self-help projects that had to operate in extremely difficult 
conditions among the restrictions placed on individual blacks and black organisations by 
institutionalised apartheid and the security laws which, by the middle 1970s, qad become harsh 
indeed. These programmes were designed, as Lotter notes, "to show the oppressed peoples that 
their well-being mattered to the Black Consciousness movement- an attempt to show that 
somebody in society cared". 7 Ramphele, one of the outstanding symbols ofBC resistance during 
the 1970s, founded and ran a medical clinic in the remote rural area to which she had been 
banished as an act of service to the dispossessed poor. It was her observation that "people who 
6 Toussaint, op cit, p.25. 
7 Lotter, "The Intellectual Legacy of Stephen Bantu Biko ( 1946-1977), p.27. 
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had known nothing but scorn and humiliation needed symbols of hope to lift the them out of 
despair and to empower them to liberate themselves".8 
The intentionalliberational strategy inherent in the community projects undertaken by SASO and 
the BPC is evident from Biko' s own words, which were delivered as part of his testimony in 
court: 
Now, conscientization programmes are precisely the type of programmes we 
embark upon in communities. . . . In other words, if we have got a physical 
programme like a clinic, we are helping the community to remove from their 
minds the defeat element that good comes from Whites. Here are Blacks working 
among us. Here are Blacks achieving a particular end which [it] is thought could 
not be achieved by us as Blacks. This helps in the building-up process. This is 
conscientization. 9 
It was Biko' s genius that he saw that the oppression of Africans could not be resolved by a people 
who had been radically demoralised by centuries of racial, economic, political and moral abuse. 
Biko certainly appreciated the distinction between the material and spiritual dimensions of 
apartheid. But because he believed that most critics of apartheid tended to be obsessed by the 
material harm done to blacks by apartheid, he tended to focus his emancipatory critique on the 
spiritual and psychological harm done to blacks. But in so doing, neither he nor his colleagues 
8 Quoted in Lotter, op cit, p.27. 
9 M. Arnold (ed.), The Testimony of Steve Biko (London, Maurice Temple Smith, 1978), 
quoted in Lotter, op cit, p.27. 
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neglected the material welfare of the people, in spite ofthe restrictive circumstances in which they 
were forced to operate. 
Biko resistance to collaboratiQn 
If Biko had felt that the material advancement was logically and existentially pnor to 
psychological/spiritual liberation, he might have followed the path which was being blazed at the 
time by various organisations organisations such as the Coloured People's Representative Council 
(CPRC), the South African Indian Council (SAIC) and the various "Bantustan" authorities. He 
might even have opted for the kind of limited cooperation with the government that was being 
pursued by the Coloured Labour Party ( CLP), ChiefGatsha Buthelezi' s Zulu Territorial Authority 
(ZT A) and Chief Matanzima, who participated in the (homeland) Transkeian parliament.10 By 
refusing utterly to cooperate with these initiatives, Biko symbolically signed his own death 
warrant. Nevertheless he ensured that the ultimate triumph of the black liberation struggle that 
would take place on black people's terms- the terms laid down from the beginning by Black 
Consciousness ideals. 
Biko was not merely inflexible or uncooperative. His very nature, I believe, tended towards 
pragmatism and cooperation. But he perceived with great clarity that the ultimate price that would 
have to be paid for any degree of collaboration with the enemy - a price that would be nothing 
less than the loss of the soul of an entire people. To him even limited cooperation with the 
10 See Howarth, op cit, p.57. 
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government would ultimately leave little for black people to choose between the illusionary 
promises of "separate development" and the illusory hopes of the non-confrontational 
"gradualism" of traditional white South African liberalism. Biko refused to sell the soul ofhis 
people. It was a harsh path that he chose, and when the apartheid government became aware that 
in Biko they had finally met what could easily tum out to be their nemesis, they strained every 
fibre of their being to stamp out all remnants ofBlack Consciousness and the revolutionaries who 
carried its banners. By the late 1970s it seemed that the government had succeeded in destroying 
or neutralising BC because all of its most notable leaders were either dead, in exile, in detention 
or under house arrest. But what the government could not kill or even mutilate was the purity of 
the vision of self-determination (rather than definition by hostile and prejudiced others) that was 
the raison d'etre ofBiko's life. 
While nearly all BC organisations and initiatives had been disbanded by the late 1970s or else 
banished (as was Ramphele's) to remote rural areas where (it was thought) they could have no 
possible influence on what the government dismissed as illiterate and ignorant peasants, many BC 
operatives escaped into exile overseas where they were usually absorbed into the structures in 
exile ofthe ANC, and, to a lesser degree, the structures ofthe PAC and CP. The BCM had not 
devoted any of its limited resources to building up viable structures in exile because Biko' s policy 
from the very beginning was to operate (as far as possible) within the framework of the laws in 
South Africa - harsh and restrictive though these were. Biko had defined BC' s primary task as 
the conscientisation of the masses. How could this be done by an organisation totally in exile? 
It is evident from Biko 's own testimony and writings that BC attempted in every way to operate 
within the restrictions of the laws that constrained the movement's basic human rights and 
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freedoms within South Africa. Since this was widely known both to the South African 
government and to concerned individuals, organisations and governments overseas, it came as an 
almost incomprehensible shock when Biko became the 46th prisoner to die "under mysterious 
circumstances" (the euphemism for murder) at the hands of the security police. Once the world 
had taken in the enormity of the news and the arrogant indifference of the South African 
government (personified by minister Kruger's tactless remark that Biko's death left him "cold", 
i.e. indifferent), the anger and outrage of the world's progressive community broke around the 
government's head, and supplied the impetus that carried the moral force ofBiko' s cause into the 
decades of struggle that lay ahead - and whicq are far from over even now. 
Many of the cadres who escaped into exile joined (as I have mentioned above) ANC and PAC 
structures in exile and their enlivening influence still provides some degree of radical vision in 
these movements which (in the case of the ANC anyway) have proved so remarkably successful 
in effecting a creative compromise between violent revolution and the imperatives of running a 
country which is based on modem capitalist principles and the requirement of approval of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In a world where the only successful players 
are those countries that can adapt to the requirements of globalisation, the ANC and its allies 
continue to attempt to balance the needs of a modem economy with the needs of the poorest of 
the poor - who still form the majority of South Africa's population and who are the true heirs 
(and possible beneficiaries) ofBiko's vision. 
The matrix out ofwhich Bikoism arose 
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I have examined in detail how the supporters of BCM and white liberals complemented and 
supported each other by means of numerous formal and informal initiatives in an on-going 
symbiotic relationship from the very beginning. This kind of paradoxical relationship between BC 
and white liberals was especially evident in the dark days when the government finally woke up 
from their ideological stupor and realised that the racial separatism enunciated in BC strategy did 
not coincide with their own master plan for an ethnically divided South Africa. 
In terms of this anti-liberal and totalitarian millenarian fantasy created by apartheid's arch-
ideologue, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, all blacks would be~ accommodated in ethnically homogenous 
and fragmented "homelands" from which they would be permitted to continue in their historically 
defined role as migrant labourers in "white" areas. Verwoerd's vision (a malign fantasy inspired 
by concerns about racial purity, lebensraum and threats to minority identity) was continuous with 
the fantasies that inspired Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s and the kind of spurious 
Aryanism that periodically grips the collective consciousness ofEuropean people. In spite of these 
drawbacks, it was billed as the only possible humane solution to the "racial problem" as 
understood by Verwoerd and his followers. It was even provided with an elaborate theological 
and philosophical justification by the theorists of apartheid and various theologians of the Dutch 
Reformed Church (with the notable exception of those few who risked their lives by opposing it 
from its inception). The approved version of these racial dogmas was then disseminated 
throughout Afrikaner society by the Broederbond, who supervised the ideologically purity of 
Afrikaners. It was from this (invisible) locus of control that the vast infrastructure of apartheid 
was imposed on the whole country. In spite of heroic instances of personal and collective 
resistance to apartheid by both blacks and whites, it seemed that no power on earth could undo 
the terrible suffering that the government continued to impose on black people in the name of 
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"separate development". So eloquent was the vision inspired by the fervent ideologues of 
apartheid that even successive Western governments were dazzled by its logic (one thinks how 
obstinately both Thatcher and Reagan supported the comforting doctrines of "constructive 
engagement"). 
The realities of apartheid for black people were very different. As the juggernaut of "separate 
development" swept over the lives of more and more individual black people, human beings were 
treated as disposable and irrelevant pawns in a master strategy that defined blacks exclusively as 
a territorially distinct labour force for the benefit of white-controlled South Afiican mining, 
industry and commerce. Those blacks who were fortunate enough to possess the permits and 
passes required to be able to work in exclusively "white" areas, were allowed to live in 
"townships" adjacent to the great cities of South Afiica, from where they were required to 
commute to work in "white" areas. Never before had any country been so overwhelmed by 
legislation designed to control every aspect of a citizen's life. It was, as Biko was quick to 
perceive, a strategy created to instil fear and subservience in the hearts of all South Afiicans- for 
who could ever be certain that he or she was not infringing some minor regulation or breaking 
some or other law?11 And since laws need bureaucrats and officials to implement them and identifY 
and punish those who transgress them, a huge subsidiary industry arose that provided sheltered 
employment for many otherwise unemployable white people who worked for the state and local 
authorities sectors that regulated the vast machinery of racist suppression and control. 
11 Howarth draws attention to Biko's article entitled "Fear- An Important Determinant in 
South Afiican Politics", in which "he shows how the systematic institutionalization of fear and 
violence in South Afiican society during the 1960s and 1970s was preventing the formation of 
black resistance to white oppression". (See Howarth, op cit, p.56.) Barney Pityana is also 
quoted in this same article as saying, "They [black people] live in collective insecurity, 
suspicion and fear" (op. cit, p.56) [my emphasis]. 
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Biko as deus ex machina 
If one wished to romanticize Biko, one might say that his personality and the political philosophy 
which he designed to emancipate black South Africans from centuries of white colonial 
domination, were exactly suited to the circumstances of the time. But he was not one of those 
charismatic figures who becomes an icon to his people merely because he died at a tragically 
young age. Biko does not survive merely as an icon or as a footnote to South African history, or 
even as a tragic reminder of how a country's most talented leaders might sometimes be cut off at 
the height of their powers and in the prime of life. 
In spite of his short life, Biko became one of the giants of South African history because the 
political philosophy which he designed and the sheer force ofhis personality filled the vacuum that 
had been left by the death, detention or exile of the leadership of the ANC and PAC in the early 
1960s. What history needed at that juncture in time was someone who could see what it really 
was that held South African blacks in chains. If the liberation of blacks in this country was to 
become more than a centuries-old hope, their situation needed someone who could articulate with 
absolute clarity the sources oftheir historical oppression by a foreign people who had subjugated 
them, stolen their land by deceit or force of arms, and (for all practical purposes) treated them as 
dispossessed slave labour in the land which had belonged to them and their ancestors since time 
immemorial. 
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Biko's identification of traditional white liberals as inimical to black liberation 
Although Biko had no illusions about the ingrained racism ofthe white oppressors and the various 
forms of political, psychological and spiritual dogma that they had evolved to legitimate one of 
the cruellest macro-enterprises in history (the colonial exploitation of Africa), his most 
extraordinary political move was his predication of the roots of African oppression on the 
attitudes and political strategies of a class that he identified simply as "white liberals", by which 
he meant those (very few) white liberals that belonged to th~ Liberal Party and which were 
represented by widely revered opponents of racism such as Alan Paton and Edgar Brookes. 
This ir.. itself was an extraordinary insight (equivalent to an intellectual and political Damascus 
Road experience) because liberals (whether white or black) of the kind represented by people such 
as Alan Paton, had always been an extremely small minority in South African society (some 
suggest that they never represented more than about 3% of the white population alone). In 
addition, they themselves had (in their own way) endured a great deal of opprobrium and 
vilification from their fellow whites. Because the educationally circumscribed ideologues of the 
National Pa~y government that came to power in 1948 soon learned to stigmatise all forms of 
multi-racialism as "communist-inspired", Paton and his ilk were subjected to the same forms of 
harassment by the security police (such as banning, house arrest and imprisonment) that became 
the routine lot of black liberationists. Yet is was for this minute but privileged and vocal minority 
of virulently anti-government non-racists that Biko reserved his most stinging condemnations. 
In one ofBiko's more graphic condemnations of the inefficacy ofliberalism in South Africa, he 
wrote: 
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[Liberalism] is a one-way course with the whites doing all the talking, the blacks 
all the listening ... [and it is] almost always unproductive. The participants waste 
a lot of time in an internal sort of mudslinging designed to prove that A is more 
of a liberal than B .... The black-white circles are almost always a creation of white 
? 
liberals .... They call a few of"intelligent and articulate" blacks to "come round for 
tea at home", where all present can ask each other the same old hackneyed 
question, "How can we bring about change in South Africa?" The more such tea 
parties one calls; the more of a liberal he is. 12 
Biko's unremitting hostility to the traditional white liberalism of the time- the impotent, self-
congratulatory and self-absorbed "tea party liberalism" to which he refers in the above quotation 
- has engendered a myth that he was opposed to all forms liberalism and to any participation of 
whites in the struggle for black liberation. Such an interpretation of Biko fails to distinguish 
between Biko's long-term political strategy and the philosophy and methodology he devised to 
accomplish it. Because of the constraints placed on Biko by his leadership of a movement ofblack 
emancipation while under house arrest and the increasingly hostile surveillance of the security 
forces who would ultimately murder him in detention, he needed to state the fundamentals of 
Black Consciousness philosophy as simply and unambiguously a manner as possible. This 
apparent simplicity of enunciation (in contrast to the crass simplicities and oversimplifications of 
white racist dogmas) concealed (and still do conceal) an enormous depth and sophistication of 
intellect and nobility of spirit, both of which were characteristic of Biko. 
12 Biko, quoted in Toussaint, op cit, p.20. 
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Biko's heritage (sadly fragmented though it is) is so implicit with what one might call universal 
human values, that it continues to attract more and more attention from scholars, researchers and 
ordinary people, some of whom despair of being able to find any kind of spiritual compass in an 
increasingly complex world. (I do not mean to imply that Biko possessed any monopoly on moral 
virtue or political wisdom, but only that South African history destined him to become one of the 
primary spokespersons for the inarticulate and suffering masses of black people, most of whom 
even today live in the long shadow of personal and collective suffering cast by the centuries of 
white racism and exploitation. I shall therefore- as I have throughout this study - continue to use 
Biko's name in this synecdochic manner, thereby craving the reader's indulgence for 
generalisations made in his name, but also thereby hoping that appreciation of the role that Biko 
played might be understood as conveying an implicit gratitude to the countless (mostly 
anonymous) people who expressed the same sentiments that he expressed, fought the same fight 
that he fought and suffered the same ordeals that were destined to be his lot.) 
The apartheid government's early miscomprehension of BC 
As the government began to take in the full moral force ofBiko' s commitment to black liberation 
(after their initial misunderstanding of BC as merely a black exposition of the Verwoerdian 
dogmas of "separate development" and the inherent spiritual, psychological and physical 
inferiority of black people), they realised that the viper that they had allowed to grow in their 
midst was, if anything, a far more dangerous threat to the survival of white hegemony than the 
armed resistance wings that the ANC and PAC were building in exile. 
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But in the early days of SASO's existence, nationalist ideologues who had not yet come to 
understand the totality of the alternative that Biko was presenting, were thrilled to stumble across 
what they believed to be an independent verification of their political dogmas. This must have 
seemed like a coup indeed, for this apparent corroboration for and approval of separate 
development came from none other than SASO - the radical student movement which Biko and 
others had founded after their disillusionment with NUS AS .. Thus an editorial of July 1971 in Die 
Burger, the Cape Town-based newspaper which acted as a mouthpiece for the National Party and 
apartheid ideology, lauded the "new spirit" that had that had arisen among "non-White" students 
and drew its readers' attention to the affinities between SASO and the government's policies of 
separate development. In the same newspaper, a leading article argued that Black Consciousness 
was to a large extent "the product of disillusionment over the nice-sounding phrases and ideas and 
programmes preached in the post-war years by ... the liberal school of thought". 13 
Dismal mishaps such as this make one wonder whether any there was anyone in any position of 
influence in the National Party government or in the government's well-sponsored security forces 
(BOSS) and its "running dogs" who staffed Die Burger, who ever really understood anything that 
Biko said or wrote in his short career as an ideologist and revolutionary leader. The very fact that 
some of the government's most intelligent commentators initially misinterpreted BC philosophy 
as represented a mirror image of their own defensive and exclusionary forms of racism, shows 
how great was the spiritual divide between Biko own understanding of the uniqueness and value 
of all human lives and the apartheid governments need to control, humiliate and degrade a vast 
nation of indigenous people in the continent which they had occupied for millennia. 
13 Quoted by Howarth, op cit, p.53. 
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It is my belief that if those in the apartheid government ofBiko' s day had really understood what 
he was saying, they might have found the courage to revere him as a spiritual and political mentor 
and guide who certainly had all the necessary qualifications to lead South Africa out of the 
artificially constructed and maintained quagmire of state-mediated "race relations" which could 
only be sustained by an increasingly harsh application of force and moral subversion to every 
aspect of every citizen's life- although blacks were obviously the primary target of all these 
applications. 
Although various superficial and populist understandings ofBiko' s legacy have encouraged some 
to imagine that he was simplistically anti-liberal and anti-white, it is my contention that a detailed 
consideration of the evidence suggests that he was at root neither anti-liberal nor anti-white. 
Having said that, I must also simultaneously assert that Biko' s obsessive opposition to traditional 
white liberalism lay at the very heart of his vision for the liberation of Africans, but that it was 
merely a strategic prelude to his definition of blackness (to which he constantly alluded as a 
positive identity in its own right that needed no comparison with other racial identities such as 
"whiteness") and the inversion of the black/whites antinomies that were paradoxically-central to 
both the racism of successive apartheid governments and the non-racialism of traditional South 
African paternalistic liberals. 
Was Biko truly anti-liberal? 
Why then, when the real enemy was so clearly defined, did Biko reserve his fury for the tiny 
minority of mostly white liberals represented by Paton and the Liberal Party who had devoted 
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their lives to opposing as best they knew how the very government and ideology which were the 
primary oppressors ofthe black people of Southern Africa? 
The simplistic answer is that Biko was "anti-liberal" and that "anti-liberalism" is therefore one of 
the dogmas ofBlack Consciousness and part of its legacy to a future South Africa. An even more 
simplistic and naive answer is that Biko was (in some ways) a racist - even though everything that 
is known about Biko demonstrates that he was a person of such compassion, intelligence, courage 
and magnanimity that the Black Consciousness philosophy that he created continues to loom ever 
larger (rather than smaller) as the years go by. Biko is the kind of person out of whom legends 
are made, and many have tried (and have continued to try since his death) to co-opt him for their 
own political or personal gain. But the facts about Biko, sparse though they are because ofhis 
premature martyrdom, continue to verify his essential goodness and the universality of his vision. 
Never has any political vision seemed more relevant than Biko' sin the circumstances of the New 
South Africa. 
Xolela Mangcu suggests that Biko' s most enduring political contribution may transcend racial 
politics altogether. He defines Biko's contribution to political thought as being his conviction that 
human freedom is "the right to self-determination" within the constraints of community life, and 
he compares him to political philosophers from traditions as various in their origins as those which 
gave rise to Rousseau, Gandhi and Nyerere. 
. 
I have been troubled by popular representations of Steve Biko as nothing more 
than the quintessential race man. Supporters and detractors alike have paid hardly 
any attention to the other dimensions of his political philosophy. But if we look 
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at the totality ofBiko's politics we see that he was just as concerned with issues 
of democracy, identity and development. ... Biko was a public philosopher in the 
tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mahatma Gandhi and Julius Nyerere. All of 
them defined freedom as essentially the right to self-determination. The theme of 
self-determination has been the inspiration of modem revolutions since the 18th 
century. It became the basis of the modem conception of individual autonomy, 
albeit within the context of a national community. 14 
Possible future trends in Biko studies 
Although the corrupting and degrading moral, spiritual, intellectual and psychological effects of 
centuries of state-sanctioned racism and racist applications on white South Africans would 
provide a fertile matrix for any number of studies, this is a field of research that has 
understandably been neglected as we still struggle to comprehend the depths of suffering and 
deprivation to which blacks have been condemned by white racist ideologies. 
Racism has a long and complex history in the West, and it is only now that scholars are beginning 
to untangle the details of the pseudo-Darwinian European colonial obsession with alienating easily 
identifiable groups in order to control them, exploit them, harm them and degrade them. It is my 
contention that much of the malaise and many of the ills of modem Western culture (the radical 
disaffection and alienation of modem American youth, for example) may be explained by as a 
14 Xolela Mangcu, "We must go back to Steve Biko for inspiration", Sunday Times, 7 
February 1999. 
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transformed resurgence of the Western impulse to define artificial rigid boundaries between what 
constitutes the Self and what constitutes the Other. This impulse, I believe, arises periodically and 
spasmodically out of the deep anxiety and fear that seems to be a permanent part of the Collective 
Unconscious of people ofWestern European origin (who were the original colonisers of Africa). 
Following Biko, one may posit a more humane and life-affirming attitude to life that is part of a 
traditional Africanist understanding of the self Although it is admittedly difficult to defend such 
racial generalisations in the face of the current social and political upheavals in Africa, many 
distinguished theorists (including Biko and other Africanists such as Nyerere) have sought to 
locate the spiritual strength of the black people in values such as the interdependence of self and 
community, the expression of practical solidarity with others, and the elevation of friendliness and 
sociability over hostile competition and an obsessive individualism that seeks its own advantage 
at the price of others. It remains to be seen just how well such traditional black values will hold 
up under the onslaught ofWestern cultural, economic and social values, but since traditional black 
values have managed to survive centuries of "westernisation", perhaps they will survive into the 
future and become the critique which will enable Westerners to reconstruct themselves personally, 
politically and spiritually. 
The most obvious difference between Africans now and Africans under colonial and white 
domination is that before colonialisation came to an end on the continent, blacks were thrown 
back on each other and on their collective identity as an oppressed people. It remains to be seen 
to what extent the historic alliance between the ANC, the Communist Party and the various labour 
organisations of South Africa will be able to modernise the country and restore dignity and human 
worth to the impoverished masses of disadvantaged black people without losing their connection 
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to the kind of spiritual strength that is traditionally African. It was this spiritual the strength that 
enabled Biko to stare down- and ultimately defeat- centuries of oppressive white church- and 
state-legitimated racism. It is this spiritual strength that is the ultimate legacy of Stephen Biko and 
the Black Consciousness Movement to South Africa. 
In conclusion, I offer Mangcu the last word on Biko and Black Consciousness: 
For me the greatest revelation over the past few years has been the universality of 
Biko's insights. I never imagined that a man I grew up knowing only as 
ubhut'Bantu in our hometown of Ginsberg would be mentioned alongside some 
of the great political philosophers of the modem era. 15 
Mabel Maimela 
Pretoria 
January 2000 
15 Mangcu, loc cit. 
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